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**The social life and sound patterns
of Nanti ways of speaking**

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**The social life and sound patterns
of Nanti ways of speaking**

by

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For my friends in Montetoni

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My most heartfelt gratitude is to the people of Montetoni for inviting me to be a part of their lives over the past fifteen years. My relationship with the people of Montetoni is based on love and respect more than anything else. Both despite and because of our substantial cultural, linguistic, and experiential differences, my longterm relationships with my Nanti friends have changed my character and my sensibilities forever for the better. Any merit that this dissertation has is dedicated to them, because they truly made it possible. Without developing the firm conviction that writing this dissertation would benefit the Nanti people, I never could have finished it. Therefore, even though this study was not written directly for the people of Montetoni as an audience, it is entirely *for* them as my friends and collaborators, and I offer it as a sign of my respect for their language, lifeways, aesthetics, sense of humor, patience, and kindness.

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**The social life and sound patterns
of Nanti ways of speaking**

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This dissertation explores the phenomenon of *ways of speaking* in the Nanti speech community of Montetoni, in southeastern Peruvian Amazonia, between 1999 and 2009. In the context of this study, a *way of speaking* is a socially meaningful, conventionalized sound pattern, manifest at the level of the utterance, that expresses the speaker's orientation toward some aspect of the interaction. This study closely examines both the sound patterns and patterns of use of three Nanti ways of speaking — *matter-of-fact talk*, *scolding talk*, and *hunting talk* — and describes each one in relation to a broader set of linguistic, social, and cultural practices characteristic of the speech community at the time.

The data for this study is naturally-occurring discourse recorded during multi-party, face-to-face interactions in Montetoni. Bringing together methods developed by linguists, linguistic anthropologists, conversation analysts, and interactional sociologists, this study explores the communicative relations among participants, interactions, situations of interaction, and the utterances that link them all, attending to both the individual-level cognitive (subjective) facets of interpersonal communication and the necessarily intersubjective environment in which communication takes place. In order to disaggregate the multiple levels of signification evidenced in specific utterances, tokens are examined at four levels of organization: the sound form, the sentence, the turn, and the move. The data are presented via audio files; acoustic analyses; sequentially-organized and temporally-anchored interlinearized transcripts; and composite visual representations, all of which are framed by detailed ethnographic description. Nantis' ways of speaking are shown to consistently and systematically convey social aspects of 'meaning' that are crucial to utterance interpretation and, therefore, to successful interpersonal communication.

Based on the robust correspondences between sound form and communicative function identified in the Nanti communicative system, this study proposes that ways of speaking are a cross-linguistically viable level of organization in language use that awaits discovery and description in other speech communities.

The research project itself is framed in terms of the practical issues that emerged through the author's own experiences in learning to communicate appropriately in monolingual Nanti society, and the ethical issues that motivate community-oriented documentation of endangered language practices.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 Introduction

This dissertation explores the phenomenon of Nanti *ways of speaking*, a phenomenon that I studied in the Nanti speech community of Montetoni between 1999 and 2009. For the purposes of this study, a *way of speaking* is a recurrent, conventionalized, socially meaningful sound pattern manifest at the level of the utterance (and I will give substance to that definition throughout the course of this work). My goal is to demonstrate that Nanti ways of speaking consistently and systematically conveyed social aspects of ‘meaning’ that were crucial to utterance interpretation and successful interpersonal communication during the period of this study; and that, based on these results, the formal,¹ interactional, and social properties of ways of speaking merit description, as a distinct level of systematic organization in language use, in other speech communities as well.

My interest in studying Nanti ways of speaking is personal as well as intellectual, since my awareness of the phenomenon grew out of my own challenging experiences (particularly in 1997 and 1998) in learning — almost entirely by trial-

¹By ‘formal’ I mean ‘having to do with form’ in contradistinction to ‘content’, ‘substance’, or ‘meaning’. This distinction is explored in greater detail in Chapter 3.



Figure 1.1: The author with Migeró, the long-time leader of Montetoni, in June 2003. I focused on field research for this study between January 2004 and May 2005; see Chapter 2 for more detailed information.

and-error — to communicate competently in Montetoni while the community was monolingual in the Nanti language. As I discuss in detail later on, the real-time need to communicate, in what was at the time a highly unfamiliar physical and social world, made the interpretive process itself very visible to me. As I struggled to interpret complex novel experiences that had important practical and social consequences on my life at that very moment, the distinct social, interactional, and referential facets of the utterances I heard around me disaggregated themselves to my ear and then in my mind's eye, and I came to realize how much 'meaning'

was right there in the sound form — in addition to the lexical and grammatical material that was new to me. Moreover, in watching Nanti individuals interact with one another, I realized that *they* were also attending to these distinct facets of the utterances they heard around them. Elements of face-to-face verbal interaction once invisible to me were suddenly visible everywhere.² My lived experiences of the salience of ways of speaking among the day-to-day communicative practices in Montetoni; as well as the realization that these ways of speaking were, in a sense, *independently* meaningful, apart from the words and grammar of the Nanti language, taught me new ways to ‘hear’ the Nanti language — and spoken language more generally — and propelled me into an exploration of ‘meaning-making’ in language *use* that ranged from articulatory phonetics to cognitive linguistics to interactional sociology to semiotic theory, with a lengthy stop-over in the philosophy of language.

That said, this study of Nanti ways of speaking is anchored in a set of premises and sensitivities particular to the linguistic anthropology of North America in the second half of the twentieth century. While this study reaches out to many related perspectives (and a few antithetical ones too) in aid of really understanding the focal phenomenon, the main trajectory here is solidly in the tradition of the ethnography of speaking,³ framed by a practice approach to language and carried out with some linguistic and conversation analytical tools. This dissertation is, at its core, a story about the social life of language in a particular place at a particular time.

This study is framed by the following fundamental premises. First, the *function* of language, and therefore its *raison d’être*, is intersubjective communication

²These experiences also led me to the more general conclusion that there is no such thing as (audible) human speech without an identifiable (audible) ‘way of speaking’, and therefore there is no human speech without this ‘layer’ or ‘level’ of social meaning, no matter how transparent it may seem; this argument is developed in Chapters 3 and 5. I do not know if functionally equivalent phenomena are present in other language modalities (like signed languages) but I would predict that they are.

³A.k.a. the ethnography of communication; see Chapter 3.

and coordination, and language *use* and linguistic structure fulfill that function together. Second, ‘meaning’ in language is not only referential but is also ‘social’ and ‘interactional’; and, moreover, ‘meaning’ is socially and interpersonally *co-created* (not transmitted or encoded, etc.) in the real-time processes of human interactions. Collaterally, for purposes of coordination, participants in interaction need, and seek, moment-to-moment information about each another *in relation to* ‘the intersubjective world’. Third, language *use* is patterned, and the recurrent patterns manifest in language use are meaning-bearing, interpretable, and *describable*. Fourth, one important domain of meaning-bearing, interpretable, describable patterning in (spoken) language use is extra-phonological sound patterning — that is, conventionalized sound patterns manifest at the level of the utterance which are distinct from, and independent of, the sound patterns of phonology.⁴ It is my claim that the phenomenon of Nanti ways of speaking substantiates every one of these perspectives.

It is uncontroversial to state that spoken utterances — as instances, tokens, of language use — have different types of patterns in them. Many of those patterns are grammatical, and linguists have developed an admirable analytical machinery to describe and explain those patterns. But spoken utterances have other types of patterns in them too — patterns that are acoustic,⁵ poetic, interactional, and social. These non-grammatical types of patterns are clearly more complex and less well understood than grammatical patterns. But it is crucial to point out that these different types of patterns cannot be collapsed down, or reduced, into one another. It is less uncontroversial to state, but no less true in my view, that these other types of patterns are both systematic in form and indispensable to ‘meaning’ in language.

⁴To be clear, this study is not a rigorous treatment of segmental sound patterns in phonetic terms; rather, it is a description of the sound characteristics that constitute utterance-level patterns of sounds in naturally-occurring language in use.

⁵In this study, I use the word ‘acoustic’ in a general sense, meaning ‘having to do with sound’, rather than in a specialized sense salient to phoneticians, phonologists, ethnomusicologists, physicists, etc.

These are distinct levels, or systems, of organization at work simultaneously in communicative interaction, and each merits attention on its own terms and at its own scale.

Though the set of patterns manifest in a token utterance may be complex, most of the concepts and analytical strategies that I have used to describe Nanti ways of speaking in this study are among the most basic tools used by linguists, linguistic anthropologists, conversation analysts, interactional sociologists, and ethnographers: I discuss tokens of talk in terms of their type-level characteristics, but I also present these tokens via recordings and sequenced, interlinearized transcripts, and I provide an ethnographic account of both their situations of origin and their broader sociocultural context, using words and images. It is my view — and a fundamental argument of this study — that it is not only possible but also necessary to expand our understanding of the systematicity of language further into the domain of language use if we are to understand the ‘total linguistic fact’ (to echo Silverstein (1985)) as it is realized in interpersonal communication. Therefore, I view the grammatical, interactional, social, acoustic, and experiential facets of token utterances as (potentially) ‘equal partners’ in the systematic meaningfulness and interpretability of that utterance. I consider the *innovative* aspect of this study to be the ways in which I have used existing tools to demonstrate the systematicity of an under-studied but fascinating phenomenon: the social life of the sound patterns of language in use.

Speaking more concretely, this study has three closely-related fundamental goals: (1) to carefully describe a set of Nanti ways of speaking as distinct and durable sound phenomena; (2) to demonstrate how these ways of speaking were indispensably implicated in meaning-making processes in the speech community of Montetoni during the period of this study; and (3) to lay out a set of analytical strategies by which ways of speaking can be described in other speech communities.

I hope to demonstrate how ways of speaking were an observable part of the moment-to-moment ‘organization of experience’ (Goffman, 1974) among Nantis, and of the larger-scale ‘organization of diversity’ (Hymes, 1974b) in the speech community of Montetoni — presenting the particulars of one example of a more general linguistic phenomenon.

1.1.1 The personal experiential basis for this study

As I intimated above, I learned to speak Nanti in a monolingual and monocultural setting. I originally became involved (beginning in 1995) with the community of Montetoni for humanitarian reasons and therefore, at the time, my interest in learning to use the Nanti language was entirely practical. To make a long and complicated story short, after my first 10-day visit to Montetoni in 1995, I made the decision to invest myself in a longer-term relationship with Montetoni, and so I returned there for lengthy stays in 1997 and 1998, specifically in order to begin learning to speak Nanti and whatever else I needed to know to serve as an advocate and intermediary on the community’s behalf (at their request; see Chapter 2).

There were no written materials on the Nanti language available to me,⁶ and I received essentially no ‘instruction’ from speakers of the language, who had never experienced an adult language learner before. Instead, like a child, I learned experientially to communicate. I observed interactions around me, I imitated what I heard, I tried out new things, I practiced new knowledge, I suffered the embarrassment of mistakes, and I repeated my successes with enthusiasm. I also made audio recordings of many of my experiences, and so, unlike a child, I had the advantage of reviewing recordings of naturally occurring speech over and over again at will, which

⁶I did have access to a small set of materials on Matsigenka, the most closely related language, which were helpful in some ways. The circumstances surrounding my involvement with the Nanti communities are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2; to clarify a point relevant here, my involvement with Montetoni led to graduate studies in linguistics and anthropology, not the other way around.

accelerated the learning process, especially in terms of learning to make necessary phonological distinctions.

Speaking about my learning process in more analytical terms, I learned to pay close attention to many aspects of verbal interaction and signifying behavior that previously had been sub-attentional phenomena for me. As I struggled to make sense of an unknown language in a largely novel physical, interactional, and social world, I learned to distinguish between and contrast different kinds of signifying activities that I observed Nantis engage in. I learned to pay very close attention to sequences of action, and to uptakes — the way an addressee or hearer of an utterance responded to that utterance. In this way, I identified patterns not only of referential meanings but of interactional and social meanings as well (I discuss these issues in detail in Chapter 3). It was through this process that I discovered that the sound patterns of ways of speaking signified independently of the referential content and the basic phonological patterns of an utterance, and that they expressed crucial elements of the ‘total meaning’ of an utterance relative to its situation of origin.

The more I observed Nanti language use over the years, the more I became convinced that Nantis themselves paid far more attention to language use than most people I had known before. Most Nantis were quite laconic most of the time (see further discussion in Chapter 2) and when Nantis did interact, I observed that they gave careful attention to what they said — both the content *and* the form of their utterances. Part of what convinced me of the salience of ways of speaking to Nanti speakers was the realization that, when quoting one another, Nantis often quoted the form *as well as* the content of the utterance quoted; put explicitly, ways of speaking were so salient that they were quotable.

Making the discovery that I was able to correctly interpret different ways of speaking even *without* understanding their referential content led me to ponder two questions, which I focused on with enthusiasm once I started my graduate studies:

what was I understanding? and how was I getting the message, so to speak? The second question was by far easier to answer: I was understanding utterance-level extra-phonological sound patterns of speech and how they matched, or mapped onto, locally conventionalized meanings. After much consideration (and reading; see Chapters 3 and 4), I came to the conclusion that ‘what’ I was understanding in these ways of speaking was speaker orientation — that is, the relation (attitude, evaluation, feeling, etc.) of the speaker to the utterance or its situation of origin — knowledge of which is an essential element in successful real-time interpersonal communication.

In sum, I have written this particular dissertation because I wanted to understand what Nanti ways of speaking signified and how they signified it. This interest led me in two principle directions: toward the unique set of sound properties that identify each way of speaking, on the one hand; and toward the social, interactional, and interpretive processes that accompany them, on the other hand. In the next few sections, I will sketch the outline of how I went about describing the set of phenomena associated with ways of speaking I have described, after which I will provide a sketch of the shape of this document itself.

1.1.2 Sound patterning in language use

In this study I show that the utterance-level sound patterns of Nanti ways of speaking take advantage of extra-phonological affordances of language for the expression of social aspects of meaning. Articulatory phenomena, or capacities, that are not part of the phonology of a language (in a narrow sense) are nonetheless — and therefore — available to speakers, to be recruited to other purposes and used ‘meaningfully’ at *other* levels of the organization of speech. The sound properties of the utterances that I describe in this study include voice qualities (that is, production of vowels and consonants, including the addition of phonologically non-contrastive qualities

such as nasalization, creakiness, breathy voice, devoicing, etc.); voice volume; timing (including duration, rate of speaking, and utterance-internal relative timing); voice pitch and pitch range; and intonation contours. Note that, within the context of this study, some of these characteristics, such as utterance duration or segment duration, can be discussed fruitfully in ‘absolute’ — or system-external — terms; while some, such as voice volume or utterance-internal relative timing, can only be discussed fruitfully in ‘relative’ — or system-internal — terms; while yet others, such as voice qualities or voice pitch, can be discussed fruitfully in both ‘absolute’ and ‘relative’ terms.

In examining specific utterance tokens (in Chapters 5, 6, and 7) I demonstrate that particular patterns of sound consistently co-occur with particular patterns of action and interpretation in real-time sequenced interactions, which I take to be an intersubjectively available demonstration of the salience and meaningfulness of these sound patterns to participants. Nanti ways of speaking are systematic, tangible, empirically describable phenomena that are part of the linguistic repertoire that participants in interaction draw upon, just as they draw upon a repertoire of vocabulary, morphology, clause structures, etc. The recurrent sound patterns of Nanti ways of speaking are interpretable through conventionalization just as other sound-to-meaning correspondences are. I assert that the *type* of meaning expressed by ways of speaking is ‘speaker orientation’ — that is, the relation of the speaker to the utterance itself or its situation of origin (including participants’ subjective states). As I discuss in Chapter 3, I am not claiming that ways of speaking constitute the *only* way to express speaker orientation, but rather that ways of speaking are one *consistent* way in which speakers express, and hearers assess, speaker orientation.

In this study, I have identified Nanti ways of speaking according to their utterance-level sound patterns. I claim that these ways of speaking take advantage of articulatory affordances not already being used by the phonology of the language;

that these utterance-level patterns do not conflict with phonological, prosodic, or other grammatical patterns; and that each way of speaking is the result of a particular combination of characteristics over the course of the utterance that set it apart from all other ways of speaking. Thus, while no one characteristic unambiguously corresponds to one way of speaking, and while not all characteristics are present on any given segment or constituent of the utterance, the *combination* of characteristics manifest across the sound form of an utterance are meaning-bearing and interpretable as a (local, conventionalized) way of speaking.

While identifying the types of sound patterns that correlated to ways of speaking in tokens of data was the necessary first step, examining these tokens of data in their situation of origin was the necessary second step. The first step revealed patterns of sound; the second step revealed recurrently meaning-bearing (interpretable) patterns of sound. In this study, I describe the distribution of the sound patterns of ways of speaking across types of situations as well as in token situations. I speak of larger-scale types of situations as activity frames and interactional frames, in order to demonstrate the recurrent interpretive frames that are associated with them.⁷ In the next sections, I will sketch out a few key aspects of my approach to ways of speaking in this study.

1.1.3 Tokens and types

As I discuss in detail in Chapters 3 and 4, in this study every individual utterance is a unique instance, or ‘token’, of intersubjectively available experience. A token utterance has a sound form, which has describable (form-level) characteristics; it is produced by a speaker, heard by hearers, and interpreted (to some degree) by

⁷See §1.1.4 below and Chapter 3 for further discussion of how the terms ‘frame’ and ‘framing’ are used in this study. Also, note that in this study, ways of speaking are not ‘defined by’ their situations of use, but rather they are, in part, ‘definitional of’ their situations of use. As discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3, this approach distinguishes my work here from much of the work on ‘genre’, in which situations of use and/or participant frameworks are presented as primary defining characteristics of the genre in question.

anybody paying attention to it. Tokens are my data; they are what I have recorded, described, transcribed, and otherwise represented in this document.

Types, on the other hand, are cognitive entities. Types are categories that individuals form through their experiences based on characteristics found in common among discrete experiences. Because so much of individual human experience is social and interactional in nature, I assume that the systems of cognitive types held by individual members of a speech community are quite similar — *but* that individuals only ever have access to *tokens* of experience (including one another’s behaviors), which they subsequently make sense of using their own (unique, dynamic) set of cognitive *types*. The process of *coordination* of (cognitive) types among individuals is one of the key activities, and outcomes, of interpersonal sequential interactions (that consist solely of tokens).⁸

In this study, I assume that *interpretation* is the process by which individuals match, or map, tokens of novel experience to cognitive types based on similarities with prior experiences — that is, similarities between the ‘novel’ and the ‘known’. This process of *typification* allows the individual to project forward, or develop expectations, about what comes next — what may happen, what an appropriate next action may be, how a particular utterance may be taken up, and so on. In a sense, then, interpretation is an iterative (and emergent) process of hypothesis-building about future experience based on ever-accumulating ‘past’ experience. It is crucial to be clear, though, that I assume the process of typification is a one-to-many mapping process; that is, any token of novel experience is mapped onto multiple types, based on a variety of individual-internal and -external situational factors. While certain interpretations of a given token of experience are more likely, or more probable, than others based on patterns in past experiences, no real-time interpretation

⁸Speaking reflexively, this entire dissertation is a token representation of all sorts of cognitive types that I have used to make sense of tokens of my own experiences as they relate to Nanti ways of speaking.

is either entirely homogeneous, pre-ordained, or unchangeable. Strictly speaking, individuals *never* ‘know’ what will happen next; rather, they are ‘hypothesizing’ about what will happen next based on what they already know, then testing their hypotheses and refining them as necessary. In the context of this study, I have assumed that this process explains how individuals interpret *every* novel experience — from utterance-level ways of speaking to the second-pair parts of adjacency pairs to physical gravity and back again.

In this study, I have talked about the mechanism for the *coordination* of individual interpretations in terms of *conventionality*, by which I mean the durable, recurrent patterns of association among experiences, representations of those experiences, and reactions to those experiences that are observable in the activities and behaviors of multiple individuals. While I stated above that no one — neither participant nor observer — has access to other people’s cognitive types, everyone has access to observable patterns of repetition in the intersubjective world, by which every one of us infers, for practical and/or analytical purposes, how other individuals are interpreting what is going on around them.

1.1.4 Frames and framing

In this study I have relied heavily on the concepts of frames and framing as a way to talk about recurrent patterns of behavior, interaction, and interpretation within the speech community of Montetoni. As I discuss in detail in Chapter 3, I have adapted these concepts primarily from Erving Goffman’s work, especially Goffman (1974), in which work Goffman defines a frame as “the definition of a situation” that is “built up in accordance with principles of organization which govern [social] events... and our subjective involvement in them” (Goffman, 1974, p. 10-11).

In this study, I talk about *activity frames*, *interactional frames*, and *interpretive frames* as three different types, and scales, of recurring patterns of action and

interaction in my data. In brief, an *activity frame* is a situation defined by the activity of its participant(s); an *interactional frame* is the immediate, locally-constituted definition of the social/interpersonal situation; and an *interpretive frame* is a specific orientation toward a topic or concept that establishes the parameters for the ascription of meaning to talk within that frame. I take it as given that at minimum one frame is always active, but that typically multiple frames, of multiple types, are active simultaneously. An important characteristic of frames and framing, as I use these terms, is that they categorize types of social, or intersubjective, experience. That is to say, although they are ‘types’ in the sense discussed in the previous section, their labels stand for conventionalized categories of lived and shared experience upon which individuals rely in coordinating their actions with the actions of other individuals.

I have labeled the frames I describe in this study based on several types of data: (1) the recurrence of phenomena, (2) the recurrence of sequences of phenomena, and (3) language about these phenomena. For example, the activity frame of ‘inter-household visiting’ recurs daily in Montetoni and has its own verb in Nanti, *kamoso* ‘to visit’. The interpretive frame of ‘scolding’, likewise, recurs daily and has its own verb, *kanomaj*. Note, however, that ‘frames’ are, for my purposes, entirely an analytical concept.

As much as frames are ‘definitions of situations’ that have a certain type of operational stability in real-time interactions, they are also the product of individual activity, interactivity, and coordination. That is to say, participants build frames together through their activities, and sustain these frames through series of (inter)actional moves. This has three important implications: first, any active frame can be modified or changed by the actions of its participants; second, it is possible for different participants in an interaction to be operating in different frames; and third, frames are ‘shared’ only to the degree that participants render them shared,

through processes of joint attention, alignment, interactional turns, and so on. This is why the concept of *framing* is as important as the concept of ‘frames’ — participants actively (which is not to imply consciously) frame their experiences, and also actively seek information (evidence, feedback) from the intersubjective world that their framings are (sufficiently) accurate and/or shared. In more colloquial terms, then, ‘framing’ is my way of talking about ‘making sense’ of the world around us.

1.2 An overview of the dissertation

This dissertation is organized in such a manner as to guide the reader from a broader perspective to a narrower one, presented as a series of perspectives in which the phenomenon of Nanti *ways of speaking* is always the center point. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 are the most wide-ranging in scope, in that each one presents a large domain of background knowledge that frames this study. Chapters 5, 6, and 7 are much more narrow in scope, each one focused on a particular Nanti way of speaking.

Chapter 2 frames this study in terms of the ethnographic and linguistic context in which it unfolded. This study has been influenced and shaped by a variety of relatively unusual social and political factors; therefore, Chapter 2 provides some history of both the community of Montetoni itself, and my relationship with that community. It includes a general description of the social life and verbal life of the community as I witnessed it over a period of fourteen years, attempting to balance long-term, stable patterns that I observed with the myriad innovations, large and small, that I also observed during that time. Chapter 2 also provides an overview of the general phenomenon of Nanti ways of speaking, out of which my subsequent focus on three key ways of speaking emerged.

Chapter 3 frames this study in terms of the conceptual frameworks in which, and out of which, this study took its shape. I discuss the philosophical orientations, intellectual traditions, and disciplinary frameworks that both sparked my interest

in Nanti ways of speaking and produced the analyses presented in this study. As I remarked earlier, my interest in gaining a deep understanding of the phenomenon of Nanti ways of speaking led me to investigate a wide range of philosophical, analytical, and methodological possibilities, and in Chapter 3 I have attempted to weave the results of those investigations into a coherent discussion of the development of the ideas that underlie this study.

Itself framed in important ways by Chapter 3, Chapter 4 frames this study in terms of the research design principles, methods, and techniques that I used to carry out the fieldwork, make the analyses, and produce the document that you see here. To a large degree, this chapter operationalizes many of the concepts and insights articulated in Chapter 3, in order to spell out the ways I carried out this study, as well as to spell out some of the practical and analytical challenges I encountered. Because of the nature of my interests in Nanti ways of speaking, the strategies I used were disciplinarily eclectic; therefore, this chapter is meant to invite the reader to evaluate these aspects of this study in terms of the results they produced, rather than in terms of their discipline of origin. Last but not least, this chapter is meant to invite the reader to adopt, and improve upon, any strategy described here that seems useful for other research contexts.

Chapters 5, 6, and 7 are the empirical heart of this study. Each of these chapters focuses on a specific Nanti way of speaking, providing detailed descriptions of both their sound patterns and their place in Nanti social life. Chapter 5 explores *matter-of-fact talk*, Chapter 6 explores *scolding talk*, and Chapter 7 explores *hunting talk*. Each of these ways of speaking is presented in terms of the types of activity frame(s) and interactional frame(s) within which I observed it situated; in terms of the types of uptakes and interpretations produced by participants in ongoing or matrix interactions; and in terms of the set of sound characteristics that characterize it. The order of these three chapters is a reflection of the relationships among these

ways of speaking, as I indicate below.

Chapter 5 focuses on matter-of-fact talk. Matter-of-fact talk was the most frequently⁹ used and had the least elaborate sound form of any way of speaking that I observed during the period of this study. It was used by everyone in Montetoni, regardless of age or gender. The label I have given to every way of speaking is meant to be descriptive, and I claim that matter-of-fact talk is the way of speaking that Nantis used when proffering a perspective, or orientation, of neutrality, and when framing their talk as intersubjectively ‘true’ and ‘factual’. As I discuss in detail in Chapter 5, matter-of-fact talk is the way of speaking that corresponds to the widely-held notion of ‘everyday’ or ‘ordinary’ conversation, and it is the way of speaking upon which the basic description of Nanti phonology, prosody, and grammar more generally are based. Crucially, though, my claim is that, in use, matter-of-fact talk proffers a neutral orientation on the part of the speaker, *not* ‘no orientation’. Because matter-of-fact talk is the least formally¹⁰ elaborate and most orientationally neutral Nanti way of speaking, Chapter 5 serves as a point of departure and comparison for Chapters 6 and 7.

Chapter 6 focuses on scolding talk, which was the second most frequently¹¹ used way of speaking that I observed during the period of this study. Although it was also used by everyone in Montetoni, it was used more often by women than by men and demonstrated the restriction that the scolded be equal to or lower than the scolder in social prominence (a concept that I discuss in detail in Chapters 3 and 6). In contrast with matter-of-fact talk, the sound form of scolding talk is much more elaborate; for example, scolding talk includes voice qualities such as nasalization and increased laryngeal tension that are not phonologically contrastive; the rate and rhythm of speech are substantially altered; and the intonation contours demonstrate

⁹This is an impressionistic, not a statistical, assessment.

¹⁰By ‘formal’ I mean ‘having to do with form’ in contradistinction to ‘content’, ‘substance’, or ‘meaning’. This distinction is explored in greater detail in Chapter 3.

¹¹Again, an impressionistic, not a statistical, assessment.

steep changes in pitch. It is my claim that scolding talk expressed disapproval on the part of the speaker toward some aspect of the behavior of its focal addressee; and that speakers used it with the intention of modifying that person's behavior. In utterances of scolding talk, then, the way of speaking itself constitutes a particularly clear interactional move.

Chapter 7 focuses on hunting talk. Hunting talk was used frequently during the period of this study, but not nearly as frequently as either matter-of-fact talk or scolding talk. Although hunting talk could, in principle, be used appropriately by any type of person, and in any type of place, it was, in practice, both situationally and topically more limited in its distribution than either matter-of-fact talk or scolding talk. Hunting talk was primarily used by men and teen-aged boys, and primarily within the interpretive frame of hunting stories, which in turn were most commonly told within the activity frame of feasting. Like scolding talk, the sound form of hunting talk is more elaborate than matter-of-fact talk; for example, hunting talk includes voice qualities such as creakiness that are not phonologically contrastive; the rhythm of speech is substantially altered; and the intonation contours demonstrate steep changes in pitch. In contrast with matter-of-fact talk, hunting talk foregrounds the unique perspective of the speaker on the content of the utterance, framing it as highly subjective. Hunting talk, along with hunting stories more generally, serve to introduce highly individualized experiences of a socially highly important activity — hunting — into the domain of social interaction and shared knowledge.

The final chapter, Chapter 8, takes a broader perspective again, and concludes this study by returning to the issue of the systematicity of Nanti ways of speaking within the broader communicative system in the speech community of Montetoni.

1.3 A few words regarding motivations for this study

Any merit that this dissertation has is dedicated to the people of Montetoni who made it possible. Without developing the firm conviction that writing this dissertation would benefit those people, I never could have finished it. My relationship with the people of Montetoni is based on love of them more than anything else. My role in the community over the years really has been more as an advocate and mediator than as a researcher — this is certainly the case from their perspective, in part because of the priorities I chose in the way I conducted myself when there. Even though it is not written directly for them as an audience, then, this study is entirely *for* my friends in Montetoni, and I offer it as a sign of my respect for their language, lifeways, aesthetics, sense of humor, patience, and kindness. My gratitude to them is immeasurable.

Many aspects of my relationship with the Nanti people in Montetoni are unusual. As I have mentioned, my relationship with them has been conducted entirely in the Nanti language, and conducted on *their* terms to the fullest extent of which I've been capable. During the period of this study, and as a result of their relative geographical isolation, the Nanti people in Montetoni had a kind of social and cultural freedom that few peoples have in the modern age of globalization. A significant part of my motivation for this dissertation, therefore, has been to document what I saw as 'uniquely Nanti' about the people who gave life to this study.

At the same time, I know that many aspects of Nanti life as described here will change, perhaps dramatically, in coming years. In the bigger picture, the Nanti people are relatively few in number and the pressures they have been experiencing from outsiders are ominous. Therefore, it is clear to me that not only Nanti lifeways, but also the Nanti language and especially their ways of speaking, are highly endangered. Another significant part of my motivation, then, has been to create a



Figure 1.2: The upper Camisea River, photographed in July 2009. Nearly 15 years after my first visit (in June 1995), I am still dazzled by the beauty of the Camisea river basin.

tangible record of what I saw as ‘uniquely Nanti’ during the specific period of this study, which has amounted to a significant era in Nanti sociopolitical history.

1.4 Transcription conventions and abbreviations

1.4.1 Transcription conventions

I have used the following conventions in my transcripts.

1. Short examples are given four-line transcriptions, as shown in (1). The first line represents the utterance as heard; the second line provides word, morpheme,

and clitic boundaries; the third line provides glosses for the elements in the second line; and the fourth line provides a free gloss in English.

(1.1) Pinoshimaitiro gu.

<i>pi-</i>	<i>noshi</i>	<i>-mai</i>	<i>-t-</i>	<i>-i</i>	<i>-ro</i>	<i>gu</i>
2-	pull	-CL:THREAD	-EPT	-REAL.I	-3nmO	look
You're thread-pulling it, look.						

2. Some long examples are given two-line transcriptions, as shown in (2), which correspond to the first and fourth lines in (1).

(1.2) Pinoshimaitiro gu.

You're thread-pulling it, look.

3. Because Nanti is spoken in a Spanish-speaking country, the practical orthography that I have learned to use to represent the Nanti language is based on orthographic conventions for Spanish rather than for English. I decided to use that practical orthography in this document to avoid the risk of being inconsistent in my transcriptions. There are only three potentially confusing characters; each is given here followed by the corresponding IPA transcription: **j** [h], **y** [j], and **u** [ui̯]; see Chapter 2 for further discussion.
4. Speech is represented in lines based on the combination of grammatical constituents and breath groups, because I assume that these are the two primary units that hearers rely on to parse the speech stream.
5. The written representations of speakers' turns at talk are represented discretely in chronological order to the degree possible. In cases of overlap, however, when the conversational floor is occupied by more than one speaker, I have represented overlapped speech using pairs of up-arrows, ↑, and down-arrows,

was based on grammatical plus intonational plus turn structural criteria. Any material immediately following and contiguous with a caret is content that I have reconstructed, based on my knowledge of Nanti grammar, idioms, and intonation, plus information that has already been provided by the speaker in the interaction.

10. An equal sign (=) links a clitic to its host, while a dash (-) links morphemes.
11. The character (N) in the second line of four-line transcriptions represents a nasal unspecified for place of articulation (discussed in Chapter 2).
12. In certain contexts, the surface contrast between the realis suffix *-i* and the irrealis suffix *-e* is neutralized. The neutralization is represented in the first line of transcriptions while the contrast is maintained in the second line.

1.4.2 Abbreviations used in interlinearized transcriptions

I have used the following abbreviations in the interlinearized transcriptions presented in this study.

Table 1.1: Abbreviations used in interlinearized transcriptions

CODE	ELEMENT	GLOSS
1S	no=, n=	First person subject
1O	=na	First person object
2S	pi=, p=	Second person subject
2O	=Npi	Second person object
3mS	i=, y=	Third person masculine subject
3mO	=ri	Third person masculine object
3nmS	o=, \emptyset	Third person non-masculine subject

3mO	=ro	Third person non-masculine object
1P	no-	First person possessor
2P	pi-	Second person possessor
3mP	i-	Third person masculine possessor
3nmP	o-	Third person non-masculine possessor
ABIL	-aj	abilitive
ABL	-an	ablative
ADL	-apaj	allative
ADJVZR	-ni	adjectivizer
ALIEN.POSS	-ne ~ -re ~ -te	alienable possession
AFF	=tyo	affirmative emphasis
ANIM	-n-	animate
APPL:INDR	-ako	indirective applicative
APPL:INST	-aNt	instrumental applicative
APPL:PRES	-imo	presencial applicative
APPL:SEP	-apitsa	separative applicative
AUGM	-sano	augmentative
CAUS:AGNT	ogi-	agentive causative
CAUS:DSTR	otiN-	causative of destruction
CAUS:INFL	-akag	influential causative
CAUS:MAL	omiN-	malefactive causative
CAUS:NAGNT	o[+voice]-	non-agentive causative
CAR	-aNt	characteristic
CL	(various)	classifier
CNTF	=me	counterfactual
CNGNT	=ta	congruent stance
CNTRST	=ri	contrastive stance

CNTRSUP	=me	counter-suppositional
COND	=rika	conditional
COP	-Nti	copula
COLL	-page	collective plural
COORD	-Ntiri	coordinator
DEONT	=me	deontic
DERANK.REL.IMPF	-tsi	deranked relativizer, imperfective
DERANK.REL.PERF	-aNkicha	deranked relativizer, perfective
DEXT	-asano	desirable extremal
DSTR	-ge	distributive
DUR	-bage	durative
EXTR	-uma	extremal
EPA	-a-	epenthetic vowel
EPIST	=rika	epistemic
EPT	-t-	epenthetic consonant
EXIST.ANIM	ainyo	animate existential
EXIST.INAN	aityo	inanimate existential
EXT.NEG	matsi	external negation
FOC.PRO	(various)	contrastive focus pronouns
FRUS	-be	frustrative
HAB	-apini	habitual
IDENT	-ita	interrogative identity verb
IMPF	-∅	imperfective
INAN	-t-	inanimate
INDEF	-ka	indefinite
INFR	=ka	inferential
INTER	tya-	interrogative

IRREAL	-n-	irrealis
IRREAL.A	-enpa	irrealis, A-class verb
IRREAL.I	-e	irrealis, I-class verb
LOC	-ku	locative
MAL.REP	-na	malefactive repetitive
NCNGT	=Npa	non-congruent stance
NEG.IRREAL	ja, jara	irrealis negation
NEG.EXIST	mameri	negative existential
NEG.REAL	te, tera	realis negation
NOMZ	-rira	nominalizer
NPOSS	-tsi	non-possessed
PASS.IRREAL	-enkani	irrealis passive
PASS.REAL	-agani	realis passive
PAT/THM	-ni ~ -ne	patient/theme argument
PERF	-ak	perfective
PL	-jig	verbal plural
PRED.FOC	onti	predicate focus
PURP	-ashi	purposive
QUOT	ka	quotative
REAL.A	-a	realis, A-class verb
REAL.I	-i	realis, I-class verb
RECP	-abakag	reciprocal
REG	-aj	regressive
REL	=rira	relativizer
REP	ke	reportive
RET	-ut	returnative
REV	-rej	reversative

SUB	=ra	subordinator
TOP.PRO	(various)	topic pronoun
TRNLOC.IMPF	-aa	imperfective translocative
TRNLOC.PERF	-aki	perfective translocative
TRNS	-ab	transitivizer

Chapter 2

Linguistic and ethnographic context for this study

2.1 Introduction

This chapter presents some linguistic and ethnographic context for the discussion of Nanti *ways of speaking* in later chapters. First, in §2.4, I provide a brief ethnographic overview to introduce you to the Nanti people in cultural, geographical, and political terms. Then, in §2.3, I describe how I came to be involved with the Nanti people. In the next two sections, §2.4 and §2.5, I discuss how this study fits into my broader humanitarian and political commitments and activities, including the practical utility of my research, since these considerations are a driving force for my research activities. In §2.6, I provide a brief sketch of Nanti social life in Montetoni between 1995 and 2009, the period of time I have known the Nantis on the Camisea River. In §2.7, I provide a basic description of the Nanti language. In §2.8, I provide a brief sketch of the verbal life of the Nanti people in Montetoni over that same period of time. In §2.9, I provide an overview of Nanti ways of speaking and their systematicity, introducing you to the perspective that I will develop in



Figure 2.1: A view of the Camisea River in September 2004, looking upriver toward Montetoni, which is situated (out of sight) on the right bank of the river. The river level is fairly low in this photo, but gets even lower at the peak of the dry season. Notice the rock-and-leaf fishing dam running across the foreground; see §2.6.3.4 for more detail.

subsequent chapters of this study.

2.2 Ethnographic overview

As of 2009, the Nanti people are a small ethnolinguistic group of indigenous Amazonian hunter-horticulturalists who speak a language in the Kampan branch of the Arawak language family. Numbering about 450 individuals, the Nantis' lifestyle during the period of this study was a subsistence-oriented one, organized around hunting, fishing, wild-gathering, and swidden gardening. Up through the time of writing, the Nanti people live in the headwaters regions of the Timpia and Camisea

Rivers at 500-1000 meters elevation in the foothills of the Andes mountains, on the southwestern periphery of the Amazon basin. In political terms, they live in the Department of Cusco in southeastern Peru, inside of the *Reserva del Estado a favor de las poblaciones Kugapakori, Nahua, y Nanti*, a federal territorial reserve established in 1990 for the protection of the then-uncontacted groups living inside it (see map in Figure 2.2).

To date, there is very little written about the Nanti people or their language, and most of the materials available were authored by me and/or my research partner Lev Michael; see Beier (2001, 2003, 2005, 2007, 2008); Beier and Michael (1998, 2001b,a, 2002); Crowhurst and Michael (2005); Michael (2001a,b, 2002, 2004a,b, 2006a,b, 2007, 2008); Michael and Beier (2007); MINSA (2003); Napolitano and Ryan (2007); Shinai (2004). The information provided in this study is based on original fieldwork done by me and Lev Michael.

From the perspectives of both indigenous rights advocates and health experts, the Nanti people are, at the time of writing, considered a ‘recently contacted people’. The Nantis who presently live on the Camisea River first established voluntary contact with non-Nantis in the late 1980s — only about 20 years ago, which is a very short time in immunological terms. For at least several generations prior to the late 1980s, the Nanti people lived only in the headwaters region of the Timpia River and deliberately avoided contact with non-Nantis. Many Nanti individuals now living on the Camisea River recounted to me harrowing contact experiences with non-Nantis over the course of their own or their parents’ lifetimes on the Timpia River as an explanation for their long-term practice of avoiding contact with unknown people (see Beier and Michael (1998) and Michael and Beier (2007) for more detailed information). However, Nantis also recounted that the acquisition (via otherwise traumatic contact experiences with Dominican missionaries during the 1970s) of a few metals tools revolutionized their farming practices,¹ and so in the mid 1980s

¹Nantis recount that previously they used bamboo and peccary teeth for cutting, sticks for




Figure 2.2: I have added the approximate location of Montetoni to a map of indigenous territories produced and distributed by the Instituto del Bien Comun. The brown area around Montetoni indicates the extent of the *Reserva del Estado a favor de las poblaciones Kugapakori, Nahua, y Nanti*. The dot is not to scale!

a few families, motivated by the objective of obtaining more metal tools, migrated across the precipitous hills that separate the Timpia river basin from the Camisea river basin.

After a few years on the upper Camisea River, these Nanti families did indeed gain access to metal tools, as a result of encounters with Matsigenkas from communities located on the lower reaches of the Camisea. Just as importantly, though, when they arrived in the region of the upper Camisea River, they also found abundant uninhabited² land for farming — especially in comparison with the steep and difficult terrain of the Timpia basin — as well as abundant fish, game, and other natural resources. News of the agreeable conditions on the upper Camisea was brought back to the Timpia basin and reached several other settlements on the Timpia River. As a result, quite a few Nanti families migrated from the Timpia river basin to the Camisea river basin over the course of the mid 1980s through the early 1990s, to the point that at present more than half of the Nanti population lives on the Camisea.³ In addition, migrations of individuals and families from the Timpia to the Camisea have continued up through the present. At the same time, it bears mentioning that over the years, a few individuals and families have migrated back to the Timpia. According to all reports from Nantis that I have met from either river basin, the groups presently living on the Timpia River have maintained their desire to avoid contact with non-Nantis; and in fact, avoiding contact and its consequences is the main reason given for the choice of some Nantis to remain, or return to, the Timpia basin, as discussed in more detail below.

The ethnonym ‘Nanti’ was given to this ethnolinguistic group in the late

digging, and the sharpest edge of an unhafted broken rock for felling trees. With only these labor intensive tools available, Nantis only cleared small garden plots on relatively poor soil where only small trees and brush grew.

²According to my understanding of regional (oral) history, the upper Camisea had previously been occupied by Matsigenka groups, but these groups had migrated elsewhere in response to a series of violent raids by neighboring Panoan groups.

³I have made estimates of the total Nanti population, as well as estimates of the Nanti population living on the Timpia river, based on accounts and descriptions given by Nantis on the Camisea.

1990s by Ángel Díaz, a Matsigenka missionary pastor affiliated with the U.S.-based Summer Institute of Linguistics (SIL),⁴ in order to replace the derogatory (and ethnolinguistically non-specific) term *kogapakori* ‘assassin, amoral person’ that Matsigenkas, and therefore everybody else, had been using to refer to the people living on the upper Timpia and upper Camisea Rivers. From the Matsigenka perspective, a *kogapakori* is any unknown, uncontacted, and presumed hostile person living further upriver and/or in the forest, regardless of ethnic or linguistic affiliation. When the people now called ‘Nantis’ learned the meaning of the Matsigenka word *kogapakori*, they strongly objected to the term. Migeró, a long-time leader and spokesperson in Montetoni, recounts saying to Díaz, “*Tera nanti kogapakori, nanti matsigenka.*” ‘I am not an amoral person, I am a human being, a moral being.’⁵ Sensitive to the need to change the negative perceptions outsiders were forming of his intended flock, and also aware of many political and institutional advantages to be gained by distinguishing these people and their language from the Matsigenkas and their language, Díaz settled upon using the name ‘Nanti’ from Migeró’s memorable declaration.⁶

Because the Nanti people lived in voluntary isolation from all other ethnic groups for several generations, as a population they are, up to the present, extremely vulnerable to introduced illnesses (Beier and Michael, 1998; MINSA, 2003; Beier, 2007). Unfortunately, their health situation is of a type that has played out countless times over the centuries in cross-cultural ‘first contact’ situations involving indigenous peoples, and the Nanti people have suffered high levels of sickness and death as a result of illnesses introduced to them from other populations. Without question, the incidence of illnesses and related deaths on the Camisea has been the

⁴Díaz worked primarily with David and Judy Payne of SIL. The Paynes are SIL veterans who have worked extensively with varieties of Ashéninka. Díaz and the Paynes collaborated to convert both educational materials and portions of the Matsigenka version of the Bible into the Nanti language.

⁵In both languages, Nanti and Matsigenka, the word *matsigenka* means ‘human being’ or ‘moral being’; see §2.4.

⁶My presentation of this story is synthesized from accounts given to me by Díaz, Migeró, and David and Judy Payne.

most traumatic aspect of Nantis' decisions to migrate there; moreover, sickness — seen as a direct result of contacts with non-Nantis — has been the most common concrete reason that Camisea Nantis cite for why the Timpia Nantis have stayed on the Timpia, rather than migrating to the Camisea, and why some Nantis have returned to the Timpia from the Camisea. Unfortunately, as a result of intermittent contacts and chains of disease transmission (Beier, 2007), sickness has reached the Timpia settlements nonetheless, and Nanti individuals have informed us that the Nanti population on the Timpia has diminished significantly in recent years.

When the first families migrated from the Timpia river basin to the Camisea river basin in the mid 1980s, they established several small settlements in the headwaters region of the Camisea. The first encounter between Nantis and Matsigenkas took place in about 1987, when a group of Nanti men were hunting quite far downriver of where the Nantis had settled and a group of Matsigenkas were gathering leaves for thatch quite far upriver of their community. Since that first fateful encounter, Matsigenkas, especially from communities on the lower Camisea River, have been centrally involved in the Nantis' relations with non-Nantis. Perhaps most impactful have been some Matsigenka individuals' efforts to 'conquer and civilize' (their terms, literally "conquistar y civilizar" in Spanish) the Nanti people, both through efforts to missionize them and efforts to educate them. These efforts have in turn brought in powerful outside institutions over the years, including the Summer Institute of Linguistics, the (catholic) Dominican mission, and Peruvian governmental and educational entities. Not surprisingly, Nantis have come to view their relations with non-Nantis as a mixed blessing, bringing both welcome and unwelcome changes to their lives.

Many aspects of Nantis' lifeways have changed since migration to the Camisea River. Perhaps most salient are the changes related to having much more frequent contact with a much larger number of individuals. Nantis have recounted that

on the Timpia, they lived in relatively small settlements that were located some distance from one another, in most cases at least half a day's walk apart. These small settlements were inhabited by extended families and tended to be matrilineal — that is, in most cases a young man would go to live with his spouse and her family rather than the other way around — but there were many exceptions to this tendency. We estimate (Beier and Michael, 1998; Michael and Beier, 2007) that most settlements on the Timpia included 20 or 30 people. Nantis have recounted that visits between settlements were amicable but relatively infrequent, roughly a handful of times a year. It seems that inter-settlement visits were made most frequently by young men seeking spouses. My observations during the period of this study indicated that Nantis preferred cross-cousin unions (a woman pairs with her mother's brother's son or father's sister's son) but this was not feasible in many cases. The only prohibition was on unions with one's classificatory siblings — the children of your mother and her sisters, or of your father and his brothers. Many Nanti men had two spouses, sisters in many cases, but no woman had two spouses. Sometimes the age difference between partners was large, especially in the case of a man's second spouse. Many Nanti pairings have lasted for decades. Most Nanti women bore eight to twelve children, the majority of whom survived to adulthood. Issues of sexual monogamy were not discussed in my presence, so I do not know what Nantis' values or practices were in this regard. It bears mentioning that a considerable amount of joking about many and varied trysts took place within the social interactional frame of feasting (see §2.6.6), but I have no data on how much this joking reflected actual sexual practices.

It also merits mention here that Nantis, up to the time of writing, have had no practice of performing marriage ceremonies, nor any other types of public ceremonies or public rituals⁷ to mark life stages or transitions. I know of two 'private rituals'

⁷By 'ceremony' and 'ritual' I mean culturally-defined and transmitted practices whose meaningfulness is symbolic or ideational, rather than practical or goal-directed.

that were practiced during the period of this study: a self-initiated post-partum seclusion, practiced by some couples, of about week for the parents of a newborn in their shared sleeping area; and a menarche seclusion for all girls, initiated by the girl's mother, in which the girl was enclosed in a tiny 'room' of *shitatsi* mats, usually in her mother's *kosena*, for about a month.

With time, and primarily due to the influence of Matsigenka individuals,⁸ in 1992 the smaller Nanti settlements that had formed on the upper Camisea consolidated into a single village called Montetoni.⁹ At its largest, in 1995, Montetoni was home to almost 250 Nantis. In 1996, however, for complex reasons, Montetoni fragmented into two villages. The second village, Marankejari, was established about 5 kilometers downriver of Montetoni by a Matsigenka school teacher and about 70 Nantis. Subsequently, several other small settlements have formed on the Camisea. As of 2009, about 170 people lived in Montetoni; about 50 lived in Marankejari; about 20 lived in Sakontojari, downriver of Marankejari; and about 10 lived in Pirijasánteni and 10 in Shinkebe, upriver of Montetoni.

In my experience, Nanti people explicitly differentiated themselves from Matsigenkas. They pointed out both cultural and linguistic reasons for considering themselves distinct peoples. At the same time, they acknowledged the high level of mutual intelligibility of Nanti and some dialects of Matsigenka (especially the Manu dialects), especially in comparison with Spanish and English. On the other hand, in political circles, a number of Matsigenka leaders have claimed that the Nanti people

⁸The most important Matsigenka actor among the Nantis in the early 1990s was Silverio Araña, a schoolteacher sent to live in Montetoni by Matsigenka administrators in the regional school system. His actions and activities are far too numerous, complicated, and ugly to detail here; see Beier and Michael (1998) for detailed information.

⁹Both Nanti and Matsigenka settlements have typically been identified based on their location relative to some significant, stable geographic feature. Usually, that feature is the river (or creek) or river's (creek's) mouth where the settlement is located; for example, *Marankejari* which can be glossed as 'snake creek', is the name of the small tributary of the Camisea River nearest to which the village known also known as Marankejari is located. Montetoni is an old name (of unknown origin) for a small but steep canyon on the Camisea River located a short distance upriver of the village known as Montetoni.

are merely a ‘backwards’ group of Matsigenkas who speak ‘broken’ Matsigenka. This rhetorical strategy, in my view, had to do with local actors’ assessments of the effective mechanisms for building and consolidating political and economic power. As a result, political tensions between the two groups have flared up at various points, and Nantis’ interests in some cases have been undercut by Matsigenka individuals in political and social arenas to which Nantis have no access but Matsigenkas do. The relationship between these two ethnolinguistic groups is complex and interesting; see Beier and Michael (1998) and Michael and Beier (2007) for additional information on relations between Nantis and Matsigenkas, and see Aza (1923, 1924); Baer (1984, 1994); Carlson (1985); Davis (1994); Johnson (2003); Johnson et al. (1986); Izquierdo (2001); Renard-Casevitz (1991); Rosengren (1987); Shepard (1988, 1997, 1999); Snell (1974, 1975, 1998); Snell and Wise (1963); Solís Fonseca (1973) for more information on the Matsigenka people.

From what Nanti friends have told me, the villages of Montetoni and Marankejari are now very unlike the small settlements on the Timpia. The primary social and political innovation was the physical co-presence of multiple extended family groups consolidated in one geographical spot. Interestingly, however, both of these villages were actually organized as a cluster of relatively economically independent ‘residence groups’ that seemed to function socially and economically in much the same way as did the small settlements on the Timpia. The large villages, then, seemed to be primarily a political alliance among these residence groups that afforded all of them intermittent access to medical and material aid from the outside world, as well as affording them novel social configurations, such as regular village-wide feasting (see §2.6.6 below).

The most dramatic practical difference between life on the Camisea and life on the Timpia had to do with the pervasive effects of the infusion of manufactured goods, and in particular metal tools, from the outside world. Metal axes, machetes,

knives, pots, and other similar technologies radically increased the productivity of the Camisea Nantis' farming activities. Hunting and fishing activities became more productive too. As a result, many everyday tasks in Montetoni are now easier, food is much more plentiful, and everyday life is more comfortable (largely due to the infusion of manufactured clothing, blankets, and mosquito nets) than in the Timpia settlements.

The impact that introduced illnesses have had on Nanti society has been severe, but for the vast majority of Camisea Nantis, the benefits of contact outweigh the risks. Life has changed in many ways over the last twenty or so years for the Nantis now living on the Camisea River, and dramatic changes continue to occur. For example, as of 2008 there was a small primary school in Montetoni run by the Dominican mission and staffed by a young Matsigenka teacher (see §2.5 for more information). Therefore, it is important to take the descriptions and generalizations I make in this study as representative only of the time period from 1995 to 2009 during which I had close contact with the community of Montetoni.

It is important to note that during the period of this study, Nanti society was unusually autonomous and self-defined relative to most indigenous groups in Peruvian Amazonia. In particular, Nanti social and verbal practices during the period of this study were relatively free from outside impositions. To a large degree, Nanti everyday life reflected the interests, choices, and priorities of the Nantis themselves, rather than being shaped by participation in a large-scale economic or political system. Of course, interactions with outsiders have had profound impacts on Nanti lifeways, but for the most part cross-cultural contact has been punctuated rather than continuous. This fact has made studying Nanti social and verbal life a truly exceptional and fascinating experience.



Figure 2.3: A group gathering in Montetoni in the late afternoon of March 5, 2005, to begin drinking *oburoki* together. Notice the brown pack at my waist, which holds a minidisc recorder and a small stereo lavalier microphone.

2.3 How I got involved with the Nanti people

My relationship with the Camisea Nantis began in 1995, in the context of a two-week humanitarian visit to Montetoni that I made with Lev Michael, to provide the community with medical and material aid that they had requested of him at the end of his first visit in 1993. Since that first visit, neither of us has ever traveled to Montetoni without the other, for two main reasons. First, in the early years, many Nantis expressed to us their distrust of single non-Nanti men, and as a result, the president of Montetoni, Migero, stipulated that we were welcome to visit only as a couple. Second, traveling to Montetoni together as often as possible, for both humanitarian and research-oriented reasons, has been an organizing principle in our lives since 1995. We made our first three-month visit to Montetoni in 1997 and

made one- to three- month visits to Montetoni in the academic summers of 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003 and 2004. In order to do focused dissertation research, we spent January-April 2004, September-November 2004, and February-May 2005 in Montetoni. Due to complicated political changes in the Peruvian government's management of the reserve the Nantis live in, we were only able to make brief humanitarian visits to Montetoni in 2007 and 2009, and were unable to actually visit the community in 2008.

As already mentioned above, while the Nanti groups living on the Camisea River have opted to experience regular contact with non-Nantis, those living on the Timpia still wish to avoid contact with non-Nantis. Out of respect for this attitude, neither Lev nor I have ever visited the Timpia River basin, and as result, I have no primary data regarding the social or verbal lives of Nantis in the Timpia river settlements; all information included in this study pertaining to goings-on on the Timpia River came from reports from Nantis either living in or visiting Montetoni.

Because of my primary commitment to promoting Nantis' own interests in their health, well-being, and self-determination, I have always combined my linguistic and anthropological research on Nanti language and society with humanitarian work on healthcare, education, land rights, and political autonomy issues. It is my humanitarian work that most interests most Nanti individuals; from my very first visit to Montetoni, Nanti leaders made clear to me that I was welcome to return to Montetoni only if I returned in order to provide them medical and material aid and to assist them in addressing the health problems they were confronting as a result of their newly-established relationships with non-Nantis. I have always been content with these terms of involvement.



Figure 2.4: Shown here is the hut that Lev and I lived in during our extended visits to Montetoni between January 2004 and January 2007 (photographed in January 2004 shortly after it was constructed). In order to avoid straining any of our friendships in Montetoni (where people build their houses through exchanges of labor), we hired four Matsigenka men from Cashiriari to construct it according to our own modest, but somewhat peculiar, specifications. Note the simple hearth under the eaves of the roof, at the front right corner of the photo.

2.4 Research at the service of Nantis' own interests

The research described in this dissertation is firmly grounded in a set of broader goals, ethics, and long-term personal commitments that I hold. I decided to study linguistic anthropology and linguistics at the graduate level, at the University of Texas at Austin, as a result of having already spent a significant amount of time doing volunteer humanitarian work with the Nanti communities on the upper Camisea River (described in Chapter 2). Those experiences deeply impressed upon me the gravity of the challenges that Nantis face as their contact with non-Nantis increases.

That work also impressed upon me how much more effective an ally and advocate I could be for the Nanti communities (and other small indigenous Amazonian communities too) with the training and credentials of a doctorate in linguistic anthropology.

As I mentioned in §, prior to the work that Lev Michael and I have done, beginning in 1995, to document Nanti language and culture, and to disseminate accurate information resulting from that documentation work, the ethnic and linguistic situation of the Nanti people was grossly misunderstood in Peru. For reasons (as I understand them) of fear combined with local dynamics of power and politics, the Nantis' nearest neighbors, the Matsigenkas, perceived of and spoke about the people now known as 'the Nantis' as *kogapakori*, a term in Matsigenka that means 'amoral being' or 'assassin'. Those Matsigenkas who had any opinion on the matter also perceived of and spoke about the Nanti language as merely 'Matsigenka spoken badly'. (Many Matsigenkas in fact still have these perceptions.¹⁰) For a long time, Matsigenkas' perceptions and opinions such as these were the only information that was spreading among non-Nantis in regard to the Nantis, for two principal reasons: first, because no one else had yet sought independent information about the Nantis; and second, because Matsigenkas were always positioned as translators and middlemen in relation to the Nantis. As a result, Lev Michael's and my research activities and advocacy work on behalf of the Nanti people — including learning the Nanti language in order to communicate directly with Nanti individuals — really have had a positive impact on Nantis' lives so far. By providing more accurate information about and more sensitive portrayals of the Nanti people, our work has positively altered the ways in which many outsiders conceive of them and, more importantly, treat them, both in face-to-face terms and at the political level.

In the most practical terms, because all Nanti people were monolingual in

¹⁰Although in most cases it makes no sense to attribute overt malice on the part of Matsigenka individuals toward Nantis in holding misinformed prejudices against them, at the same time, these attitudes have been in fact destructive to the Nantis' well-being in a variety of ways, and in some cases, overt malice was indeed a factor.

Nanti when my involvement with them began, learning to speak the Nanti language was the first and most important move I made. Aside from issues of monolinguality, however, I felt it was crucial that I become able to communicate with Nanti individuals in their own language, and according to their own practices, if I were to have any real chance of assisting them in finding appropriate and effective solutions to the kinds of problems they themselves thought they had. As a result, in short, I have organized a substantial part of my life around learning to share a Nanti perspective on the world. Along these lines, I think it is because I have chosen to behave and speak *appropriately*, by Nantis' own standards (to the degree I am able, and always with sincere and respectful intentions), that have I been able to earn many Nantis' trust. In turn, I have been able to understand, to some degree, the nature of the political, social, and health situations in which the Nantis have found themselves as a result of establishing long-term voluntary contact with non-Nantis; and in turn, I have been able, to some degree, to contribute to their well-being and autonomy as a people.

Shifting now to the issue of my research activities in particular, my decision to do documentary and descriptive research on the Nanti language, and more specifically on Nanti language use practices, is congruent with explicit requests made by various Nanti leaders and community members, that I help them address specific social and political problems — principally introduced illnesses, land use and territory/boundary issues, and cross-cultural misunderstandings — that they were confronting as a result of their relocation from the Timpia river basin to the Camisea river basin. Up to the present moment, clear communication between Nantis and non-Nantis *depends upon accurate translation* between Nanti and other languages, which makes an intimate understanding of the Nanti language and its use politically indispensable. Without clear (and sensitive) communication, none of the problems that worry the Nanti people can be effectively, or even adequately, addressed.

The Nanti people face a range of serious threats to their survival — both threats to their physical survival, resulting from their recent contact with new illnesses against which they have little immunological defense; and threats to their cultural and linguistic survival, resulting from their involvement with more powerful outsiders determined to change them in one way or another. I take my promises and commitments to the Nanti people — most fundamentally, to promote their well-being and autonomy — very seriously, and have organized many aspects of my life around humanitarian activities for their benefit, as well as for the benefit of other small indigenous groups in Peruvian Amazonia. This includes founding and running (with Lev Michael) a small 501(c)(3) non-profit charitable organization, Cabeceras Aid Project, whose mission is to provide medical and material aid as well as humanitarian assistance to these groups; see www.cabeceras.org for more information.

On a more personal note, working with and getting to know the Nanti people over the years has been an amazing, fascinating, humbling, and often really fun process. I feel very grateful for this opportunity.

2.5 Language documentation: practical and ethical considerations

With fewer than 500 speakers, Nanti is considered by standard measures an endangered language, even though essentially all of its speakers are presently monolingual in Nanti. A significant part of my motivation for working with the Nanti language has to do with the value of ‘endangered language documentation’ as an activity in its own right.

The issue of endangered language documentation actually sits at the intersection of several political, ideological, and intellectual perspectives. Many linguistic

anthropologists, descriptive linguists, indigenous communities, and indigenous activists alike share strong a commitment to documenting endangered languages, even if their particular sets of motivations are not coextensive. The perspective in common to all these groups is the inherent value of that which is linguistically unique to a particular indigenous group, and the resultant drive to preserve or document that uniqueness in some way while it is still available. In my own case, doing work to document the Nanti language and its use supports not only the political and ideological goals that Nanti individuals and I myself hold, but also supports the intellectual and ethical values I hold, of investigating, documenting, understanding, and promoting the diversity found in human languages and cultures.

The specific motivations that I and Nanti individuals have for documenting Nanti language and communicative practices are overlapping but non-identical. Crucially, however, we share an important tangible goal: to assure that Nantis are able to continue to speak Nanti as their first language, as well as to assure that their first written language can be Nanti, in spite of the pressures applied by outsiders that they speak and write Spanish and/or Matsigenka instead.

In addition to having a small number of speakers, the Nanti people, and especially Nanti children, are experiencing significant pressure from outside entities — primarily the (catholic) Dominican mission in the region, but also from Peruvian *mestizo* healthcare personnel and educators — to learn to speak Spanish. Ironically, from my perspective, one of the gravest threats to the long-term survival of the Nanti language is the institution of education. This is a two-pronged threat: first, there are presently no adequate pedagogical materials in Nanti (see below); and second, the attitudes of most Peruvian *mestizos* and acculturated indigenous people in the region, including the teachers, are strongly assimilationist — most outsiders want Nantis to become either *mestizos* or Matsigenkas, but few outsiders are content with Nantis remaining Nantis or with Nantis remaining monolingual in Nanti.

Nantis say they want, and have the internationally-recognized right, to be educated in their native language. But if their language is not documented — particularly in descriptive and pedagogical grammars, texts, and derivative educational materials — their children will have no opportunity to be educated in Nanti. I consider my own training to be a powerful tool at the service of Nantis' own interests, both at present and as their relations with outsiders unfold and change.

Over the years, the attitudes of Nanti adults toward the presence of a school in Montetoni and the introduction of the Spanish language have ranged from strongly negative to ambivalent; see Beier and Michael (1998) and Michael and Beier (2007) for a lengthy discussion of the Montetoni Nantis' early and highly damaging experiences with a Matsigenka-run school in the early to mid 1990s. Nonetheless, the pressure from outsiders — governmental representatives, missionaries, and Matsigenkas alike — has been strong, and largely insensitive to issues of Nanti self-determination. In 2007, the Dominican mission built a primary school in Montetoni and placed a young Matsigenka teacher, Willy Prialé Arias, there with his family; it remains to be seen exactly how this new presence will impact Nanti lifeways and language practices. In my view, the question is not one of whether Nanti children will eventually learn Spanish; I am sure they will. The question is whether or not they will continue to speak Nanti too, and whether they will do so with pride or shame in their ethnolinguistic heritage. While this particular Matsigenka teacher has expressed his willingness to teach Nanti children to read and write in Nanti, he has no appropriate materials for doing so. At present, the only materials available for the school in Montetoni, provided by the Ministry of Education, were prepared by the Summer Institute of Linguistics and are closely based on Matsigenka school materials. Prialé explained to us in 2009 that these materials simply are not enough like the Nanti language and its use in Montetoni to be effective. The vitality of the Nanti language, then, is as much a practical as an ideological one in the school right

now. Therefore, in the summer of 2009, Lev Michael and I met with this teacher and were able to make an agreement with him that we would provide him with appropriate materials in Nanti as soon as possible, and he would commit to using them in his classroom.

In addition to the practical goal of creating educational materials for use in Nantis' classroom education in the short term, another important goal in producing documentary materials in and on the Nanti language is to create a tangible record regarding a part of the Nanti people's collective ethnic and linguistic history for the use of present and future Nanti individuals. I see all of the work involved in gathering data for my dissertation as potentially useful to future efforts to generate useful written and recorded materials in Nanti. One of the purposes of recording Nanti discourse data will always be to analyze it in relation to my research questions, but at the same time, another purpose will always be to build the collection of recorded resources that Nantis will have for their own historical, educational, or political purposes in other contexts. In part, then, I see one of my research tasks in a study of this type to be to put together an interesting and accessible record of Nanti communicative phenomena for future use by Nantis themselves, should they so desire. After all, if the materials exist, they can choose not to use them, but if such materials don't even exist, this choice is never available. More broadly, I hope the documentary materials I produce may be a useful resource for other researchers and activists working with similar and/or related issues, especially having to do with understanding the unique languages, cultures, and societies indigenous to the Amazon Basin.

2.6 A brief sketch of Nanti social life

This section provides a brief sketch of everyday life in Montetoni during the period of this study. The purpose of this sketch is to provide an adequate and evocative

backdrop against which my subsequent discussions of Nanti ways of speaking will make sense.

2.6.1 A few words on the framework of ‘frames’

As I discuss at length in Chapter 3, I have chosen to talk about Nanti social life in this study in terms of ‘frames’ and ‘framing’. In brief, a ‘frame’ is a complex ‘type’ of human experience that is recognizable to individuals because of recurring patterns of co-occurrence among particular characteristics of novel ‘tokens’ of experience that are experienced in real (chronological, social) time. The cognitive experience of recognition, based on past experiences, projects forward from previous situations and outcomes into expectations for future situations and outcomes. Individuals take action in the shared world based on the set of assumptions and expectations they hold at any given moment regarding what ‘will’ or ‘should’ happen next. (These assumptions and expectations are, in general, sub-attentional and unexamined.) I have chosen this analytical framework because it accommodates both the unique and spontaneous nature of individual human action and the real constraints that social conventions (assumptions, habits, expectations, etc.) place on individual action.

At the broadest level, during the period of this study, there was a set of activities that Nantis regularly engaged in, in and around Montetoni, and which regularly situated, or formed the frame for, interactions, and/or which provided a context, or frame of reference, for talk. All of the activities that I describe in subsequent sections of this chapter can be seen as ‘activity frames’ inside of which, or overlapping with which, Nantis activated various ‘interactional frames’ and ‘interpretive frames’ with each other. This section lays the groundwork for subsequent detailed descriptions and discussion of Nanti ways of speaking within specific interactional frames and activity frames.

In the context of this study, **activity frames** are locally defined and durable

patterns of human activity that situate both (a) an individual's doings and (b) the sociability and communicative activity of groups. In this scheme, for any individual at any moment, at least one activity frame is always active (even if that activity frame is 'sleeping' or 'dying'). Activity frames include not only doings that individuals undertake alone and silently, but also people's most public and socially-engaged doings. In Montetoni, some of the most common activity frames were hunting, farming, fishing, manufacturing, visiting, feasting, sitting, sleeping, cooking, drinking *oburoki*, scolding, and telling hunting stories.

An **interactional frame**, in contrast, is constituted and activated by the intention of one or more individuals to communicate with one or more other individuals. Exactly how an individual's intention to communicate plays out has to do with the maintenance and sustaining of the activated interactional frame. In Montetoni, some of the most common interactional frames included inter-household visiting, chanting, gathering to drink *oburoki*, conversing, scolding, and telling hunting stories. Note that an interactional frame is always an activity frame too, while not all activity frames are interactional frames.

The next sections describe in practical terms the places and activities that framed the everyday lives of Nanti individuals during the period of this study.

2.6.2 The organization of space and place in Montetoni

In both their patterns of daily activities and in their communicative practices, Nantis in Montetoni divided physical space into four principal contrasting domains: one's home (and by extension, the village), one's garden, the river, and the forest. Note that while one's house/home, *nobanko* 'my.house,' and one's garden, *notsamaitira* 'my.cultivate.NOMINALIZER', are both conceptually and grammatically possessed, the forest, *inkénishiku* 'forest.LOCATIVE' and the river, *nijaku* 'water.LOCATIVE' are neither conceptually nor grammatically possessable. Nanti individuals spent con-



Figure 2.5: Members of each residence group in Montetoni collaborated to keep common areas clear of weeds, as shown in this photo of a group working in ‘my’ residence group. In the background are the structures of a single household; from left to right are a *magantarira* (shared by Joshi, Maroja, and children); the *kosena* (shared by Joshi, Maroja, Bikotoro, Eroba, and children); and the chicken house (shared by Maroja and Eroba); Bikotoro’s and Eroba’s *magantarira* is out of frame to the left of the *kosena*.

siderable time in all of these places over the course of the weeks, months, and years, and each of these places was associated with its own set of life-sustaining activities.

2.6.2.1 The village: houses, sleeping huts, residence groups, and community

During the period of this study, the epicenter of one’s life in Montetoni was *nobanko* ‘my.home/house’. This term refers to both the physical structure(s) of one’s house(s) and the more generalized location that encompasses the places that one most often sleeps, eats, and hangs out, as described next.

Nantis recounted that in their Timpia settlements, all the members of a settlement shared a single, very large thatched dwelling, in which each woman had an individual cooking fire, around which she, her spouse, and her children organized their sleeping, eating, manufacturing, and primary social activities. At that time, then, *nobanko* was a single large physical and social structure. Since founding Montetoni, however, and under the influence of Matsigenka expectations, most Nanti families have adopted the practice of building a small rectangular thatched sleeping hut with a raised floor (*nomagantarira* ‘my sleeping place’) and a separate *kosena*, from the Spanish word *cocina* ‘kitchen’ (*nogosenate*, in possessed form).¹¹ A *kosena* in Montetoni was a tightly-walled, relatively low, densely thatched round or oval structure with a dirt floor. It housed a family’s cooking fire and was the center of almost all adults’ daytime activities in the village. The physical form of *kosenas* in Montetoni was a blend of long-standing Nanti building strategies and strategies introduced by Matsigenkas in the 1990s. Note that the term *nobanko* was commonly used to refer to both *kosena* and *magantarira*.

In general, each *kosena/magantarira* pair pertained to one adult man and his spouse(s) and children. However, there were many exceptions to this generalization. First, a number of large *kosenas* in Montetoni were in fact shared by two men and their respective spouses and children. In some cases there was a sibling relationship among some of these adults, but not always. In these cases, each man and his family had their own separate *magantarira*.¹² Second, in many cases when a new young couple formed, this woman had her own fire in the same *kosena* as her mother, and the couple slept in this *kosena* until they built their own houses. Importantly, then, while every Nanti individual in Montetoni always pertained to a *kosena*, at any

¹¹I deduce that Nantis took to using the words *kosena* and *magantarira* as a result of coming to distinguish between two structures, in place of the single structure, *nobanko*, that they lived in prior to contact with Matsigenka influence.

¹²For example, at the time of writing, Ijonira and his two spouses and all their young children, and Ijonira’s brother Bérene and his two spouses and all their young children, shared a single, very large *kosena*. Each man and his spouses and children had a separate *magantarira*.

given moment many Nanti individuals did not pertain to a *magantarira*. During the period of this study, Nantis spent relatively little time in their sleeping huts when they weren't actually sleeping; the *kosena* was 'home' (*nobanko*) in the most real and practical sense. In fact, over the years, and especially during the years when no schoolteacher was present in Montetoni (1996 through 2007), I noticed that Nantis were becoming less and less interested in building and using a *magantarira* and were more and more likely to sleep in the *kosena* on a mat near the cooking fire. Moreover, over the years, the *kosenas* in Montetoni became larger and fewer in number, as sisters and/or mothers and daughters opted, in the long term, to share a single *kosena* with multiple cooking fires — a residence pattern much more like the prior residence patterns on the Timpia.

Another striking similarity in Montetoni to the residence patterns on the Timpia is the fact that Montetoni was functionally organized into what I call 'residence groups', as I mentioned in §2.2. There is no term in Nanti for the organizational phenomenon of a 'residence group'. Functionally, however, a residence group was a very real phenomenon; certain Nanti families built their *magantariras* and *kosenas* in clusters, and it was among and within these families that most social and subsistence activities were shared.

Similarly, although the notion 'village' is both extremely useful for this discussion of Nanti residence patterns and the best descriptor in English for Montetoni, it does not actually correspond to a single concept or word in Nanti. Rather, Nantis spoke either more specifically — in terms of people's individual homes/houses, (*nobanko* 'my.house', *ibanko* 'his.house', *obanko* 'her.house'); or more generally — in terms of 'where someone lives' (*notimira* 'my.live.NOMINALIZER', *itimira* 'his.live.NOMINALIZER', *otimira* 'her.live.NOMINALIZER'); there was no single lexical item in Nanti that meant 'village' or 'settlement' or even 'cluster of huts'. However, because the notion of *comunidad* 'community' in Spanish was so important to outsiders, some

Nantis, and in particular Migero, the long-time leader and spokesperson in Montetoni,¹³ adopted the word *komoniraro* ‘community’ from the Spanish word to refer to the recognizable intentional social cooperation and cohesion that hold Montetoni (and Marankejari) together.

As discussed at length in Beier (2001), the salience of the distinction between the notion of Montetoni as a ‘village’ vs. a ‘community’ is both interesting and important. In the present discussion, the term ‘village’ refers to the physical, mappable location where Nantis have lived on the upper Camisea River. The ‘community’ of Montetoni, on the other hand, was a social phenomenon, a state of cooperation, cohesion, and unity that was generated as a result of Nantis’ intentional engagement with each other. As I mentioned previously, to a large extent the residence groups that constituted Montetoni were largely economically independent from one another, and social contact among them was, for the most part, voluntary rather than necessary. As Migero explained it, *komoniraro* is what results from collaborative activities among all the family groups in Montetoni, including cooperative labor to clear and maintain the open areas of the village, village-wide fishing expeditions, and, perhaps most importantly, weekly village-wide feasting (see §2.6.6). *Komoniraro* was not a physical entity or a place, but rather a relational achievement that the residents of Montetoni regularly (though not continuously) cultivated.

In fact, Montetoni as a ‘village’ has actually had four different physical/geographical locations since my first visit in 1995 — pointing to the social/conceptual rather than locational salience of the ‘community’. All four village sites have been within a few kilometers of each other.¹⁴ Each relocation of the village has been motivated by a deterioration of the existing village site in some way, combined with the periodic need to reconstruct houses, as their materials age and deteriorate over

¹³See §2.6.7.3 for more information about Migero and his leadership role in Montetoni.

¹⁴The name for the village, Montetoni, is taken from the Matsigenka name for a small canyon (*pongo* in Spanish) on the Camisea River a few kilometers upriver from the village sites.

the years. In each move, the village has been relocated to an area that had already been cleared and used for a garden by one of the village residents. Likewise, in each move, a few families have moved first and the rest of the families have gradually followed, each residence group relocating at its own pace.

Although Nantis were very comfortable in the forest, the distinction between the ‘village’ and the ‘non-village’ was visibly apparent and demarcated in Montetoni. Nantis kept the ground around and between their huts clear of almost all trees, shrubs, weeds, and plants and spent substantial physical effort to scrape living areas completely bare of plant material. Aside from an apparent aesthetic preference, Nantis pointed out that keeping living areas free of vegetation was important for keeping snakes and predatory cats at a distance from domestic animals and birds as well as people.

2.6.2.2 The garden

Contemporary Nantis are hunter-horticulturalists, and a significant part of Nanti social life and economic activity during the period of this study was organized around the swidden garden — *chacra* in local Spanish and *notsamaitira* ‘my.cultivate.NOMINALIZER’ in Nanti. The garden was the source of the one and only foodstuff that all Nantis consume every day, *sekatsi* ‘yuca’ (*Manihot esculenta*). It was also the source of a wide variety of other foodstuffs and cultigens, the primary source for firewood, and, equally importantly, a place to find a measure of privacy. Although I have never been told this directly, I infer that the garden was the primary place for sexual intimacy between Nantis.

All Nanti men participated in the clearing and maintenance of at least one garden, either his own, his father’s, or his father-in-law’s. All Nanti women continuously participated in the planting, maintenance, and harvesting from at least one garden — either her spouse’s or her father’s. Children regularly accompanied



Figure 2.6: Nanti gardens are a key source of both food and firewood. In this photo of a recently cleared and planted garden, there are *sekatsi* plants, *shinki* plants, and future firewood visible both in the foreground and throughout the garden. A bright green stand of mature *sekatsi* in an adjacent garden is visible across the far back side of the garden, in front of the darker green treeline.

their mothers to the garden, and participated in harvesting and cultivating activities from a young age. I often saw very little children return to the village from the garden, trailing behind their produce-laden mothers and sisters, carrying, with dignity, a small bundle of their own from the day's harvest. Nanti farming practices are discussed in detail in §2.6.3.1.

2.6.2.3 The river

Montetoni is located on the bank of the Camisea River.¹⁵ It is my understanding that Nantis have always located their settlements very near a river or stream — in fact, usually near a river’s mouth, where a smaller stream empties into a larger river, although this has not been true for Montetoni; note, however, that the location of the first settlement called Montetoni was chosen by a Matsigenka schoolteacher, not by Nantis themselves.

The river was a very important part of everyday life during the period of this study. Nantis typically bathed two or three times a day in the river, almost always at dawn and again at dusk. In addition, women used the river to wash meat, fish, garden produce, clothes, babies, dishes, and other utensils; to obtain water; to hand-gather *jetari* fish; and to process hand-gathered forest products. Men used the river to fish with bow and arrow, hook and line, handnets, thrownets and/or gill nets (see §2.6.3.4 for more information on fishing practices); to clean hunted game; and to process hand-gathered forest products. Children also regularly hand-gathered *jetari*, as well as playing together in or near the river. My impression is that fish were a more frequent source of protein for Montetoni’s residents than was forest game, and that time at the river was, on the whole, more productive per unit time than either hunting or wild-gathering protein sources.

The importance of the river to the organization of Nanti everyday life is manifested in the directional and locative adverbs, most of which express location in relation to the river: *katonku* ‘upriver’, *kamátitya* ‘downriver’, *pasotaatira* ‘on this side of the river’, *intaati* ‘on the other side of the river’ (although *inkénishiku* ‘in(to) the forest’, and *nigánkishih* ‘in(to) the middle of the forest’, are also very important). Likewise, the river basins in their territory were important points of reference in talk, as well as important sites for subsistence activities. While the Nantis in Montetoni

¹⁵To speak precisely, all four of Montetoni’s sites have been located on the bank of the Camisea River. The current site is about a ten-minute walk into the forest from the actual riverbank.



Figure 2.7: I have added the approximate location of Montetoni to a map of the Manu National Park produced and distributed by the Manu Wildlife Center, available at www.manu-wildlife-center.com/cusco_map.htm.

and Marankejari referred to the stretch of the Camisea river where they live with the name *Kamisuja*, an adaptation of the Matsigenka name, they referred to the headwaters tributaries of the Camisea River by the following names: *Shinkebe*, *Mayóbeni*, and *Pirijasánteni*. Similarly, the Timpia River is named *Ogorakaate* and the Manu Chico River is named *Seraato* in Nanti. Upon asking where a man is at any given moment, for example, a common answer is simply *Seraato* or *Pirijasánteni*,

with the name of the river basin standing in for the set of activities associated with it (hunting, fishing, wild-gathering, etc.); likewise, upon asking where a woman is at any given moment, a common answer is simply *nijaku*, ‘at the river’.

2.6.2.4 The forest

Nestled in the foothills of the Andes Mountains, which lie just to the west, and located in the ecological zone of the Manú National Park, which lies just to the east (see map in Figure 2.7), the Nanti people are living in one of the most biodiverse regions on the planet. Conservation International has called the Tropical Andes region the “richest and most diverse region on Earth” (Conservation International, 2009) and the Manú National Park, a UNESCO World Heritage Site (UNESCO, 2009), is also considered to have one of the highest levels of biodiversity in the world.

If the diversity of plants, animals, birds, and fish in the immediate environment has been an advantage to the Nanti people, perhaps the region’s greatest disadvantage is the steepness of the hills and riverbeds, in as much as the geography makes both farming and traversing it quite difficult. At the same time, though, the forbidding hills and canyons of the Timpia River have served as the Timpia Nanti settlements’ greatest defense against outsiders, since river travel is impossible up-river of the middle Timpia River; and the difficulty involved in reaching Montetoni, due to the many dangerous rapids on the Camisea River, has prevented the intrusion of many would-be interlopers (loggers most especially).

Nantis often traveled long distances into and through the forest, up the hills, and/or over to nearby rivers and streams, in order to obtain particular resources in particular places. Nantis of all ages were extremely fleet of foot and able to travel great distances in a single day if they so desired. Nantis knew specific places to obtain specific species of animals, birds, fish, caterpillars, trees, vines, fruits, and

arrowcane, as well as other specific materials for manufacturing and housebuilding. The forest around Montetoni was laced with narrow but well-worn trails leading out into the various sectors of the forest that villagers regularly used. When Nantis went on overnight outings, they have described constructing either simple temporary cane-and-leaf shelters for a single night or two; or larger, more sturdy, but still temporary, cane-and-leaf shelters that served as a base of operations for multiple days and nights. They built these shelters either in the forest or at a river's edge, depending on where they wanted to be during the day.

Interestingly, the forest surrounding Montetoni was functionally divided up into quadrants that pertained to the different residence groups in Montetoni. This is an interesting evolution in Nanti resource management since the founding of Montetoni because, as I understand it, settlements on the Timpia River were much smaller, and moreover, all the residents of a settlement were part of the same economic/subsistence unit, so as a result there was no need for concern about who was extracting resources from which part of the forest near the settlement. Because Montetoni was made up of seven distinct residence groups, however — which were seven largely independent economic/subsistence units — resource use constituted a potential source of conflict. I don't know exactly how the present system developed, but I do know that each residence group regularly visited specific places for hunting and fishing and did not regularly use the specific places used by other residence groups — unless a collaborative effort had been overtly coordinated between or among members of different residence groups.

2.6.3 Subsistence activities

As I mentioned in §2.4, contemporary Nantis are hunter-horticulturalists, and during the period of this study, Nanti society was organized around a diverse range of subsistence activities. All Nanti men hunted and fished on a regular basis, and



Figure 2.8: I estimate that during the period of this study, Nanti men and teen-aged boys spent more of their waking hours away from the village than in it, dedicating their time to clearing and maintaining gardens, hunting, fishing, and wild-gathering. In this photo, a group of men return to the village after working together in a garden. In general, Nanti individuals — male and female, and of all ages — were extremely adept and at ease outside the setting of the village.

Nantis of all ages gardened and wild-gathered on a regular basis, in order to provide food for short-term consumption and to acquire materials for the manufacture of houses, tools, clothing, etc. Since the only food preservation technique Nantis used was smoking, which preserves meat and fish for several days at most, very regular efforts to obtain protein were made, and farming and wild-gathering activities were an important part of the organization of everyday life. The next few sections describe Nantis' farming, wild-gathering, hunting, and fishing practices.

2.6.3.1 Farming practices

All Nanti men participated in the clearing and maintenance of at least one swidden garden (called a *chacra* in regional Spanish) — either his own, his father’s, or his father-in-law’s. All Nanti women continuously participated in the planting, maintenance, and harvesting from at least one *chacra* — either her spouse’s or her father’s. Interestingly, a garden is considered the responsibility and property (in a Nanti sense of this concept) of a man, while a garden’s produce is considered the responsibility and property of a woman. A garden is referred to as *itsamaitira*, ‘his.cultivate.NOMINALIZER’, while yuca is most often referred to as *oseka*, ‘her food’.

When a man wanted to begin a new garden, he would enlist the help of other men in clearing the land. Men and women (and children too) were involved in the regular longterm planting, maintenance, and harvesting of most crops. Women were typically the decision-makers regarding the sharing of garden produce with other women (and their households by extension). Nanti adults visited their gardens several times a week, sometimes every day, in order to cut and carry firewood from it, clear weeds, and harvest and replant cultigens. Men often set up hunting blinds in their gardens as well, in order to hunt invading mammals.

The main crop that Nantis grew was yuca, *Manihot esculenta*, a starchy tuber that formed the staple of their diet; its name in Nanti is *sekatsi*, ‘yuca’.¹⁶ The Camisea Nantis cultivated many varieties of *sekatsi*, as well as several varieties of *paryanti* ‘plantain’, both green and sweet (*Musa spp.*); *shinki* ‘corn’ (*Zea mays*), *tsanaro* ‘taro’ (*Colocasia sp.*); *mágoná*, ‘wild potato’, *koriti* ‘sweet potato’, (*Ipomoea batatas*); *shonaki* ‘dale dale’ (*Calathea allouia*); *tsitíkana*, ‘hot pepper’ (*Capsicum spp.*); *shanko* and *ímpogo*, two varieties of sugarcane (*Saccharum spp.*).

Other important useful non-edible cultigens included *ampeji*, ‘cotton’ (*Gossypium sp.*); *kogi*, ‘barbasco’ (*Lonchocarpus urucu*); *potsoti*, ‘achiote’ (*Bixa orel-*

¹⁶Note that the verb that means ‘eat’ is *seka*; the term *sekatsi* is lexicalized from the root *seka* plus the morpheme *tsi* which indicates alienable possession.



Figure 2.9: In this photo, taken in 2005, Bikotoro is helping his spouse Éroba (not pictured) harvest *sekatsi*. Although men often help with harvesting produce from household gardens, the labor of harvesting produce, as well as the produce itself, was always spoken about as ‘belonging’ to women.

lana)¹⁷; *seri*, ‘tobacco’ (*Nicotiana tabacum*); *pijaryentsi*, ‘bottle gourd’ and *pajo*, ‘dish gourd’ (both *Lagenaria siceraria*); and two kinds of seed beads, *chobankiriki* (*Sapindus saponaria?*) and *sarijoki* (*Coix lacryma-jobi*).

The crop most often shared among women was *sekatsi*, for the preparation of *oburoki*, a fermented yuca ‘beer’ that was consumed during village-wide feasting. See §2.6.6 for further discussion of feasting.

¹⁷Achiote is, in fact, edible, but it was not considered so by Nantis.

2.6.3.2 Domesticated animals

Although Nanti individuals did not seek out and raise animals specifically for consumption during the period of this study, many people in Montetoni domesticated and/or cared for a variety of mammals and birds. Treated as pets, these animals eventually either escaped or were eaten. People often brought back infant birds and animals — including guans, curassows, monkeys, coatis, and even tapirs — that they encountered in the forest, usually as a result of having killed the mother while hunting. Over the years, a number of households acquired dogs from Matsigenkas, but dogs lived very short lives in Montetoni, usually dying young from snakebite or starvation.

In addition, since the introduction of *chaberi* ‘chickens’ by visiting Matsigenkas, *chaberi* have become an immensely popular (and prolific) addition to Nanti households, primarily as pets. Nantis show a great general interest in and fondness for birds, and these sensibilities have extended to *chaberi*. Nantis almost never killed their chickens to eat them, although they did occasionally give or barter chickens to *mestizo* and Matsigenka visitors from downriver. Likewise, Nantis rarely ate *chaberi ogitsoni* ‘chicken eggs’, preferring to let them hatch. As a result, many women have 15 or 20 chickens at a time, of all ages. Though far fewer in number, introduced *pantyo* ‘ducks’ enjoy the same lifestyle as *chaberi* do in Montetoni.

2.6.3.3 Wild-gathering practices

As mentioned above in §2.6.2.4, Nantis have recounted traveling long distances into and through the forest in search of specific natural resources. These trips were always, in effect, combined hunting and wild-gathering trips, since during the period of this study Nanti men never left the village for the forest without bow and arrows in hand. Most of the time, a trip away from the village and into the forest was made with a destination and target in mind, but other kinds of food and plant resources

were usually gathered or hunted opportunistically along the way.

The most important wild-gathered food sources were various species of caterpillars, grubs, beetles, fruits, and nuts. Wild-gathered materials included various types of tree barks (primarily for manufacturing string and rope), vines, *saboro* flower stalks (*chakopi* ‘arrowcane’) for making arrows, and leaves (primarily *kapashi* leaves for thatching houses and *saboro* leaves, or *saboropena*, for weaving *shitatsi* mats). Nanti harvest various species of trees for manufacturing and house-building, including *kuri* palm trunks for bows and *kamona* palm trunks for flooring.

A number of wild-gathered resources required tree-climbing to be gathered, and I infer that most Nanti men were skillful and fearless climbers. Nanti women never climbed trees, to my knowledge. Nanti men used a technology to climb trees that they called *magitensi*, which is a bundled loop of thin rope that was looped around the man’s two feet and used to press firmly against the tree trunk as the man lifts himself with his arms. During the period of this study, men, women, and children alike wore *magitensi* as an adornment (men wore one bundle across the shoulder and chest, while women wore two bundles across the shoulders and chest), but only men and boys used them as a climbing tool.

2.6.3.4 Hunting and fishing practices

Hunting and fishing were regular and important activities in Nanti society. Excepting in circumstances of illness or extremely bad weather, I estimate that most men (that is, males over about 15 years old) hunted and/or fished at least twice a week during the period of this study.¹⁸ Hunting and fishing trips usually involved several individuals, and often involved an entire household or the majority of a residence group. As mentioned above in §2.6.2.4, Nantis regularly traveled great distances in pursuit of particular resources, and special trips to the *Seraato* river basin for fish

¹⁸This pattern will be radically altered by the presence of a school.



Figure 2.10: In the dry season months when the river level was already low, residents of Montetoni often built fishing dams across a section of the river, as shown here in 2004. Rocks were arranged and then leaves placed along the upriver side to seal the gaps between the rocks. The purpose of the dam was to create shallow areas in which individuals could easily hand-gather or arrow-pierce fish visible in the crystal-clear waters.

or monkeys, to the Sakontojari river basin for fish, or to the watershed hills between the Camisea and Timpia river basins for coveted species of birds were made in regular cycles.

In general, during the time period of this study, Nanti men hunted game animals with bows and arrows.¹⁹ They also fished large fish with bows and arrows when the water was clear. In turbid river conditions, Nantis preferred to use (imported) nylon thrownets for large fish. For small fish, Nantis used handwoven hand nets and (imported) hooks and line.

¹⁹In 2007, the Dominican mission began giving shotguns and shells to Nantis.

Prior to migrating out of the Timpia River basin, Nantis recounted primarily fishing with bow and arrows. Manufactured fishing technologies, including nylon fishline, metal fishhooks, and woven nylon thrownets, introduced by outsiders quickly became very popular among the Nantis living on the Camisea, and have been among the kinds of material aid most consistently requested of Cabeceras Aid Project.

Because there were no settlements upriver of the Nanti settlements, and because the population density in the upper Camisea river basin was very low, during the period of this study game animals and fish were bountiful. The main animals hunted included: monkeys (woolly, howler, spider), peccaries (white-lipped and collared) tapirs, deers, pacas, and agoutis; the main birds hunted included currasows, guans, chachalacas, and doves.

Perhaps the most frequently eaten type of fish was the *jetari*, a type-level term for numerous species of armored catfish in the *Loricariidae* family (known as *carachama* in Spanish). Ranging in size from an inch in length to perhaps 10 inches in length, the varieties of *jetari* available in the headwaters regions of the Camisea, Manu Chico, and Sakontojari rivers were numerous and plentiful. These fish are bottom feeders and spend long stretches of time sucking algae from rocks on the riverbed, making hand-gathering them a relatively easy task (for a Nanti). During the period of this study, Nantis frequently hand-gathered *jetari* among the river rocks right next to the village, but they also made regular trips to various places where *jetari* were especially plentiful.

The generic term for fish in Nanti is not *jetari*, however, but *shima*. This term is also used specifically for the species *Prochilodus nigricans*, called *boquichico* in regional Spanish. The generic category *shima* includes a diverse range of scaled, smooth-skinned, and armored fish of various sizes. Very small fish, however, are categorized as *shibajegi*.



Figure 2.11: In this photo, taken in 2005, a couple work on manufacturing tasks side by side in their *kosena*: Márota is weaving a *shitatsi* mat while Jabijero is carving bamboo arrow heads. In situations such as this, I observed that Nanti individuals were usually silent, engaging in talk to coordinate their activities but rarely talking in order to talk; see §2.8 for further discussion.

During the period of this study, many Nanti men cultivated *kogi* ‘barbasco’ (*Lonchocarpus urucu*), a vine whose resin is toxic to fish and as a result was used for large-scale fishing activities. Because it kills so many fish at once, Nantis used *kogi* infrequently and cautiously, and when they did so, large groups of people participated in order to catch as many of the poisoned fish as possible.²⁰

2.6.3.5 Manufacturing practices

Nantis manufactured a variety of useful objects out of either cultivated or wild-gathered materials. The objects manufactured by men included: houses, bows, arrows, bowstring, rope, cooking paddles, knotted string bags, and *koriki* nosedisks, an adornment worn by Nanti women. The objects manufactured by women included: *shitatsi* mats (as sitting and sleeping surfaces, also sometimes used for walls) cotton thread, cotton cloth, woven strainers for *oburoki* ‘yuca beer’, beaded necklaces and other adornments. Prior to the introduction of metal pots and metal and plastic utensils, women manufactured clay bowls and pots, but this labor-intensive activity was given up entirely in Montetoni as soon as metal pots were available.

Manufacturing was most commonly done in the *kosena* ‘cooking hut’, often on a *shitatsi* mat near the fire. Some activities that required more space, such as weaving mats and weaving cotton cloth with a backstrap loom, were more commonly done outside near the *kosena* or near the sleeping hut. Apart from manufacturing objects, time at home was also regularly given to the repair and maintenance of these sorts of items; again, most of these activities took place in the *kosena*.

With the introduction of axes in the late 1980s, Nantis began manufacturing canoes and wooden fermenting vessels; these objects were manufactured at the site of the felled tree rather than in the village.

2.6.4 The organization of time and activity in Montetoni

Like every place, Montetoni had a loosely regular rhythm of life, a comfortable sort of cyclicity of activities that lent time itself a uniquely Nanti character.

Activities in Montetoni were very much in tune with the cycle of the sun. At only about 11 degrees south of the equator, both daylight and darkness in Montetoni were roughly 12 hours long, every day of the year. On regular non-feast days, I would

²⁰ *Lonchocarpus urucu* paralyzes fish gills, so that they die of suffocation. It is not toxic to humans, animals, or birds.

say that, on average, Nantis were awake and active for roughly 15 hours, from about 4 in the morning until about 7 in the evening, and asleep or at rest for the remaining 9 hours. Nanti adults were, in general, most active between 4 in the morning and 1 or 2 in the afternoon.

Table 2.1: Talking about time in Nanti

TIME ANCHORED IN THE MOMENT OF SPEAKING	
Maika	Now, right now, today, a point in time
Kamani	Tomorrow, a day in the near future
Paita	Later
Inkajara	Recently, already
Chapi	Yesterday, a day in the recent past
Pairani	A long time ago
NATURAL PHENOMENA WITH TEMPORAL IMPLICATIONS	
Kenti	Sun
Cashiri	Moon
Impokiro	Stars and planets
Oshirijagajira nija	The dry season, 'when the water dries'
Okimojatajira nija	The wet season, 'when the water grows'
TIME ANCHORED IN THE MOVEMENT OF THE SUN	
Mapunajenka	First light
Okuta	The beginning of day
Kamani onkute	Tomorrow at first light
Kutagite	Daytime
Kenti katinka	Midday
Shabinitanaji	Eveningtime, evening-fall
Chapinitanaji	Nighttime, night-fall
Chapinijenka	Nighttime
Sagiteniku	The wee hours
Nigankigite	Midnight

Typically, the adult residents of Montetoni arose before dawn, at first light. If men were going out to hunt, especially at some distance from the village, they often left at this hour. People often went to their gardens at the very beginning of

the day, as well. In the dry season, when there were few clouds and little rain, the sun was blazing hot by 8 in the morning sometimes, and so people preferred to be either indoors or in the shade of their gardens or the forest by the time the sun was shining intensely.

Whenever the weather was good — which meant no rain and few clouds — there were relatively few people in the village during the day. The majority of families were out gardening, hunting, fishing, and/or wild-gathering. More often than not, the only people in the village during the daytime were a small number of women and small children, anyone who was sick or injured, and me and Lev. The principal exception to this rule were the days when a household was preparing *oburoki*, in which case all the women of the household were often together in the *kosena*.

When the weather was not good — which meant heavy rains and/or low temperatures — people tended to stay in the village. If the skies cleared early enough in the day, though, people would often make more brief outings to garden or fish. The degree to which Nanti adults were willing to venture out in wet or cold weather was closely calibrated to the quantity of food and firewood they had at hand.

Typically, everyone who had left the village for the day was back home by dusk. Most of the time, people returned from gardening, fishing, hunting, and wild-gathering activities by about 3 in the afternoon, which left time for bathing and visiting (see §2.6.5) before nightfall. On non-feast days, the village was usually quiet and still by 7 in the evening.

In broader terms, activities in Montetoni were in tune with the seasons. In the Amazon Basin, there are just two seasons: the dry season and the wet season. Interestingly, the timing of these two seasons varies quite a bit in different parts of the Amazon Basin. In the lower Urubamba River valley, which includes the Camisea

and Timpia river basins, the pattern is to see a peak of intense rains, swollen rivers, and sodden earth in January, and to see a peak of brilliant sunshine, quiet trickling rivers, and parched earth in September. In the area around Montetoni, the dry season spans roughly May to September (5 months), and the wet season spans roughly October to April (7 months).

During the dry season, families, and even entire residence groups, occasionally made multi-day or even multi-week trips to specific places where desired resources were available. During the wet season, in contrast, when the rains were heavy and the river rose, Nantis were much more cautious about deciding to leave the village, even for a full day. The principle reason, I infer, that Nantis did not make lengthy trips during rain was that someone always carried coals for starting a fire at their destination (matches being a recently introduced and still vulnerable source of fire) for warmth and cooking food, and rain was likely to extinguish the coals — thereby extinguishing the possibility of either warmth or cooked food. Although Nantis' tolerance for wet and cold was admirable, they also tended to avoid being wet and cold for long periods of time.

Occasionally, the region experiences cold snaps (called *friajes* in local Spanish), which typically involve heavily clouded skies, brisk winds, and temperatures in the mid to low 60s. A *friaje* often lasts three to five days. When I have been in Montetoni for a cold snap, nearly everyone has stayed in their *kosenas*, huddled together by the fire, waiting for the cold snap to pass, eating whatever food they have on hand.

2.6.5 Visiting

A key aspect of Nanti social life in Montetoni during the period of this study was the making of inter-household and inter-residence group visits. Most (adult) visiting was done in the evenings, between about 5pm and 6pm, after people had returned



Figure 2.12: Visiting was a key social activity in Montetoni during the period of this study. Here, in 2005, Anita (at right) is visiting her mother Maroja (at left) while Maroja is straining *oburoki*. The two women live in different residence groups, but they typically visit one another at least once every day. Atypically, a bundle of fresh meat wrapped in leaves (brought to Maroja by someone, but I don't know who) is sitting waiting on the floor in front of Anita; as soon as Maroja finished her task and cleaned her hands, she cooked it.

to the village from the day's activities but before sunset. If people had stayed the day in the village, were not sick, and the weather was not severe (which were the two most common reasons that people stayed the day in the village), visiting also took place during daytime hours. Note that, on the whole, Nanti women spent more daytime hours in the village than men did, and correspondingly engaged in daytime visiting activities more often.

Nantis most frequently visited other huts within their own residence groups, but visits to other residence groups, and especially visits to parents and siblings in

other residence groups, were also very frequent. Typically, the visitor(s) approached the *kosena* of the visitee(s), stopped at the door, and peered inside to see if the intended visitee(s) was present. If the visit was meant to be brief, the visitor simply crouched at the door and conversed several turns with the visitee(s). If the visit was meant to be lengthy, then upon seeing the intended visitee(s), the visitor entered the *kosena*. Explicit permission to enter was not required; whether a person would enter another's *kosena* was, apparently, keyed to the visitor's level of comfort with interacting with the present occupants of the hut.

Typically the visitor entered the *kosena* of the visitee and sat down either near the doorway or near the location of the primary visitee. Interestingly, neither the visitor or the visitee was expected to begin conversing immediately. It was not uncommon for a visitor to arrive, sit down, and simply sit in silent co-presence with the visitee for some time. I even witnessed occasions when someone came to visit, entered someone's hut, sat down, attended to ongoing activities and/or conversation, and then left without ever having said anything. More often than not, of course, visitors and visitees did interact verbally. The principal topics of visits of this sort were the recent activities of the participants, their families, and everyone else of common interest. See §2.8 for more detailed discussion on Nanti interactional conventions and practices. Less commonly, these visits provided the opportunity for the sharing of food resources; more often the visitor left with food, though sometimes the visitor arrived in order to give food.

If all the residents of a *kosena* were away, typically the last one to leave covered the entry with something, usually a *shitatsi* mat; this practice had two useful outcomes: it served to inform others that the residents were all away for a stretch of time; and (to some degree) it kept interloping dogs, chickens, children, and other curious visitors out of the empty *kosena*.

2.6.6 Feasting

Feasting in Montetoni, during the period of this study, constituted a radical break from the activity frames and interactional frames of the rest of the week. I use the word *feasting* here to refer to a complex set of activities that center around the sharing and drinking of *oburoki* (manioc beer)²¹ in Montetoni over the course of anywhere from 18 to 72 hours. During my lengthy stays in Montetoni between 1999 and 2005, this set of activities recurred roughly every six to nine days. Without homogenizing everyday activities overmuch, it is safe to say that the contrast between ‘feasting’ and ‘non-feasting’ was clear and stark to Nantis as much as to me during the period of this study. In this section, I will describe some of the key elements of feasting, taking advantage of some of the contrasts it provides with non-feasting days.

Nantis referred to the social and temporal frame that accompanies feasting with the existential statement, *Aityo oburoki*, ‘There is manioc beer’. There was no category term in Nanti for the event itself; I have chosen the terms ‘feast’ and ‘feasting’ because they reflect the aspects of the celebration of plenitude and the conviviality of sharing that characterize these regular (cyclical) events in Montetoni. Nantis referred to the feast-internal activities of drinking *oburoki* with declarative intransitive statements such as *nobiika* ‘I drink’; *yobiikajigaka* ‘they have drunk’; and *noshinkitaka* ‘I got drunk’. They referred to chanting in a similar manner, saying *nomatikake* ‘I chanted’.

During the period of this study, feasting was actually an important organizing principle for many activities throughout the (non-feasting) days of the week, because of the cycle of *oburoki* production. The cycle is shown in Table 2.2.

²¹Manioc beer is common throughout Amazonia, and has been for centuries (Hornsey, 2003). Called *masato* in Peruvian Spanish, it is a beverage made by the open-air fermentation of manioc (*yuca* in Peruvian Spanish; *sekatsi* in Nanti; *Manihot esculenta*) mash. Fermentation results from first adding a source of sugars (in the Nanti case, corn sprouts or sweet potatoes) and then adding enzymes through mastication of some of the manioc mash.



Figure 2.13: Nantis harvested large quantities of *sekatsi* for the preparation of *oburoki* for village-wide feast gatherings. In this photo, taken in 2005, Migeró and his spouse Arísuja return from their garden, each carrying perhaps 25 or 30 kilos of yuca.

More often than not, feasting only occurred in one place at a time in Montetoni, such that all villagers who were interested in feasting were in the same place together. Nantis often went to considerable lengths in order not to end up with conflicting gatherings, which led to the socially awkward process of individuals deciding which gathering to attend — for example, household members often carefully investigated who was planning to serve *oburoki* when, and then calibrated the straining and diluting of their batch to the serving order they expected. In addition, men

Table 2.2: The feasting cycle in Montetoni

Day 0.	A feast ends.
Day 1.	All participants rest for an entire day.
Day 2 and 3.	The subsequent day or two, most villagers garden, hunt, fish, wild-gather.
Day 3 or 4.	Women harvest large quantities of <i>sekatsi</i> .
Day 4.	Women peel, boil, mash, and masticate <i>sekatsi</i> into <i>oburoki</i> mash.
Days 5-6.	The <i>oburoki</i> mash is left to ferment. The fermentation is ‘open air’ (that is, no starter or yeast is used), catalyzed by the saliva added in the mastication step. Corn sprouts and/or sweet potato are added to increase the sugar content of the mash and to accelerate fermentation.
Days 6 and/or 7, maybe 8.	Each batch of <i>oburoki</i> mash is diluted with water and strained to a drinkable consistency right before it is served. Each woman who has prepared a batch of <i>oburoki</i> shares it out to visiting drinkers herself, or enlists the help of other female relatives or residence group members.

often positioned themselves carefully during a gathering at one place in order to say, *aityo oburoki*, ‘there is beer (at my place)’ at the crucial moment when the current serving household announced, *tsoja*, ‘(Our *oburoki* has) run dry’. so that the gathering would relocate in its entirety to their household. Occasionally households even relocated their own guests in the early stages of drinking, if they learned of a simultaneous gathering and assessed that it was strategically wise to reorder drinking activities in that way.

For most individuals in the village, the location of current or imminent feasting activities was found out through either word of mouth or simple observation. That is, if one walked around the village in search of the feasting location, you would find it, based on sounds, unless someone told you where to go first. By convention, any comer was welcome to join the gathering, and was in some sense included in the sharing of *oburoki* — although the rate at which any particular person was served *oburoki* was strongly determined by the number of people present and their relative distribution in space. But a safe social expectation in Montetoni was that anyone was free to join a feasting gathering anywhere.

If all feasting gatherings had an informal, open door policy, it is also true that some individuals were pointedly invited by the hosts to come and drink, and that this step of making invitations was an important way to both initiate and maintain close bonds between individuals and households. Men often took the opportunity provided by a new batch of ready-to-serve *oburoki* to go to the households of a few men who were important to them and invite those men to come drink. Men often made these invitations in a somewhat stiff and unusual manner, perhaps walking, dressing, and/or speaking in a manner sufficiently atypical to draw the attention of onlookers or visitees, and not infrequently making purposeful visits to men in distant residence groups to deliver an invitation. Likewise, though typically with a more casual demeanor, women often visited households that were socially important

to them or to their households and invited people to come drink. Note that, in general, if the invitation was simply ‘about’ the invitation to drink together, women and teenage children more often than men were the messengers. In contrast, if the invitation was as much ‘about’ the *making* of the invitation by one household to another, or by one individual to another, then it was more likely for a man to take on the task. Reframing this observation, if the invitation was about maintaining already strong inter-household bonds, in which the social stakes were very low, women and teenage children tended to do the inviting. But if the invitation was about initiating a bond, or strengthening a weak bond, between households, in which the social stakes were relatively high, then men tended to do the inviting. Speaking in Bourdieu-ian terms, Nanti men worked hard to accrue a certain kind of social capital through interactions like these, and likewise they spent that kind of social capital very prudently (Bourdieu, 1977). Note, strategically, that if a person didn’t invite individuals or families to drink, then if particular individuals did not join the gathering, it didn’t really count as a rejection; whereas if an individual or a family group was overtly invited, but then did not participate, it did count as a rejection, and all parties ended up vulnerable to social scrutiny and criticism.

I observed during my stays in Montetoni that an overt invitation to drink with someone can be a very tricky interactional frame. First, the response given to an invitation amounted to a significant level of social commitment on the part of the invitee to the inviter to attend. Second, if an invitee has said he will attend, he was strongly and rightly expected to attend by everyone who knew he said ‘yes’ — both co-present overhearers and anyone that the inviter told that the invitee had accepted an invitation. On the other hand, if the invitee said ‘no’, he would not come, his saying ‘no’ was likely to be widely quoted and to be evaluated in a negative light by other Nantis. All in all, the most-often used safe and noncommittal answer was *nokema* ‘I hear/understand’, which constituted an appropriate next-turn

response, and yet did not constitute an overt commitment to a particular course of action. Note that the principal reason that an invitee might decline an invitation in the context of village-wide feasting would be the co-occurrence of feasting at a more desirable location; therefore, inviters were careful to know specific details about other feasting activities in the village before inviting people to drink in their households. Other issues and nuances regarding who invited whom to drink were closely tied to issues of social prominence, which is discussed at length in §2.6.7.4.

Feasting was a village-wide activity in two senses. First, as I have mentioned, everyone in the village was free to participate in drinking wherever it was going on. Not only were individuals expected to simply arrive and join the group, but passers-by were often called in to drink as they approached a drinking group. Second, in my observation, during every feast at least one household in every residence group produced and shared *oburoki*, and in many cases, almost every adult woman in the village produced and shared her own batch. As a result, each feast involved a huge total amount of *oburoki*; in 2000, I estimated that some feasts involved the harvest of about 500 kilos of yuca, and resulted in 200 to 250 gallons of *oburoki*, for consumption in a village of about 180 people! That said, I estimate that some adult men consumed upwards of 5 gallons of *oburoki* each over the 18 to 24 hours of a feast.

The feasting practices I observed in Montetoni during the period of this study had a very interesting relationship to the Nantis' migration to the Camisea river basin. First, feasting as frequently and intensively as Nantis were feasting in Montetoni was a direct result of the introduction of manufactured vessels — pots, buckets, and bowls — to which the Nantis have only had access since migrating to the Camisea.

Second, feasting required vast quantities of excess *sekatsi* (yuca, sweet manioc) — excess in the sense that it was *sekatsi* that was available beyond what was

used for daily food needs in the residence group. And the farming practices that made such large quantities of excess *sekatsi* possible required manufactured tools, specifically axes and machetes. This is because the key limiting factor on garden production is garden size, and garden size is dependent on the gardener's ability to clear a plot or plots of land at the right time of year, and this ability depends on the tools available to him. With machetes, clearings are opened up quickly. With axes, trees are felled quickly. Of course, speed is a relative concept, and Nanti were comparing their contemporary farming techniques using metal tools with their prior farming techniques using digging sticks and broken stones, so the difference in clearing accomplished per hour of labor was dramatic.

It is my impression that most Nanti women who came to the Camisea as adults had long-term personal experience with making (fermenting) *oburoki*; in my early visits to Montetoni, I saw women fermenting small portions of mash by masticating *sekatsi* and then placing it in leaves to ferment. Many of the women with whom I have discussed the history of *oburoki* production indicated that they knew how to make it, but not in the quantities that it is now made on the Camisea. The key aspects of *oburoki* production that have changed since the migration from the Timpia are the frequency of production and the quantity produced.²²

2.6.7 Aspects of social organization in Montetoni

2.6.7.1 The identification of groups of people

In both the Nanti and Matsigenka languages, the word *matsigenka* is both important and polysemous, and a source of significant cross-cultural confusion. Taken by itself, the word *matsigenka* in the Nanti language is best glossed as 'human being' or 'person' and contrasts with non-human things and beings of all sorts (animals, spirits and the dead, inanimate objects, etc.). It is also often used, however, to

²²A few women have indicated to me that they did not make *oburoki* prior to living on the Camisea River.

contrast the social and moral qualities of some human beings' behavior with the asocial, antisocial, and/or amoral behavior of other beings. Thus, Nanti individuals characterized someone who attacked a Nanti settlement on the Timpia as a *matsigenka* rather than an animal or evil spirit; but also characterized this attacker as *not* a *matsigenka* but rather a *kentantatsirira*, which means 'one who shoots arrows (at people)' or *sarijantatsirira* 'one who attacks (people)'. The fact that the noun *matsigenka* is also used as an ethnonym for the 'Matsigenka' or 'Machiguenga' people compounds confusion regarding the ethnolinguistic relationship between the groups now known as 'Matsigenka' and 'Nanti'. As discussed in §2.2, the ethnonym 'Nanti' was given to this group of people in the late 1990s by a Matsigenka missionary.

In Nanti referential practice, an individual's current place of residence — in the physical sense of a geographically locable settlement — was key for Nantis in identifying that person. A person was usually identified and referred to in conversation by their place of residence; for example, a Nanti visitor from Marijentari was referred to as *Marijentarikunirira* 'Marijentari.LOCATIVE.NOMINALIZER' and a Matsigenka visitor to Montetoni from the downriver village of Segakiato (called Segakijari in Nanti) was referred to as *Segakijarikunirira*, 'Segakijari.LOCATIVE.NOMINALIZER'.

Nantis did not often categorize people in 'ethnic' or 'racial' terms. They used the term *birákocha* (borrowed from Matsigenka) to refer to Spanish-speaking non-Nantis; and they used the term *kurinko* (also introduced by Matsigenkas but derived from the Spanish word *gringo*) to refer to non-native-Spanish-speaking non-Nanti people they have met (people like me, Lev, my kin, other people from wherever I am from, US SIL missionaries, etc.) If, however, a particular *birákocha* were known to live in Lima, he would typically referred to as *Rimakunirira*.

2.6.7.2 Aspects of the organization of interpersonal relations

The principal way that Nanti individuals referred to one another during the course of this study was via a fairly complex set of kinship terms. There were separate vocative and third person forms for all kin categories, and distinct sets of terms for male and female egos. The kinship system categorized blood relationships in interesting ways, only some of which are relevant to the present study. Most important is the fact that each parent and all his or her same-sex siblings fell into the same kinship category. That is, I would call my mother and all her sisters *ina* and I would call my father and all of his brothers *apa*. Similarly, all the same sex children of my same-sex parent fell into the same category, so I would call all of my own sisters and all of the daughters of my mother's sisters *nobire*; and I would call all of my own brothers and all of the sons of my father's brothers *iariri*. Interestingly, there were no consanguinal terms for my father's sisters, my mother's brothers, or their children. However, since Nanti reproductive practices showed a preference for 'cross cousin' unions, these were exactly the categories of individuals most likely to become one's in-laws, for which there is another set of kinship terms, including *nokoriti* for one's spouse (of either gender).

An interesting and relatively unusual aspect of Nanti social (and verbal) life was their interpersonal naming practices. Prior to contact with non-Nantis, Nantis relied almost exclusively on kinship terms to refer to one another, and had no practice of assigning a 'name' — a unique identifier — to their children. Because Nanti settlements on the Timpia had relatively few residents — around 20 to 30 people — I infer that the everyday management of personal reference using origo-anchored kinship terms was relatively easy, simply because one had so few individuals to refer to. As Nantis tell it, a very small number of famous — or, better said, 'infamous' — adults on the Timpia had personal names (unique identifiers) given to them, but my sense is that these names were used specifically by people who did not know

these individuals personally, but only knew of and spoke of their acts of aggression on other Nantis.

Another important aspect of interpersonal reference and discursive reference among Nantis is closely tied to local sociocultural configurations. In my experience, and in my data set, Nantis relied heavily on third person pronouns and third person verbal argument clitics in their referential practices. As a newcomer to Montetoni, I found this practice very confusing and ambiguous, but Nantis, of course, had no difficulty identifying third person referents in such cases. In observing this practice over the last ten years, I have figured out some of the principles by which Nanti referential practice operates. Basically, Nantis calculated reference based on (1) degree of intimacy or association with other people; (2) degree of frequency of particular activities at particular times of day; and (3) degree of probability of a certain person being in a certain place. In other words, Nanti individuals possessed very detailed understandings of the relationships and habits of other individuals, and used these understandings as a base for third person reference. For example, if a person asked a woman, *Tya ijatake*. ‘Where did he go?’ the most probable referent was the woman’s spouse. If, however, the woman’s spouse was co-present at the time the question was asked, then next most probable referent was the next most significant male in the woman’s life, and so on.

The first names that I use for individual Nantis in this study are names that were assigned to them by outsiders — either by Ángel Díaz, the Matsigenka pastor who coined the name ‘Nanti’ (see §2.2), by Silverio Araña, the first Matsigenka school teacher who lived with the Camisea Nantis, or by visiting healthcare personnel. Over the years, Nanti individuals have also been assigned last names (two, a patronym and a matronym, in the hispanic tradition) but the degree of inaccuracy and confusion surrounding these last names is so great that I entirely avoid tangling with them. When Araña and Díaz named the individuals who had migrated from the Timpia

to the Camisea basin, they gave every person a unique first name, so to this day, in almost all cases, any first name refers only to one individual.²³

Over the years since Nanti individuals were first named in the early 1990s by outsiders — for those outsiders' own convenience — Nantis themselves have come to find first names useful. I speculate that the primary reason for this is that not all residents of Montetoni have kinship ties with one another, which means that the previously appropriate system of kinship term reference was no longer sufficient to refer to all villagers. Montetoni was a much larger settlement by far than any Nanti settlement on the Timpia River. As a result, the referential possibilities were far more numerous. Not surprisingly, as a rule, the younger the person, the more comfortable they were with the notion and use of personal names, and so the children were best able to remember and rely on others' personal names.

2.6.7.3 Basic social categories and roles

During the period of this study, Nanti society was remarkably flat and egalitarian, both in practice and in cross-cultural terms. First, there was no formalized or institutionalized economic specialization in Montetoni. All men hunted, fished, farmed, wild-gathered, and engaged in certain manufacturing tasks. All women raised children, farmed, engaged in certain manufacturing tasks, kept a larder and kitchen to feed her family, and so on. Informally, some individuals excelled at certain tasks relative to other individuals, and so some men hunted more frequently, while other men fished more frequently, but these differences in practice were freely self-selected. Only some women knew how to weave cloth with a backstrap loom, but apparently any woman who wanted to learn could learn. The economic impacts of these personal kinds of talent or specialization were seen at the level of inter-individual and

²³The few cases of duplicate first names have resulted either from confusion on the part of outsiders (including the renaming of adults) or the ignorance of healthcare providers regarding the systematicity of Nanti first names thus far. Compounding the confusion and ignorance is the fact that written records were ill-kept and often lost by the healthcare personnel.

inter-household exchange, while the social impacts were seen at the level of relative social prominence and repute that certain individuals had for certain tasks.

Second, while men and women have different roles and responsibilities, there was no discourse of the inferiority or superiority of one or the other sex.²⁴ Nanti children became competent at gender-appropriate tasks at a very young age (see Figure 2.14). For example, five year old girls were skilled at many aspects of fire tending and food preparation. Boys began playing with toy bows and arrows at about 4 years old, and began to hunt with adult men at roughly 12 to 14 years old.

Third, there were almost no overtly acknowledged or titled ‘specialists’ of any type in Montetoni — including the absence of so-called ritual or medicinal specialists, even though such types of roles are common in Amazonia and even among the neighboring Matsigenkas. Rather, knowledge of a small but important set of curing practices was widely shared among adults, and there were no secret or specialized knowledge nor practices that were considered exclusive. A few practices were considered to be the domain of women and a few others the domain of men, but these were not carried out in secrecy. Likewise, over the years, certain individuals practiced certain types of knowledge more frequently than others did, but these individuals were self-selected.

Three ‘specialist’ roles emerged in Montetoni after ongoing relations with non-Nantis began; these were the roles of *peresetente*, from the Spanish word *presidente* ‘(community) president’; *poromotoro*, from the Spanish term *promotor de salud* ‘volunteer healthcare worker’; and *operatoro* from the Spanish word *operador* ‘(radio) operator’. Each of these specialized social roles emerged in Montetoni in the context of interactions between Nantis and non-Nantis, and the opportunities and necessities that those relationships brought with them. The roles of *operatoro* and *poromotoro* have been occupied sporadically and by different individuals in Monte-

²⁴Note that, unlike what has been reported for the neighboring Matsigenkas, Nanti society included no discourse nor practice that labeled women as impure during menstruation.



Figure 2.14: In general, Nanti children became remarkably competent at gender-appropriate tasks at a very young age. In this photo, a six year old girl is spinning bark fiber into cord. After separating a strand of bark fiber into even thinner strands, as shown here, she will roll the fine strands against her shin to create a long cord, the beginnings of which are resting on her extended leg.

toni over the years, as a result of a variety of complex factors. The most stable and important specialist role that has emerged in Montetoni is that of *peresetente*. Nanti social organization on the Timpia did not include any formalized leadership roles separate from the relative power relations that inhered in family structure. Most outsiders, however, have expected, and even insisted on, having a single ‘leader’ to deal with among the Nanti people on the Camisea. Since about 1996, Migero has

been considered the ‘president’ of Montetoni, based on the notions of indigenous community governance stipulated by Peruvian law. Nantis have adopted the term *peresetente* to reflect Migeró’s special status as a leader and spokesperson acknowledged by Nantis and non-Nantis alike. Up to the time of writing, no other aspects of the ‘governance’ of Montetoni correspond to the expectations of outsiders, making Migeró’s position as leader and intermediary extremely important to outsiders. It was extremely good fortune for the residents of Montetoni that Migeró was not only willing to take on this difficult and perilous role but was also a sensitive, skillful, and wise leader.

Relative authority within the household and residence group was based, informally, on age grades. A father had relative authority over his own spouses in some domains, and over his own as well as other children, but if a household included two men, one did not have relative authority over the other unless relative age difference were substantial. The same relations held among the male heads of household throughout the residence group. Male heads of household initiated and led many activities and tasks within their household or residence group, but their leadership derived from cooperation and mutual interest. Relative authority among Nanti individuals was overall based on cooperation and mutual interest; individuals used neither coercion, force, nor the threat or reality of violence.

Relative authority based on age group was especially important in child-rearing practices. Older children assumed substantial responsibility for and cared for younger children. These relationships were particularly important in the learning and socialization process for everyone involved: older children provided ‘scaffolding’ for younger children, while at the same time learning parenting skills incrementally through practice.

2.6.7.4 The phenomenon of social prominence in Montetoni

While it is true that Nanti society had no institutionalized hierarchy, it is also true that, in practice, in everyday life, not all Nantis were of equal social stature. Real relative social stature in Montetoni — which was changeable, a dynamic, not static, phenomenon — reflected a combination of factors, including one's age group, one's competence in executing the tasks associated with one's age group, and one's ability to initiate activities that others would join or imitate, with some influence from the social stature of one's birth parents. Relative social prominence was observable in specific situations via a variety of indicators, which I will discuss next.

First, in the most experiential terms, 'socially prominent' Nanti individuals were more often watched, listened to, and asked about than others on a day to day basis. Likewise, the behavior of prominent individuals was more often taken up as a model for other individuals' behavior. Note that these were small-scale, individual acts of differentiation that *elevated* the prominence of some individuals — they were not acts of differentiation that diminished or devalued anyone. In the case of men, prominent individuals more easily recruited or attracted co-participants in various activities, like hunting parties, fishing parties, house-building work, and grass-cutting. In the case of women, prominent individuals were the first ones to harvest *sekatsi* for a feast, after which other women went out and harvested as well; this also means that these women were typically the first ones to host drinking parties and thereby initiate village-wide feasting.

By extension, the more socially prominent a Nanti individual was, the more likely they were to be visited or asked about during visiting rounds. For example, of all the neighbors I had in my residence group, other women most often asked me about the activities of Migero's younger spouse Maira, instead of, or prior to, asking me about the numerous other women in the residence group. Likewise, visiting men most often asked Lev (only or initially) about Migero's activities.

In many, but not all, cases, the relative social prominence of a man and one of his spouses was roughly equivalent. In a few rare cases, however, the social prominence of one member of a couple or trio was much greater than the others. The most socially prominent men lived in the largest residence groups. Functionally, the explanation I give for this is that once a prominent man had decided where to locate his home, a greater number of other individuals chose to cluster around this location (rather than (a) choosing another person as a nucleus or (b) themselves functioning as a nucleus). The number of adult children that an individual had did influence these patterns, but it was not the only factor.

Note that while in many situations, local relative social prominence was easy to calculate (for example, a father and his young son), in some cases relative prominence was ambiguous (for example, two teenagers) and therefore tended to be constituted through behaviors *in the moment*, including, for example interactional moves to evaluate each other's behavior through teasing, the use of scolding talk, etc. This kind of ambiguity in relative prominence was often played out on the spot, through contestations, protestations, and outright backfires of these types of interactional moves.

The use of space when Nantis gather to drink *oburoki* together is one of the very best sites for observing how Nantis enact and embody social prominence as a fluid set of relations in Montetoni. As drinkers begin to arrive at the *kosena* where drinking is just getting underway, *shitatsi* mats are spread out in the focal drinking area, usually by the woman or women whose *oburoki* will be drunk. Sometimes, the man of the household will begin to spread out the *shitatsi* mats as the first visitors arrive, but he quickly is aided by the woman or women of the household; alternatively, the man of the household may call out "*shitatsi*" as visitors arrive, which constitutes a request to which a woman or *korakona* will quickly respond. It is interesting to note that since accommodating visitors is an activity usually carried

out by women, it is a salient demonstration of sociability when adult men do so. The general principle in action, in all cases that I have observed, is to acknowledge visiting drinkers promptly and to make it possible, as quickly as possible, for them to sit down comfortably in places that are ‘socially ratified’ by the placement of the *shitatsi* mats themselves.

Once *shitatsi* mats have been spread out, visitors may sit down. Visitors choose their spots carefully, situating themselves relative to others already present, relative to the cooking fire, relative to the pots of *oburoki*, and relative to the physical boundaries of the space itself. In this process, I assert that individuals provide an indication of how they perceive their own prominence in the given setting, since placing oneself near to someone or something reflects the level of comfort and familiarity they feel with that nearness and they way that their nearness may preempt the nearness of others. Feast after feast, I have noticed that siblings cluster together; hunting partners cluster together; and age groups cluster together. Shy individuals or visitors from distant residence groups sit near the walls and doors; prominent male heads of household cluster near each other and near to the cooking fire. Note that sometimes, the male head of the household (and therefore, the host) will indicate, through a gesture and a few words, where a new arrival is welcome to sit; such an action is an excellent indicator of the host’s perception of the visitor’s social prominence relative to his own, because men only pay this sort of attention to guests as prominent as or more prominent than themselves.

As individuals arrive in and move about the physical and social space in such situations, they are iteratively choosing and adjusting their location relative to others. As a group of drinkers spends time together, with astonishing consistency certain individuals end up clustered together in the center of the social space and others end up on the periphery. If the physical space is large enough (for example, outside of a large *kosena*), certain of the most prominent men will end up sitting in

a cluster that resembles the ‘nucleus’ of a dynamic social ‘atom.’

I consider social prominence to be an ‘emergent’ phenomenon in Montetoni, neither prescribed nor acknowledged in any explicit way, but rather the result of relations among co-present individuals in a specific situation, a specific moment. More generally, a given individual’s social prominence emerges over time, through continuity in actions and interactions in Nanti society.

It is crucial, in this discussion, to emphasize that relative social prominence was constantly being regenerated (or made or lost) in Montetoni as a result of the social doings of Nanti individuals. That is, if a person’s actions and activities were attended to, admired, and imitated, that person’s future choices regarding actions and activities could successfully perpetuate their status; but at the same time, certain choices that individuals made, as well as their reactions to unforeseen circumstances, resulted in dramatic shifts in their social prominence in Montetoni.

Note that there was no word for ‘social prominence’ in Nanti. What I have described here was not a locally labeled characteristic or phenomenon in Nanti society. But I chose to discuss the phenomenon here because it was an observable, recurrent, and relatively stable principle of social organization in Nanti society. This concept has turned out to have a lot of explanatory power when figuring out why a particular course of events unfolded the way it did rather than unfolding in a different, though equally plausible, way.

2.7 The Nanti language

This section provides basic information on the Nanti language. My aim is to provide enough information here to support the examples and arguments I make in this study. A more extensive sketch of Nanti is available in Michael (2008). Many of the examples given in this section appear in transcripts elsewhere in this document.

2.7.1 Genetic classification

For the purposes of this study, the Nanti language can be classified as one of seven commonly-recognized members of the Kampan branch of the Arawak language family, all spoken in the Andean foothills and adjacent lowlands in southeastern Peru and peripheral western Brazil. In this classification, Nanti's sister languages are Asháninka, Ashéninka, Kakinte, Matsigenka, Nomatsigenga, and Pajonal Ashéninka (spellings of these names vary in the literature). Varying perspectives on the classification and member languages of this branch of the Arawak family are found in Aikhenvald (1999); Campbell (1997); Cysouw (2007); Kaufman (1994); Payne (1991); Wise (1986, 1999), as well as at www.ethnologue.com. It is clear that Nanti is most closely related to Matsigenka, and it seems to be most similar to the Manu variety of Matsigenka, which makes sense given what is known about the history of migrations and social networks in this part of the Amazon Basin. It seems likely that Nanti and the varieties of Matsigenka actually form a dialect chain as illustrated here, with adjacency indicating greater similarity: Upper Urubamba Matsigenka — Lower Urubamba Matsigenka — Manu Matsigenka — Nanti. For a lengthy discussion of this and other issues surrounding the classification of Nanti and the Kampan languages more generally, see (Michael, 2008, pp. 212-219).

2.7.2 Brief typological overview

Nanti is a polysynthetic, head-marking language with open classes of nouns and verbs, and closed classes of adjectives, adverbs, demonstratives, pronouns, and clausal clitics. Verbal arguments are usually cliticized to the inflected verb stem in SVO order, but free subject, object, and oblique NPs may be used as verbal arguments and/or co-occurring material. Both nominal and verbal number are optional and infrequently used. Many nouns and adjectives are obligatorily marked for gender (masculine or non-masculine) and/or animacy (animate or inanimate).

Nanti exhibits noun incorporation and a multiple classifier system. Additional detail on Nanti is provided in subsequent subsections.

2.7.3 Vowel inventory

As shown in Table 2.3, Nanti has five contrastive vowel qualities and two contrastive vowel lengths. Note that /u/ is a (typologically unusual) monomoraic diphthong that patterns with /e/ and /o/ in stress assignment (Crowhurst and Michael, 2005; Michael, 2008). In addition, Nanti permits five bimoraic diphthongs: /ae/, /ai/, /ei/, /oi/, and /ui/.

Nanti is sensitive to the intrinsic sonority – that is, the resonance related to a vowel’s height. In languages like Nanti, “[t]he sonority hierarchy grades vowels into classes that correspond to their natural height class: low vowels have high intrinsic sonority, mid vowels have less, and high vowels have low intrinsic sonority” (Crowhurst and Michael, 2005, p. 54). The sonority hierarchy exhibited by Nanti vowels, for purposes of verbal stress assignment, is a > e,o,u > i.

Table 2.3: Nanti vowel inventory (IPA).

	FRONT	CENTRAL	BACK
HIGH	i, i: (ii)		u (u)
MID	e, e: (ee)		o, o: (oo)
LOW		a, a: (aa)	

2.7.4 Consonant inventory

The consonant inventory of Nanti is given in Table 2.4. Interesting characteristics of this inventory include the lack of a voiced counterpart to the alveolar stop; the series of contrastive alveo-palatal segments; the large number of allophones, particularly of the stops, conditioned by the height of a subsequent vowel; and the presence of a

Table 2.4: Nanti consonant inventory (IPA). Allophones are given in square brackets; graphemes used in this text for phonemes are given in parentheses, if they differ from the standard IPA symbol. Table adapted from Michael(2008).

	LABIAL	ALVEOLAR	ALVEO-PALATAL	VELAR	GLOTTAL	UNSPECIFIED
VOICELESS STOP	p [p, pʰ]	t [t, tʰ]	tʰ (ty)	k [k, ks, kʰ]		
VOICED STOP	b [b, bʰ, β, w]			g [g, gʰ, g̃, g̃ʰ, gʰ]		
AFFRICATE		tʰs [ts, tʰʃ] (ts)	tʰj (ch)			
FRICATIVE		s [s, ʃ]	ʃ (sh)		h (j)	
FLAP		r [r, rʰ] (r)	rʰ (ry)			
NASAL	m [m, mʰ]	n [n, nʰ]	ɲ (ny)			[m, n, ŋ](n)
GLIDE			j [j, ʒ, dʒ] (y)			

nasal unspecified for place of articulation (a feature common to all of the Kampan languages). This segment acquires its place of articulation from the following stop or affricate, if one is present; otherwise, it deletes. (See Michael (2008) for further discussion.)

2.7.5 A note on orthography in this study

In deciding how to represent the sounds of Nanti in this study, I often found myself having to choose among three representational systems, one being the phonemic characteristics of the Nanti sound system; another being my habit of writing Nanti using a Spanish-influenced practical orthography; and another being the conventions of the International Phonetic Alphabet (IPA) that most linguists are familiar with. The compromise I settled on was to use the practical orthography — which uses the grapheme ‘j’ for the IPA sound [h] and ‘y’ for the IPA sound [j] — in the first line of every example. I represented important phonemic information, such as the nasal unspecified for place of articulation, in the second and third lines of the examples, and presented an additional line of IPA transcription in cases where a narrow representation is important. For your convenience, I list here the Nanti alphabet used in this study, with IPA equivalents for the three non-transparent graphemes: a, aa, b, ch, e, ee, g, i, ii, j [h], k, l, m, n, ny, o, oo, p, r, ry, s, sh, t, ts,

Table 2.5: Nanti syllable types.

σ -TYPE	LEXICAL PHONOLOGY	POSTLEXICAL PHONOLOGY
tautomorphemic	(C)V(N), (C)V:N, (C)V ₁ V ₂ (N)	(C)V(N/S), (C)V:N, (C)V ₁ V ₂ (N)
heteromorphemic	(C)V(N), (C)V:N	(C)V(N), (C)V:N, (C)V ₁ V ₂ (N)
NOTE:	C=consonant, V=vowel	N=nasal, S=sibilant

ty, u [u̠i], y [j].

2.7.6 Syllable structure and its effects

There are a number of constraints on syllable structure that affect word shape and word formation in Nanti. In particular, epenthesis and deletion of segments are widespread processes in word formation in Nanti, in order to avoid illicit syllable structures; these processes are most common in the concatenation of verbal morphology. The following constraints “hold for all syllable types, and at all levels of the phonology:

1. “[i] complex onsets are not permitted;
2. “[ii] onsetless syllables are permitted only in word-initial position;
3. “[iii] the only permitted coda is the underspecified nasal *N*, and then only when followed by a voiceless stop in the onset of the next syllable (hence, no word-final nasals);
4. “[iv] diphthongs cannot be of rising sonority (see §2.7.3); and
5. “[v] triphthongs are not permitted.” (Michael, 2008)

Table 2.5 lists the syllable types that are permitted in Nanti.

In order to avoid illicit sequences of segments in word formation, either epenthesis or deletion occurs. Specifically, in post-root morphological concatenation, usually the segment /a/ is epenthesized between consonants, and the segment /t/ is epenthesized between vowels. In a small number of particular cases, segment deletion occurs instead. In pre-root morphological concatenation, usually the first vowel of a heteromorphemic sequence is deleted. An important exception is the case of the masculine subject clitic, *i=*, which becomes a glide rather than deleted, thereby preserving contrast in person-marking.

2.7.7 Phonological processes

The allophony of Nanti consonants that is evident in Table (2.4) is, in part, the result of a number of different phonological processes, as shown in (2.1), (2.2), and (2.3) respectively.

(2.1) All stops and nasals are subject to palatalization in the following environment:

$C \rightarrow C^j / _ (eC)[+high]$; where $[+high] = /i/$, palatalized C, or $/tʃ/$;

right-to-left spreading may occur across $/e/$.

e.g. $/peri/ \rightarrow [p^j eri]$

e.g. $/ameteri/ \rightarrow [am^j et^j eri]$

(2.2) Velar stops undergo height assimilation to high and mid vowels, resulting in frication upon release.

e.g. $/kibatiro/ \rightarrow [k^{\widehat{j}} iwatiro]$

e.g. $/pikenaNtake/ \rightarrow [piksenantak^{\widehat{s}}e]$

e.g. $/pogijatakeri/ \rightarrow [pog^{\widehat{z}} iatakseri]$

(2.3) Palatalization that neutralizes sibilant contrast: $s \rightarrow \text{ʃ} / _ i$

e.g. $/sitatsi/ \rightarrow [\text{ʃ} itatsi]$

e.g. $/yabisake/ \rightarrow [jabisak^{\widehat{s}}e]$ but $/yabisi/ \rightarrow [jabif^{\widehat{i}}]$

In addition, intervocalic $/h/$ participates in two more phonological processes. First, intervocalic $/h/$ produces nasalization of the preceding vowel, as in (2.4); and second, intervocalic $/h/$ can delete, as in (2.4) and (2.5).

(2.4) $/pajo/ \rightarrow [p\text{ã}ho]$ or $[p\text{ã}\text{õ}]$

(2.5) $/nojati/ \rightarrow [noati]$

2.7.8 Metrical stress

The metrical stress system in Nanti is “an iterative stress system whose default preference is an alternating, iambic rhythm” (Crowhurst and Michael, 2005, p. 48) and whose basic metrical foot is disyllabic. This system is complex, with different patterns for nouns and noun-derived adjectives; and for verbs, verb-derived adjectives, and adverbs.

For nouns and noun-derived adjectives, forms are parsed left to right in disyllabic iambic feet. The final syllable is extrametrical and no degenerate feet are permitted. Unlike verbal stress, nominal stress is insensitive to vowel quality. Primary stress is assigned to the penultimate syllable, unless the word is lexically stressed, or includes an extra-prosodic final syllable (*-ro*, *-ri*, *-tsi*), in which cases stress is assigned to the antepenultimate syllable. Unlike verbs, a large number of Nanti nouns exhibit lexical stress. Examples are given in Example 2.6.

(2.6) a. Default penultimate stress of nouns and noun-derived adjectives

shíma ‘*generic fish*’, ‘*boquichico fish*’

nobánko ‘*my house*’

encháto ‘*tree*’

b. Antepenultimate stress due to extrametrical final syllables

jétari ‘*carachama fish*’

sáboro ‘*arrowcane*’

shítatsi ‘*mat woven from arrowcane leaves*’

c. Lexically assigned stress

obúroki ‘*yuca beer*’

mágoná ‘*sachapapa*’

pákitsa ‘*eagle sp.*’

For verbs, verb-derived adjectives, and adverbs, prosodic words are parsed iteratively from left to right into disyllabic iambic feet, with primary stress generally falling on the right-most stressed syllable. Verb-final clitics, including object clitics, are extraprosodic. Under most circumstances, degenerate feet are not permitted. Although stress is iambic, it is sensitive to syllable weight and sonority according to the scale $a > e, o, u > i$, as shown in Example 2.7. For a detailed discussion of the complex system of stress assignment in Nanti, see Crowhurst and Michael (2005).

(2.7) a. Pinoshimaitiro: (pi,no)(ʃi'mai)ti<ro>

pi= *noshi* -*mai* -*t-* -*i* =*ro*
 2S= pull -CL:THREAD -EPT -REAL.I =3nmO
 You're thread-pulling it.

b. Yobiikajigaka: (yo,bii)('kai.ga)ka

i= *obiik* -*a* -*jig* -*ak* -*a*
 3mS= drink -EPA -PL -PERF -REAL.A
 They drank.

c. Noshinkitaka: (no,shiiŋ)(ki'ta)ka

no= *shiNki* -*t* *ak* -*a*
 1S= be.drunk -EPT -PERF -REAL.A
 I got drunk.

2.7.9 Intonation

In Nanti, intonation participates in the system of grammatical relations as well as in the system of sound/experience relations described in Chapter 3. Within the system of grammatical relations, intonation contours serve to demarcate syntactic constituents (words, phrases, and clauses). Because intonation in Nanti speech is primarily a means for expressing speaker orientation, this topic is discussed in detail in Chapter 3.

Interestingly, in the realm of grammatical relations in Nanti, I have found no evidence that intonation consistently distinguishes declarative sentences from polar interrogatives (yes/no questions) in Nanti. Rather, the way of speaking that I call matter-of-fact talk is used to make a statement, with which the addressee either agrees or disagrees — an *interactional* process that results in the functional equivalent of a grammatically marked or constructed polar interrogative. See §2.7.23 for further discussion.

2.7.10 Clipping in Nanti speech

Clipping occurs when a speaker truncates the final segment(s) or syllable(s) of an utterance during its production. Clipping is very common in Nantis' speech; the most commonly clipped elements are all or part of the final unstressed syllable(s) of a verb complex (for example, *tya pija* for *tyara pijate* 'Where are you going?' or *nonkamoso* for *nonkamosote* 'I will go visiting').

Clipping is not a characteristic exclusive to particular ways of speaking but it does interact in consistent ways with some of them. For example, utterances of scolding talk usually do not display clipping of segments that are typically clipped; in contrast, matter-of-fact talk and women's visiting talk display a relatively heavy use of clipping. The phenomenon of clipping in Nanti speech is discussed at greater length in Chapter 2, as part of the discussion of matter-of-fact talk.

2.7.11 Basic verb structure

The basic structure of the Nanti verb is given in (2.8). Nearly all inflectional morphology is suffixal, except for the irrealis reality status prefix, which is discussed in §2.7.12.1 ; and nearly all derivational morphology is suffixal, except for a small set of causative prefixes, discussed in §2.7.14.

(2.8) SUBJECT= IRREALIS- CAUSATIVE- ROOT -DERIVATION -INFLECTION =OBJECT

2.7.12 Inflectional morphology

All verbs are obligatorily inflected for reality status and aspect, but tense is not an inflectional category in Nanti. Temporal reference is inferred from reality status and aspect marking, and through the (optional) use of temporal adverbs. Optional inflectional categories include directionals, locatives, number-marking for associated verbal arguments, and verbal quantifiers.

2.7.12.1 Reality status

Reality status is one of two obligatory inflectional categories in Nanti.²⁵ The basic reality status contrast is between realis and irrealis status. All verb roots fall into one of two arbitrary classes, which determine how reality status is marked; I follow Michael (2008) in labeling these classes A-class and I-class. The realis and irrealis suffixes, as well as the co-occurring irrealis prefixes are given, and exemplified in Table 2.6.

Table 2.6: Reality status inflection

	REALIS		IRREALIS	
kant <i>say</i>	-i	nokanti	N- -e	nonkante
kem <i>hear/understand</i>	-a	nokema	N- -e	nonkeme
biik <i>drink</i>	-a	nobiika	N- -empa	nobiikempa ²⁶ irobiikempa ²⁷

Although the semantics of reality status is complicated, we may generalize that *realis* status expresses positive polarity, and is associated with non-future temporal reference, as in (2.9); while *irrealis* status is associated with negative polarity

²⁵There has been some debate regarding the typological validity of reality status as a category. See Michael (2007) for a clear discussion of the validity of this category in the Nanti language.

²⁷The N- prefix only place-assimilates to voiceless stops, and therefore does not surface in this particular example.

²⁷The N- has an allophone *r-* that appears before vowel-initial verb roots with third person masculine subjects.

(2.10.a), future temporal reference (2.10.b), and counterfactual modality.

(2.9) Neje maika noneji inkajara oga.

neje maika no= nej -i inkajara o- oga
 yeah point.in.time 1S= see -REAL.I recently 3nm- this.one
 Yeah, just recently I saw this one (my daughter).

(2.10) a. Tera nonkante.

tera no= N- kant -e
 NEG.REAL 1S= IRREAL- say -IRREAL.I
 I did not say.

b. Onkante, ‘nobetsiikaji.’

o= N- kant -e no= betsiik -aj -i
 3nmS= IRREAL- say -IRREAL.I 1S= fix -REG -REAL.I
 She will say, ‘I fixed (it).’

Reality status interacts with negation in important ways; see §2.7.16 below. It also interacts with modality and clause-linking in interesting ways, but those topics are beyond the scope of this brief sketch; see Michael (2008) for additional discussion.

Note that the I-class realis suffix *-i* undergoes a process of vowel-lowering after the perfective aspect morpheme *-ak* that neutralizes the contrast between it and the I-class irrealis suffix *-i*, such that the form /*no= kant -ak -i*/ is pronounced [*nokantak̄se*].

2.7.12.2 Aspect

Aspect is one of two obligatory inflectional categories in Nanti. The basic contrast is between perfective and imperfective aspect, which is marked either (a) by the morphemes *-ak*, perfective, and *-∅*, imperfective, or (b) by one of a set of portmanteau

morphemes that combine aspectual and spatial meanings: *-aj*, regressive perfective; *-ut*, returnative perfective; *-aki*, translocative perfective; and *-aa*, translocative imperfective.

2.7.12.3 Grammatical number

Grammatical number, when indicated, is usually marked by one of two optional inflectional suffixes. The plural suffix *-jig* indicates that at least one of the verbal arguments is plural. The distributive suffix, *-ge* indicates not only plurality of one of the verbal arguments but also a temporal or spatial distribution of its referents.

2.7.12.4 Directionals

Two directional suffixes are available, and commonly used, to express the motion of the subject of intransitive verbs and the object of transitive verbs. The ablative suffix *-an* expresses motion away from the deictic center; the allative suffix *-apaj* expresses motion toward the deictic center. Note that for non-motion verbs, these suffixes have additional meanings; ablative *-an* expresses an inceptive sense, while allative *-apah* expresses the sense ‘upon arriving’.

2.7.12.5 Verbal quantifiers

There are four verbal quantifier suffixes that I will briefly mention here, following the characterizations given by Michael (2008): the undesirable extremal *-uma*; the desirable extremal *-asano*; the durative *-bage*; and the malefactive repetitive *-na*.

2.7.13 Verbal modal clitics

There are two verbal modal enclitics in Nanti: the counter-suppositional and deontic enclitic *=me*, and the epistemic modal enclitic *=rika*. The enclitic *=me* has

two functions: “i) to mark the proposition expressed by an utterance as counter-suppositional, and ii) to indicate deontic modality.” (Michael, 2008, p. 271). The enclitic *=rika* expresses the speaker’s uncertainty “regarding the truth of the proposition expressed by the clause in which the *=rika*-bearing verb appears” (Michael, 2008, p. 273).

2.7.14 Derivational morphology

There are a large number of derivational processes in Nanti. Many of these are valence-increasing processes; some preserve word class and some change the word class of the resulting element. This section provides a brief summary of Nanti derivational processes; valence or word class changing derivational processes will be indicated as such.

The reversative suffix *-rej* derives a stem that expresses the reversal or undoing of an action or state: *Okucharehanake*. ‘It became unsnagged.’

The frustrative suffix *-be* derives a stem that expresses an unsuccessful, interrupted, or otherwise unsatisfactory state, action or outcome: *Ikantabetakeri*. ‘He told him, to no avail.’

The realis passive suffix *-agani* and the irrealis passive suffix *-enkani* derive passive verbs whose valence is decreased by one argument, obviating the subject element and shifting the erstwhile object element to subject position: *Oogagani*. ‘It is eaten (edible).’

The characteristic suffix *-ant* derives a stem that expresses a habitual action or state of its subject. This suffix reduces the valence of transitive verbs, obviating the object element: *Atsikanti*. ‘It (the dog) is a biter.’

The reciprocal suffix *-abakag* derives a stem that expresses a reciprocal action between the subject and object elements; it appears that plural marking of the verb is obligatory with the reciprocal: *Inijabakagajigaka*. ‘They spoke to each other.’

Nanti has four causative prefixes, the agent causative *ogi-*, the non-agent causative *o[+voice]-*, the destructive causative *otin-*, and the malefactive causative *omin-*, and one causative suffix, the influential causative-*akag*; all of these increase the valence of the verb by one element. Michael (2008, p. 279) observes that “[t]he causative affixes are distinguished by how they select for characteristics of the causee or how they add information about the caused action or the participants in the caused event.” Note that Nanti causative constructions (together with applicatives) bear a good part of the functional load born by adpositions in other languages.

Nanti has four applicative suffixes, the instrumental applicative *-ant*, the presential applicative *-imo*, the separative applicative *-apitsa*, and the indirective applicative *-ako*. All of these may increase the valence of an intransitive verb by one element; and all may promote an erstwhile peripheral argument to object positions, perhaps demoting or even eliminating the original object. Note that Nanti applicative constructions (along with causative constructions) bear a good part of the functional load born by adpositions in other languages.

The denominal reversative *-rej* derives an intransitive verb from a classifier or an inalienable noun (Michael, 2008); the resulting stem expresses the loss of a part, a structural failure, or a break of some sort: *Yogitorejakero*. ‘He decapitated it.’ (-gito = head).

2.7.15 Existential verbs

Nanti has a trio of irregular existential verbs: *ainyo* (for animate subjects); *aityo* (for inanimate subjects); and *mameri* (for all negative existentials). These verbs typically take a noun phrase as their subject, as in *aityo sekatsi*, ‘there is yuca’; they may also take a clausal complement, as in *ainyo opiriniti*, ‘she is there sitting’, indicating both the presence of an entity and the realization of an action in a particular place. These verbs are defective and take no morphology, with the rare exception of the

frustrative suffix *-be*.

2.7.16 Negation

The negation system in Nanti is complex. There are three clause-level negators, *te*, *ja*, and *matsi*; a negative existential verb, *mameri*, and a set of negative pronouns that combine a negator and an interrogative pronoun (for example, *tera tsini*, ‘nobody’ and *tera tata*, ‘nothing’). This section focuses on clause-level negation.

The key distinction between *te* and *ja*, on the one hand, and *matsi* on the other, is scope. The first two negators are constituent, or internal, negators; while the third, *matsi*, is a propositional, or external, negator. Unlike the internal negators, the external negator has no effect on the reality status of its clause, as shown in (2.11).

(2.11) *Matsi ari hanta pitimakero hanta.*

matsi *ari* *hanta* *pi=* *tim* *-ak* *-i* *=ro* *hanta*
EXT.NEG POS.POL there 2S= live -PERF -REAL.I =3nmO there
It is not the case that you, indeed, live there. [Adapted from Michael (2008, p.383)]

The two internal negators, *te* and *ja*, cliticize to the element to their right, which is most commonly the polyfunctional clitic *=ra*, although they also cliticize to other second position clitics, as well as to other phonological words, including the verb itself.

The key difference between *te* and *ja* is their relation to the notional reality status of their complements. The ‘realis negator’ *te* selects for *notionally* realis complements, while the ‘irrealis negator’ *ja* selects for *notionally* irrealis complements, as shown in (2.12).

(2.12) a. *Tera nonkante.*

tera *no=* N- *kaNt* -*e*
 NEG.REAL 1S= IRREAL- say -IRREAL.I
 I did not say.

b. Jara nokanti.

jara *no=* *kanti* -*i*
 NEG.IRREAL 1S= say -REAL.I
 I will not say.

The notional basis for irrealisness used here can be characterized as those states of affairs that are either ‘unrealized’ or ‘unknowable’ (Mithun, 1995). Note that in a sense, the logic of irrealisness combined with negation results in a sort of notionally ‘doubly irrealis’ state of affairs: the notional negation of something already notionally unreal. Grammatically this plays out in Nanti as *realis* morphology marking negative irrealis clauses; see Table 2.7.

Table 2.7: Negation and reality status marking.

POLARITY	NOTIONAL REALITY STATUS OF I-CLASS VERBS		
	Realis	Irrealis	Doubly irrealis
POSITIVE	-i	N- ...-e	NA
NEGATIVE	NA	te(ra) N- ...-e	ja(ra) ...-i

2.7.17 The basics of Nanti syntax

Because Nanti is a head-marking polysynthetic language that marks the majority of both grammatical relations and inter-clausal relations through morphology on the (main clause) verb, issues of verbal morphology and syntax are tightly intertwined in Nanti. This section describes the basic elements of Nanti (morpho)syntax that are relevant to the examples provided in this study; see Michael (2008) for a more complete discussion of Nanti syntax and morphosyntax.

2.7.18 Verbal argument expression

In Nanti, verbal arguments are marked in one of two ways: either as free elements or as verbal clitics. The verbal argument clitics are given in Table 2.8.

Table 2.8: Nanti person-marking clitics

	SUBJECT PROCLITIC	OBJECT ENCLITIC
1st person	<i>no=</i>	<i>=na</i>
2nd person	<i>pi=</i>	<i>=Npi</i>
3rd person masc.	<i>i=</i>	<i>=ri, =ni</i>
3rd person non-masc.	<i>o=</i>	<i>=ro, =ni</i>
1st person pl. inclusive	<i>a=</i>	

Core verbal arguments can be expressed in various ways in Nanti. Most commonly, verbal arguments are expressed as clitics on their verb, in which case the elements are ordered SVO, as in (2.13).

(2.13) Nonejiri.

no= nej -i =ri
 1S= see -REAL.I =3mO
 I see him.

Overall, Nanti demonstrates a nominative-accusative system of agreement and alignment; compare the first person A argument (*no=*) in (2.13) and the S argument (*no=*) in (2.14a) with the first person P argument (*=na*) in (2.14b).

(2.14) a. Noneji.

no= nej -i
 1S= see -REAL.I
 I see.

b. Inejina.

i= *nej* *-i* =*na*
 3mS= see -REAL.I =1O
 He sees me.

Core arguments can also be expressed as a referential noun phrase, as in (2.15) and (2.16), although the use of overt referential NP arguments is much less common than the use of person clitics in discourse. Again, in simple declarative sentences, these elements are ordered SVO. Note that thus far there are no cases of naturally occurring discourse in which *both* of the arguments are expressed by a referential noun phrase.

(2.15) Maira nejakiri.

Maira *nej* *-ak* *-i* =*ri*
 personal.name see -PERF -REAL.I =3mO
 Maira saw him.

(2.16) Nonejake Maira.

no= *nej* *-ak* *-i* *Maira*
 1S= see -PERF -REAL.I personal.name
 I saw Maira.

2.7.19 Focus and topic expressions

A focused element may appear in a preverbal focus position. This element is in complementary distribution with the person clitic (which is non-focused) and may be a focused pronoun, as in (2.17), or a referential noun phrase, as in (2.18).

(2.17) Naro __matikajigake.

naro *matik* *-a* *-jig* *-ak* *-i*
 1.FOC.PRO sing -EPA -PL -PERF -REAL.I
 We (exclusive) sang. [Adapted from Michael (2008, p. 346)]

(2.18) Piseka nonkige__.

pi- seka no= N- kig -e
 2P- manioc 1S= IRREAL- harvest IRREAL.I
 I will harvest *your manioc*. [Adapted from Michael (2008, p. 346)]

A topic expression may be expressed as a dislocated constituent at either periphery of the clause. A topic expression may be a pronominal element or a referential noun phrase, and it appears in addition to its co-referential verbal argument, as in (2.19).

(2.19) a. Iroro ashitakotakero.

iroro o= ashi -t -ako -t ak-
 3nm.TOP.PRO 3nmS= cover -EPT -APPL:INDR -EPT -PERF
-i -ro
 -REAL.I =3nmO
She, she put her in menarche seclusion. (literally: She covered her over.) [Adapted from Michael (2008, p. 348)]

b. Nokamosojigiri [yoga Roso Cabri].

no= kamoso -jig -i -ri i- oga Roso.Cabri
 1S= visit -PL -REAL.I =3mO 3m- that personal.name
 We visited him, that Roso Cabri. [Adapted from Michael (2008, p. 349)]

Topic expressions provide additional information about their co-referential verbal arguments, for purposes of clarity, disambiguation, and referent tracking. The distinct syntactic positions of focused elements and topic expressions are demonstrated in (2.20) [Examples are adapted from Michael (2008, p350-1)].

(2.20) a. Iriro tera inkentero.

iriro tera i= N- keNt
 3m.TOP.PRO NEG.REAL 3mS= IRREAL- shoot.with.arrow
-e =ro
 -IRREAL.I =3nmO
 He, he didn't shoot it.

b. Tera iryo kentero.

tera *iryo* *keNt* *-e* *=ro*
 NEG.REAL 3m.foc.pro shoot.with.arrow -IRREAL.I =3nmO
He didn't shoot it.

c. Iryo kentakiro Migero.

iryo *keNt* *-ak* *-i* *=ro*
 3m.FOC.PRO shoot.with.arrow -PERF -REAL.I personal.name
Migero

He shot it, Migero (did).

Table 2.9: Nanti topic and focus pronouns

PERSON	TOPIC PRONOUNS		FOCUS PRONOUNS	
	SINGULAR	PLURAL	SINGULAR	PLURAL
1	naro	narohegi	naro	
2	biro	birohegi	biro	
3 masc.	iroiro	iroirohegi	iryo	
3 non-masc.	iroro	irorohegi	iro	
1 pl. incl.		harohegi		haro

The question of the relationship among verbal person clitics, pronominal elements, and referential noun phrases in terms of their status as verbal arguments is beyond the scope of this study; see Michael (2008) for additional discussion.

2.7.20 Non-core arguments

The addition of non-core arguments to a clause is principally accomplished through derivational morphology. Oblique arguments are those marked with Nanti's only adposition, the locative suffix *-ku*, which has a general locative meaning.

2.7.21 Noun phrases and their coordination

Nanti noun phrases are right-headed. Attested noun-phrase-internal modifiers include adjectives, quantifiers, and determiners/demonstratives, but complex noun phrases are relatively uncommon in discourse; Nantis seem to prefer such discourse strategies as parallelism, NP elision, noun incorporation, and classifier suffixation.

Similarly, overt NP coordination is rare in Nanti discourse, but there are two coordinating elements that can be used to coordinate two NPs: *intiri*, which is used when the following nominal element is masculine; and *ontiri*, which is used in all other cases.

2.7.22 Possessive constructions

In Nanti, a set of prefixes is used to mark possession on nouns, as shown in Table 2.10. These possessive prefixes do not specify number, except in the case of the inclusive first person plural *a-*; therefore, if a plural suffix is used, there are multiple readings — for example, *ibankojegi* can mean ‘his houses’, ‘their house’, or ‘their houses’; discourse context disambiguates.

Table 2.10: Possessive prefixes

	BEFORE CONSONANT		BEFORE VOWEL	
	-banko, <i>house/home</i>		-ampeji, <i>cotton</i>	
First person	no-	nobanko	n-	nampeji
First person plural inclusive and generic	a-	abanko	∅-	ampeji
Second person	pi-	pibanko	p-	pampeji
Third person non-masculine	o-	obanko	∅-	ampeji
Third person masculine	i-	ibanko	y- (before a, o)	yampeji
			∅- (before i, u, e)	

Nanti also has a set of possessive pronouns, given in Table 2.11, which are used demonstratively or to express contrastive focus.

Table 2.11: Possessive pronouns

	SINGULAR	PLURAL
1st	nashi	nashihegi (excl.), hashi (incl.)
2nd	pashi	pashihegi
3rd masc.	irashi	irashihegi
3rd non-masc.	ashi	ashihegi

2.7.23 Interrogative constructions

Content interrogative constructions are expressed using an interrogative pronoun in sentence initial position together with the omission of a person clitic or referential noun phrase for element interrogated, as in (2.21). Nanti interrogative pronouns are given in Table (2.12).

(2.21) a. Tsini __nejakeri.

tsini nej -ak -i =ri
 who see -PERF -REAL.I =3mO
 Who saw him?

b. Tsini inejake__.

tsini i= nej -ak -i
 who 3mS= see -PERF -REAL.I
 Whom did he see?

In the course of this study, I have come to the conclusion that ‘polar interrogatives’ in Nanti are, strictly speaking, an interactional phenomenon, not a grammatical one (compare Michael (2008, p. 289-90)). By this I mean that, in a strict sense, the only difference between a ‘declarative’ utterance and a ‘polar

Table 2.12: Nanti interrogative pronouns

INTERROGATIVE	GLOSS
tata	<i>what</i>
tsini	<i>who, whom</i>
tyani	<i>which one (animate)</i>
tyati	<i>which one (inanimate)</i>
tya(ra)	<i>where, how</i>

interrogative’ utterance is the uptake it receives in interaction. There is no syntactic construction, interrogative morphology, or intonation contour in Nanti that obligatorily marks a polar interrogative.

2.7.24 Imperative constructions

Positive imperative constructions are expressed through the use of the irrealis inflection on the verb and the omission of the subject element, as in (2.22).

(2.22) a. Pena!

p *-e* *=na*
 give IRREAL.I =1O
 Give me (it)!

b. Pena oka!

p *-e* *=na* *oka*
 give IRREAL.I =1O this
 Give me this!

There is no negative imperative construction in Nanti; rather, negative polarity directives are expressed using a more general ‘polite directive’ strategy, as in (2.23).

(2.23) a. Pijate.

pi= ja -t -e
2S= go -EPT -IRREAL.I
Go, please.

b. Jara pijati.

jara pi= ja -t -i
NEG.IRREAL 2S= go -EPT -REAL.I
Don't go!

2.8 A brief sketch of Nanti verbal life

This section provides a brief sketch of Nanti verbal life in Montetoni during the period of this study, which will serve as background for the descriptions and discussions of ways of speaking that form the core of this study. First, in §2.8.1, I describe some of the basic Nanti language ideologies, as I understand them, that informed Nanti communicative practices. Then, in §2.8.2, I discuss some aspects of Nanti metacommunicative awareness, including the ways Nantis actually talked about language and its use. Next, in §2.8.3, I discuss some of the recurrent patterns I observed in the organization of face-to-face interactions in Montetoni, principally in terms of ‘turn taking’ and ‘floor management’ conventions. Next, I discuss the distribution and function of parallelism in Nanti discourse, focusing on its important role in dialogic interactions. Finally, I describe the Nanti discursive ecology from an area-typological perspective.

2.8.1 Language in use: ideologies and practices

During the period of this study, Nanti society was almost exclusively a face-to-face society, which is to say that almost all interpersonal communication among Nantis was carried out in a direct, real-time, face-to-face manner. As of 2009, no Nanti

adults were literate and therefore no form of written communication was in use among Nantis. The single form of non-face-to-face interaction was the infrequent use of a two-way radio by a few young men, in order to communicate between Montetoni and Marankejari, at those times when both communities possessed functional radios; these radios were used equally often to communicate with a few Matsigenka communities in the region.²⁸

In my view, the face-to-face nature of everyday verbal life in Montetoni was one of the most important conditioning factors on the types of ideologies and practices I observed in Nanti society. To be more explicit, the frequent, direct, and essentially unavoidable contact that many individuals had with one other on a day-to-day basis in Montetoni made the consequences of speech very immediate and tangible. Similarly, the relatively small number of individuals that any one person communicated with, over the course of weeks, months, and years, equated to a relatively tightly-woven, inter-dependent, and sensitive social network, in which every individual's words and deeds were relatively consequential to everyone else, and in which social and verbal conventions were widely shared and rapidly diffused. Put another way, being one person out of 200 means you have more influence in your speech community than if you are one out of 2000, or 20,000, etc.

Speaking was an especially important form of social action in Nanti society during the period of this study, and words were considered deeds to a much greater extent than in any other society or community I have lived in. For example, the accuracy of a person's reports about events, and the faithfulness with which a person quoted the speech of others, were aspects of talk that were closely monitored, tracked, and evaluated by Nantis. Similarly, how individuals were construed or represented in talk was a matter to which Nantis paid close attention, and Nantis were

²⁸The radio signal sometimes reached as far as Nueva Luz on the Urubamba River; communication was most frequent with Cashiriari, Segakiato, and Camisea on the Camisea River, and Kirigueti, on the Urubamba River.

very careful not to misconstrue other’s activities or misrepresent their words. A significant part of Nanti socialization was the development of a fine-tuned sensitivity to the social and personal responsibilities and consequences of talk.

Not surprisingly, the structures of the Nanti language have certain communicative affordances, and Nanti communicative practices took advantage of those affordances.²⁹ As discussed at length in Michael (2008), Nanti communicative practices included extensive use of a set of evidential resources in the Nanti language, including the inferential clitic =*ka* and a set of quotative particles used for direct speech reporting (such as *oka* ‘she said’, *ika* ‘he said’, and *noke* ‘I heard’). Michael (2008) demonstrates how these evidential resources were deployed in Nanti interactions as means of managing both utterance responsibility and event responsibility based on a system of pragmatic inference.

In my experience, Nanti individuals were, on the whole, spare with their words. That is to say, Nanti individuals were silent a lot of the time, even when they were in close proximity to one another. Co-presence among Nantis often did not include interactions among them, and I often observed Nanti individuals coming and going, moving in and out of one another’s presence, without interacting or even acknowledging one another. Moreover, I observed that Nanti individuals engaged in almost no phatic talk whatsoever during their everyday activities, in the sense of engaging in talk that is exclusively intended to generate sociability without communicating information.³⁰ Many interactions were very brief and made efficient use of a small number of words and utterances. Overall, Nantis appeared to me to hold no social expectation that they must acknowledge one another or interact in any way,

²⁹This statement is meant to have a tightly synchronic scope, and is not meant to make a claim of causality, especially not from a diachronic perspective; the nature, or directionality, of the relationships between language structures and language practices is a fascinating question but is far beyond the scope of this document.

³⁰Nanti interactions within the activity frame of feasting, and especially within the interactional frame of what I call *shitatsi* banter, stood in striking contrast to everyday practices in this domain; see §2.6.6 for more information.

unless there were immediately relevant information to be shared or obtained. In my view, these practices reflected the language ideology mentioned above, that speech was considered to be a consequential form of social action, and substantiate the generalization that Nanti individuals chose their words carefully before speaking.

Similarly, Nanti individuals typically spoke quietly when they did speak. Nantis generally set the volume and force their turns of talk based on the distance of the intended hearer(s), and someone farther away was addressed with greater volume and force than someone nearby.³¹ At the same time, Nantis tended to speak in the quietest and least forceful manner that still enabled the intended hearer(s) to hear them, producing a minimum, rather than a maximum, appropriate voice setting. Overall, Nantis calibrated the volume of their voices quite carefully to the social situation and potential participants at hand, resulting in a relatively high level of control by the speaker over the selection of hearers and ratified overhearers of their turns at talk.

This strategy was particularly apparent in the management of secondary interactions in which a turn, or sequence of turns, of talk co-occurred with a primary interaction but did not constitute the main focus of (all of) the participants' attention. In these cases, Nantis tended to speak in the quietest and least forceful manner that still enabled the intended hearer(s) to hear them, speaking unobtrusively, and signaling a lack of intent to take the floor with the content of the utterance.³² Broader issues of turn management are discussed in §2.8.3.

In accord with the ideologies and practices described above, I observed a distinction in Nanti verbal life between what I will call 'public talk' and 'private

³¹Although this observation may, at first glance, seem to be an interactional universal, rather than a Nanti-specific description, I have observed that, in fact, many white-collar males in US society frequently do not calibrate their voice volume in this manner; rather, their tendency is to speak at full volume and full force in a variety of types of situations.

³²This observation is especially relevant to the production of scolding talk because it often occurred as a secondary turn or secondary interaction while a primary interaction was unfolding; see Chapter 6 for a detailed discussion of scolding talk.

talk'. By 'public talk' I mean talk that was produced in order to be heard and potentially acknowledged by anyone present at the scene. By 'private talk' I mean talk that was produced in order to be heard and acknowledged by specific recipients only. My assessment of these two categories is based on consistent correlations I observed between types of talk and types of interactional frames on the one hand, and patterns of repetition and dissemination on the other hand. Most types of talk were commonly disseminated, repeated, and quoted outside of their situation of origin, but some types of talk were not. It is on this basis that I categorize the former types as 'public talk' and the latter as 'private talk'. Types of private talk had the following types of characteristics: a restricted participant framework (usually dyads and triads); unusually close spatial proximity among participants; distinctive body postures (for example, participants sitting hunched forward, with heads close together and slightly bowed) and eye gaze (usually still and aimed at the ground); and modified voice volume (usually low) and voice quality (sometimes whispered or breathy). Overall, I observed that Nanti individuals were quite sensitive to and respectful of these overt indicators of 'private talk' and did not appear to eavesdrop on one another, intrude upon ongoing interactions with these types of characteristics, or repeat the talk exchanged in these types of interactions in other situations. I am, of course, making these generalizations based on having had much greater access to 'public talk' than to 'private talk' on a daily basis in Montetoni, but over the years I observed many interactions that I would categorize as 'private' according to the criteria just given, that in turn had the restricted distribution patterns I have also described.

2.8.2 Metacommunicative awareness in Nanti language use

Rather than describing Nanti verbal life in entirely etic terms, it is illuminating to consider certain aspects of Nantis' own metalinguistic and metacommunicative

awareness through a discussion of some of the most common words/concepts that Nanti speakers used in their everyday speech to talk about speech and communicative activities.

It is interesting to note that Nantis did not engage in discourse about either the structural or aesthetic aspects of language, either with one another or with me. During the period of my study, for example, the Nanti language included no words for the concepts ‘word’, ‘sentence’, ‘quotation’, or ‘meaning’, nor for ‘rhythm’, ‘line’, ‘poetry’, ‘verbal art’, etc. I do not know if Nanti individuals cared about the structural or aesthetic aspects of language use, since they did not speak about it. In contrast, as discussed above in §2.8.1, Nanti language ideologies about the accuracy, truthfulness, specificity of speech are well developed, as is their vocabulary for discussing these aspects of language use, as I describe in detail below.

Nantis regularly used the following words to categorize types of talk that they and others engaged in. All but the last of these terms are verb stems which participate in regular derivational and inflectional processes. Considering these terms alongside one another gives us a sense of which aspects of talk are most salient to Nantis when they direct another person’s attention to an act of speaking. I do not claim this list is exhaustive; rather, it presents the metalinguistic concepts most commonly used during the period of this study.

nij. (*intransitive*) *speak, utter.* (*transitive*) *speak to, address.* This verb foregrounds the simple act or capacity to communicate through speaking. In nominalized forms *nonijira, pinijira, onijira, inijira*, it refers to a person’s actual speech; an individual’s language in a linguistic/grammatical sense; or to human speech and language in general.

kant. (*intransitive*) *say, assert.* (*transitive*) *tell, say to.* This is the most frequently used verb of speaking. In its transitive form, it is used for direct quotation of either another person or of one’s self. It foregrounds the description, assertion,

or evaluation made by the speaker without adding any additional evaluative frame (as with, for example, terms like ‘ask’ or ‘lie’).

kamant. (*transitive and intransitive*) *inform, advise, let know.* This verb foregrounds the transfer of information via an utterance while backgrounding the exact form of the utterance. It is the verb that may license paraphrasing of a previous utterance, and specifically does not indicate a direct quotation, although the utterance may be a direct quotation.

kogako. (*transitive*) *ask about, inquire.* This verb is used to indicate a request for information. It is lexicalized from the stem *kog* ‘want’ and the valence-increasing indirect applicative morpheme *-ako*.

kajem. (*transitive*) *call or call to someone.* This verb/concept refers to both the articulatory act of ‘calling out’ and to the interactional move of calling to someone. It also refers to both a single turn of ‘calling out’ and an interactional frame in which a speaker works to ‘call’ a person to come to a place — for example, a person calling a family member to visit or live in a place.

kantabe. (*transitive*) *say or tell in vain.* This verb/concept expresses the dissatisfaction of the speaker with the response that the addressee or recipient made to the speaker’s utterance. It was most often used to frame the unsuccessful attempt on the part of speaker to warn or caution the hearer about something. It is lexicalized from the stem *kant* ‘speak’ and the frustrative morpheme *-be*.

kantagena. (*intransitive*) *banter, joke, tease.* This verb/concept refers to the type of playful and humorous interaction that forms part of feasting activities.

kanomaj. (*transitive*) *reprimand, scold.* This verb/concept refers to the verbalized negative evaluation on the part of the speaker of some action taken by the addressee. It most frequently was used to describe the way of speaking that I call scolding talk; see Chapter 6.

tsojeg. (*intransitive*) *lie, speak to mislead.* This verb/concept proffers a very

negative evaluation of someone's speech. Although it is occasionally used in jest, it is for the most part a strong statement of evaluation that speakers make judiciously. Framing another person's speech as a 'lie' is an act that has social implications for the framer as well as the framee, since it makes the claim that someone spoke in order to mislead another, and in most cases evidence for such a claim is subtle.

kis. (*intransitive*) *be angry; (transitive) express anger toward.* In its intransitive form, this verb/concept means 'to be angry'; its transitive form may functionally mean 'to hit' as well as 'to yell at.' This verb/concept was not used often in Montetoni because in general, anger is a highly dispreferred emotion, and so anger was infrequently displayed by, and infrequently attributed to, Nanti individuals.

nebit. (*transitive*) *request, ask for.* This verb/concept specifically refers to the communicative act of requesting something from or of someone, with the vague sense of transferring ownership rather than borrowing/lending (see below). In general, Nantis did not 'request' anything of anyone very frequently, and when they did so it was typically a relatively private interactional frame. The most common situations for 'requesting' were made among women for yuca in order to make *oburoki*; and by Nanti individuals to me and/or Lev in private for particular manufactured goods.

ampina. (*transitive*) *borrow.* This verb/concept refers to both the communicative act and the physical act of one person borrowing an object from another for short-term use. Individuals most often 'borrow' items within their own residence groups, or from close kin in other residence groups. The items most often borrowed are special tools that only a few people own.

kenkij. (*transitive*) *remember.* This word/concept refers both to the mental activity of remembering and to the communicative act of talking about remembered events. Use of this term is one of the ways that past experiences from the intersubjective world are brought into the present moment of interaction, and ren-

dered again relevant to contemporary happenings. It is often used to indicate the speaker's awareness of past commitments made to the addressee and to renew those commitments.

kenkitsabako. (*transitive*) *recount one's reminiscences of events in the distant past; (intransitive) reminisce in one's mind about events in the distant past.* This verb/concept was used most often to refer to the kind of interactive story-telling and reminiscing that took during feasting, especially in the early hours of sitting and drinking, before chanting began. In this type of situation, 'reminiscing' was an appropriate, though not common, activity. Outside the context of feasting, however, it seemed to connote sadness and attachment, and was considered an inappropriate yielding to the emotions.

ogo. (*intransitive*) *know.* This verb/concept refers to having (conceptual) knowledge or information, as well as having (actional, experiential) knowledge of how to do something.

ogotag. (*transitive*) *inform or instruct someone.* This verb/concept refers to an action or series of actions in which one person provides new information to another, or instructs another person in a new action or activity. It includes both the verbal transfer of information and the presentation or demonstration of conceptual, experiential, or actional knowledge for the benefit of another person — for example, showing someone the location of something.

ogotag. (*transitive*) *explain; teach or instruct someone, by words, deeds, or examples.* This verb/concept refers specifically to the action or series of actions through which a person is acknowledged as knowing something that another person doesn't know, and the knower explains, teaches, or instructs that person with the mutually acknowledged purpose or intention to share or transmit knowledge. This process ranges from one person demonstrating to another a procedure for obtaining a particular result, to the decontextualized verbal 'teaching' that teachers do in

classrooms.

shonkako. (*transitive*) *translate from one language to another.* This verb /concept was used by Nantis to refer to the process through which one person who knows two languages ‘translates’ from one of these languages to the other for the benefit of other parties. To my knowledge, it does not include the process of rewording or modifying speech for better understanding among speakers of a single language. It is lexicalized from the verb stem *shonk* ‘turn over’ and the valence-increasing indirect applicative morpheme *-ako*.

kabakaba. (*intransitive*) *joke and laugh together.* This verb/concept was used to refer to the kind of interactional behavior common during feasting in Montetoni, in which people joke together and tease one another. This type of behavior was far more common among men than among women. It refers to both the general soundscape of laughter and banter, and speakers’ specific turns of joking.

matik. (*intransitive*) *chant, referring to the verbal art form performed during weekly manioc beer feasts.* This verb/concept encompasses both the performance of chant formulae and the performance of extemporized *karintaa* poetry (see below).

kamoso. (*intransitive*) *check out, investigate; inquire about; (transitive) visit, check out, chat with, interact with someone.* This verb/concept was used extremely frequently in everyday life, to describe a wide range of information-gathering activities. Even if this verb/concept were used to describe the ‘checking out’ of a natural rather than social situation, its use in interaction rendered the ‘checking out’ a social activity by implying a basic willingness, or even an overt intention, on the part of the speaker, to share the information gathered with the addressee. This verb/concept, then, describes one of the practices by which information about the intersubjective world is inducted into the world of interpersonal communication.

karintaa karinta. (*vocable, non-referential sound form; noun.*) This word/concept has the unusual status of primarily being used as a non-referential

vocable in the composition of extemporaneous chanted poetry during feasting. On rare occasion, it was used as a noun to refer to the activity of composing extemporaneous poetry as well as to the compositions themselves.

2.8.3 Turn management in interactions

As discussed in detail in Chapter 3, the close study of verbal interactions in the traditions of ethnomethodology and conversation analysis has revealed remarkable orderliness and regularity in the local management of those interactions. Much of the work on turn-taking in interaction has been guided by a seminal article, Sacks et al. (1974), which presents what the authors call the “grossly apparent facts” of conversation, which include, for example, the facts that “speaker-change occurs”; that neither “turn order” nor “turn size” is “fixed”; and that “various ‘turn constructional units’ are employed” (Sacks et al., 1974, p. 701). Interestingly, while most of these proposed ‘facts’ were attested in Nanti interactional practices, data from Nanti conversational interactions actually challenge the ‘facts’ proposed regarding transitions between speakers. Specifically, what has come to be known as the ‘no gap, no overlap’ principle did not hold in Nanti interactions, in either direction. The assumption that Sacks et al. (1974) made was that, overall, for the sequencing of turns to be cooperative and successful, there would be almost seamless transitions between sequences of turns. However, both gaps and overlaps were not only common but also *unproblematic* in Nanti interactions. What the Nanti data suggest is that, in fact, a particular speech community calibrates in its own way what count as cooperative and appropriate transitions in turn sequencing.

In terms of transitional gaps in turn sequencing, it was often the case that the pacing of an interaction was relatively slow, and transitions between speakers and turns was separated by a period of silence that neither ‘counts’ as a turn nor counts as a forfeit of a turn. Nanti interactants were, in general, simply willing to

wait longer for an interaction to unfold than Sacks et al. (1974) expected.

More than this, in some interactional frames in Montetoni, overlapping and simultaneous talk was in fact preferred over strictly sequenced turns. In various types of multi-party interactions in Nanti society, simultaneous and overlapping talk was not only appropriate, but in fact it constituted an indicator of successful communication and a high level of participant alignment. These types of interaction included *shitatsi* banter (described in §2.9) during drinking gatherings, and certain types of unidirectional information exchange among men. Similarly, simultaneous and overlapping speech in hunting stories typically built up (rather than broke down) the turn-taking structure of the interaction. In general, back-channeling — defined, for the purposes of this study, as the production of verbal material by the addressee of a speaker that is not disruptive to the primary speaker’s turn in progress — is commonly used in Nanti interactions. As discussed in §2.8.4, back-channels often consist of the repetition of segments of the primary speaker’s unfolding discourse. Finally, Nanti interactants regularly interrupted themselves or others in order to execute brief secondary turns or side sequences of scolding talk or matter-of-fact talk, without upsetting the overall success of the primary interaction.

2.8.4 The use of parallelisms in interactions

During the period of this study, Nanti speakers in Montetoni regularly used a wide variety of types of parallelism in their interactions, and both the functions and the distribution of parallelism in their talk are intriguing, in light of the work that has been done on the use of parallelism in other speech communities and contexts.

The notion of parallelism, taken as “the patterned repetition of some discursive unit” (Beier et al., 2002, p. 135), has been central to the study of verbal art and poetics within the disciplines of linguistics and linguistic anthropology, among others. If one looks at a broad set of speech communities, speech events, and speech

forms, a remarkably rich and varied range of phenomena can be, and have been, described as ‘parallelism’ in the general sense just provided — including by Beier et al. (2002). Interest in the phenomenon of parallelism as such is largely due to the work of Roman Jakobson, who identified parallelism as “a general, we may even say the fundamental, problem of poetry” ((Jakobson, 1960, p. 368); see also Bauman (1986); Bauman and Briggs (1990); Jakobson (1966, 1968)). Perhaps because of its conceptual and analytical origins in the study of verbal art and poetics, parallelism has been primarily seen as aesthetic resource, a facet of verbal art, and an artifact of individual ‘self expression’. It has been most extensively studied in monologic discourse forms; and most often assessed to be a kind of artistic overlay or evocative but ‘meaningless’ (in a narrow sense) manipulation of a more basic substrate of semiotic meaning.

In the Nanti case, however, parallelisms were widely used in everyday *dialogic* communication. They were used across activity frames, interactional frames, and ways of speaking, and they were clearly implicated in the communicative force of talk in interaction. The purpose of this section is to explore the place of parallelism in Nanti verbal life.

In the context of this study, ‘parallelism’ is the quality of (partial) similarity between two utterances such that the fact of (partial) similarity has communicative force. The notion of parallelism captures the insight that ‘sameness’ is cognitively salient, and therefore potentially significant and signifying. I assume that the distribution of similarity and difference among a set of tokens foregrounds the associations between them, which enables Nanti speakers to use parallelisms in interaction as a means to demonstrate sameness across utterances, which in turn demonstrates a sameness of speaker orientation.

Note that, in general, discussions of parallelism rest on the assumption that the patterns of similarity and difference are both apparent and significant to speakers

and/or hearers, not just to students of parallelism. In many cases, the assumption is made but not substantiated. In the context of this study, I do assume that parallelisms were used by speakers intentionally (unless there is evidence to the contrary), and I assume that parallelisms in sequences of utterances by multiple speakers were both intentional and salient to the unfolding interaction (again, unless there is evidence to the contrary), based on the durable patterns of communicative force that parallelisms can be shown to have across multiple turns of talk in interaction.

Several types of parallelisms are common in my data set of naturally occurring Nanti discourse data. These include the (content-faithful) repetition of words, phrases, and/or clauses; and/or (form-faithful) repetition of intonation contours, voice volume, and/or voice qualities. In addition, types of parallelism included (1) repetition by a speaker of all or part of his or her own speech; and/or (2) repetition by a speaker of all or part of another person's speech. Parallelisms were a regular back-channeling strategy in Nanti interaction, and it was not uncommon for one utterance to be nearly identical to the immediately prior utterance in the context of adjacency pairs or chains. In fact, these examples were key in my developing an understanding of the communicative force (or function) of parallelism in dialogic interaction. As second pair parts in adjacency pairs, parallel utterances can be understood as a specific type of uptake strategy. Specifically, the more a new utterance is like a previous utterance, the less new information is contributed to the interaction. If a turn at talk is taken that does not convey new information, then what is the function of such an utterance? I see two primary functions in Nanti discourse: (1) to convey the message, from addressee to speaker, 'I heard you' or 'I understood you'; and/or (2) to proffer or display inter-speaker alignment.

Alignment is the interactional process by which discourse participants establish and or demonstrate a shared orientation toward something, most obviously the content of an utterance or the topic of the interaction. To that end, a Nanti

addressee in an interaction would often repeat parts of the speaker's talk while a speaker was speaking, overtly demonstrating that (a) he is attending to the speaker and (b) acknowledging the speaker's words. For example, a Nanti addressee not infrequently would repeat all or part of a speaker's utterance content- and/or form-faithfully, demonstrating a comprehension of the utterance, and then proceed, in a subsequent turn, to negate or contradict that utterance.

As I mentioned, Nanti speakers frequently produced parallelisms in utterances across sequences of turns of talk. A speaker might deploy parallelisms with his or her own previous utterances, or with the previous utterances of other participants. These two types of parallelism — (1) with one's own speech and (2) with the speech of another participant — seemed to have similar but non-identical communicative force. Parallelisms with one's own prior speech conveyed commitment — that is, sameness of form and/or content indicated sameness of orientation. Parallelisms with another participant's prior speech conveyed alignment — that is, sameness of form and/or content indicated the sameness of the speaker's orientation to the addressee's previously expressed orientation.

Given that parallelisms were common in Nanti discourse, it is not surprising that parallelisms are attested in all of the ways of speaking that I have examined. While the parallelistic use of a particular way of speaking across multiple utterances is common in my data, these parallelisms are not an artifact of the way of speaking as such, but rather an artifact of the more general alignment strategies described above.

One final observation merits mention. In my data set, parallelism is one type of 'repetition' that is attested, but not the only type. There were three principal types of repetition that occurred in Nanti discourse: re-iterations, reportings, and parallelisms. A re-iteration was the production by the same speaker of the same utterance, with no apparent changes in form, content, or signification, prompted

by the addressee not hearing or not comprehending the first iteration. A reporting was the production, or quotation, of a previous utterance in which prior authorship is explicitly expressed. Note that this encompasses both direct quotation of one speaker by another and self-quotation of the speaker by the speaker, both of which were common practices in Nanti interactivity. In both of these cases, the sameness of the ‘repeated’ utterance was not the addition of communicative force, but rather the re-presentation of the communicative force of a prior utterance. Parallelism is the one type of repetition that was signifying because it was repetition.

2.9 An overview of Nanti ways of speaking

For the purposes of this study, I define a *way of speaking* as a recurrent, conventionalized, socially meaningful sound pattern manifest at the level of the utterance. An utterance, in turn, is an analytical unit that pertains to the analysis of real-time, sequential, interpersonal communicative interaction. An utterance is a single continuous meaning-bearing sound form produced by a single speaker; and a way of speaking is an utterance-level sound pattern that is made up of a set, or cluster, of distinct sound characteristics. Such sound patterns are interpretable in interaction through conventions of association shared among members of the speech community of Montetoni. I discuss these definitions and their implications in much greater detail in Chapter 3; the purpose of this section is to provide a broad overview of the phenomena and perspectives that I explore throughout this study.

In examining naturally occurring discourse³³ in the speech community of Montetoni over the period of this study, I have identified and described a coherent, though not complete, set of ways of speaking that interactants used on a regular basis to express particular speaker orientations. The set I have worked with includes

³³By ‘naturally occurring discourse’, I mean spontaneous, intentional, interactional talk, in contrast to elicited or scripted talk.

*matter-of-fact talk, scolding talk, hunting talk, women's visiting talk, peresetente talk, shitatsi banter, and karintaa poetry.*³⁴ In this section, I discuss each of these ways of speaking in brief, in order to provide a sense of how they fit together as a set of communicative strategies. Then, later, in Chapters 5, 6, and 7, I discuss matter-of-fact talk, scolding talk, and hunting talk respectively, in detail, making occasional reference to the other ways of speaking mentioned here.

My discussion of Nanti ways of speaking begins with *matter-of-fact talk* because it provides a useful point of departure for a discussion of the phenomenon of ways of speaking. Matter-of-fact talk was the most commonly used and widely distributed way of speaking during the period of this study. It was the prototypical type of talk used in mundane exchanges of information and was the most neutral way of speaking in terms of speaker orientation and evaluation. It is my hope that talking about matter-of-fact talk *as* a formal³⁵ way of speaking will draw attention to some of the unexamined — and, I argue, erroneous — assumptions that are often made about the nature and (in)significance of ‘everyday conversation’ as such. In addition, because of its sound characteristics and patterns of distribution, matter-of-fact talk provides an illuminating point of contrast for the discussion of other Nanti ways of speaking.

Scolding talk was the second most commonly used way of speaking during the period of my study, and is the second way of speaking that I discuss in detail. While, like matter-of-fact talk, it was a regular part of everyday interactions, and was present in all types of activity frames and interactional frames, I claim that the primary function of scolding talk, in striking contrast with matter-of-fact talk, was to foreground speaker orientation and/or evaluation. Moreover, scolding talk conveyed

³⁴It merits brief mention that ‘baby talk’ was *not* among the ways of speaking used by Nantis in the period of this study. Although women and older children on occasion imitated the noises and utterances of babies as a form of dyadic interaction, babies were not, in general, spoken to, interacted with, or ‘taught’ to speak in any distinctive way.

³⁵By ‘formal’ I mean ‘having to do with form’ in contradistinction to ‘content’, ‘substance’, or ‘meaning’. This distinction is explored in greater detail in Chapter 3.

a negative evaluation and a disalignment of orientation between the speaker and its focal addressee. Although it was evenly distributed across activity frames and interactional frames, its distribution varied across types of participants in terms of gender, age, and social prominence. It was used more often by some types of individuals than others, and was used most often by mothers to children. As such, it played an important role in the socialization of children and constitutes an important link between actual instances of discourse and broader themes of normativity and appropriateness in Nanti behavior.

Hunting talk, while used quite often during the period of this study, was nonetheless used much less often than either matter-of-fact talk or scolding talk. This also means that the distribution of tokens of hunting talk was relatively restricted in my data set. I attribute the relative infrequency of the use of hunting talk to two principle factors. First, the content of hunting talk centers on a particular domain of activities having to do with hunting; as a result, hunting talk is appropriate to a smaller set of activity frames and interactional frames than either matter-of-fact talk or scolding talk. Second, because it centers around the domain of hunting, its use was more common among particular types of participants — primarily adult males and teen-aged males — and not, in general, interactionally appropriate between other types, such as, for example, parents and their small children. Like scolding talk, hunting talk foregrounded speaker orientation, but in contrast, hunting talk expressed a *positive* evaluation of a particular framing of reported events, as the speaker used hunting talk to convey the validity of his (or her) specific perspective on those events. Hunting talk is the third way of speaking that I discuss in detail in this study.

Women's visiting talk was also used quite frequently during the period of this study, but its distribution was restricted to certain interactional frames and certain participant frameworks. Women's visiting talk was most often used in dyads or



Figure 2.15: Migero was the *peresetente* of Montetoni for most of the time period of this study. He is shown here with Lev Michael in 2009. They are recording a video message, addressed to non-Nantis, regarding the community's interests and concerns. Lev and I have recorded many audio and video messages of this type over the years. Migero is the principal innovator and user of the way of speaking that I call *peresetente* talk.

triads of mothers, daughters, and sisters, in order to activate an interactional frame of restricted mutual responsibility for the content of talk. It contrasts with the other ways of speaking mentioned here in being the most 'private', rather than 'public', way of speaking I examined.

Peresetente talk was a way of speaking that was quite limited in its use, as well as in its users. The overwhelming majority of tokens of *peresetente* talk were produced by the one man (Migero) who inhabited the role of *peresetente*, or community president, in Montetoni during the period of this study. Nonetheless, this

way of speaking was, on a few occasions, used by other senior or socially prominent men.³⁶ *Peresetente* talk was used to frame discourse as representative of the community of Montetoni as a cohesive group, and had the locally highly unusual quality of stating an evaluative perspective on social and political events that was not meant to express solely the individual speaker's orientation but rather the community's orientation as well. In my view, this way of speaking was used judiciously, because it carried with it a high potential for resulting in dissent, and it was only used on occasions when a highly charged political or social event needed to be addressed, and especially when that event involved the presence or impact of outsiders on the community of Montetoni.

Shitatsi banter was a way of speaking that was used only within the activity frame of feasting (as described in §2.6.6 above). At the same time, it was almost always used during the drinking gatherings in the early hours of feasting, when participants were just beginning to drink and socialize with one another, and before chanting began. I call this way of speaking *shitatsi* banter because it typically took place while people were gathered sitting or otherwise lounging on *shitatsi* mats in or near the *kosena* from which *oburoki* was being served. I claim that *shitatsi* banter activated an interactional frame whose purpose was to foreground sociability, good humor, conviviality, and social solidarity. In this interactional frame, telling anecdotes, teasing, joking, laughing — banter in general — were the norm, as participants foregrounded the humorousness of their own experiences, as well as the experiences of others. In contrast, the 'informational' nature of communication receded, as talk was heavily recycled in the service of drawing out its humorous and sociable facets.

Karintaa was the most restricted and formally complex way of speaking that I examined during the period of this study. It was used exclusively within the activity

³⁶See §2.6.7.4 for more information on the notion of social prominence.



Figure 2.16: In this photo, taken in 2005, Neri, Joroteja, and Rárija are shown chanting together; Neri is composing a line of *karintaa* poetry.

frame of feasting and within the already active interactional frame of group chanting. Unlike all the other ways of speaking in Montetoni, *karintaa* poetry was chanted rather than spoken, a metrically- and melodically-driven form of poetry. At the same time, it was extemporaneously composed and often content-driven, making it both formally and interactionally an exceptionally rich communicative phenomenon. As I claimed in Beier (2001), *karintaa* was the only regularly available, socially acceptable interactional frame in which participants expressed highly individuated orientations and evaluations regarding the actions of others, and in which potentially conflictual perspectives were aired and (usually) resolved. As such, *karintaa* can be seen as lying at one extreme, and matter-of-fact talk at the other, of a continuum of ways of speaking, in both formal and interactional terms, during the period of this study.

From the beginning of this study, I have conceived of Nanti *ways of speak-*

ing as a coherent level of organization, and a stable *type*, of language use in the speech community of Montetoni. Moreover, I consider Nanti ways of speaking to be not only *like* one another but *related to* one another, as members of a durable set within a durable system of meaning-making and interpretation, a system that I am calling, in this study, a discursive ecology. My assessment of their relatedness as members of a durable set is based on two observations: (a) that the selection of one way of speaking in any given utterance is also simultaneously the non-selection of other ways of speaking, and (b) that the contrasts among them are significant and signifying. The primary evidence I offer to argue that ways of speaking constitute a stable level of organization in language use in Montetoni is that all the ways of speaking I investigated demonstrated consistent deployment of a consistent set of sound characteristics, across all speech situations in which I observed them used, as a means by which speakers expressed, and hearers assessed, the speaker's orientation toward his own utterance or its situation of origin. The forms were stable, the types of interpretations were stable, and the correlations between these were stable.

2.9.1 Interpretability and interpretation of ways of speaking

Even if I persuade you that the sounds of Nanti ways of speaking are patterned, what evidence is there that this patterning itself is meaningful to people in Montetoni? That is, are the regular sound patterns that I have found in this study salient to Nantis themselves, or only to me as an outsider analyst? I argue that they are locally meaningful and interpretable based on the following evidence.

First and foremost, each way of speaking described in this study is a recurring sound phenomenon that is produced in the shared environment of verbal interactions and has recurred in Nanti verbal interactions over the course of many years. But any given way of speaking does not occur all the time, just sometimes. This means that sometimes individual Nantis are intentionally selecting and deploy-

ing the set of formal characteristics that constitute one particular way of speaking rather than selecting another. This also means that potentially every Nanti can recognize the sound pattern of a particular way of speaking when it occurs in a novel interactional situation, based on their own exposure to it and experience of it in prior interactional situations. The fact that these sound patterns recurred systematically over an extended period of real, historical time and situations places them outside the realm of random phenomena and inside the realm of intentional signifying phenomena. Leaving aside for the moment the question of *what* particular ways of speaking signify, I argue that their systematicity and distribution in interactions demonstrate that ways of speaking do signify to Nantis. Minimally, their occurrence links them to previous occurrences and draws attention to the similarities between a novel experience and prior ones.

Individuals who deploy a given way of speaking in a given interaction are demonstrating to one another (a) that they know ‘what is going on’ interactionally and (b) that they are jointly attending to specific aspects of their situation rather than others. From the speaker’s point of view, using a particular way of speaking constitutes a socially recognized means for initiating or sustaining a specific type of joint interactional activity, or activating a specific interactional frame, among co-present individuals. From the hearer’s point of view, hearing this way of speaking establishes one clear option for appropriate response and turn-taking in the ongoing interaction. Each Nanti way of speaking provides crucial information to participants regarding what a particular strip of talk is ‘about’ from the speaker’s perspective, and therefore activates an interpretive frame that has guidelines for appropriateness built right into it. An utterance stripped of its style could potentially be put to various diverse, or even radically different, social or communicative ends; an utterance of hunting talk, for example, draws participants’ attention to specific aspects of an utterance’s possible meanings instead of others.

Third, a crucial piece of evidence for the salience to Nantis themselves of ways of speaking as unique and meaningful elements of the speech stream is their robust quotability. When one speaks using a particular way of speaking, one can expect that if what is said circulates outside the conversation of origin, then it will circulate form-faithfully. For example, once put into the Nanti social sphere, strips of hunting talk are regularly quoted and recycled form-faithfully, both by the original speaker and by their hearers. In other words, Nantis quote the whole package, content and form, of ways of speaking.

2.10 Concluding remarks

I hope that, in this chapter, I have provided enough general background information on the Nanti people, their lifeways, their language, and their language use during the period of this study that subsequent discussion of the particular phenomenon of Nanti ways of speaking will make sense to you. The next two chapters focus on conceptual and methodological aspects of this study, in order to establish a particular intellectual and ethical framework for subsequent chapters. The following three chapters are the empirical core of this study, each one devoted to a single Nanti way of speaking. It is also my hope that the various threads of this study will weave together for you in a way that is not only interesting but also coherent, and perhaps even enjoyable to read and contemplate.

Chapter 3

Conceptual frameworks for this study

3.1 Introduction

This chapter provides a discussion of the disciplinary frameworks, intellectual histories, and philosophical orientations from which this study of Nanti ways of speaking has emerged. In particular, this chapter makes a break from the practical, real-world perspective adopted in the previous chapter, and shifts to a close examination of the assumptions — that is, the axioms, premises, and presuppositions — that inform my analysis, in this study, of Nanti ways of speaking as a socially significant acoustic¹ phenomenon.

¹In this study, I use the word ‘acoustic’ in a general sense, meaning ‘having to do with sound’, rather than in a specialized sense salient to phoneticians, phonologists, ethnomusicologists, physicists, etc.

3.2 Overview of the main concepts

In the context of this study, I make the following assertions. Nanti *ways of speaking* are recurrent, conventionalized, socially meaningful sound patterns manifest at the level of the utterance. An *utterance* is an analytical unit that pertains to the analysis of real-time, sequential, interpersonal communicative interaction. An utterance is a single continuous sound form produced by a single speaker; and a way of speaking is an utterance-level sound pattern that is made up of a set, or cluster, of distinct sound characteristics. Such sound patterns are interpretable in interaction through *conventions of association* shared among members of the speech community of Montetoni. These conventions associate particular ways of speaking with particular types of *speaker orientation*, based on associations in and among participants' prior interactional experiences. Nanti ways of speaking impart information about the speaker of the utterance and his or her orientation to either the referential content of the utterance or its situation of origin (including the mental and emotional states of the participants). The relevance of this information about the speaker is determined by the social and interactional situation in which the utterance originates.

The utterance is the primary unit of analysis in this study. A single utterance interfaces with four related but distinct systems of relations: sound/experience relations, grammatical relations, interactional relations, and social relations. The details of this framework are discussed in detail below and in Chapter 4, and are represented schematically in Figure 3.1.

Ways of speaking are constituted by *clusters of sound characteristics* that co-occur within the domain of an utterance. The characteristics that cluster together to create a way of speaking are independently realizable, not dependent upon one another to come into being. For example, the voice qualities of an utterance and the rate of speaking are entirely independent variables. Note that an utterance *must* have voice qualities and a rate of speaking; these are defining characteristics




Figure 3.1: Illustration of the four systems of relations that intersect in an utterance. Each of these systems is relevant to the other three, yet each has its own principles of organization; each is relevant to ‘total utterance meaning’, yet each merits investigation and description on its own terms.

of human speech. The issue here is *how* voice qualities and rate of speaking are manifest in a particular utterance. The cluster of characteristics that constitute a way of speaking can be present in a single complete and coherent utterance without necessarily co-occurring on a single constituent element (a sound segment, a syllable, a word, etc.) of that utterance. As utterance-level phenomena, the characteristics of ways of speaking do not conflict with co-occurring phonological phenomena.

This study of Nanti ways of speaking relies heavily on a particular formulation of type/token relations. I have chosen this as a primary framework for this study because it gives me a way to strike a balance between the real-world phenomena of intersubjectivity and communicative practice — the realm of tokens — on the one hand, and the real-world phenomena of individual-internal cognitive and interpretive processes — the realm of types — on the other hand. In brief, in my view, individuals share access to tokens — that is, discrete instances of interpersonal experience — but each individual makes sense of these tokens through cognitive processes of categorization that result in a system of concepts — that is, types and type relations — upon which individuals rely to guide their actions in the social world. These concepts are built out of subsets of characteristics of the token. Types are gradient (or graded) phenomena, or ‘fuzzy categories’, that are organized by degrees of likeness, or similarity, not by relations of identity. Consequently, some tokens of experience are better exemplars of a type than others, depending on the degree to which the tokens display the characteristics on which the type is built. I flesh out this framework and argue for its appropriateness to the study of Nanti ways of speaking through the rest of this work.

Clearly, ways of speaking are not the only means for conveying information about the speaker of an utterance. Just like in other domains of linguistic expression, there are multiple means for realizing a single concept. For example, it is possible to refer to a single referent with a proper name (Chris), a generic noun (the woman), a

pronoun (she), a deictic element (that one), etc. The element used is selected by the speaker of the utterance in accord with his or her communicative goals. Likewise, it is possible to express speaker orientation lexically/referentially (saying “I disapprove of your actions”), corporeally (manifesting a tight frown), acoustically (using a type of ‘scolding talk’, as described in this study), by combining these modes of expression (Saying “I disapprove” in a disapproving way while frowning), and so on. Again, the means used is selected by the speaker of the utterance in accord with his or her communicative goals.

3.3 The assumptions upon which this study of Nanti ways of speaking is built

This section explicitly states the set of assumptions (axioms, premises, and presuppositions) that underlie this study. I have stated these premises explicitly, in list form, for two reasons. First, since this study draws on concepts from a number of disciplines, I don’t think it is safe to assume that the reader will begin from the same set of premises that I do. Second, it has taken me a long time to identify the assumptions that this study makes, and the process of clearly articulating these assumptions (and the relations among them) has been central to the development of this study. If perhaps some of these premises seem only distantly related to my analysis of Nanti ways of speaking, I aver that they are, nonetheless, central to my attempts to find coherence and self-consistency in my own ideas.

3.3.1 Assumptions about language and grammatical relations

1. I assume that human language is a complex system of systems of relations. This assumption is rooted, for me, in the ideas of Ferdinand de Saussure (Saussure et al., 1916) and Roman Jakobson (Jakobson, 1957, 1960, 1966,

1981, 1990; Jakobson et al., 1990), and it is particularly well articulated in Hanks (1996).

2. I assume that the part of human language which we call ‘grammar’ can be understood as a system of pure relationality. That is, the systematicity of grammar is exactly that set of relations which can be abstracted from occasions of use of language.² This assumption is rooted in the insights expressed by Saussure in his *Cours de linguistique générale*, in which he argues that language is a ‘synchronic semiotic system’ that is constituted through arbitrary (conventionalized), linear (sequential) relations among forms.
3. The forms that compose the system of relations called grammar are most commonly called ‘signs’ or ‘linguistic signs’. In this study I conceive of and talk about ‘linguistic signs’ (as well as other conceptual entities) as a type of ‘type’, for reasons that I will lay out below. In this study, I assume that grammar is a ‘system of types and type relations’.
4. I assume that the formal³ system of relations of a language only has ‘meaning’ in its use; that is, in unique discrete moments of interpersonal interaction (broadly interpreted to include ‘delayed’ and ‘repeatable’ types of interaction, like writing and reading, as well as ‘intrapersonal’ and self-directed uses of language). Without use, language is relational but meaningless. ‘Meaning’, in this study, refers to the associations individuals make among experiences, in order to form expectations about the future based on outcomes in the past.
5. I assume that human language is much more than grammar — that is, it is not only a system of arbitrary (conventionalized), linear (sequential) relations among forms. Rather, I assume that human language is a tool for human

²It has been brought to my attention that the phenomenon of creolization challenges this assumption (Crowhurst, personal communication); I will take this into account in future work.

³By ‘formal’ I mean ‘having to do with form’.

communication (and not the only tool, either). In a broad ordinary sense, I assume that the sole reason grammar exists is in order that individual human beings may ‘coordinate’ with one another, where ‘coordinate’ includes establishing joint attention with one another, exchanging ideas, coordinating physical activities, expressing feelings, aligning attitudes and orientations, etc. This is fundamentally a function-oriented perspective (Jakobson, 1960; Jakobson et al., 1990; Silverstein, 1976, 1987, 1993), in that I assume that interpersonal communication and coordination is the purpose of language use, and that individuals select strategies (many of which are provided by the grammar of a language) to achieve specific goals in the social/physical world. In my view, then, grammar is at the service of communicative function.

6. I assume that there is a cooperative relationship between grammar and speech. A sequence of grammatical forms are linked to one another within language, while a sequence of utterance forms are linked outside of language into human experience. What exactly the utterance forms are linked to is determined by the participants plus the situation of origin.
7. I assume that language has multiple functions in the social world: it is a communicative system; it is a tool for individual expression and expressivity; it is a repository of history; it is a social activity in itself; it is a vehicle for aesthetics, ethics, and morality; it is a means for social control, differentiation, and distinction.
8. I assume that language, as a sign system, has three primary functions: to ‘refer’ — that is, to stand for, or label, entities and relations among them (physical objects and activities; events; mental objects, activities, and states; emotional states, etc.); to ‘index’ — that is, to point to entities and relations among them; and to ‘evoke’ — that is, to call to mind, or associate, entities

and relations among them.

9. I assume that all human languages are functionally equivalent. That is, every human language has its own particular set of strategies for achieving a language-external range of communicative functions. I assume that this set of communicative functions is potentially infinite and universal, but is finite in as much as those functions are realized and instantiated in concrete instances of communicative interaction.

Contingently, I assume that any comparison among (or within) languages is only possible because of a pre-existing assumption of functional equivalence. Therefore, even if a linguistic theoretical or typological discussion is entirely free of reference to ‘communicative function’, the underlying assumption that forms have functional equivalence is indispensable. Said another way, a typological approach to human language rests on the insight that ‘types’ are functionally universal but ‘tokens’ are local and specific.

It merits mention that looking at language in terms of its functions is a means of making linguistic generalizations and cross-linguistic comparisons; it does not equate to an adherence to a comprehensive functionalist theory of society, psychology, mind, etc.

10. Within the analytical framework of this study, the type *utterance* — that is, the single continuous sound form produced by a single speaker, produced in a ‘real place’ at a ‘real’ time — maps onto the type *sentence* within the system of grammatical relations.

3.3.2 Assumptions about the systematicity of language in use

11. I assume that communication — that is, language use in interactions among social individuals — is orderly and systematic (as argued by Dell Hymes),

not chaotic, disordered, and random (as suggested by Saussure, Chomsky, etc.⁴) More strongly, I assume that the robust systematicity that has been found in language-as-a-system (*langue* in Saussure's terms) can also be found in communicative practices (*parole* in Saussure's terms) if we look in the right places.

12. I assume that human language is composed of a system of systems, or levels, of organization, each of which is coherently organized and linked to other levels of organization in systematic ways (Morris, 1938). Every human language has these levels of organization, but each instantiates each level in its own way. The best understood levels of organization of human language include phonology, morphology, and syntax, and strides are being made in the domains of semantics and pragmatics. I hypothesize that ways of speaking are an additional level of organization waiting to be described systematically.
13. I assume, as it is widely assumed based on extensive data, that all human languages have *nouns*. That is to say, linguists operate on the assumption that any human language will include the type *noun*, where a *noun* is a type of linguistic element (1) whose (minimal) function is to name entities; (2) that can function as the subject or object of a verb, or the object of an adposition; and (3) that will be attested by a set of tokens in speech (or writing) that demonstrate the properties in (1) and (2) and result in distinctions in meaning. Similarly, I share the assumption that any (spoken) human language will include the type *phoneme*, where a *phoneme* is a type of linguistic element (1) that is the minimal unit of potentially meaningful sound within a language's system of recognized sound distinctions;⁵ (2) whose identity is constituted by

⁴It merits mentioning that I consider the move to separate language-as-system from language-in-use (a) brilliant and (b) absolutely essential to the analysis of both phenomena. I also think it is essential to put these two facets of language back together again and see them as equally significant, and signifying, parts of a whole.

⁵I have stated this assumption in terms of sound because this study focuses on a spoken language;

contrast with other phonemes; and (3) that will be attested in human speech, in the form of allophones, in ways that result in distinctions in meaning.

In parallel, I assume that any (spoken)⁶ human language will include the linguistic type *way of speaking* (1) whose function is to convey speaker orientation toward an utterance or its situation of origin; (2) that can convey speaker orientation instead of, in addition to, or in opposition to, the speaker orientation conveyed by other linguistic forms in the same utterance; and (3) that will be attested in human speech at the level of the utterance, as a set of sound characteristics that result in distinctions in meaning. The type of meaning distinctions conveyed by ways of speaking are social, not referential, in nature.

3.3.3 Assumptions about token/type relations

14. For the purposes of this study, a *token* is an instance, a unit of experience, extracted from the flow of percepts, to which meaning may be ascribed. A *type* is a concept, an abstraction, a generalization that an individual holds (cognitively), that is based on assessments of likeness among tokens (Peirce et al., 1958; Wetzel, 2008).

While a token has intersubjective availability, a type is a cognitive phenomenon. The degree of sharedness of types among individuals is a result of (a) likenesses among individuals' conceptual, cognitive processes and (b) degrees of sharedness of lived experiences of relevant tokens. Types range widely in their level

to be clear: in other language modalities, phonemes are realized in other ways.

⁶Note that because I am focusing on ways of speaking in a spoken language in this study, I have discussed the type *way of speaking* in terms of sound properties. I do not know if functionally equivalent phenomena are present in other language modalities (like signed languages) but, in the context of my own underlying assumptions, I assume that functionally equivalent phenomena *are* present in other language modalities.

of complexity and specificity; and sets of types are in nested, intersecting, and orthogonal relations with other types.

15. I assume that typification — the creation of cognitive types based on tokens of experience — is categorization. “The act of categorization is one of the most basic human cognitive activities. Categorization involves the apprehension of some individual entity, some particular experience, as an instance of something conceived more abstractly that also encompasses other actual and potential instantiations.” (Croft and Cruse, 2004, p. 74)
16. I assume that language works as a communicative system because of — and contingent upon the degree of — similarities among the concepts (types and type relations) that individuals hold. And spoken language works as a communicative system because of — and contingent upon the degree of — similarities among the concepts speakers and hearers have based on the sounds (or sound patterns, or Saussurian sound images) they perceive.
17. I assume that type/token relations apply to all cognitive categories. That is, discrete tokens of linguistic experience create obvious cognitive types like words and syntactic word orderings. But discrete tokens of interpersonal experience also create cognitive types of experiences, including types of interactional moves, social roles, social institutions, emotional orientations, etc.
18. I assume that the system of type relations of language is a crucial part of meaning-making in language in use (just not the only part). For example, it is the system of relations among forms that create sentences in English that allows me to make limited sense of the sentence ‘Colorless green ideas sleep furiously.’ My knowledge, or recognition, of the types *clause*, *noun phrase*, *verb phrase*, *adverb*, etc. is what makes some sense of this sentence as of the type *grammatical nonsense sentence in English*.

19. I assume that it is the relative stability and durability of types within a system of type relations that makes them useful for the categorization and interpretation of constantly changing input. Typification is the process of recognizing novel tokens in experience as instances of known types, and of creating new types out of novel experiences (see Schutz (1970)).
20. I assume that the many ‘types’ that map onto a single ‘token’ may include clashes and contradictions among them, which the mind will have to resolve through the processes of interpretation.
21. I assume that through the iterative processes of typification, some types emerge that are ‘prototypes’, or best examples, of a particular type. While a particular token may be perceived as a ‘perfect example’ of a type, the ‘prototype’ itself is a revisable, update-able concept.

3.3.4 Assumptions about individual minds and interactional relations

22. I assume that human beings are pattern-seeking creatures, and that similarity, difference, contrast, and repetition are the fundamental types of relations that humans rely on to identify patterns in any perceptual field.
23. I assume that patterning in language — structure and use — maps onto certain cognitive categorization schemes. Therefore, examining language structure and use can tell us something (though not everything) about cognitive categories and their schemes.
24. I assume that “the representation of linguistic knowledge is essentially the same as the representation of other conceptual structures... and language is the real-time perception and production of a temporal sequence of discrete, structured

symbolic units” (Croft and Cruse, 2004, p. 2). This assumption is crucial to my analysis of Nanti ways of speaking because I am attributing meaningfulness to ‘structured symbolic units’ — namely, sound properties of situated utterances — that are not included in the standard notion of ‘linguistic knowledge’.

25. I assume that “categories and structures in semantics, syntax, morphology and phonology are built up from our cognition of specific utterances on specific occasions of use” (Croft and Cruse, 2004, p. 4) — and I add the ‘categories and structures’ of ways of speaking, interpretive frames, and interactional sequencing to the list of phenomena that we build up cognitively through language use.
26. I assume that the individual mind processes novel input in sequential order, in real time, such that categorization and comprehension is a gradual, unfolding process that is always open to revision and reconfiguration. This assumption does not negate the role of temporally unanchored phenomena such as memory, emotion, etc. in the processes of categorization and comprehension.
27. I assume that every speaker of human language holds a set of operating principles, assumptions, and expectations in his or her individual mind. I assume these principles, assumptions, and expectations are accretions of individual experiences over the course of the individual’s lifetime. These principles, assumptions, and expectations are a heterogeneous and non-self-consistent set of concepts that are subject to continual revision based on the individual’s new experiences.
28. I assume that in order to make sense of lived experience, individual minds categorize new experiences (novel input) according to their likeness to prior experiences. Moreover, I assume that individual minds operate on the (unexamined) assumption (1) that other individuals also have minds, and (2)

that all human minds function in roughly the same way (see Schutz (1970); Tomasello (1999); Hutchins (1995)).

29. I assume that the individual mind processes novel input by recognizing similarities between the ‘novel’ and the ‘known’ and as a result provisionally assigning the novel input to the type category or categories to which it is most similar. I also assume that the mind selects and attends to some input, but not all input, and moreover that the more frequently a stimulus is recognized, the more easily recognized it will be in future instances. As a result, the selectivity of attention of every individual is sensitive to that individual’s habits of categorization.
30. I assume that every participant brings his or her own set of experience-derived types to interactions and, as a result, the mappings between tokens they all experience, and the types each one maps to, will be non-identical. Again, the degree of understanding is contingent upon the similarity of these non-identical types. The more two individuals interact, the more similar the concepts, categories, and types they hold will be.
31. I assume that to some degree individuals share conventions of association among symbols and the intersubjective world. What, exactly, the conventions and symbols *are* must be figured out, but I accept that they are there. Phonology is a nice, safe example of this presupposition; we observe that certain sounds can be articulated by one person and recognized by another person such that the two successfully mutually orient their gaze to a particular object in their surroundings. The challenging cases are those in which complex phenomena are identified as symbols and we try to puzzle out the conventions of association shared by individuals. The challenging cases, however, do not challenge the presupposition, but rather the level of complexity that it is

reasonable to expect to decompose.

32. I assume that one of the operating principles (assumptions and expectations) that all individuals use in interpersonal interaction is that communication is possible as a result of speaking language, and that there is a relatively stable set of other individuals who will understand, to some degree, a speaker's words, because these individuals have experienced shared understanding before.
33. I assume that the system of type relations, which constitutes the grammar of a language in a strict sense, resides only and uniquely in each individual language user's mind. This is to say that every individual has a unique grammar in his or her mind, be it ever so slightly different from anyone else's. At the same time, however, it is precisely the similarities among these unique grammars across groups of individuals that makes interpersonal communication and understanding possible.
34. I assume that the 'types' of language that reside in individual minds are concepts that have been created out of discrete experiences of perceived (physical, emotional, interpersonal, intellectual) phenomena. I also assume that a huge portion of the perceived phenomena that create an individual's set of cognitive types are instances of language use.
35. I assume that although a set of individuals can be said to speak the 'same' language, the specific set of types and the relations among them that each individual holds is unique. The degree to which communication among individuals is successful corresponds to the degree to which the individuals' respective sets of types and relations are alike.
36. I assume that individuals in interaction have varying degrees of understanding of one another, as well as varying degrees of interest in, commitment to, and capacity for maximizing understanding with others. This means that I assume

that each participant brings his or her own degree of willingness to cooperate to an interaction, and that this degree of willingness both can change over the course of the interaction and have a substantial impact on the communicative ‘success’ of the interaction for all participants.

37. I assume that interpersonal understanding is solely a product of interpersonal interaction, and that individuals can only ‘know’ whether or not they share interpersonal understanding through interaction. That is, interpersonal understanding must be co-created and verified through interaction. To be clear, I assume that individual cogitation and reflection can enhance interpersonal understanding, but that individual cognitive activity is secondary to interpersonal interaction. This set of assumptions accounts for both ‘understanding’ and ‘misunderstanding’ in verbal communication by locating understanding in the communicative activity between individuals, not within the individuals themselves.
38. I assume that the individual mind chops up experience into recognizable pieces of various types at once, and that many cognitive processes are going on at the same time. I also assume that the mind attends more closely to those processes that best serve the immediate goal at hand. This assumption accounts for why an individual may respond to the ‘same’ stimulus on two different occasions in two different ways, and for why an individual may notice and/or remember only parts of a given experience.

3.3.5 Assumptions about language and interactional relations

39. I assume that the real-time sequencing of interaction is (a) a crucial organizing principle in language use and (b) a crucial element in the processes of real-time interpretation. More specifically, I assume that the observable phenomena of

turns, uptakes, adjacency pairs/chains, and next positioning provide participants (and observers) indispensable information about both the interpretive and intersubjective processes that are active during interaction.

40. I assume that individual people are separate perceivers with separate and unique histories, memories, predilections, sensitivities, etc. — that is to say, distinct subjectivities. As soon as individuals engage in interaction, however, intersubjectivity is created to some degree. Intersubjectivity is, in essence, shared knowledge. Intersubjectivity is an activity and an accomplishment that emerges moment to moment through interaction.
41. I assume that when interacting, different participants will share particular communicative goals to different degrees. I also assume that there are multiple concrete ways to meet a particular communicative goal, and that communicative ‘success’ can be defined in different ways by one participant, and be defined in different ways among participants. As a result, I see communicative ‘success’ as set of outcomes that participants achieve both together and individually on a case by case basis.
42. Within the analytical framework of this study, the type utterance maps onto the type *turn* within the system of interactional relations.

3.3.6 Assumptions about language and social relations

43. I assume that language use is a type of social action (Bourdieu, 1977; Bourdieu and Thompson, 1991; Hanks, 1987, 1990, 1996). This is an extension of the function-oriented approach indicated above, because I assume that language is one type of social action among many that individuals use to achieve specific goals in the intersubjective world.

44. I assume that language use is purposeful, goal-directed interactivity. By this I mean that when a person uses language, that instance of use is a discrete, observable activity that the individual engages in, in the shared world, with the intention that other individuals perceive and interpret it.
45. (Same as 7) I assume that language has multiple functions in the social world: it is a communicative system; it is a tool for individual expression and expressivity; it is a repository of history; it is a social activity in itself; it is a vehicle for aesthetics, ethics, morality; it is a means for social control, differentiation, and distinction.
46. I assume that the ‘meaning’ of a particular utterance uttered by an individual is co-created through the process of interaction among participants, and that the ‘meanings’ of utterances and interactions emerge as the outcomes of participants’ mutually oriented interactional moves.
- This also means that I assume that ‘meaning’ is neither unitary nor stable, but rather is a time-dependent collection of potential associations, assumptions, and expectations anchored in participants’ communicative goals.
47. I assume that in all interpersonal interaction, part of the ‘meaning’ of the interaction emerges from grammatical relations, and another part of the ‘meaning’ emerges from social relations. That these two part exists is certain; their relative importance is situational.
48. I assume that individuals can be grouped according to their participation in a speech community, which is an analytical unit defined by the observable fact that its members interact with one another according to certain identifiable patterns of language use.⁷

⁷The notion that such a group exists abstractly and endures over time, apart from specific instances of interaction among individuals, seems to me a common, but mistaken, assumption.

49. I assume that human languages change over time as a result of the continuous processes of typification that originate in individual language users but disseminate among them through interaction.
50. Within the analytical framework of this study, the type ‘utterance’ maps onto the type *move* within the system of social relations.

3.3.7 Assumptions about sound/experience relations

51. (Same as 8) I assume that language, as a sign system, has three primary functions: to ‘refer’ — that is, to stand for non-linguistic forms (physical objects and activities; events; mental objects, activities, and states; emotional states, etc.); to ‘index’ — that is, to point to non-linguistic forms and relations among them; and to ‘evoke’ — that is, to summon or call to mind non-linguistic forms and relations among them.
52. I assume that a significant part of ‘meaning-making’ in verbal interaction is founded on the evocative, or associative, properties of sound forms, which is, in part, why every interpretive move in interaction is (a) in principle, unforeseeable, (b) in principle, heteroglossic, and (c) in theory and in practice, entirely locally contingent.
53. I depart from the assumption that the perceiver is initially confronted by an undifferentiated sound stream. Upon perceiving that sound stream, the perceiver recognizes various elements and combinations of elements in it, and categorizes whatever he or she recognizes as tokens of known types. I assume that this happens on various levels of organization of the sound stream, such that some recognized elements will be words, some will be syntactic constructions, some will be ways of speaking, some will be idioms, some will be stances or orientations, etc.

54. I assume that the perceiver's environment provides far more stimuli than the perceiver can process at one time. Therefore, the processes of recognition just mentioned are highly dependent on factors of both attention and relevance as the perceiver's mind selects out part of the total set of momentaneous stimuli. Attention has to do with focusing cognitive processing on specific facets, factors, or tasks that constitute the perceivable surround. Relevance, in contrast, has to do with focusing cognitive processing on some immediate problem or goal. Relevance is a key means for guiding perception and attention (but not the only means).
55. I assume that as part of the 'online' cognitive processing that underlies verbal interaction, interactants make use of contrast at all levels of language structure in assessing the salience and interpretability of a communicative sound stream.
56. I assume that verbal communication relies on sound/experience mappings, but not sound/experience pairings; that is, interpretation is an experiential process that makes multiple (simultaneous and sequential) associations that feed forward into subsequent sound/experience mappings. Sound/experience mappings are a one-to-many relation, not a one-to-one relation.
57. I assume that speech sound signifies as a result of combinations of sound forms in units of different temporally-anchored sizes. These units include segments, grammatical constituents, and utterances. One 'token' of speech maps onto many 'types' of different sizes.
58. I assume that if one takes an utterance, and removes from it everything that can be explained by the standard frameworks of descriptive linguistics, the sound form that remains (a) is also meaningful to language users within some system of conventionalized relations; and (b) the sense or senses in which it is meaningful can be discovered and described systematically.

59. I assume that the sound forms (or patterns) that constitute Nanti ways of speaking (as characterized in 58) map onto social meanings, not referential meanings; they map onto types of orientations (attitudes, evaluations, stances, etc.) that speakers hold toward an utterance or its situation of origin. There are two types of sound/experience mappings: one is sound to concept and one is sound to orientation toward concept. These mappings are shared among individuals to the degree that they are *conventionalized* over time through repeated use.

By ‘conventionalized’ I mean an arbitrary but durable association between two signs based on the sharedness of this association among members of a speech community. I do *not* mean an arbitrary association between signs within a system of signs to the exclusion of real-world knowledge (this distinction is drawn clearly by Voloshinov et al. (1973)).

60. Within the analytical framework of this study, the type utterance is a type of sound form that is interpretable based on processes of association based on an individual’s prior experiences.

3.4 The disciplinary frameworks for this study

This section provides an intellectual and disciplinary history of the approach to Nanti ways of speaking that I have taken in this study. Here I trace the lines of thinking that resulted in the assumptions listed above, and that resulted in my understanding of ‘the utterance’ as a point of intersection among four sets of relations — social relations, interactional relations, grammatical relations, and sound/experience relations — through which ‘meaning’ is made.

Speaking generally first, this study brings together a number of related, but non-identical, and occasionally incompatible, lines of inquiry, out of which I have

attempted to formulate a coherent framework. My own path was roughly this: the ethnography of speaking/communication literature showed me the richness of ‘naturally occurring discourse’ and its key constituent, the ‘utterance’; and convinced me to look at language use phenomena for my dissertation project. That body of literature, in turn, led me to early literature in sociolinguistics, where I discovered Hymes’ and Gumperz’ visions of the systematicity of language use phenomena and the ‘ecology’ of discourse; to literature on ethnopoetics, where I discovered the ‘line’; and to literature on discourse-centered approaches to culture, where I discovered the intersection of language, culture, society and individual expression (where I eventually built my home, so to speak!). That body of literature, in turn, led me to literature on practice theory and the practice approach to language, where I discovered ‘social action’, ‘intersubjectivity’ and ‘relationality’; and then literature on Marxist/dialectical approaches to language, where I discovered ‘dialogicality’ and ‘heteroglossia’.

Meanwhile, in parallel, the ethnography of speaking/communication literature led me to literature on conversation analysis, where I discovered ‘turns’ and ‘sequencing’; and to literature on interactional sociology, where I discovered ‘frames’ and ‘moves’. Again in parallel, my interest in the Nanti language (in a more conventional sense) led me to literature on descriptive and documentary linguistics, where I discovered a wealth of both field and analytical methods; and to literature on sign relations and typification, where I discovered ‘tokens and types’ and discovered ‘relationality’ in a whole new way. That literature, in turn, led me to literature in cognitive science and cognitive linguistics, where I discovered ‘attention’, ‘cognition’ and ‘categorization’. All of these chains of ideas and insights at long last sorted themselves out into the system of complementary relations illustrated in Figure 3.1. The following sections elaborate on the summary just given.

3.4.1 The ethnography of Nanti ways of speaking

This study is, at heart, an ethnography of communication (a.k.a. an ethnography of speaking; to me these labels are interchangeable at this level of detail). Using the framework of the ethnography of speaking/communication makes *language use* the object of inquiry and necessitates that one take into account not only the ‘grammatical relations’ in speech but also the ‘social relations’ among speakers of language. Work done in this tradition sensitized me to the distinction between ‘language form’ and ‘language function’ and to the importance of investigating these two phenomena without collapsing them into one another. It also convinced me that language use practices among members of a speech community are systematic, and inspired me to examine the phenomenon of ways of speaking as one of the organizing principles of communicative practices in Montetoni. The idea that *ways of speaking* are one of the organizing principles of communication as a system — as well as the term itself — originated with Dell Hymes (Hymes, 1974b), within the context of foundational work in the ethnography of speaking/communication tradition (Bauman and Sherzer, 1975, 1982, 1989; Gumperz and Hymes, 1964, 1972; Hymes, 1974b; Sherzer, 1983, 1990). In particular, Sherzer’s (1983) ethnographic work on Kuna ways of speaking changed forever the way I look at, listen to, and understand ‘language’ — both intellectually and experientially.

Sherzer characterizes an ethnography of speaking as “a description in cultural terms of the patterned uses of language and speech in a particular group, institution, community or society” (Sherzer, 1983, p. 11), which complements Hymes’ vision of the ethnography of communication as

a science that would approach language neither as abstracted form nor as an abstract correlate of a community, but as situated in the flux and pattern of communicative events. It would study communicative form and function in integral relation to each other (Hymes, 1974a, p. 5)

It is this sense of *integral relation* between form and function that motivates my description of the sound patterns of Nanti ways of speaking in the context of their social life.

In a series of publications during the 1960s and 1970s, Dell Hymes elaborated and refined both the goals and the terms that constitute the ethnography of speaking/communication research paradigm. In a book chapter dedicated specifically to articulating the scope of the ways of speaking (Hymes, 1974b) Hymes proposed this concept as “a productive analytical framework for describing the organization of linguistic behavior” that encompasses the set of “styles” (or “means of speech”) together with the “speech economy” of a community. In an analytically powerful turn of phrase, Hymes characterizes the speech community as an “organization of diversity” and posits the speech community as the crucial unit of analysis for the study of communicative behavior.

Hymes (1974) discusses in detail the concept of ‘style’ and how to differentiate among speech styles shared by the members of a speech community. In this discussion, Hymes turns to two simple but powerful analytical principles that were put forward by Ervin-Tripp (1972) as the principles that guide all linguistic description: “rules of co-occurrence” and “rules of alternation”. For my purposes here, Ervin-Tripp’s key insight is the primary analytical distinction between ‘co-occurrence’ and ‘alternation’.⁸ The power of these principles in studying a system of communicative behavior is that they provide an empirically robust way to describe patterning across multi-modal, real-time social and interactional phenomena. In using these principles to understand Nanti interactional data, then, I posit that a Nanti way of speaking can be identified when most (if not all) of the formal and contextual characteristics — minimally described in etic terms and ideally also described in

⁸I consider the formulation of this insight in terms of “rules” to be a reflection of earlier modes of thinking in linguistics, and reframe the insight for my purposes in terms of the types of processes of selection that speakers employ when communicating.

emic terms — adhere to a particular locally-defined pattern of co-occurrence and alternation.

Within the ethnography of communication tradition, discourse is conceived of as “actual instances of language use and the patterning of these instances of language use into systems of communicative practice, including such types of organization as speech genres, participation frameworks, and the poetics of verbal performance” (Beier et al., 2002, p. 122). In this study, I chose to focus on how actual instances of language use constitute one of the systems of communicative practice in the speech community of Montetoni, the system of ways of speaking.

As evidenced in the previous paragraphs, the terms *genre* and *style* have been widely used to talk about the types of phenomena that I explore in this study.⁹ After much consideration, I have decided to avoid using these terms in my discussion of Nanti ways of speaking, for the following reasons. These terms have a long history of use, which means that a heterogeneous set of definitions and assumptions adhere to them in their use; I have found that, as a result, using these terms locks in my interlocutors’ pre-existing ideas and thereby short-circuits my attempts to describe Nanti ways of speaking on their own terms. Providing narrowed, local definitions doesn’t solve this problem. Speaking generally, the common conception of ‘genre’ — the product of a long tradition of literary criticism crossed with a much earlier era of social anthropology — is too static, inflexible, preordained, and comprehensive in nature to characterize Nanti ways of speaking accurately; while the common conception of ‘style’ — largely associated with an earlier era of (in my opinion, under-theorized) sociolinguistics — is too individualized, epiphenomenal, and idiosyncratic in nature.

Moreover, the fundamental conceptual problem with applying the notion ‘genre’ to Nanti ways of speaking is apparent in this characterization made by

⁹Valuable perspectives on the concept of ‘genre’ in linguistic anthropology include Bauman and Briggs (1990); Briggs and Bauman (1992); Hanks (1987, 1996).

Bakhtin et al. (1986, p. 60):

“Each separate utterance is individual, of course, but each sphere in which language is used develops its own *relatively stable types* of these utterances. These we may call *speech genres*.”

The problem for me is that genres are conceptualized as an *outcome* or product of a situation (i.e. ‘sphere’), rather than as a defining element of a situation. The difference is a subtle one, but also a crucially important one for this study, because I have analyzed Nanti ways of speaking as situation-defining, not as situation-defined. Clearly, there are ‘spheres’ of language use that are associated with ‘relatively stable types’ of utterances. The issue has to do with the social and interactional nature of how those ‘spheres’ come to exist in the first place.

This study focuses on Nanti ways of speaking as one particular type of organization of communicative practice. In order to take ways of speaking as such as the center point of description and analysis, I have both worked with and re-worked some of the key terminological and conceptual material used by other ethnographers of communication, in order to produce a systematic, and self-consistent, discussion of the systematicity apparent in my data set.

3.4.2 Taking a discourse-centered approach to Nanti culture and society

For all its strengths and insights, early work in the ethnography of speaking/communication tradition resulted in a relatively static, dehistoricized, and agentless portrayal of speech communities and their communicative practices.¹⁰ An effort by ethnographers of speaking to incorporate the relationship of language use (discourse)

¹⁰For different views on the strengths and weakness of the ethnography of communication framework, see Hanks (1996); Keating (2001), and Duranti (1997).

to individuals, culture, and society resulted in the emergence of the ‘discourse centered approach to culture’. Work undertaken with this approach sensitized me to the fact that actual instances of speech are the locus of multiple systems of organization and signification.

The discourse-centered approach to culture (Sherzer, 1987a) proposes “that culture is localized in concrete, publicly accessible signs, the most important of which are actually occurring instances of discourse” (Urban, 1991, p. 1) and “takes [discourse] to be the richest point of intersection among language, culture, social, and individual expression” (Sherzer and Woodbury, 1987, p. vii). In this view, “culture is an emergent, dialogic process, historically transmitted but continuously produced and revised through dialogues among its members” (Farnell and Graham, 1998, p. 412), while at the same time, “an instance of discourse arises only against the backdrop of a continuing history of such instances, in relationship to which it can be situated” (Urban, 1991, p. 9). This approach asserts that actual instances of discourse are not only representative of but *constitutive* of the social and cultural life of the community in which they occur, and it has the tremendous strength of looking at rather than through discourse to understand specific social and cultural configurations. Discourse, culture, and society are mutually constituting, or dependently co-arising, such that recurring social and cultural configurations shape, enrich, and constrain discourse *and* actual instances of discourse perpetuate, shape, characterize, and transform culture and society. One of the goals of this study is to demonstrate how verbal, cultural, and social configurations are mutually constituting in the contemporary Nanti case.

Key works in the ethnography of speaking tradition, undertaken with a discourse-centered perspective on indigenous South American societies, have shown the richness of this approach for understanding local patterns of communication and culture, as well as revealing areal-typological patterns throughout lowland South

America. In particular, Sherzer's work with the Kuna of Panama (Sherzer, 1974, 1983, 1990); Basso's work with the Kalapalo of Brazil (Basso, 1985, 1987); Briggs's work with the Warao of Venezuela (Briggs, 1992, 1993a,b); Seeger's work with the Suyá of Brazil (Seeger, 1987); Graham's work with the Xavante of Brazil (Graham, 1984, 1995, 1986, 2000); Gnerre's work with the Shuar of Ecuador (Gnerre, 1986, 2000); and Urban's work with the Shokleng of Brazil (Urban, 1984, 1988, 1991) have shown how patterns of discourse maintain cultural continuity while also providing resources for dealing with social and political change, both through 'formal' ways of speaking — such as myth-telling, narrative and song performance, and other ritual activities — and through 'everyday' communicative patterns — such as conventions of dialogical interactions, joking, poetic speech, and other creative forms.

3.4.3 Nanti discourse in an areal-typological perspective

Amazonia is both among the most linguistically and culturally diverse areas of the world and among the least understood. The relative dearth of thorough documentation of indigenous Amazonian discourse forms (Beier et al., 2002), together with the grave threats to linguistic and cultural diversity (Grenoble and Whaley, 1998; Woodbury, 1993) recently accelerated by globalization, were motivating factors in my decision to focus on Nanti ways of speaking and thereby make a tangible contribution to the body of literature on Amazonian discourse. My attention to both the areal and typological characteristics of Nanti discourse and processes and its exceptions to areal-typological patterns is informed by key works on lowland Amazonian discourse, verbal art, and poetics (see Beier et al. (2002) for an extensive bibliography).

As noted by Beier et al. (2002, p. 121), “[i]n indigenous lowland South America there are several discourse forms and processes that are shared by groups of people of distinct genetic linguistic affiliations”. The purpose of this section is to

situate my work on Nanti ways of speaking relative to a broader areal-typological perspective on discourse forms and processes in indigenous lowland South America.

The basic perspective of the areal-typological approach to language phenomena is that it “assumes contact between groups within geographic areas and across genetic language boundaries and assumes that intergroup social contact can lead to language change... [and that] particular discourse forms and processes become shared owing to their diffusion between societies.” (Beier et al., 2002, p. 121) Although on a short-term historical scale — that is, going back several generations — Nanti speakers have had little social contact with other ethnolinguistic groups, the question of the presence of areally common discourses forms and/or processes in contemporary Nanti verbal life is nonetheless one worth asking from a much longer-term historical perspective.

Most strikingly, in contrast with many speech communities in indigenous lowland South America, during the period of this study the Nanti people of Montetoni engaged in very little ritualized behavior, or ritualized discourse, of any type at all, apart from the domain of feasting and chanting (discussed in Chapter 2). For example, Nanti used no discourse forms or processes specific to events such as birth, puberty, marriage, illness, or death. While all of the life events mentioned here were of both personal and social significance, none were publicly acknowledged or celebrated in any typified way. Similarly, no political aspect of life had a ritualized component to it, nor was any sort of religious ritual or discourse practiced at all; nothing I observed in Nanti verbal practice could be classified as “ceremonial dialogue” (see Beier et al. (2002, p. 130)).

On a smaller scale as well, Nantis used no elaborate ritualized forms or processes for greeting, leave-taking, giving counsel, reprimanding, educating, or any other type of frequent interaction. Certain types of adjacency pairs or chains were common in certain types of interactional frames, but their use was always primarily

functional (informative) and never merely symbolic (or purely formal).

One widespread discourse process in indigenous lowland South America that can be found in Nanti verbal life is *templatic dialogicality*, which Beier et al. (2002, p. 130) characterize as “forms that are relatively fixed in structure and are usually associated with particular discourse contexts... templatic dialogical discourse forms are characterized by an interactional framework in which the discursive roles of the participants are quite delimited... and which frequently assigns to those roles certain discursive resources and disallows others”. Two domains of Nanti discourse fit this characterization: chanting and *karintaa* poetry in the context of feasting, and certain kinds of asymmetrical information-giving interactions; I will briefly discuss each of these types of discourse next.

First, templatic dialogicality can be identified in the performance of chanting and *karintaa* poetry during village-wide feasting, in as much as participants simultaneously produce chant formulae from a fixed repertoire, and then, within the matrix of the chant formulae, compose extemporaneous but metrically- and melodically-constrained poetic discourse that is often dialogical in nature. The acoustic, social, and interactional facets of these performances are complex and fascinating; see Beier (2001, 2003); Michael (2004a); Crowhurst and Michael (2005) for focused discussions.

Second, in certain interactional contexts, Nantis produce what is called ‘echo speech’, in which one participant assumes the role of primary speaker and information-giver, while another or other participants limit their participation to a type of ‘back-channeling’ that involves repeating segments of the primary speaker’s talk, using a lower voice volume and allowing a slight delay. These types of interactions may be narratives or merely descriptive in nature, and participant roles may shift over the course of the entire interaction, such that a primary speaker may become a back-channeler when another participant takes the floor.

One other discourse form that is widespread in indigenous lowland South America can also be found in Nanti verbal life: *parallelism*, which (Beier et al., 2002, p. 135) characterize as “the patterned repetition of some discursive unit”. I discuss the functions of parallelism in Nanti discourse in detail in Chapter 2; in brief, parallelism in Nanti discourse is an interactional, alignment-oriented phenomenon, not an aesthetically-motivated discourse form.

3.4.4 Toward a Nanti discursive ecology

This study pursues one of the central goals of the ethnography of speaking/communication tradition: to demonstrate, through close attention to naturally occurring discourse, the “systematic coherence ... in the ways that speaking is organized” (Bauman and Sherzer 1989 [1974]: xi) and, thereby, to demonstrate how a speech community and its ‘speech economy’ (à la Hymes 1989 [1974]), reformulated here as a discursive ecology, constitute a systematic “organization of diversity” (Hymes, 1974b, p. 433) in language in use.

In their writings on the large scale patterns of communicative behavior, both Dell Hymes and John Gumperz in their foundational texts in this research tradition (Gumperz and Hymes, 1964, 1972; Hymes, 1974a,b)), as well as other ethnographers of speaking/communication, invoke the concepts of ‘economy’, ‘ecology’, and ‘environment’ to characterize the systematicity of these patterns. In using these concepts, various ethnographers of speaking highlight the bounded yet permeable nature of the speech community, the dynamicity of the system over time, the complexity and interdependence of the relationships between the elements within the system, and the contingent nature of communicative activity. Yet these powerful concepts have been largely under-theorized and under-utilized in data-driven ethnographies of speaking and communication. In this project, it has been my intention to flesh out and substantiate the concept of discursive ecology by applying the in-

sights mentioned above to the bounded communicative system shared by Nantis on the Camisea River.

In the context of this study, a *discursive ecology* is an emergent level of organization in communicative behavior that results from the dependent relationships across time and space among a set of communicative practices. From the analyst's perspective, a discursive ecology is a dynamic system of distinct communicative practices whose organization is manifest in the observable patterns of continuity and contrast across individual utterances and interactions. More concretely, from the user's perspective, this is the set of categories we rely on and draw from every day to figure out what *kind* of message someone is sending us.

One of the main critiques of the ethnography of speaking/communication tradition has been the formidable breadth and depth of knowledge that the ethnographer would need, in order to accurately and responsibly describe an entire communicative system — especially when studying a system to which they are not 'native' (Bloch, 1976; Duranti, 1997). It seems to me, however, that the point of the ethnography of speaking is to prioritize paying attention to and describing the *systematicity* of communication within a speech community, rather than to attempt an exhaustive survey of every one of the elements of that system.

3.4.5 Ethnopoetics

Work in ethnopoetics and ethnomusicology convinced me that the organization of discourse, and especially the aesthetic dimensions of language use, are achieved according to local, not universal, principles. Ethnopoetics emerged from the Boasian and Jakobsonian traditions of linguistics and anthropology in the work of Dell Hymes (e.g. Hymes (1981)) and Dennis Tedlock (e.g. Tedlock (1983)), who recognized that existing text artifacts of indigenous verbal art could be discovered anew by seeking patterning within the text itself. Sherzer and Woodbury (1987)

explain that ethnopoetic analysts “take Native American discourse seriously as their starting point...[and] as having precise and complex linguistic patterning” (Sherzer and Woodbury, 1987, p. 1). Expanding out of these origins in the analysis of existing Native American text artifacts, the analytical principles of the ethnopoetics tradition have proven useful to scholars studying a wide variety of literatures, both oral and written, primarily because ethnopoetics breaks from, and provides a principled alternative to, long-standing descriptive and analytical frameworks confined by structural and aesthetic principles forged in specific artistic traditions.

Hymes’ body of work in ethnopoetics originated in the goal of rediscovering Native American texts by transforming written blocks of oral dictation (originally transcribed for linguistic and ethnological purposes) through reanalysis and retranscription that reveals their poetic form. Tedlock’s work focused on the process of transcribing into written form texts whose primary existence is or was oral; but both scholars “recognized that an important aspect of Native American discourse and a central feature of its verbal artistry is organization into lines and groups of lines.” (Sherzer and Woodbury, 1987, p. 1). Taking the line to be the primary organizational unit of Native American verbal art, ethnopoetic analysis seeks to discover and describe what makes a line a line in terms of the patterns of recurrence inherent in the form of the text itself; as well in the performance of the text for oral discourse forms.

Sherzer defines the line as “a unit independent of and yet related to conventionally recognized grammatical units such as phonemes, morphemes, and sentences” and observes that in his own work with Kuna ways of speaking, “[i]nvestigation of the structuring of lines in Kuna discourse requires attention to the intersection and interplay of linguistic, sociolinguistic, and poetic structures, patterns, and processes.” (Sherzer, 1987b, p. 103) The line, then, constitutes an independent level of complex organization that ideally exists in the overlap between emic and etic understandings

of form and pattern. As such, theorization of the line is useful to the investigation of both the organization of individual utterances and relations among utterances in interaction.

In his ethnopoetic analyses of oral texts, Tedlock has used such aspects of oral performance as alternation between speech and silence and variations in pitch, loudness, voice quality, tempo, and cadence, to define the line. Hymes, concentrating on written texts, has instead focused on aspects of the texts such as hierarchic and often numerically constrained rhetorical patterns, repetitions, recurrences in content and syntactic form. Woodbury, whose work with Central Alaskan Yupik also deals with oral texts, summarizes “five potentially independent types of recurrent, hierarchic organization on which poetic representation has been based: pause phrasing, prosodic phrasing, syntactic constituency, global form-content parallelism, and adverbial particle phrasing.” (Woodbury, 1987, p. 176) In addition to the potential utility that the specific characteristics used by Hymes, Tedlock, Woodbury, and other ethnopoetic analysts have for the analysis of Nanti ways of speaking, an important analytical generalization emerges from their work on text analysis: the investigator must determine what counts as “the same” across utterances across time; and across forms and characteristics based on the patterns inherent in the discourse, not external to it. In addition, the ethnopoetic perspective on the line in verbal art suggests two important axes on which discourse can be analyzed. First, discrete, independent characteristics of patterning and patterning of characteristics co-exist in particular lines, utterances, texts, and longer strips of discourse. Second, more complex patterns of patterning result from interactions across less complex patterns within particular lines, utterances, texts, and longer strips of discourse.

These two axes suggest at least six different levels on which the analyst can seek patterns of organization. First, within a single strip of discourse, there are characteristics that are defined in ‘absolute’ or system-external terms, such as

duration, timing, voice qualities. Second, there are characteristics that are identified by their patterns of co-occurrence and alternation, such as repetition and parallelism. Third, there are characteristics that are regarded as salient by native speakers and hearers, such as rhyming and punning (neither of which, for example, Nantis find interesting.) Fourth, across a set of strips of discourse, there are patterns that are defined in universal terms, such as numerical patterning and topic orientation. Fifth, there are patterns of patterns that are identified by co-occurrence and alternation, such as large-scale form-content parallelism. Sixth, and finally, there are patterns that are regarded as salient by native speakers and hearers, such as metacategories or ‘types’ of song and poetry, like a jig or a limerick.

These ethnopoetic principles provide a useful framework for discovering independent yet interpenetrating levels of organization in naturally occurring discourse, and were important to the process by which I identified the levels of organization operative in Nanti ways of speaking.

3.4.6 Descriptive linguistic approaches to sound

As much as this study is about language use and communicative practices, it has turned out to be no less an exploration of the most fundamental principles of language in the biggest sense. I found that I simply could not understand the phenomenon of Nanti ways of speaking without developing some understanding of how language works as a system of pure relationality. To do so, I went back to the beginning, in a sense, to the ideas of Ferdinand de Saussure (Saussure et al., 1916) and Roman Jakobson (Jakobson, 1957, 1960, 1966, 1981, 1990; Jakobson et al., 1990) — but, crucially, taken from the perspective of the practice approach to language as articulated by William Hanks (especially in Hanks (1996) and through his graduate course *Fundamentals of Language in Context*, which I was able to attend at the University of California, Berkeley in Spring 2009). This was one of the most intellec-

tually satisfying aspects of this project, because it enabled me to finally understand the distinctions among the four sets of relations illustrated in Figure 3.1 and to understand the equal importance of both the *arbitrariness* and the *situatedness* of language as communicative practice.

Unfortunately, in my view, ever since Chomsky (1963) drew the distinction between ‘linguistic competence’ and ‘linguistic performance’ in the study of language as a system, linguistic phenomena like ways of speaking have been essentially excluded from the domain of linguistic description. For decades, the mainstream of linguistics as a discipline (with the important exception of sociolinguistics) has seen ‘language in use’ as messy, unorganized, unprincipled, and therefore ‘outside’ of the realm of ‘language as a system’, which is their object of inquiry.

And yet, paradoxically, it is exactly the methods of mainstream descriptive linguistics that have served me in this study for the description of the sound properties of Nanti ways of speaking. Basic linguistic theory rests on the idea that isolable characteristics of sound patterns combine to result in recognizable signification, which is exactly how I claim that Nanti ways of speaking signify. The pivotal difference is that ways of speaking take the utterance, not the segment, as their principal domain of expression. Jakobson (1960, p. 355) himself, in discussing the ‘emotive’ or ‘expressive’ function of language noted that “emotive cues easily undergo linguistic analysis.” (see §3.5.2.5) for further discussion.) The concepts and terminology that I have used in this study to describe the sound patterns of ways of speaking all come from directly from phonetics and phonology (Ladefoged, 1993, 1996; Ladefoged and Maddieson, 1996; Pullum and Ladusaw, 1996).

That said, I have found that, in general, the literature in the traditions of (so-called) formal linguistics, descriptive linguistics, and even sociolinguistics does not engage with utterance-level phenomena in the way that I do. Even the literature on intonation is largely centered around the *grammatical*, not interactional,

significance of intonation. Studies of intonation center on that which is contrastive, conventionalized, and generalizable in utterance production, blind to issues of local or ‘context-dependent’ signification. Moreover, despite the attention given to the issue of gradience by Bolinger (1961), I have not come across literature in phonology in general, or on intonation in particular, that engages satisfactorily with the issue of gradient (or graded) signification in sound phenomena — which, I claim, is a key aspect of signifying nature of Nanti ways of speaking (see §3.5.1.2).

In this study, I have approached Nanti ways of speaking as patterned, principled sound phenomena, and I have described their sound patterns using the tools commonly used to describe the phonology of a language. Even if this particular study shows inadequacies in my use of these tools,¹¹ I hope the point is made, nonetheless, that ways of speaking are a distinct and robust level of organization in natural languages that can be described using the very tools we use to describe the phonology of a language.

A cheery irony that I see here is that descriptive linguists, by doing phonology in the traditional sense, have already gone a long way toward describing the local equivalent of matter-of-fact talk in many linguistic descriptions — as well as bumping up against (before ruling out) all sorts of phenomena that may well define other ways of speaking in a given language. At least, then, this work provides a point of departure for the study of ways of speaking.

3.4.7 Theories and methods of conversation analysis

If the notion of discursive ecology is dependent on an understanding of principled patterns of organization *among* formally defined ways of speaking and everyday interactions, it is no less dependent upon an understanding of principled patterns of interaction *within* ways of speaking and everyday interactions. As such, the

¹¹It has been made clear to me already, for example, that the way I have used spectrograms in this study is unsatisfying for several reasons; this is a problem I will address in my future work.

analytical tools forged by conversation analysts are crucial to my analysis of Nanti interactions.

Perhaps the most exciting and useful insight I gleaned from conversation analysis (CA) is that the greater part of what anyone — participant and observer alike — knows about ‘what is going on’ in a particular real-time, face-to-face interaction is right there in the utterances themselves — which is also to say, right there in the recordable, analyzable sound signal. It is the focus on the minutiae of specific utterances, within specific, sequentially organized turns, produced by specific individuals at specific moments of chronological, historical time that can enable the social scientist to *substantiate* — or not — hypotheses and generalizations about how larger scale phenomena like, interaction and society, actually ‘work’ (see also §3.5 for further discussion of this issue).

A number of principles and concepts that underlie this study were first articulated among the fundamental principles guiding CA. First, the commitment to using ‘naturally occurring’ discourse as the source for data espoused by practitioners of the discourse-centered approach to culture; second, the commitment to giving analytical primacy to patterning that emerges from discourse data (of especial importance to the practitioners of ethnopoetics); and third, the notion that communicative interactions are both ‘context shaped’ and ‘context renewing’ were innovations of early conversation analysts. (?Goodwin and Heritage, 1990).

CA emphasizes the importance of the local organization of occasions of language use in meaning-making and attends to the phenomena of collaboration and sequentiality in talk. The perspectives and methods of CA stimulated my interest in examining the (co-)creation of meaning among (rather than internal to) individuals.

As conversation analysts have demonstrated for other communicative systems, a key element to understanding large-scale patterns of Nanti interaction is understanding how participants organize specific interactions. A seemingly univer-

sal characteristic of communicative behavior is that it is always sequential, in as much as interactants always (eventually) alternate their turns at talk. Departing from this simple but powerful insight, conversation analysts have operationalized the process of identifying sequencing phenomena in communicative interaction by using the *turn* as the basic unit of organization that links specific utterances to larger-scale multi-party interactional patterns. The concrete facts of sequencing in real-time interaction sensitized me to the irreducible axis of interactional relations in which an utterance maps onto a ‘turn’ and convinced me to integrate both the theoretical orientation and the concrete analytical methods of CA into my examination of Nanti communicative practices.

A *turn* is the basic unit in sequential interaction during which a particular speaker is the focus of joint attention. Typically, the turn constitutes one strip of talk in a sequence of strips of talk that alternate among participants; therefore, one turn may be made up of one or several utterances. A turn, then, is defined by its social-interactional context and can not be understood without it. Note that, by this definition, silence *can* constitute a turn but *can not* constitute an utterance.

Another organizing principle from the conversation analytical toolkit that I consider crucial to understanding Nanti interactions is the notion of recipient design (Sacks and Schegloff, 1979). That is to say, I assume that interactive talk among individuals is always at least partly motivated by the speaker’s immediate assessment of the recipients of their talk as well as their sociostructural and historical links to the recipients; and therefore, at least some aspects of the relevance of talk correspond to identifiable properties of the immediate situation as well as of the sociostructural and historical links between speaker and recipient(s). Moreover, because in most cases a given relationship will offer a multiplicity of identifiable characteristics as resources for talk, examining which characteristics are in fact deployed in interactions reveals the ways in which interactants enact and articulate aspects of their relationships

through talk.

Recurrent patterns in conversational sequencing, such as adjacency pairing (Schegloff and Sacks, 1984) and next positioning (Goodwin and Heritage, 1990) reveal chains of association that participants make in interactions; patterns of sequencing also reflect local assessments of appropriateness and relevance. Observing these types of patterns across series of utterances reveals some of the ways in which Nantis actively create, maintain, and alter their relationships to one another through discourse. A significant part of the utility in examining such properties of interaction as turn organization, adjacency phenomena, and alignment strategies such as response and repair is that it is precisely the relational nature of these phenomena that reflect the dynamicity and emergent nature of interaction.

An important (if restricted) commonality between the ‘outside observer’ of an interaction and its participants is that all are actively working to make sense of the words and behaviors of other individuals, to whose internal processes they have no access. If the participants in an interaction have the advantage of greater ‘inside knowledge’ of what is going on in the real-time unfolding of their interaction, the outside observer has the advantage of recording that interaction and reviewing it again and again, discovering the multiplicity of possible alternatives that the interactants might have chosen. It is from this perspective that many of the analytical tools in the CA tradition are so useful to an ecological approach to discourse. By identifying recurrent characteristics and organizational patterns at the level of sequential utterances, the observer learns how interactions unfold through the moment-by-moment moves that interactants make; and the multi-move processes through which understanding is achieved (or not) are revealed.

3.4.8 A practice-centered approach to language

My understandings of Nanti ways of speaking are deeply influenced by practice theory and the practice approach to language. Works on practice theory and its applications to language phenomena (Ahearn, 1998, 2001; Bourdieu, 1977; Bourdieu and Thompson, 1991; Giddens, 1979, 1984; Hanks, 1987, 1990, 1996, 2000, 2005, 2009; Keating, 1998; Ortner, 1989) have developed nuanced formulations of human agency, individuality, community, and society that are fundamental to this study. Practice theory is “a theory of the relationship between the structures of society and culture on the one hand, and the nature of human action on the other” which strives to understand “how persons and human activity can be constituted through the social process, while at the same time society and history can be constituted through meaningful human activity.” (Ortner, 1989, p. 11). In a recent formulation of the practice approach to language, Hanks et al. (2009, p. 3) articulate an approach that sees language “as historically embedded practice, cognitively rich, grammatically structured, and part of the social world in which speech is a modality of action.” Crucially, this “focus on practice implies that we view language as an ongoing process in what the Prague School linguists called a “dynamic synchrony.”” (*ibid.*) I am particularly drawn to this approach because it strives to account for empirical phenomena that often seem contradictory on the surface: durable social, cultural, and historical structures that perpetuate across time on the one hand; and the facts of change and novel, creative individual action on the other.

In examining contemporary relationships among Nanti individuals and residence groups within the context of recently-formed villages, I proposed that performing *karintaa* poetry in the context of village-wide feasting provided a unique opportunity for Nantis to verbally integrate novel experiences into existing patterns of social understanding (Beier, 2001). In the course of that work, I came to understand that human relationships — on any scale, whether dyadic or community-level

— are not passive states, but rather are active, collaborative accomplishments of individuals who are actively, volitionally engaged with one another. More specifically, I came to see ‘community’ in Montetoni as an achievement afforded by — but not inherent to — the spatiotemporal configuration of the ‘village’. I came to see ‘sociability’ as a joint achievement on the part of individual people. In this study, I have built on those insights in exploring the broader set of relationships among (spontaneous) individual verbal social action, observable patterns of language use and interpretation, and more durable patterns of shared conventions and practices in the speech community of Montetoni.

In my view, language use is one of the most important ways in which humans organize themselves into ‘societies’. I found that patterns in Nanti language use reliably corresponded to larger-scale patterns in daily social life. In the context of this study, looking at language use revealed, in part, how individual Nantis organized their lived experience, as well as their moment-to-moment behavior relative to one another.

3.4.9 Frames, framing and frame analysis

In this study, I rely heavily on the framework of ‘frames’ and ‘framing’ in describing the place of ways of speaking in Nanti interactions (see principally Bateson and Bateson (1972); Goffman (1974)). A *frame* is a complex multi-modal type that is derived from and applied to lived experience, in order to assign meaning to novel experiences. The concept of ‘framing’ highlights the fact that any human action is at once unique unto itself and irresistibly typable within the categorizational schemes (‘frames’) that social interactants use to make sense of their world. The framework of frames provides me with a way to talk about large-scale patterns of similarity among the (tokens and types of) interactions described within the framework of conversation analysis (§3.4.7) from the perspective of a practice approach to lan-

guage (§3.4.8). In this study a frame is (1) a conceptual primitive¹² and (2) a basic descriptive and analytical unit. I have chosen to use this formulation for talking about Nanti communicative practices because it conveys the sense that communicative action is at once (a) bounded by certain co-existing factors and (b) spontaneous within those bounds.

The concept of frame that I use in this study is largely based on Goffman's use of the term. He characterizes a frame as "the definition of a situation" that is "built up in accordance with principles of organization which govern [social] events... and our subjective involvement in them" (Goffman, 1974, p. 10-11) He also observes that, "[g]iven their understanding of what it is that is going on, individuals fit their actions to this understanding and ordinarily find that the ongoing world supports this fitting. These organizational premises — sustained both in the mind and in activity — I call the frame of the activity." (Goffman, 1974, p. 247) That is, defining a situation is a process that unfolds through the activities of lived experience. We — either as participants or as analysts — can step back and apply the term 'frame' to any particular situation based on our knowledge of the principles of organization that are in play in that situation. A practical formulation for identifying active frames in a situation, provided by Goffman (1974, p. 8) himself, is simply to ask the question, "What is it that's going on here?" Aligning Goffman's concepts with related terms that I use in this study, a (real, concrete) situation is a token of experience; the process of defining that situation it is the process of typification; and the outcome of that process, a frame, is a type (or set of types, or type of types.) Interactionally and socially, frames are types of behavior, and they are the outcome of every individual person's ability to recognize and then perpetuate likeness in behavior and interaction through time and space.

In my view, framing is simultaneously a cognitive and interactional process.

¹²By 'primitive' I mean a primary, undecomposable (or undecomposed) concept from which other concepts are derived; see Chapter 4, §5.4 for further discussion.

As Croft and Cruse (2004, p. 19) have observed: "...how an experience is framed is a matter of **construal**: it depends on how the speaker conceptualizes the experience to be communicated, for the understanding of the hearer." This act of 'construal' can be understood as both the cognitive process of conceptualizing and the interactional process of communicating, or speaking, this conceptualization and thereby making a move in an interaction process. And these processes continue to run; the next participant 'frames' the next utterance, and then the next one, and so on. From a practice theoretical approach, interaction participants actively frame their talk on a turn by turn basis, actively activating frames that stay active only as long as they are kept active by the activity of the participants. Frames may feel stable and enduring, as a result of the continuous activity participants put into maintaining them, but in an important sense any frame can be 'broken' in an instant — abruptly 'unplugged' and 'disappeared' by a shift in attention.

Furthermore, in this study, 'frames' offer a useful way to talk about 'context', by which I mean the heterogeneous set of factors that are relevant during face-to-face interaction. The concept of frames that I use here, however, is narrower than the notion of 'context' for two reasons. First, concretely, every frame that I discuss foregrounds relevant factors that are manifest in the unfolding interaction and its surroundings, through participants' speech and actions, while backgrounding more abstract (non-manifest) factors, such as individuals' memories, distant histories, implicit cultural tropes, and the like — factors that lack an intersubjective access. Second, both concretely and in principle, multiple frames may be active simultaneously, and these frames can be different for different participants — breaking the sense of homogeneity and uniformity that tinges the notion of context.

I consider Nanti ways of speaking to be framing devices because they are an essential part of the definition of the situation in which they are used; they provide one important part of the answer to the question, 'What is it that's going on here?'

3.4.9.1 Types of frames: activity frames, interactional frames, and interpretive frames

There are three types of frame that are central to my discussion of Nanti ways of speaking: the activity frame, the interactional frame, and the interpretive frame. Taken together, this set of types of frames offers one possible useful schema for describing many aspects of organization of social life in Montetoni (and elsewhere to be sure).

An *activity frame* is a situation defined by the activity of its participant(s). Everything that people **do** constitutes an element of some activity frame(s), describable in local terms. One type of activity, of course, is verbal interaction. An activity frame is a set of doings, recognized as a set by local convention, which can be expected to, and do, co-occur and recur at discrete moments in time. In as much as any individual's actions can be recognized and categorized in some way in local terms, all activity corresponds to some activity frame. Note that people's doings may also constitute elements of activity frames that are not describable in local terms — for example, I can say that Sajoro is 'courting' Marisera by bringing her a gift of fish, based on my knowledge of the social significance of such gifts between Nantis, even though Nantis didn't use any word that is equivalent to 'courting' in describing such situations.

Activity frames pertain to situations. They are a means for understanding the overall organization of human behavior, by definition taking in to account multiple levels of activity and multiple constraining factors. In general, the physical setting and the activity frame must be separable, because one physical setting can be used for multiple activities, and different specific places can count as tokens of a specific type of place.

Many activity frames are, in addition, by convention, identified with specific locations or kinds of locations; specific kinds of participants; and specific kinds of

interaction and talk. Engaging in one, some, or all of the doings associated with a given activity frame in part defines the social and interactional situation in which individuals may find themselves. Arrow-making, *oburoki*-making, hunting, visiting, drinking, chanting, resting, being sick, and sleeping were all common activity frames in Montetoni. Note that assessments of what is ‘appropriate’ behavior within a given activity frame reflects the relationship between what is done in a given moment and the *expectations* for what can be done according to the conventionalization of the set of doings.

Activity frames may co-occur with one another, either as parallel situations or as nested situations; for example, while a man is making arrows and a woman is making *oburoki* (parallel activity frames) they may engage in a conversation (a nested activity frame). The notion of nesting does not necessarily imply a hierarchical relationship between the relevant activity frames; rather, it indicates the distribution of time and individual attention that are manifested in the specific situation. Activity frames also co-occur with interactional frames, again either as parallel or nested frames. These relational concepts are discussed in detail in Chapter 4.

Activity frames, while durable by definition, are not timeless or unchanging; rather, they are continuously reconstituted through the doings of individuals and groups plus the associations and expectations that result from the realization of those doings. The notion of an activity frame is simply a way to refer to durable patterns of recurrence among subsets of the doings of individuals, out of the total set of their doings across time.

An *interactional frame* is the immediate, locally-constituted definition of the social/interpersonal situation. People are engaged in an interactional frame to the degree that they are engaged in joint attention to something. From another perspective, an interactional frame is a situation defined by the type of interactional moves made by its participants (within the activity frame of verbal interaction).

An interactional frame is also a set of doings, recognized as a set by local convention, which can be expected to, and do, co-occur and recur at discrete moments in time, but it is in addition specifically constituted by communicative behavior. Interactional frames pertain to utterances, in sequential order, in real time. The crucial difference between an activity frame and an interactional frame is that the latter is strictly co-extensive with a specific chain of interactional turns; it is a behavioral primitive in the sense that it is entirely dependent on the moves of individual interactants for its perpetuation or dissolution. An interactional frame is a kind of social situation constituted and sustained by the joint attention of its participants to their ongoing interaction; a given type of interactional frame, such as a hunting story, is constituted and sustained by the nature of the turn-by-turn interactional moves of its participants.

Every interaction that takes place between two or more individuals constitutes an element of some interactional frame(s). For example, Anita is conversing with her sister, Maroja is scolding her daughter, Rosa is soothing her baby, etc. Again, more than one interactional frame may be active at a time: Anita may conversing with her sister Márota while Márota is scolding her son. Note that for the purposes of this study, the mere co-presence of two or more individuals does not constitute an interactional frame; actual interpersonal interaction must take place in order to activate an interactional frame.

Interactional frames may in part be constituted by ways of speaking. That is, the sound form of talk may distinguish one type of interaction from another that could be the same in every other way. In this sense, we may consider ways of speaking to be local, conventionalized framing devices.

An *interpretive frame* is the specific orientation toward a topic or concept that establishes the parameters for the ascription of meaning to talk within that frame. When applied to communicative activity, an interpretive frame is a specific

orientation toward a topic or concept taken by and/or attributed to a speaker in an utterance. Note that this formulation presupposes a multiplicity of possible orientations that the speaker could take, both from the speaker's perspective and from the addressee(s) and/or hearer(s) perspectives.

In the real-time development of interactions between two or more individuals, certain types of chains of statements and replies often emerge within a given interactional frame. When certain characteristics of these chains are present, then I assume that a specific shared interpretive frame is active for the participants.

3.4.10 Real-time relations among frames

Based on the definitions just given, it follows that at any given moment of interaction between two or more people, multiple frames are active. That is to say, there will be some activity frame active, at minimum the frame of 'people having a conversation'; there will also be some interactional frame active, at minimum the frame of 'someone addressing someone'. There we have two frames already, each of which can cease to be active independent of the other. Much of the time, social situations are much more complex than this, and numerous frames are active at once; for example, taking an example from Chapter 6, we can identify the activity frames of 'drinking *oburoki*', 'visiting at Bejaterisa's and Ijonisi's kosena', 'sitting on the floor on mats' and 'assuaging a fussy child'; add to these, for Bejaterisa herself, the activity frame of 'sharing out *oburoki* to visitors'. We can identify the interactional frames of 'conversing with friends' and 'attempting to engage the attention of a fussy child'; add to these, again, for Bejaterisa herself, the interactional frame of 'scolding a fussy child.' Further, when Bejaterisa deploys a strip of scolding talk, she activates the interpretive frame of scolding talk, within which Mikajera's uptake is situated.

Looking at frame relations at a closer level of detail, multiple frames are 'nested' when a given frame is activated and deactivated 'inside' another frame

in a temporal sense. So, taking another example from Chapter 6, when Erejón and Chabera are conversing, and Erejón deploys a strip of scolding talk, we can describe that scolding talk as nested within the interactional frame of conversation. Considering another common case in Montetoni, an interpretive frame of scolding talk may be nested inside an interactional frame of *shitatsi* banter, which in turn is nested inside the activity frames of hosting friends and drinking *oburoki* together.

In contrast, multiple frames are ‘overlapping’ when two frames overlap in a temporal sense. For example, the interactional frame of ‘an extended conversation between two sisters, Maira and Arisuja’, may overlap with an initial activity frame of ‘Maira sweeping the floor’ and a subsequent activity frame of ‘Maira peeling yuca’ and a final activity frame of ‘Maira sitting, resting, and feeding the baby’, all four of these frames overlapping with the additional activity frame of ‘Arisuja mending clothing’.

In a much broader sense, I consider a ‘speech community’ to be a fundamental type of interactional frame, in as much as a speech community corresponds to a bounded set of relatively stable parameters for behavior and interpretation.

3.5 Broader issues of interaction and interpretation

Having presented some of the intellectual history of this project in previous sections, in this section I shift focus to a broader and more integrated discussion of a set of core concepts and perspectives that underlie this study. These issues have to do with the way in which the utterance, as a multi-faceted and intersubjectively available fact-in-the-world, is a focal point in each of the four systems of relations illustrated in Figure 3.1. This section looks at interpretation from two perspectives: inwardly, toward cognition; and outwardly, toward intersubjectivity and interaction. The reason for this is straightforward: focusing on a specific utterance implicates two things: (1) a specific speaker, which implicates a specific mind; and (2) a specific

situation in which that specific speaker is engaged with other speakers.

This study, on a general level, aims to identify some of the mechanisms by which we humans achieve some degree of mutual understanding when we interact with others. In my view, mutual understanding is an achievement, not a state, in interpersonal relations, and in fact, can be quite difficult to achieve, depending on how different the interacting people and their perspectives are from one another. Every time that we interact with another person, what do we do, and what can we do, to gauge if we are in fact achieving mutual understanding? How is it that, in real-time face-to-face interaction, both understanding and misunderstanding are possible outcomes? In my view, examining the details of Nanti ways of speaking — their forms, their uses, their consequences, etc. — provide a measure of insight into these questions and some of their answers. In this study, I describe how certain observable communicative conventions — manifest in the sound patterns of sequences of utterances (tokens) situated in their frames of origin — consistently co-occurred with durable, recurrent interpretive frameworks in which certain *types* of interpretation were more common than others; upon which I build the case that, at least during the period of this study, these conventions (sound patterns) and types of interpretation were part of the systematicity of the Nanti language, for communicative purposes, to the same degree as were the other levels of its structure (its grammar).

3.5.1 Interpretation, looking inward

This section outlines my understanding of the interpretive process by which individuals engage in organizing their experiences. The ideas here are most relevant to the sound/experience relations and the grammatical relations associated with the utterance. For the purposes of this study, to *interpret* is to ascribe meaning or significance to a percept; to conceive of the significance of something. This may be an internal (cognitive) process or an interactive process, either passive or ac-




Figure 3.2: A simple schematic of the interpretive process of a token of speech.

tive, and either conscious or sub-attentional. The individual-internal component of interpretation encompasses the cognitive processes of perception, attention, association, comparison, categorization, typification, semiosis (that is, the application of signs and symbols to perception or experience), and gradience. The process is summarized in Figure 3.2 and described step by step in the next section.

3.5.1.1 The interpretive process

I assume that sound waves exist and are a fact in the shared experiential world. Let us begin at the moment that a token of sound reaches the sensory apparatus of person U. U's perception of the sound token introduces the token to the activity of U's brain/mind. If and when U perceives the sound token, then U may (partially) attend to the perceived sound. When U attends to perceived sound, that sound

becomes ‘new information’. Similarly, if and when U attends to the perceived sound token, then U may (partially) recognize the perceived and attended sound token. If U recognizes that sound token, then it becomes (partially) ‘interpretable information.’ An utterance, in this frame, is an interpretable sound, and interpretability is the quality of having something(s) in common with prior interpretable, interpreted events.

If and when U recognizes a perceived and attended sound token, then U may (partially) associate that sound with known information (or mental representations). Known information is, in part, categorized according to properties that generalize to ‘types’. U’s mind first recognizes ‘new’ information as ‘like known’; then associates ‘new’ with various ‘knowns’; then compares ‘new’ with various ‘knowns’. Central to the store of ‘known’ information that U draws upon are the sign relations of the language(s) U speaks and the other (social/cultural/individual) semiotic systems that U relies on.

If and when U associates ‘new’ with ‘known’ information, then U may categorize the new information as sufficiently like known information that U may categorize this particular token of ‘new information’ as a token of a known type.

If and when U interprets a token as an instance of a known type, then U may react/respond to it based on U’s experiences of reacting/responding to the known type. Note that a single token may be categorized, or interpreted, as multiple types. Tokens and types are in a one-to-many, not one-to-one relationship.

I assume that interpretation is an active mental process that runs again and again and again, as the mind seeks similarities and differences among ‘new’ and ‘known’ — as new tokens of experience are associated with and compared to known types of experience.

A fundamental aspect of this process is its selectivity. I assume that the perceiver’s environment provides far more stimuli than the perceiver can process

at one time and so the mind must select and attend to some (not all) aspects of the environment. Attention has to do with focusing cognitive processing on specific facets, factors, or tasks that constitute the perceivable surround.

My present understanding of interpretation relies heavily on processes of association. By association, I mean something very simple: two experiences (we can also call them stimuli and/or tokens) co-occur for U, and subsequently anything like one of those experiences *may* remind U of the other experience. “Certain concepts ‘belong together’ because they are associated in experience.” (Croft and Cruse, 2004, p. 7) When U associates one token with another token or with a type, U thereby associates qualities of the known element to the new element. U’s understanding of something known is extended and applied (perhaps temporarily, perhaps durably) to the new experience.

I assume that in language a finite set of elements combine to yield an infinite set of patterns. In a single utterance, we can find a multitude of patterns that resemble previous utterances, and we can exploit the similarity between the known and the new by assuming similarities exist between the patterns themselves. Therefore, if X either co-occurred with Y or resulted in Y; and if Z is similar to X; then we may anticipate that Z may co-occur with or result in Y in the future.

I take it as a given that every utterance uttered by a speaker and perceived by others will be subsequently interpreted by those others (and perhaps by the speaker as well). Through the process of interpretation, interaction participants will select some interpretation, out of all the possible meanings of that utterance, upon which they will respond to the utterance. Note that the response may be spoken — in which case we will call that response an uptake — or unspoken, but for the purposes of this study we will assume that utterance interpretation is essentially an automatic process for any individual in relative control of his senses.

By definition as interactional participants, speakers and hearers are engaged

in unfolding processes of attending to utterances uttered and interpreting them — both other’s and their own utterances, potentially during and after the moment of uttering. That is, all participants are interpreting their shared experience simultaneously, and (to some degree) in coordination with one another. However, in a strict sense, interpretation is something that each individual does individually, cognitively. There is too much information out there in the experiential world for one individual mind to take all of it into account, and so each mind selects some of (shared) experience to attend to. Therefore, we each perceive, interpret, and remember independently of everyone else. And yet, it seems to me that the fact that each of us is perceiving, interpreting, and remembering independently of one another is too often invisible to us; people seem, more often than not, to act based on the assumption that all participants are dealing with the *same* set of information and therefore producing the *same* interpretations of it — but (observably) this just isn’t so.

3.5.1.2 Gradience and interpretation

One of the principal ways in which Nanti ways of speaking differ from other signifying forms at other levels of language structure is the fact that each of the characteristics that constitute a way of speaking is optional, suprasegmental, relative, and gradient in its realization in a given token of speech. First, any given characteristic is *optional* because it is not required for either a grammatically well-formed or an interactionally minimally-appropriate utterance. In fact, I argue that it is *because* their deployment is optional that clusters of characteristics, perceived together as a way of speaking, serve to activate a specific type of interactional frame.¹³ Second, these characteristics are *suprasegmental* in that they can be differentiated and sepa-

¹³England (2009, p. 230) makes a similar point in describing the defining characteristics of narrated tales in Mam: “None of these characteristics is unique to narrative tales, although some of them are more prevalent in these stories than in other kinds of speech...Together the characteristics define the genre of narrative tales and enable them to be readily recognizable.”

rated from the required segmental and constituent-level phenomena that constitute the Nanti language as a phonologically and grammatically structured system; as such, I claim that they occur at a distinct level of organization of language (use).

Third, these characteristics are *gradient* because each of these characteristics can be realized in degrees — that is, each can be described in terms of being ‘more’ or ‘less’ present in the data. In reference to sound properties, *gradience* means that each identifiable characteristic is one that can be realized to a greater or lesser degree, or with greater or lesser intensity, and that its realization is not binary (that is, ‘present’ or ‘not present’). In addition, these characteristics are fundamentally *relative*, which is to say, each is characterizable only in terms of a range of possibility and contrasting realizations within that range. In practice, these characteristics are relative in their realization because they only constitute meaningful elements in a given utterance as a result of their *relation* to other elements in that utterance and surrounding utterances. For example, vowel lengthening in scolding talk only makes sense in terms of ‘longer’ or ‘shorter’ duration relative to other vowels; and utterance rate and rhythm in scolding talk only make sense in terms of ‘faster’ or ‘slower’ speech production across time. While it is possible to measure the length of a particular vowel or the duration of a particular utterance in terms of seconds, this measurement is only useful in identifying scolding talk if we compare it to the length of another vowel or to the duration of another utterance. Because the degree of realization of the sound characteristics of a way of speaking is not collapsed into a binary, all-or-nothing type of distinction in the interpretive process, the sound characteristics of a way of speaking function as do, for example, intensity adjectives like ‘very’ and ‘really’ in English or their equivalent, *païro*, in Nanti.

To be clear, gradience is, of course, potentially a factor in all speech production; for example, what counts as /a/, ‘short a’, or /aa/, ‘long a’, in Nanti is not dependent upon absolute time duration of the sound [a], but rather is the result of

identifying the sound as ‘short’ or ‘long’ based on locally salient contrasts between them in relative duration and articulation. The crucial difference between gradience in this case and in the case of, for example, scolding talk is that, in the first case, on the phonemic level the [a] sound is perceived and categorized as either /a/ or /aa/; the contrast is ‘binary’. In the case of scolding talk, however, gradience in realization is salient, relevant, and interpretable in and of itself.

It is important to emphasize here that the *presence* of a way of speaking in an utterance is not optional; the option consists of *which* way of speaking and *which* characteristics are used. Just as spoken language requires (circularly) speaking, I claim that spoken language requires a *way* of speaking; and that the way of speaking used is a necessary factor in the interpretive process of interactive communication.

Because of the gradient nature of the characteristics that constitute a way of speaking, each of these individual characteristics may be observed, and to varying degrees, in a large number of utterance tokens. This is a reflection of the combinatorial power of distinct linguistic resources (which is not news). In practice, any given token of talk may be more or less “like” matter-of-fact talk or scolding talk or hunting talk, and the characteristics that constitute scolding talk in particular may be more or less obvious, realized to a greater or lesser degree in one token than in another, or essentially absent. My claim is that it is the *co-occurrence* of a particular cluster of sound characteristics — or a sufficient subset of them — that renders a particular way of speaking like scolding talk recognizable and interpretable as such. Because of the combinatorial potential of these individual characteristics, a given utterance can be more ‘like’ or less ‘like’ a particular way of speaking along a continuum or axis of realization at whose terminus we approach (conceptually) a prototype or best example, or (concretely) an ‘exemplary’ token (see §3.5.1.3).

Because Nanti ways of speaking are gradient phenomena, it follows that any given utterance is potentially like or unlike every possible way of speaking, and

furthermore, that many utterances will not be clearly and exclusively identifiable with one single way of speaking. This is certainly the case in my data set; many utterances resemble various ways of speaking, to some degree, all at once. Far from being merely a source of indeterminacy or confusion in communicative situations, however, the possibility of gradience in the acoustic realization of a way of speaking affords a corresponding possibility for gradience in the degree of foregrounding of the speaker's orientation toward the utterance. In other words, for example, degrees of realization of the sound characteristics of scolding talk correspond to degrees of severity of the reproof or scold conveyed by the speaker. Evidence for the correspondence between degrees of realization of scolding talk and degree of severity of the scold is found most clearly in recorded interactions in which the speaker gradually increases the prominence of the characteristics of scolding talk over several turns, until the point at which the focal addressee responds in a way that satisfies the speaker and brings the strip of scolding talk to an end. I argue that the type of formal gradience manifest in ways of speaking is crucial to the expressive possibilities of human language, and moreover, I argue that it reflects the complex and unfolding nature of individual speakers' orientation toward their experiences and the topics of their talk. The phenomenon of gradience at the level of ways of speaking reflects the fact that every utterance in human face-to-face interaction has multiple facets to it, both in terms of the affordances of the means of communication, and in terms of the intellectual, emotional, physical, and other states and conditions that participants experience in the moments of speaking.

3.5.1.3 Types, best examples, and prototypes

The goal of this section is to align the concepts of tokens and types that I have presented (in §3.2 and §3.3.3; see also Chapter 4) with the concept of gradience, presented in §3.5.1.2 above, and then to situate them within my broader under-

standing of the process of by which Nanti ways of speaking are interpretable and interpreted.

As I have stated, for the purposes of this study, a ‘token’ is a specific instance of experience (of arbitrary size) to which meaning may be ascribed; while a ‘type’ is a conceptual (cognitive) category constituted by degrees of sharedness of certain characteristics (or properties or attributes) of its members. One token of experience can map onto many types, based on distinct clusters of characteristics (For example, the token of me, ‘Chris’, maps onto the types ‘female human’, ‘avid cyclist’, ‘graduate student at UT’, ‘resident of California’, etc.). Conversely, many tokens of experience in the world can map onto a single type (For example, all tokens of ‘female humans’). As (McClamrock, 1995) puts it, types are ‘multiply realizable’ in the sense that many tokens can manifest the set of characteristics that inhere to a particular type.

While many characteristics of experience can be categorized, in principle, as ‘binary’ in their presence or absence (for example, \pm FEMALE or \pm VOICED), many of them cannot (for example, SIZE or LOUDNESS). Therefore, in principle, while the type /g/ is + VOICED or it is a /k/, tokens of sounds of many different degrees of loudness may be of the type LOUD SOUND. This fundamental issue in cognitive categorization led to the development of prototype theory and theories of graded categorization (Rosch, 1975; Lakoff, 1987), which posit that some members of a category are more central representations of that category (or type) than others are.¹⁴ Crucially, though, prototypes are also cognitive phenomena (not intersubjectively available experiences) that are built up gradually and incrementally out of an individual’s experiences of a multitude of tokens; in other words, a prototype is a kind of ‘ideal’ to which lived experience is compared in the interpretive process. A specific token of experience may be perceived (consciously or not) as the best example of a

¹⁴Hanks (1990) provides an extensive discussion of indexicals in terms of prototypes.

type, but the prototype is always open to (or vulnerable to) revision through novel experiences.

For the purposes of this study, then, types are gradient (or graded) phenomena, ‘fuzzy categories’, that are organized by degrees of similarity, or likeness, not by relations of identity.¹⁵ Consequently, some tokens of experience — including token utterances and tokens of ways of speaking — are better exemplars of a particular type than others, depending on the degree to which the tokens display the characteristics on which that type is built. I assume that every type-level category *accommodates* a central, most representative prototype — that is, a single type that demonstrates better than any other type (or token) all the characteristics, properties, or attributes associated with the type — but that, in fact (and in actual data), most members of a type-level category differ from that prototypical member in a variety of ways, and moreover, that a token’s membership in type-level categories is situated, graded, and contingent upon the experience and perspective of the categorizer.

In the specific case of Nanti ways of speaking, then, I assume that, in principle, every utterance (token) is a potential member of every type-level way of speaking, but that in practice, in the process of interpretation, utterance tokens recognized by a participant as representative of a specific type or types (way(s) of speaking) relative to the degree to which he or she perceives the presence of the cluster of characteristics that would be present in a prototypical, or best, example of a particular way of speaking.

3.5.2 Interpretation, looking outward

This section outlines my understanding of the interpretive process by which individuals engage in coordinating their experiences with those of other individuals.

¹⁵To be exceedingly clear here, by *similarity* I mean ‘alike in some way(s) and different in some way(s)’, while by *identity* I mean ‘not different in any way’.

These ideas are most relevant to the interactional relations and social relations associated with the utterance. The interactional component of interpretation involves intersubjectivity, joint attention, expectations, and relative orientation.

Despite my close attention to the cognitive aspects of the interpretive process in §3.5.1, I see those aspects as subordinate to the intersubjective reality (and close description of) actual language use phenomena. It is my view that only by observing and documenting the actual interactivity between actual individuals can we find *empirical* evidence of what is actually going on in ‘language in use’. No one — participant or observer — has direct access to the perceptions, experiences, thoughts, emotions, etc. of other individuals; each of us only has access to the *behaviors* of others, from which we may form inferences about their perceptions, experiences, thoughts, emotions, etc., based on likenesses we perceive among their behaviors and our own experience-derived behaviors. From the speech (and other semiotic behavior) of others, we may form inferences about the thoughts, attitudes, beliefs, evaluations, etc. of others, again based on likenesses to our own correspondences between internal states and forms of expression. (Crucially, however, we may be wrong about those inferences.)

What individual people do, what they say, what they think, what they say they do, what they say they think, what they think they do, and what they think they say are all separate phenomena. For students of social interaction, it is of fundamental importance not to confuse these phenomena with each other. At one degree removed, it is of equally fundamental importance not to confuse individual and group level phenomena. Fortunately, in my view, looking closely at naturally occurring discourse data provides a wealth of intersubjectively-available information on most of the phenomena just mentioned. It also provides the researcher with a means for methodically assuming (to some extent) the perspective of every participant in an interaction, as each one makes a series of unique, discrete, sequenced

moves in the collaborative production of social interactivity. The next few sections address some of the key aspects of such collaboration.

3.5.2.1 Intersubjectivity

The concept of intersubjectivity is crucial to this study. By intersubjectivity, I mean the degree to which different ‘subjectivities’ — that is to say, different participants in interaction — share a perception of, or perspective on, a situation. Intersubjectivity is the result of coordination among individuals, and is a type of joint activity, not a passive state. Through discrete moves, individuals work to establish knowledge of the perspectives of other individuals, and to evaluate the similarities and differences, among those perspectives.

This assertion is not an unsupported claim (or inference) about the cognitive processes of individual minds. Evidence of this work on the part of individual participants is manifest in their interactional behavior. As Schegloff (1992, p. 1295) has persuasively argued,

Organizational features of ordinary conversation and other talk-in-interaction provide for the routine display of participants’ understandings of one another’s conduct and of the field of action, thereby building in a routine grounding for intersubjectivity.

Schegloff (1992) argues that interactional phenomena such as ‘conversational repair’ in general, and ‘third position repair’ in particular, are concrete evidence that interactants are monitoring one another’s understandings in talk-in-interaction, as well as concrete evidence of their efforts to modify or repair those understandings as they deem necessary.

The concept of intersubjectivity, of course, requires two other concepts: subjectivity and reciprocity of perspectives. For the purposes of this study, *subjectivity* is the *set* of properties and qualities — including consciousness, memory, emotions,

habits, opinions, etc. — which is unique to a single biological individual human being. A subject, here, is an experiencer. The notion of *reciprocity of perspectives* is discussed next.

As I stated in §3.3.4, I assume that individual minds operate on the (generally unexamined) assumptions (1) that other individuals also have minds, and (2) that all human minds function in roughly the same way. Tomasello (1999, p. 5) speaks of this “very special form of social cognition” in human beings as “the ability of individual organisms to understand con-specifics as beings *like themselves* who have intentional and mental lives of their own.” In the field of phenomenology, Schutz (1970) talked about this concept as ‘reciprocity of perspectives’; and the interactional and social consequences of this type of social cognition have been explored in fields ranging from cognitive science (Hutchins, 1995) to economics (Anderson et al., 1988) to composition and rhetoric (Syverson, 1999).

Moreover, I assume that *because* an individual experiences that he or she has attitudes, stances, feelings, emotions, opinions, etc. — cognitive states and processes that I collectively call ‘orientations’ — he or she will infer (presumably implicitly) that other individuals also have attitudes, stances, feelings, emotions, opinions, etc. — orientations that are, to some degree, manifest in the acts of communication (see discussion below in §3.5.2.5).

I assume that to a significant degree, participants in interaction rely on the immediate feedback and unfolding of an interaction to evaluate and calibrate the degree of intersubjectivity they have achieved with one another. More strongly, in my view, interactants can in fact only evaluate the degree of intersubjectivity that they have achieved as a result of paying attention to the manifest feedback they get from one another; most of the time, in interaction, individuals assume a particular level of intersubjectivity without substantiating this assumption through attentional activity.

The degree of intersubjectivity that participants achieve through interacting is mostly sub-attentional. In practice, intersubjectivity may or may not involve an *awareness* on the part of the participants of either (a) the fact of intersubjectivity or (b) the degree of sharedness of perspective. In an unfolding interaction, intersubjectivity is a variable state that is achieved moment by moment through the activity of interacting.

3.5.2.2 Joint attention

I asserted above that intersubjectivity is a type of joint activity. The purpose of this section is to spell out in greater detail some of the crucial sub-components of any type of joint activity. The most basic of these is *joint attention*.

Let us imagine two Nanti individuals, A and B, co-present in their *kosena*. Given the condition of co-presence, work still must be done to initiate and sustain interactivity between these individuals. Imagine that A is making arrows and B is peeling yuca. A wants to ask B a question. The first, most basic, step A needs to take is to attract B's attention. A may do that simply by speaking his question, if he assesses that B will recognize that he is addressing her. Otherwise, A may have to call out to attract B's attention. Then, after B acknowledges A with a glance or an utterance, B may speak his question. But notice A's first step, to gain B's attention, is separable from A's second step, which is to establish joint attention with B *to* something.

Joint attention is a social activity; it is the process of establishing mutual awareness between/among individuals in perceptual terms. Once joint attention has been established, *joint attention to something* may be established. That is, joint attention is a necessary antecedent to joint attention to something; one can achieve the former independently of achieving the latter. The establishment of joint attention to something is the result of successful coordination between/among individuals

and their mutual awareness of a selected object or topic. In the context of language use, joint attention to something is the result of successful semiosis — that is, of an individual succeeding in referring to, or otherwise indicating, the object or topic of mutual awareness. Once joint attention to and mutual awareness of something is established, processes of coordination may begin, through which participants collaborate in some activity — a conversation, a transaction, a construction task, etc.

The process of establishing joint attention to something in participants' shared environment is a crucial part of the process of coordinating their assessments of relevance (Sperber and Wilson, 1995) in interaction. In establishing joint attention to something, participants select, or foreground, some aspect of their shared experience (instead of selecting or foregrounding other aspects). In this study, I claim that Nanti ways of speaking are a means for establishing joint attention between/among interactants to the speaker's orientation toward an utterance or its situation of origin (see §3.5.2.5 below for further discussion).

To summarize, joint attention licenses communication. Communication, in turn, licenses joint attention to something. Joint attention to something, in turn, licenses coordination between/among individuals (including the coordination of assessments of relevance), which in turn licenses the sequential turns of verbal and social interaction.

3.5.2.3 Indeterminacy and multiple realizability in interpretation

Up to this point in discussing interpretation, I have not problematized the issue of coordination among participants' interpretations. Naturally, when two individuals are interacting in real time with one another, both rely on the assumption that they hold a certain amount of knowledge in common. The better they know one another, generally, the more confident each can be in what they can assume that the other person knows.

A widely shared folk model of language holds that language represents or encodes — in a simple, one-to-one manner — things, states, and activities out there in the world; and that when one speaker of a language utters something in that language, anyone who hears it will assign the exact same meaning to that utterance as the speaker did, or as would any other speaker of the language in question. That is, meaning is assumed to be only and entirely ‘inside’ language; and meaning is seen as belonging to language (not to speakers). In short, in this model meaning inheres in language. Note that even if individuals do not consciously conceive of language this way, in the moment-to-moment process of interacting, individuals tend to *operate* as though this folk model holds.

The point I wish to address in this section is the fact that in every conversational moment reside real and potential differences in the interpretations of the respective participants. Differences in interpretation can be of any degree, and only some of them cause serious misunderstandings between participants. Nonetheless, I assume that, in principle, any utterance has multiple felicitous interpretations — and at minimum, there are always two (no matter how slightly different) active interpretations, the speaker’s and the hearer’s. To be clear, I assume that the experience of the speaker is always distinct from the experience of the hearer/addressee/recipient/interpreter.

Among other factors, those aspects of language-as-a-system that are active guide and constrain, but formally underdetermine, meaning. This statement has two implications: one, that there are more aspects of language-as-a-system to be understood formally; and two, that these will further constrain, but still underdetermine, meaning.

The point I am making is a simple one: ‘meaning’ is not stable or unitary. This perspective is one the fundamentals of a practice approach to language; meaning is not assumed to be given, stable, or to have a single locus, but rather is

assumed to be *created* locally, interpersonally, and interactionally, and based on the collaborative communicative projects of participants.

The inherent dialogicality, heteroglossia, and dialectical affordances of language — in all media, not just spoken language — has been explored extensively (notably by Bakhtin (1981); Bakhtin et al. (1986); Voloshinov et al. (1973); Williams (1977)). These explorations draw our attention, first, to the multiplicity of meanings and interpretations possible in any particular utterance for both the speaker and the hearer; and second, to the ways in which particular utterances are situated in the historical and social patterns that members of a society continually produce and reproduce. This literature thus engages with both the presence and the absence of the *individual* speaker in the interpretation of utterances.

All speech is positioned in time, in space, and in a speaker, which makes every utterance unique. Similarly, the flow of time means that every moment of human experience includes every moment of experience prior to it, which means that no two moments are identical. Moreover, every perceiver — hearer(s) and speaker alike — brings a unique set of expectations to the process of interpretation in interaction. Within the context of these parameters, the interpretation of any utterance is affected by an arguably infinite set of factors. Theoretically, then, every utterance has a potentially infinite set of possible meanings/interpretations.

Practically, however, every utterance is likely to have a relatively small set of plausible or felicitous meanings/interpretations, and the differences among these, in most cases, are likely to be of little consequence. There are several factors that substantiate this claim. First, utterances do not stand alone. They are part of a sequence of experiential events, through which interactants build up knowledge of not only their shared world, but also of one another's store of knowledge. Second, communication is intentional and purposeful. Participants, by engaging in interaction, are actively involved in creating joint attention, interactional alignment, and

intersubjective understanding to at least some degree. Third, a significant portion of the ‘knowledge’ relevant to an utterance is embedded and available in the intersubjective situation in which interaction unfolds. Both the shared lifeworld and prior discourse are not only passively available to interpretive processes, but also can be called upon in utterances to anchor meanings and interpretations. Fourth, an utterance can be demonstrated to have a consequences in the social world, such that certain interpretations can be seen as (a) substantiated and (b) co-created through the process of interaction.

This is why turn sequencing in sustained interaction is so important. Multiple elements, produced and gathered over multiple turns, are put together by participants to yield an interpretation of the situation at hand. In a sense, dialogicality amounts to a type of online ‘hypothesis testing’. In everyday life, when individuals interact with one another, they in effect test the bounds of their common knowledge, either implicitly or explicitly. Over the course of real-time interaction, participants can render, as necessary, the knowledge and assumptions that are active for them. The more explicit that participants render relevant knowledge and assumptions, the greater the possibility for sharedness of interpretations among them.

Neither the form nor the potential interpretations of any utterance, uttered for the first time in real time, is predictable — either for the speaker or the hearer(s). At a basic level, every juncture in interaction affords infinite communicative possibilities. Nonetheless, some forms, some interpretations, and some uptakes *are* more likely than others, based on interactional conventions and expectations shared by the interactants. Active frames matter to both speakers and hearers in both the production and reception of real-time interaction. Interactional conventions such as adjacency pairing and next positioning project both ‘forward’ and ‘backward’, so to speak, in that the presence of one affords the presence of the other in the process of sequenced interaction.

As I discussed in §3.5.1, I assume that the interpretable aspects of an utterance have to do with similarities to previous experiences and utterances in prior lived moments and situations. The production of utterances, which is to say communicative interaction, is by definition a social process. This is what makes interpretation fundamentally ‘conventional’; an individual’s exposure to the practices, responses, and attitudes demonstrated by other members of a group is what affords the possibility of coordinated interpretations. Individuals bring to the moment of interpretation the conventions that they have learned as members of a speech community, and the more that any two members of that community interact with one another, the easier the coordination of their interpretations of shared experiences will be.

In sum, the coordination of interpretations among participants in interaction is the result of an active, multi-step process; it doesn’t just happen. At the same time, the basic indeterminacy of language does not prevent interactants from achieving some level — and often, a high level — of mutual understanding and coordination through the process of face-to-face interaction.

3.5.2.4 Appropriateness and expectations

In conducting our lives, we rely heavily on expectations we hold regarding how anticipated actions and events will be like previously experienced actions and events. This is most obvious in our interactions with the physical world; we expect the sun to rise, rain to fall, fish to live in the river, and so on. It is less obvious but no less true in interpersonal interactions: we expect certain kinds of anticipated actions and events to be like previously experienced actions and events. If I make a move to engage someone in interaction, I expect them to respond and engage with me (not to ignore me). If I ask a question, I expect an answer (not a random, unrelated string of words). If I proffer intimacy or antagonism to someone, I expect intimacy

or antagonism from them in return.¹⁶

It is from the realm of expectations about the world of experience-based behaviors that the notion of appropriateness emerges. An appropriate action is one that fits with my expectations of what is possible within a certain established set of interactional parameters.

I rely heavily on the notion of appropriateness in describing the place of Nanti ways of speaking in Nanti social life. Appropriateness¹⁷ is a quality of interpersonal interaction that is difficult to characterize, and yet its violation can be deeply felt. In lived experience, it is often easier to identify and describe an inappropriate aspect of behavior than it is to describe exactly what is appropriate about a behavior. Appropriateness is ‘about’ the social nature of individual action, ‘about’ how the social and interactional ‘moves’ that people make affect other people. Although it is unnoticed and sub-attentional most of the time, the quality of appropriateness in interpersonal interaction is ever-present, and it is, in my view, one of the defining qualities of ‘normality’ or ‘naturalness’ in everyday life. The purpose of this section is to characterize what this notion means in the context of this study, and to lay out my understanding of how appropriateness ‘works’ in Montetoni.

In this study, the notion of ‘appropriateness’ corresponds to a quality of interpersonal behavior — either verbal or non-verbal — that is based on the activity frames and interactional frames that are already active in a social situation and the set of expectations for what can, could, or should happen next. In turn, an expectation is an individual’s projection forward into the future of an idea about what can or will or should occur next based on their experiences of outcomes in previous similar situations.

¹⁶These comments are informed partly by Sperber and Wilson (1995)’s discussion of relevance in interaction.

¹⁷**appropriate.** *adj.* (1) especially suitable or compatible; fitting. (<http://www.merriam-webster.com>); (2) suitable or fitting for a particular purpose, person, occasion. (<http://dictionary.reference.com>).

This characterization means that the appropriateness of individual behaviors (or, more narrowly, moves) is evaluated, at a certain level, by each individual involved in a social situation, based on their individual prior experiences. At the same time, the sharedness (co-experiencing) of prior experiences by individuals allows for potentially high levels of sharedness of evaluation of appropriateness on a case by case basis.

An appropriate *type* of action is one that is preceded in similar prior activity frames and interactional frames; and an appropriate action is one that does not violate locally-held expectations regarding possible next actions in an unfolding interpersonal situation. An appropriate action does not break or disrupt the already-active activity frames or interactional frames, but rather continues or shifts or initiates a frame that fits with the already-unfolding situation. An appropriate move is a move that does not violate the expectations of co-present interactants regarding the kinds of physical actions and kinds of social moves that are in alignment with their definition(s) of the situation. Seen from another perspective, an appropriate move is also one that is interactionally ‘successful’, in terms of having elicited the type of response the actor was intending to achieve. Note that we can observe an individual react or behave differently in the contrasting situations: when a new experience fits his expectations, versus when a new experience violates his expectations.

Like many concepts used in this study, *appropriateness* is a gradient, not binary, phenomenon; that is to say, some actions are more appropriate to a token situation and others are less appropriate, while the evaluation of an action as ‘completely’ or ‘entirely’ or ‘perfectly’ appropriate or inappropriate is rarely relevant to actual human behavior or experience. Moreover, in the playing out of interactions, many concrete possibilities count as appropriate, or appropriate enough, for the interaction to play out successfully (enough). My discussion of this notion, therefore,

is not meant to suggest that appropriateness has clear boundaries in any situation, but rather to point out one of the evaluative frames I identified as operative in Nanti interactions during the period of this study.

It was the case that I rarely had direct access to Nanti individuals' expectations about an unfolding situation, in the sense of being party to explicit, overt metacommentary. Instead, I relied (as did all other participants) on individual participants' sequential moves — responses, reactions, and uptakes — to assess the relationship between the unfolding situation and their evaluations of its level of appropriateness.

Concretely, several types of data became relevant to my assessment of interactional participants' (local, situational) evaluations of (local, situational) appropriateness. All these data were types of uptake that provided positive feedback to a move and/or displayed an absence of negative feedback. For example, when an appropriate move was made, it wasn't ignored by other participants; it did not interrupt the flow of the interaction — rather, other participants responded quickly and naturally; another participant responded 'in kind' — that is, with a move of a similar nature; and/or if the move was made by a child, he or she was not scolded as a result.

3.5.2.5 Speaker orientation and relationality

Up to this point, I have said relatively little about the apparent subjective aspects of participants' interactional behavior. That is, although I have discussed aspects of the cognitive processes of interpretation, as well as aspects of the intersubjective processes, I have largely avoided addressing the issue of the individual participant's specific, unique perspective, or his intentional actions, or his intended meanings. The emphasis of §3.5 thus far has been on *how* utterances in general, and ways of speaking in particular, signify — not on *what* they signify. This section addresses




Figure 3.3: Any token utterance stands in relation to various concurrent phenomena, all of which are (potentially) relevant to interpretive processes in real-time communicative interaction. As schematized here, an utterance (potentially) expresses the speaker's relations to (1) his or her own subjectivity; (2) his or her own utterance; (3) previous utterances; (4) the addressee; and (5) the intersubjective world.

these issues directly, especially as they relate to the phenomenon of ways of speaking in Nanti communicative practice.

Without contradicting anything said in §3.5.2.3 about the indeterminacy of interpretation in interaction, I assume that the individual speaker (subjectivity), when producing an utterance, has a specific meaning (or set of meanings) in mind,

which he intends to express in his utterance.¹⁸ This intended meaning (potentially) includes referential aspects (mappings between words to the experiential world), social aspects (mappings between the speaker and the experiential world) interactional aspects (mappings between the speaker and the hearer/interpreter), and subjective aspects — what I call the *orientation* of the speaker to any of the above mappings. Note that I am speaking here of *types* of meanings that inhere to the utterance and am not making any claim about the specific meaning of any utterance.

At its most basic conceptual level, an ‘orientation’ is ‘the position of an element relative to another element’. Adapting this notion to the domain of verbal interaction, a speaker’s ‘orientation’ is the position, or attitude, or evaluation, that the speaker expresses relative to (1) the utterance itself — that is, its content or form; and/or (2) relative to the situation of origin of the utterance — that is, the active activity frames, interactional frames, or interpretive frames; the apparent or inferred social/physical/mental/emotional conditions of other participants; the perceived social/physical/mental/emotional conditions of the speaker himself, etc.

This formulation of the concept of orientation owes a heavy debt to the formulations of the communicative functions of language as articulated by Jakobson (1960); Jakobson et al. (1990) and Silverstein (1976, 1987, 1993), and particularly to discussions of the ‘expressive function’ of language. In Jakobson’s words, “The so-called EMOTIVE or “expressive” function, focused on the ADDRESSER, aims a direct expression of the speaker’s attitude toward what he is speaking about.” (Jakobson, 1960, p. 354) He goes on to observe that the expressive function

flavors to some extent all our utterances, on their phonic, grammatical, and lexical level. If we analyze language from the standpoint of the information it carries, we cannot restrict the notion of information to the cognitive aspect of language. (*ibid.*)

¹⁸I am not making any claims about self-awareness of intention, only about intention as such.

It is because of these insights articulated by Jakobson that I came to hold the perspective, discussed in detail in Chapter 5, that all utterances express speaker orientation to some degree — even if the orientation proffered is one of evaluative neutrality.

The concept of orientation that I am proposing here also owes a debt to Goffman’s concept of footing. In Goffman (1981a, p. 128)’s own words, “[a] change in footing implies a change in the alignment we take up to ourselves and the others present as expressed in the way we manage the production or reception of an utterance.” For clarity, I have chosen to talk about the management of ‘orientation’ rather than ‘alignment’ in interaction, but his insight here is fundamental to my understanding of the phenomenon.

The concept of ‘orientation’ proposed here is similar in some ways to conceptions of evaluation and stance (DuBois, 2007; Englebretson, 2007; Kärkkäinen, 2003, 2006; Kockelman, 2004, 2005). In his detailed exploration of the concept of stance, DuBois (2007, p. 141) states that “the act of taking a stance necessarily invokes an evaluation at one level or another, whether by assertion or inference”; he later defines evaluation “as the process whereby a stancetaker orients to an object of stance and characterizes it as having some specific quality of value.” (p. 143). He also states that

Speakers do not just perform generic stance *types*, they perform specific stance acts, which have specific content and are located in a particular dialogic and sequential context. (p. 145)

While these formulations have been helpful to me in developing the concept of ‘orientation’ relevant to this study, I have chosen not to use the term stance because, overall, the use of this term is underspecified and inconsistent, and as a result does not capture the concept that I am calling ‘orientation’ in a solid or consistent manner.

My assessment of the local relevance of speaker orientation in real-time interaction is rooted in the notion of ‘reciprocity of perspectives’ (see §3.5.2.1). Stated explicitly: because individual U evaluates, U assumes that other speakers of human languages also evaluate. As stated, this is a claim about U’s perceptions and cognitive assumptions, but not about U’s actions in interaction. Taking an active approach toward the reciprocity of perspectives, we can observe in some cases, and infer in others, that U, assuming evaluations are made by others, seeks information about those evaluations. Note that U’s assumption *that* others evaluate, based on analogy with U’s own experience of evaluating, is distinct from U’s assumptions regarding *what* others evaluate. The accuracy of U’s assumptions regarding *what* others evaluate is contingent upon the information U has from them and about them.

Note that a speaker may both give and ‘give off’ information regarding her orientation toward a situation (in the Goffmanian sense). That is, the speaker’s orientation may be highly explicit or it may be subtle and masked in any given utterance. But the point is that both the speaker and the hearer impute meaning and significance to the speaker’s words, actions, activities, etc., and one of the domains of significance is ‘speaker orientation’ — sometimes despite the intentions of the speaker.

In sum, I have just made three related but distinct claims: (1) speakers have orientations — based on the inherent perspectivity of subjectivity; (2) hearers expect speakers to have orientations — based on the reciprocity of perspectives; and (3) speaker orientation is one aspect of the interpretation that participants assign to utterances in real-time, face-to-face interaction.

The claim that I make in subsequent chapters of this study is that Nanti ways of speaking were an important and nuanced resource for Nanti interactants in both expressing and interpreting speaker orientation in face-to-face interaction.

In the next section, I directly address the issue of the interpretability of speaker orientation through the sound patterns of ways of speaking.

3.5.2.6 The interpretability of Nanti ways of speaking

In the context of the speech community of Montetoni, the repeated use of certain types of utterance-level sound patterns, and the correlation of certain types of uptake with the presence of these patterns, have led me to form certain generalizations about: a) which specific sound characteristics are salient in these patterns; and b) what kinds of interpretations are consistently associated with these sound patterns in Nanti interactions. Chapters 5, 6, and 7 explore in detail the observations and generalizations I have made regarding the utterance-level sound patterns and conventionalized interpretations of three particular Nanti ways of speaking; the purpose of this section is to state concisely my understanding of the *process* by which ways of speaking, as a type of experience, are interpretable.

I propose that a Nanti way of speaking can be recognized by interactants when a specific cluster of sound characteristics is recognized. For example, utterance *U*, which consists of referential content *C* plus intonation contour *W* plus rhythm *R* plus nasalization characteristic *N*, is recognizable as scolding talk. Note that the cluster of characteristics may be present and recognized by one participant, but not recognized by another, for any of a number of reasons. This does not concern us at the moment; our present assumption is mutual recognition among interactants.

I propose that *if* a token of talk can be recognized as a token of a type of a particular way of speaking, due to the presence of a specific cluster of sound characteristics, *then* that token is interpretable in terms of the conventions associated with the type. Once again, the participant may not interpret the token in this way, but I assert that the speaker has reasonable cause to anticipate that the hearer will make this association and engage in this type of interpretive process; and, moreover,

the speaker has cause to assume that the response given has taken these conventions into account. In other words, we are working, for the moment, with an idealized case in which communication is ‘successful’ in terms of a high degree of ‘alignment.’

I also propose that the presence of a particular set of characteristics is a *minimum* requirement for the association of a specific token with a known type of talk. However, these characteristics are gradient phenomena, by which I mean that they may vary in intensity or degree of realization, on two scales: (1) at an extracted and isolated time-independent point; say, the degree of creakiness or nasalization of a specific segment; (2) over the entire time-dependent course of the token; whether few, some, or all segments are creaky or nasalized. Similarly, intonation contours can exhibit greater or lesser degrees of difference between their highest and lowest points, or in their trajectory of change across the entirety of a token. In addition, other characteristics may be present that make the particular token an even better example of the type. For example, utterance *U* as described above, may also have creaky voice characteristic *V*, as do many tokens of the type scolding talk; however, the absence of creaky voice characteristic *V* does not prevent utterance token *U* from being recognizable as scolding talk, and the presence of creaky voice characteristic does not alter the status of the utterance as a token of scolding talk.

Having argued that the realization of a Nanti way of speaking in the case of a specific token (utterance) is a gradient phenomenon, and that the characteristics themselves are gradient phenomena (by which I mean: variable in quality while kind is constant; more or less creaky, but creaky nonetheless), I propose that the interpretation is *also* a gradient phenomenon (perhaps even in a dependent relationship to the gradience of the realization of the way of speaking, but this possibility demands further investigation.) In experiential terms, I am proposing that a person can be more or less annoyed, excited, serious, etc., and that these degrees of emotion are correlated expressively to the gradient realization of ways of speaking.

I propose that the interpretation of ways of speaking involves several simple but multi-step cognitive process. First, when an utterance U is perceived, the sound pattern of the way in which it was spoken bears an (iconic) relation of likeness to previously experienced sound patterns. That likeness of sound pattern links the known outcomes of previous experiences to the potential outcomes in the present situation. More generally, as discussed in §3.5.1, I assume that novel experiences remind us of past experiences and their outcomes, and those outcomes experienced in the past produce expectations in the present about potential future outcomes.

Second, perceiving the sound pattern of a way of speaking reminds perceivers of their own subjective states when they themselves used this way of speaking. The association between the sound pattern and the subjective sense results in an inference that the present speaker holds subjective state similar to the one remembered by (or evoked in) the perceiver.

In sum, it is my claim that Nanti ways of speaking provide a conventionalized means for speakers to express or represent their individual orientations as part of their own utterances, and for hearers to assess that speaker's orientation. I am not claiming that the sound patterns of ways of speaking are the *only* way for speakers to convey orientations, but rather that they are *one* of the conventionalized means for doing so. The key point is that the utterance-level sound patterns of ways of speaking provide an independent and distinct channel for the expression of, and perception of, speaker orientation, which is available simultaneously with other expressive means (including, for example a referential channel) within the total experience of an unfolding, real-time communicative interaction.

Chapter 4

Methods and techniques for this study

4.1 Introduction

This chapter describes the specific steps I took that resulted in the understanding of the Nanti *ways of speaking*¹ presented in this study. Since there are many other possible perspectives on and approaches to the study of ways of speaking apart from mine, this chapter attempts to illuminate, at least in part, the reasons that I arrived at the particular understanding that is presented here.

In order to study both the sound patterns and the social life of Nanti ways of speaking, I found that I had to pull together an array of methods and techniques that were appropriate to the unique combination of the nature of the question, the physical fieldwork setting, the specific types of analyses that interest me, and the kinds of analyses that are technically possible for the specific data set I ended up with. At the same time, I found that the steps that were necessary to proceed from a

¹In this document, the term *way of speaking* refers specifically to a ‘recurrent, conventionalized, signifying sound pattern manifest at the level of the utterance’; see Chapter 3.



Figure 4.1: Recording *shitatsi* banter during a feast in 2005. The cane mat you see is called a *shitatsi* in Nanti. Our Nanti friends saw value in our recordings from several angles — as a language learning tool for me and Lev; as a means of sharing speech (messages, stories, histories) with people not present; and as a way to let potential allies *kamatitya* ‘downriver’ and as far away as *notimira* ‘my homeland’ learn about their language and lifeways.

practical and impressionistic curiosity about Nanti ways of speaking to a systematic understanding of their constituent elements, how and what they signify, and their place in Nanti social life, required some disciplinary and intellectual flexibility on my part, as no one research method, analytical framework, or representational scheme was adequate to the richness of the phenomenon under scrutiny. All in all, I have two fundamental motivations for providing a detailed discussion of the array of methods and techniques I used: first, to render explicit how I reached the conclusions I reached; and second, in the hope that my most fruitful strategies might be useful to other researchers working with similar kinds of data, similar interests, and/or

similar field conditions.

This study of Nanti ways of speaking is based on naturally occurring discourse data² gathered in the Nanti community of Montetoni between 1999 and 2009 (see Figure 4.1). Although most of the data examples presented in this study were recorded by me between 2003 and 2005, my broader understandings of the phenomena I am studying are grounded in my participation in Montetoni's speech community during that whole ten year period, as well as in data gathered by my research partner Lev Michael and countless highly intersubjective conversations that he and I have had about our data and our experiences. Indeed, it is often impossible to separate my insights into Nanti verbal life from his, so I want to overtly acknowledge his contributions to this study again here.

I begin this chapter by describing the fundamental objectives that guided me in designing my research project. Then, in §4.1.2, I outline in very basic terms the procedural steps I took from the very beginning of this study through the present moment of writing. With that background information at hand, then in §4.2, I describe certain pre-existing social and environmental circumstances that placed some base-level constraints on the way I designed my research project. In §4.3, I discuss the complex process of doing research as a participant observer in Montetoni; then, in §4.4, I describe the specific methods and techniques I used to gather naturally occurring discourse data for this study, as well as some of the attendant ethical and procedural decisions I had to make along the way. In §4.5, I shift from an orientation toward fieldwork issues to an orientation toward issues of analysis. In the subsequent sections, I discuss the principles of a grounded theory approach (§4.5.1); the conceptual and procedural aspects of taking a token/type approach toward my data (§4.5.2); and, finally the various units of analysis, and the relations among these units, that form the conceptual bridge from my data tokens to the descrip-

²By 'naturally occurring discourse', I mean spontaneous, intentional, interactional talk, in contrast to elicited or scripted talk.

tions and analyses of Nanti ways of speaking that are the core of this study. I close this chapter with a discussion of the challenges I faced in attempting to produce a satisfactory multi-modal representation of the sound phenomena at the heart of this study (§4.6).

4.1.1 Concrete objectives

I had the following general but concrete objectives in mind while designing (and gradually improving upon) the methods and techniques I used in this study:

1. To gather a large quantity of naturally occurring discourse data in a wide variety of physical and social settings in Montetoni in a relatively unobtrusive yet transparent manner;
2. To collect sufficient ethnographic information to be able situate that naturally occurring discourse data in an adequate description of Nanti social, cultural, and verbal life;
3. To find evidence in that data set of the principled patterning of Nanti language use and, in particular, of the sound patterns that characterize Nanti ways of speaking;
4. To identify, describe, and visually represent the relevant patterns that I found in my data set in the most transparent manner possible.

These basic objectives guided me not only in making initial choices regarding research design, methods, and techniques but, more importantly, they also guided me in modifying and improving aspects of my project, as I progressed from (sometimes naive) conceptual engagement to practical, empirical engagement with my research question.

4.1.2 Overview of research design and methods

The following list provides a summary, in conceptually sequential order, of the basic strategies and methods that I used to gather, analyze, and represent the data upon which this study is based. The remainder of this chapter describes these steps in detail.

1. I was able to gather ‘the data’ — that is, naturally occurring, spontaneous verbal interactions among people in Montetoni — as a *participant observer* in everyday Nanti social life.
2. I made recordings *in situ* of naturally occurring discourse — including small strips of verbal metadata that I added to the recording before or after strips of naturally occurring discourse.
3. I regularly created fieldnotes *in memoriam* regarding my experiences as a participant observer.
4. I occasionally created fieldnotes *in situ* during certain kinds of structured interactions.
5. I compared (and contrasted) strips of recorded naturally occurring discourse, comparing the characteristics of specific tokens of talk to other (a) formally³ similar tokens, (b) tokens from previous turns from the same interaction, and/or (c) tokens from the turn-in-progress, in order to identify the main characteristics that distinguish the sound pattern of one way of speaking from all others.
6. I created careful descriptions of the characteristics, correspondences, and contextualizing factors relevant to these recordings, in order to generate and jus-

³By ‘formal’ I mean ‘having to do with form’ in contradistinction to ‘content’, ‘substance’, or ‘meaning’. This distinction is explored in greater detail in Chapter 3.

tify a set of robust generalizations about the social salience of the sound patterns of Nanti ways of speaking.

7. I compared my data set and the patterns and generalizations that I found grounded in it (see §4.5.1) to existing scholarship on the individual/language/culture/society nexus.
8. I developed a relatively self-consistent set of terms and analytical principles that were appropriate to the description of Nanti ways of speaking.
9. I developed a set of representational schemes, using tools like L^AT_EX, Praat, and ZeusDraw, in order to visually convey salient patterns and relationships in my data that support the generalizations I make here.

4.2 Pre-existing conditions that constrained the design of this study

4.2.1 Social pre-conditions

As I discussed in Chapter 2, this study emerged from my pre-existing relationship with the Nanti community of Montetoni, a relationship that was founded on my original and overarching roles as a ‘provider of aid’ and an ‘advocate’. When I decided to bring the role of ‘researcher’ with me to Montetoni as well, it was very important to me not to damage or distort my existing relationship with the residents of Montetoni as a result of my research activities. Thus I considered it necessary that my research project fit within the established parameters of my social niche in Nanti society.

Fortunately, from a certain perspective, from my very first encounter with the residents of Montetoni, the importance of my learning to speak Nanti was clear to everyone, since Nantis were at that time, and in practical terms still are, mono-

lingual in Nanti. Therefore, my process of learning the language for practical and socio-ethico-political reasons was a comprehensible and locally acceptable frame of reference within which I was able to broaden and deepen that process of ‘learning the language’ to include the foci of this study.

Certainly, observing and participating in Nanti society in ‘real time’ was the only way I could gather certain kinds of information and make certain kinds of generalizations. At the same time, recording everyday interactions was the foundation of much of my learning, even before conceiving of the research project described here. From our earliest visits to Montetoni, Lev and I talked to Nanti individuals about how and why we wished to record some of their interactions. Explaining that we really wanted to learn to speak their language well, we described how our recordings allowed us to rehear, memorize, and practice parts and kinds of interactions that we had been present for. Nantis not only thought this was a very sensible strategy, they also recognized its utility for them as well, sometimes asking to listen to our recordings, and even at times encouraging others to listen to them.

My guiding intention in designing this research project, then, was to continue in my accepted role as a relatively unintrusive observer of Nantis’ day-to-day activities, comporting myself in the same manner as I had during my first several extended stays in Montetoni before beginning this research project, while expanding the scope of my learning and ‘data gathering’ activities. This guiding intention is the bedrock of the objective of gathering data ‘in a relatively unobtrusive yet transparent manner’ and was most practically relevant to decisions concerning when, where, and how I would *record* data during my stays in the village. That is, I already had a relatively clear sense of where and when my physical presence was welcome; the relevant decision was whether or not my recording would also be welcome.

The history and origins of my relationship with the community of Montetoni — and, in particular, the underlying orientation that we shared toward me improving

my ability to communicate competently within their speech community — led to my decision to place many of the observations and generalizations put forth in this study in the frame of my own experiences of learning about linguistic and social appropriateness in Nanti society.⁴ In other words, I have never lost sight of the practical aspect of learning about Nanti ways of speaking.

I had another large-scale reason for gathering data in as unobtrusive a manner as possible. As I discussed in Chapter 2, prior to my arrival in Montetoni, Nantis had had almost no experience with outsiders like myself, or with recording devices of any sort. As a result, any observable activities that I engaged in having to do with the manipulation of recording devices were either unprecedented (at least in the early years) or highly unusual, as well as entirely foreign, and, therefore, they were always potentially disruptive to an ongoing social situation.⁵ Because my personal social strategy is to behave as appropriately as possible, as often as possible, while in Nanti society, I designed my data gathering strategies to be maximally unobtrusive as well as minimally disruptive. I will discuss my specific strategies as well as their rates of success in further detail later in this chapter.

The final social pre-condition framing this study — and one that continues to be among the biggest concrete challenges to my analyses — is that while I gather data monolingually in Nanti, I talk about and write about my data in English and Spanish. Because at the time of this writing, no Nanti person (yet) speaks either English or Spanish, I can not check my translations with any native speaker of Nanti. This fact has had its most limiting and pervasive impact on my decisions regarding which data tokens I am willing to use. If I can imagine any way that my translation or my interpretation might offend the author of the token, I don't use that token, no matter how 'good' it is as 'data'.

⁴See Chapter 3 for a discussion of the notion of appropriateness in the context of this study.

⁵I mean that such activities tended to 'break the frame' of whatever was going on by attracting people's attention, often disrupting exactly whatever was of interest for recording purposes in the first place!



Figure 4.2: The final leg of the journey to Montetoni requires a long, narrow, and small wooden boat (or dugout canoe) with a very shallow draft, outfitted with a long-shaft single-stroke *peque peque* motor, in order to navigate the steep, shallow rapids of the upper Camisea River. Almost every year, we have rented this type of transportation in Cashiriari, the uprivermost Matsigenka community on the Camisea. In this photo, taken in 2009, I am seated in the middle of the boat, flanked by two Ministry of Health personnel (who accompanied me to carry out a health study in the Nanti communities), while the two Matsigenka boatmen fill the motor with gasoline.

Rather than feel a sense of freedom as a result of my nearly exclusive access to both Nanti and English, I have always felt a visceral sense of accountability to both Nanti speakers and English speakers that I interpret and translate from Nanti to English in as faithful a manner as possible — a task that has proved extremely difficult in many cases, given the conceptual and expectational gulf that separates everyday life in Montetoni from everyday life in Austin or Berkeley. I only hope that some day, if/when a Nanti person is in the position to evaluate my translations and interpretations, they will understand my good intentions.

4.2.2 Physical pre-conditions

The physical environment of Montetoni placed some sizable constraints on both my research strategies and their outcomes. First, the arduous 7- or 8-day journey from Lima to Montetoni — involving one commercial flight, one charter flight, one commercial ‘river bus’, two different boat charters, and lots of time not actually in a boat, but rather in the Camisea river pulling that tiny boat up treacherous rapids (see Figure 4.2) — demanded that I bring as little gear and equipment with me as possible, for reasons of weight and volume as well as practical personal safety.

Second, I had to plan for watertight safe storage for all research-related materials, because of the travel conditions just mentioned, and because the built infrastructure of the village of Montetoni provides small thatched huts, while the rainforest climate provides intense rains and winds on a regular basis. Similarly, curious hands and voracious rodents both necessitated careful storage practices (see §4.4.7).

Third, I (and Lev) had to be entirely self-sufficient in terms of power sources. The village of Montetoni does not have electricity, the equatorial day is only 12 hours long, and the social interactional patterns of Montetoni’s residents necessitated that I be able to engage in reading and writing tasks after sunset (see §4.4.6).

Fourth, in order to be able to record Nanti interactions in whatever place and at whatever time presented itself, my recording equipment needed to be light and portable, yet sturdy. At the same time, this equipment needed to be appropriate for recording multi-party interactions among participants who were situated in a variety of locations — or even in motion — relative to the location of the recording equipment (see §4.4.1).

Finally, recording naturally occurring discourse data entails recording without any control over the soundscape. Speaking concretely, recording wherever the interactions took place in Montetoni meant simultaneously recording competing hu-



Figure 4.3: The hut that Lev and I lived in during our visits to Montetoni between January 2004 and January 2007 (pictured in Chapter 2) included a 9-foot-by-9-foot enclosed area, which provided the only real privacy Lev or I had while in the village. As pictured here in 2005, in order to avoid biting insects and to minimize the stream of visitors, we often worked inside of our *magamento* ‘mosquito net’ during the afternoons.

man sounds, animal sounds, bird sounds, bug sounds, weather sounds, river sounds, etc. The net result is a very acoustically⁶ complex data set, which has placed sometimes substantial limitations on the kinds of sound analysis I can do with the data I have (see §4.4.1 and §4.4.8).

As I discuss below, I was able to deal with some of these physical constraints with more success than others. Speaking generally, these constraints primarily had an impact on the quality of the raw data I was able to gather, which in turn had an impact on the kinds of analysis I could do adequately, and contingently, the kinds

of generalizations I have been able to make.

4.3 Participant observation in Montetoni

As I stated in §4.1.1 above, my basic objectives for the ‘in the field’ phases of this study were to gather a large quantity of naturally occurring discourse data in a wide variety of physical and social settings in Montetoni in a relatively unobtrusive yet transparent manner; and to collect sufficient ethnographic information to be able situate that naturally occurring discourse data in an adequate description of Nanti social, cultural, and verbal life.

Not surprisingly, given my training as an anthropologist, I chose *participant observation* as my primary method for gaining access to and gathering naturally occurring discourse data in Montetoni (Bernard, 2002, 2006; Farnell and Graham, 1998; Sherzer, 1983, 1987a; Urban, 1991). My situation-specific implementation of this general method, however, was perhaps unorthodox in some ways. In concrete terms, while in Montetoni I participated in everyday Nanti activities and ‘special events’ along with other community members, but much of the time I was wearing a recording unit at the same time. The details of this data gathering strategy are provided in §4.4.1.

From a methodological standpoint, merely ‘participating in’ and ‘observing’ everyday events does not constitute data. The experiences of ‘participating’ and ‘observing’ are only that — personal experiences — unless they are concretized in some way, in some medium. At that point, a ‘personal experience’ has been partially transformed into an intersubjectively available record or artifact. In my view, to the degree that the *content* of that record is intersubjectively available, that recorded content can be considered ‘data’. In other words, a written journal entry or an

⁶In this study, I use the word ‘acoustic’ in a general sense, meaning ‘having to do with sound’, rather than in a specialized sense salient to phoneticians, phonologists, ethnomusicologists, physicists, etc.

audio-recorded conversation are intersubjectively available artifacts, but only their intersubjectively accessible components have utility as data. (See further discussion of intersubjectivity in Chapter 3). To that end, I documented my participant experiences and observations in a variety of ways, creating narrative descriptions, drawings, diagrams, and images of happenings, events, timelines, relationships, and patterns of whatever I could (see §4.4 for more details).

Doing this fieldwork as a participant and an observer in some ways reshaped my character. I learned to do ‘double takes’ with my perceptions, and to see an unfolding situation from multiple perspectives simultaneously. I learned to pause and watch other people act and react, noticing the flow of experience without always getting swept up in it.⁷ I learned to formulate and test little unobtrusive hypotheses over and over again, trying out moves and strategies in my interactions with people and seeing if I got the results I anticipated. It is because I worked very hard to become aware and recognize what was going on ‘in my head’ and what *wasn’t*, that I feel emboldened to make the claims I make here as (at least partially) intersubjectively valid.

It is important to mention that my complicated status as an insider/outsider while in the Nanti communities *did not* afford me any physical separation of ‘participant’ from ‘observer’ while I was in the presence of Nantis, nor did my own definitions of my role at any given moment matter much in the shared social world of Montetoni. To put this in more concrete terms, Nantis consistently dealt with me with reference to *their own* social categories and norms; and any abstract categories of mine — such as ‘detached observer’ or ‘professional researcher’ — were largely irrelevant to our day-to-day experience of one another.

⁷Not surprisingly, perhaps, during the course of this project, I delved into literature on mindfulness practice; I recommend especially Beck (1989); Brach (2003); Nhat Hanh (1987); Kabat-Zinn (1994).

4.3.1 Becoming a participant observer

I know from my own lived experience that in many places, becoming a competent *participant* in local goings-on is a relatively simple process; likewise, in many places, becoming a competent *observer* is a relatively simple process. However, these are two different processes, and becoming a competent *participant observer* is yet a third. Moreover, it appears to me that the further outside of one's own zone of comfort and familiarity one ventures, the harder it is to become a competent participant, and yet the easier it is to become a competent observer.

Becoming a competent *observer* can actually be done in two ways, with two very different outcomes: (a) one may observe through the lens of one's own perspective, foregrounding differences between the known and the unknown; or (b) one may observe by setting aside one's own perspective and taking on new perspectives, foregrounding an experiential (or phenomenological) understanding of the unknown. The first kind of observation is, I think, inevitable based on how human cognition works, and moreover, it is essential to the coherent integration, description, and analysis of novel phenomena. The second kind of observation, though, is sometimes possible, and adds an immeasurable richness and sensitivity to the kinds of descriptions and analyses one can produce for the benefit of others of novel phenomena.

In my particular case, I strove to combine these two sorts of observation deliberately and consciously, in order to best understand and express the uniqueness of Nanti social and verbal life. Certainly, in practical terms, in the context of this study, the process of becoming a competent participant in Nanti goings-on was entirely wrapped up with my capacity to observe carefully and imitate what I saw done, as well as to take in and integrate feedback from Nanti individuals signaling the appropriateness (or not) of my and others' behaviors.

Becoming a competent *participant* requires stepping outside of one's own actional habits and engaging in new actions and behaviors. How *well* one performs

those new actions and behaviors can only really be evaluated by the ‘locals’ for whom those actions and behaviors are in fact habitual; as a result, we can only evaluate our own success as a competent participant based on the feedback we get from the ‘locals’ we are engaging with. Competent participation, then, is in a fundamental sense inseparable from competent observation of one’s own self in novel contexts. Certainly this observation pertains to all individuals who find themselves in novel contexts and not only to deliberate ‘participant observers’, but there are two important differences. First, the deliberate participant observer *wants* to behave in ways that are locally appropriate (which is often not the case in cross-cultural contact situations); and second, the deliberate participant observer prioritizes behaving in locally appropriate ways, at the expense of other self-preserving or self-distinguishing behaviors, effecting a kind of ‘self erasure’ that in most social circumstances is counter-intuitive.

4.3.2 Becoming a ratified participant

A crucial step that I had to take, starting when I arrived in Montetoni for my first extended stay in 1997, was to slowly and gradually become a *ratified* participant in day-to-day activities.⁸ This entailed being with Nanti individuals and families as often as seemed appropriate and doing whatever they were doing to the degree that seemed appropriate. In those first months, I had little knowledge of the Nanti language, so my actions spoke volumes. Fortunately, frequent visiting by a woman to other women’s *kosenas* is part of the daily routine, so I began with that, visiting other women and calibrating the length of my visits to the degree of welcomeness I felt each time. Once there, I watched.

Parents’ instructions, reactions, and responses to their children taught me a huge amount about behavioral appropriateness. Similarly, watching sisters’ interac-

⁸I am using the notion ‘ratified’ and the term ‘ratified participant’ in the sense established by Goffman (1981b) but also extending it beyond participation in talk to include participation in other forms of interaction and action.

tions, brothers' interactions, spouses' interactions, and intergenerational interactions taught me what kinds of behavior were likely to produce which kinds of outcomes. What I observed, I imitated to the largest degree I was able, and then I took careful note of the outcomes of these imitations (to the degree that I was able to be self-aware in what were sometimes highly stressful social circumstances.)

Once I had made some friends and established some bonds with certain households, I increased the range of activity frames, and then interactional frames, that I participated in. Based on my growing knowledge of Nanti expectations based on age grade and world knowledge, I opted to co-participate in small household tasks as would befit a young woman just reaching adulthood. This choice enabled me to demonstrate my willingness to inhabit a locally-defined social role while it could also accommodate my low level of locally-appropriate world knowledge.

4.3.3 Acquiring linguistic competence

A crucial activity in the scenario just described was, of course, observing the use of language among Nantis: observing which sounds went with which activities, not only in terms of learning 'names' for people, things, and actions, but also finding the robust patterning of Nantis' ways of speaking. As I have mentioned, I learned to understand, speak, and use the Nanti language in a monolingual environment. This means that I had to pay very close attention to the co-occurrences and sequences of sounds and actions that went on in my presence, as well as to make and act upon 'real time' hypotheses and interpretations during interpersonal interactions. Crucially, only by acting on and testing out these hypotheses was I able to gradually build up a self-consistent body of knowledge about the sound-to-meaning correspondences of the Nanti language. While I did have access to a small set of reference materials on the Matsigenka language, those materials were of little help in making sense of the complex sounds of the Nanti language that I encountered every day.

It bears mentioning as well that prior to dealing with me and Lev, the Nanti individuals with whom I spent time had had little or no experience of an adult learning their language. Up to that point, adults had only fallen into two categories: fluent speakers of Nanti and non-speakers of Nanti. Therefore, in the early years, the partiality of my knowledge of Nanti — getting part but not all of what was said — was my biggest challenge, both intellectually and interpersonally, and the greatest source of confusion for my Nanti interlocutors.

If learning the Nanti language this way was extremely difficult and exhausting, it was also very, very effective. Learning to speak Nanti through lived experience seared knowledge into my memory and my mind in a way that translation-mediated learning never has — and never could, I now believe.

Of course, I am still learning and still improving my communicative competence. However, after my first three extended visits (1997, 1998, and 1999) I was able to communicate adequately, and by about 2002, Nanti adults seemed to take for granted my ability to communicate competently in Nanti.

4.3.4 Learning to perform appropriately in interactions

My most important task in learning to speak Nanti was not memorizing new information, but rather imitating others and practicing whatever I learned as often as I could. Just as important as learning what to do, however, was learning what *not* to do and/or when not to do particular things in various social situations in Montetoni. Appropriateness is a complex and subtle behavioral art in any social situation, and the more a new situation is unlike one's 'home culture' the easier it is to behave inappropriately — even without knowing it. In my view, the most effective strategy by far for learning to behave appropriately, and for learning to 'perform' appropriately in face-to-face interactions, is to spend countless hours on the periphery of local activities, observing how people engage — or don't engage —

with one another, relative to the various salient factors and characteristics that constitute each situation. Second only to this is the strategy of acting very cautiously in novel social situations and paying extremely close attention to the responses one evokes in others. Thus, acting as a competent participant (as often as possible) in Nanti society was inseparable from acting as an ever-vigilant observer, in the process of learning both when and how to act, and when *not* to act, according to local systems of appropriateness.

As important as learning appropriateness is in novel cross-cultural situations, I feel it is just as important to take personal risks in order to demonstrate one's willingness to learn, even in the early stages of the process. As obvious as this will seem after I say it, many people in challenging social or linguistic situations don't seem to realize that using what they know, no matter how limited, in the most locally appropriate manner possible, is the shortest path to mastering that knowledge, adding new knowledge, and gaining people's respect. In my view, an outsider's unwillingness to perform to the best of her abilities in social situations — usually out of fear of 'doing it wrong' — actually impedes learning, and worse, impedes people's ability to understand, empathize with, and grow comfortable with that person.

4.3.5 Friends as teachers and consultants

Not surprisingly, over the years I have developed some particularly rewarding relationships with a few individuals in Montetoni, a handful of people who I have come to consider my closest friends in Montetoni. Also not surprisingly, most of these individuals have become my best 'consultants' in my learning and researching activities, both because they and I have developed mutual interest in one another's lives and because we have well-matched temperaments. As a result, though I have data from interactions all over the village of Montetoni, and I have probably recorded

every single Nanti I know at some point, my data set is populated by certain individuals and certain households more than others. I have made an effort to be clear about about this uneven distribution whenever it has seemed relevant to this study.

The people from whom I have learned the most over the years include my women friends Maroja, Chabera, Anita, Neri, Bejaterisa, and †Ajorora; and my men friends Bikotoro, Migero, Josukaro, Erejón, †Oras, and Tekori; and I am extremely grateful to each of them for their patience and good humor.

4.4 Data gathering activities in Montetoni

This study describes Nanti ways of speaking as I experienced and observed them in the period 1999 to 2009. However, the focal time period during which gathering data for this dissertation was my main activity in Montetoni was between December 2003 and May 2005.⁹ In that time period, I made three extended stays in Montetoni:¹⁰ late December 2003 through early April 2004; late September through early November 2004; and late February through late May 2005. During those stays, I cyclically made recordings; created fieldnotes; listened to, catalogued, backed up, and created metadata for my recordings; did selective transcription of recordings; and began initial analysis of the patterns apparent in the recordings; more detail on the cyclical nature of this process is provided in §4.5.1.

In this study, I used four types of media to create physical records of my activities as a participant observer: audio recordings, video recordings, written fieldnotes, and still photographs. Each of these types of artifact has particular affordances as a medium for capturing potentially intersubjectively available phenomena. For example, while audio- and video-recording documents more co-occurring facets of a

⁹This was the period during which I had dissertation research funding from the National Science Foundation and the Wenner-Gren Foundation.

¹⁰These stays were interspersed with other research projects in which I was involved in Peruvian Amazonia.

given event than does writing, even the best audio- or video-recorded data require metadata and supplementary fieldnotes about crucial non-auditory and non-visual aspects of the recorded event that are ‘out-of-frame’, so to speak. I will discuss my use of these types of physical records in detail below.

4.4.1 Gathering audio data

Because of my interest in identifying and describing aspects of the sound patterns of Nanti language in use — and the sound characteristics of ways of speaking in particular — audio recordings are the most important medium for data for this study. Specifically for my purposes, audio recordings provide a chronologically time-dependent, form-faithful record of what specific people said and how they said it at particular identifiable historical moments.¹¹

I gathered the vast majority of my audio data using a recording method that Lev Michael and I developed when we first began to document Nanti feasting, in which recording is done by a person wearing an IRU, or Individual Recording Unit. For the data presented in this study, the IRU was almost always being worn by me.¹² The IRU is a (very) small pack worn around the waist that contains a MiniDisc recorder connected to a stereo lavalier microphone that is clipped to the pack itself or to the person’s clothing. The IRUs I used for this study consisted of either a Sony MZ-R37 MiniDisc Recorder, a Sony MZ-B10 MiniDisc Recorder, or a Sony MZ-NH900 HiMD Recorder with a Sony ECM-717 Stereo Lavalier Microphone. The first two types of recorders use standard MiniDiscs, while the third type uses Hi-MD format MiniDiscs. In the case of the first two types of recorder, recording on a 74- or 80-minute stereo MiniDisc in stereo mode provides higher quality recordings,

¹¹At the same time, in almost all strips of audio recorded naturally occurring discourse — when divorced from any supplementary media — individual participants are only identifiable by their voices, which gives them a high degree of anonymity to ‘outsiders’.

¹²In contrast, we made many recordings of feast chanting when a Nanti individual was wearing an IRU.

while recording on the same MiniDisc in mono mode allows 148 continuous minutes of recording, which is advantageous in many open-ended social situations. The third type of recorder, using the HiMD format, permits very high quality, uncompressed PCM recordings. For this study, however, I most often made compressed stereo ‘Hi-LP’ recordings so that recording time was not a limiting factor. A single 1GB Hi-MD disc can accommodate 35 hours of compressed recording (but only 1 hour of uncompressed PCM recording). This feature was extremely useful in Montetoni, since I frequently wanted to participate in many-hour-long social situations without having to interrupt the flow of activities or my participation in them to change out a full MiniDisc.

The IRU’s key advantages are these: first, the IRU is light, portable, and sturdy; second, the recorder goes wherever the IRU’s wearer goes, and records whatever the wearer says or hears, thus providing access to naturally occurring discourse contexts; and third, the IRU is unobtrusive yet visible, so everyone knows at a glance that they are being recorded. The IRU requires no special attention or monitoring once turned on; intermittent attention, to check battery level and recording time, and to replace a full disc with an empty one, is sufficient to produce hours of recordings. Note that the microphone or the recorder may easily be switched off at any time that the wearer chooses to stop recording.

The principal disadvantage to the IRU is the non-focused nature of the recording technology. Although the microphone records whatever is nearest to it, when listening to recordings made using this system, it is often difficult to establish figure/ground relationships in the soundstream, especially during simultaneous multi-party interactions — which are quite common among Nantis! In addition, if the microphone is brushed by the wearer’s movements, the quality of the recording is severely compromised. When I wore the recorder myself, I had to be conscious to prevent sound from my own voice and movements canceling out the voices of

other participants. By choosing to record audio data with small portable minidisc recorders and small external stereo microphones, I was able to record, as I had planned, large quantities of naturally occurring discourse data in a wide variety of social and physical settings in and near Montetoni.

On some occasions, I used a MiniDisc recorder and a stationary stereo microphone positioned somewhere in the built environment in order to record interactions that took place in stationary social spaces. The primary advantage of this strategy was being able to focus the microphone on specific areas of the social space; the primary disadvantages were its vulnerability to environmental factors (feet, chickens, buzzing insects, and small children in particular) and the limitations on the directionality of the microphone once it was in position, if participants changed location. But if, for example, I had visitors in my hut, or if I could anticipate appropriate surroundings such as a feast gathering, I often opted to use a bigger and better-placed directional stereo microphone to get clearer, more focused recordings of specific interactions.

I typically made recordings three or four times a week. Sometimes I recorded whatever happened in my presence, while other times I purposefully recorded during an event or activity that I knew about in advance. I made a point of making recordings in a wide variety of events, activities, and social settings in Montetoni. I made the largest number of recordings during everyday visiting rounds — both when I visited other households and when residents of other households came to visit me (and Lev).

Even the best audio recordings require metadata and supplementary information to render them useful. In addition to commonplace strategies such as keeping datalogs and other written metadata, I found that ‘verbal metadata’ — that is, spoken information that I added to my recordings at the beginning, at the end, or even at spontaneous moments — became a critical part of my recordings, since I usually



Figure 4.4: Whenever anyone in Montetoni asked to listen to our recordings, we gladly obliged them. In this photo, taken in September 2004, Tekori (left) and Tomashi (right) are laughing at whatever they are hearing amid a crowd of curious children. Notice, on the table, the two types of minidisc recorder, the stereo microphone, the portable speakers, and the two pair of professional headphones connected by a splitter (all Sony equipment); these items were in constant use while we were in Montetoni, between gathering, reviewing, analyzing, and sharing our recordings.

didn't create written fieldnotes while visiting recording *in situ*. Thus, for example, I would occasionally mutter the names of individuals present but silent during a particularly interesting stretch of discourse, or speak the names, in sequential order, of participants in chanting lines during feasts.¹³

4.4.2 The ethics of recording naturally occurring discourse

Being able, in principle, to record at any time and in any place is secondary to the issue of the *appropriateness* of making recordings at a specific time in a specific place. On the one hand, Nantis understood and were, in the abstract, comfortable with my stated desire to record their speech, in order that I better understand it

¹³In hindsight, of course, as years pass and my memories of specific moments fade, I wish I had done this even more often than I did.

and therefore learn to speak Nanti better and communicate more effectively. On the other hand, there are always moments in human communication when talk is meant for only some, and not all, ears. As a result, I had to make a variety of decisions regarding when to record.

In recording naturally occurring discourse in Montetoni, I expressed clearly to people that they were welcome to ask me at any time not to record them, that they were welcome to listen to any of my recordings, and that if they asked me to erase any recording, I would promptly comply with their wishes. Put in other words, I obtained people's informed consent to record their interactions. The reality of the situation, however, was that (a) people never asked me to not to record; (b) people actually wanted to listen to my recordings relatively infrequently and (c) with one exception, no one never asked me to erase anything I had recorded.

I attribute these facts to three more general factors: (a) Nantis adults rarely told one another what to do, and for them to tell me what to do (or not do) would have been very socially awkward. Confrontational behaviors, and even non-confrontational behaviors, in which one adult interferes with the activities of another adult, were highly dispreferred by Nanti individuals, and so Nantis almost never expressed any overt objection to my presence or my recording activities; (b) Nantis already expected their discourse to circulate widely, and so my recordings fit in with an existing language ideology about the 'public' nature of talk; and (c) the vast majority of my recordings were simply uninteresting to Nantis, because they contained interactions that they themselves were present for and therefore already knew 'enough' about. As a result, the responsibility for filtering and censoring my recordings lay almost exclusively with me. I was very cautious always to attend to and respond to individuals' physical and verbal behaviors in my presence in such a way as to avoid either my presence or my recording causing people to seem uncomfortable.

My criteria for filtering, censoring, and/or erasing audio recordings were the following. First, I didn't even record obviously sensitive situations. Second, I made sure that the presence of the recorder was obvious on or near my person, so that people could calibrate their activities to it, just as they would to any other participant. Third, if I did record something that, in hindsight, seemed sensitive — offensive to someone, incriminating of someone, etc. — I either erased the recording immediately, or have since refrained from translating it or using it in my analyses and writings. One advantage of having hundreds of hours of recordings and a long-term relationship with people and a place is that it is relatively easy to avoid using sensitive or potentially-sensitive content.

In sum, in carrying out this study, I made countless moment-by-moment and case-by-case decisions, regarding what to record, what to erase, what to transcribe, and what to analyze, based on my best understandings of Nantis' own definitions of privacy and interactional appropriateness. I very much hope that my intention to be respectful is clear, should any Nanti person in the future express any objection to my use of this data set.

4.4.3 Gathering video data

I have made video recordings at various points during my stays in Montetoni. Many Nanti individuals have shown an interest in and curiosity about video recordings, and have never overtly objected to the presence of the video camera. Moreover, many Nantis have been curious to watch the videos we have made. Nonetheless, in most social situations in Montetoni, making video recordings was a culturally-alien and therefore intrusive activity, and as a result tended to make people self-conscious and/or distracted. Over the years, Lev and I have struck a balance between the negative and positive aspects of video recording by bringing out our camera only infrequently and using it only for very brief periods of time. As useful as video data is in certain respects, given the social pre-conditions within which my research was



Figure 4.5: I used the video recorder sporadically during this study, in order to document specific activities and events; in this photo, I was recording Maroja and her daughter processing arrow cane (center) and Joshi making women's *koriki* nosedisks (at the far left).

set, everyone (including me) was invariably more comfortable when the camera was not present, and as a result I have always used it relatively sparingly.

Video recordings are a rich source of interactional data in a number of ways. Video recording documents spatial and temporal aspects of the physical setting; the visual identity of participants; participants' movements; spatial orientations; gestures, lines of sight, and gaze; and other multi-modal aspects of interaction. Most of the video recording I did took place in common spaces of the village during feasting. I occasionally video recorded special events and activities that took place in the village, as well as some conversations and interviews with Nanti individuals. I had originally planned to do more video recording than I actually did during the course of this study. I opted for less video recording when I experienced how disruptive it was to almost any activity I hoped to film; simply bringing out the video camera usually resulted in a curious audience gathering around the camera, thus breaking the very activity frame or interactional frame I had intended to film.

If I did bring the camera out, I would film many things in one day; then I would put the camera away for days or weeks, to let it recede from the foreground.

During the course of this study, I first used a Sony DCR-TRV120 Digital-8 camera and later a Sony DCR-HC85 MiniDV camera; I used an external stereo microphone and a wide-angle lens to improve sound and image capture, and I almost always used a tripod.

4.4.4 Still photography

Still photography has many of the advantages of video recording: it is a medium for recording important aspects of spatial, organizational, and interpersonal phenomena. I gathered a fairly large collection of digital photographs during the course of this study, which provide supplementary information on various activities that went on during my stays. I used a small digital camera, so it was much less obtrusive or interruptive than my video camera. As a general rule, however, I used the still camera infrequently, for the same reason that I used the video camera infrequently: its presence usually had a disruptive effect on the ongoing activity frame.

One unexpectedly innovative use of the still camera was teaching, at their request, a handful of young men how to use the camera and then lending it to them during several feast gatherings. The photographs they took of one another and of other feast participants are full of character and good humor and provide a unique and positive record of feasting.

4.4.5 Creating fieldnotes

In the context of this study, the category ‘fieldnotes’ includes: hand-written observations, speculations, hypotheses, questions, generalizations, media metadata, and rough transcripts kept in paper journals; typed versions of all of the above kept in computer files; hand-drawn sketches, relationship trees, and maps; computer-generated maps, figures, and tables; and computer-generated spreadsheets and data-

bases. The general purpose of these fieldnotes was to capture physical, situational, historical, interpersonal, and other aspects of interactional phenomena — plus their relationships across time. Given the perspectivized and heterogeneous nature of fieldnotes, I would characterize them as ‘raw analysis’ rather than as ‘raw data’; nonetheless, my fieldnotes are part of the data set for this study in as much as they constitute a record of many intersubjectively available facts, relationships, structures, and memories.

I brought a Mac laptop computer with me to Montetoni almost every time I have visited, in order to create fieldnotes; type up handwritten fieldnotes; create transcripts of recorded data; write up initial hypotheses, insights, and generalizations; create spreadsheets for data organization, metadata, and analysis; read and review electronic reference materials; and do preliminary analytical work with audio and video data files, among other things. While transporting and protecting a laptop computer under the physical conditions described in §4.2.2 has always been a challenge, it has also always been worth the trouble, in order to have access to the data-protecting and -processing power of a computer. At the same time, the difficulty of keeping a computer in good working order in Montetoni over extended periods of time was sufficiently great that I relied heavily on handwritten paper records on a day-to-day basis.

One other facet of my collection of fieldnotes merits mention. Most of them are written *in memoriam* rather than *in situ*. That is to say, I chose to take written notes very sparingly while participating in social activities in Montetoni, because the activity of writing was not something that local participants engaged in during the period of this study. Instead, I made mental notes about salient phenomena and then wrote notes down on paper or electronically later on, when no longer in the company of Nantis. I also created contextualizing fieldnotes while reviewing my recordings. This was a conscious aesthetic, interpersonal, and emotional decision

on my part; I was unwilling to engage regularly in activities that no Nanti would ever engage in while in the presence of Nantis. This decision rendered extremely important the quantity and quality of information I could store in my memory. This is, I suppose, one of the greatest potential weaknesses of this study; namely, that many of the small details upon which my generalizations are made spent a period of time in my memory before being written down. In order to address this weakness, I regularly checked my memories, as well as my actual fieldnotes, with Lev Michael, in order to include a level of (at least partial) intersubjectivity; I also checked my memory of many important happenings and phenomena in the context of conversations with Nanti friends, thus including another level of (partial) intersubjectivity. Beyond these interactive intersubjective activities, I routinely checked my memories against existing audio-recordings, video-recordings, still photographs, fieldnotes, data analyses, census records, and so on.

In a certain sense, the task of creating fieldnotes has continued and will continue as long as I continue to generate and coordinate metadata and commentary based on my field experiences as well as my recorded data set. It is the coordination task that has posed some of the greatest conceptual organizational challenges. After trying out several unsatisfactory ways of cataloging the metadata, transcripts, fieldnotes, and commentary associated with my data set, I finally set up a ‘datalog’ database (using the freeware application BibDesk) with custom-made fields that enables me to keep detailed, searchable records for all of my recordings, as well as for strips of recordings of any size.

4.4.6 Power sources in Montetoni

As I mentioned in §4.2.2, Montetoni has no source of electricity, so I had to bring all power sources — for light, recording, and computing — with me. For lighting, I only used flashlights and headlamps. For audio recording, I only used AA-battery



Figure 4.6: Lev setting up our flexible solar panel on a bamboo frame in Montetoni in 2005.

driven devices. For video recording, I brought several fully charged long-life camera batteries to the field and used them judiciously.

Providing power for running my computer and its accessories was the most complicated and costly problem to solve. The solution Lev and I chose was solar energy. We brought a flexible solar panel, a charge controller, a 12V (automotive) battery, a DC/AC power inverter and many meters of wire, and set up a stationary charging system in our hut each time we arrived in Montetoni; see Figure 4.6. Because the solar panel required direct sun, charging the 12V battery depended on having direct sun at the right time of day. In order to deal with the unpredictable

variation in the amount of charge available on any given day, we chose the simplest solution and calibrated our computer use to the solar power available. Note that the computer's internal battery could be charging during the sunniest parts of the day even if I wasn't using the computer at the time.

4.4.7 Protecting equipment and data artifacts in the field

As discussed in §4.2.2, the physical conditions for doing research in Montetoni are challenging in some ways, particularly in terms of protecting electronic equipment from moisture. Therefore, while in Peru, I stored all of my equipment, all of my data MDs and videotapes, and all of my field notebooks in airtight, watertight cases (see Figure 4.7).

I backed up my audio recordings by duplicating them onto other MDs and I kept the copies in a separate case. Due to practical limitations on both disc space and battery power, I only imported select segments of audio and video data into my computer for analysis. I backed up my computer files onto an external hard drive.

4.4.8 The limitations of naturally occurring discourse data

Recording naturally occurring discourse data allows one to study a variety of phenomena that cannot be studied closely in any other way. That said, the naturally occurring discourse data that I gathered in this study has certain very serious limitations as data.

Unfortunately, my data, over all, are of very poor quality in terms of sound signal. This is a result of the rich and varied soundscape against which Nanti daily life unfolds. Participants are often moving around, manipulating objects, and making sounds in any of a number of ways. Children, animals, birds, and insects present on the scene produce loud and often high pitched sounds that mask the sound signal that counts as 'data'. In general, Nantis speak relatively quietly, and so their



Figure 4.7: Watertight, hardshell equipment cases are a necessity in the conditions presented by the Amazon Basin. Notice, in this photo taken in 2009, that these cases — already covered with mud and gnawed on by rodents — are traveling in the open prow of a small boat. I highly recommend these particular Dorskocil Seal-Tight Waterproof cases; they latch on all four sides and the ‘Large’ model is just the right size to be airline carry-on luggage.

voices are often faint on my recordings. Likewise, spatial configurations result in the microphone being much closer to some participants than to others, resulting in uneven signal strength over the course of many of my recorded interactions (see, again, Figure 4.1).

While the human ear can easily distinguish among various competing sound sources — including when listening to a recording — sound analysis software such as Praat can not make such distinctions. As a result, analyzing strips of data with a tool like Praat is challenging at best, and in many cases, impossible, due to the competing sound sources captured by the recording.

The analytical consequence of this reality is that I have had to use more impressionistic descriptions of the sound characteristics of my data than I had planned to use, because in practice the analyses produced by Praat simply did not provide the information that they could, in principle, provide (see Figures in Chapters 5, 6, and 7).

4.5 From data to analysis

The kind of data used for this study is *naturally occurring discourse data* — by which I mean, in this specific case, audio recordings of spontaneous interactions, of varying length, recorded over several years, in a variety of places, involving a large number of participants, often including myself as a participant observer, and supplemented by video recordings, still photographs, and fieldnotes (as described in §4.4). Because I was investigating patterns in the use of language in everyday interactions, I recorded very frequently — as did my field research partner, Lev Michael, who also gave me access to his recordings — with the result that my total potential data set consists of hundreds of hours of recordings.¹⁴

In gathering this data, I attempted to find a balance between (a) recording often enough that the phenomena of interest were amply represented and (b) limiting my recording in order to avoid ‘unprocessed data overload’. In hindsight, I opted more often in favor of (a) than (b), with the consequence that I did (and do) in fact suffer substantial ‘unprocessed data overload’ in this project.

Faced with hundreds of hours of highly heterogeneous original data, I had to implement various strategies in order to organize, disaggregate, and categorize these data, ultimately producing a much smaller primary data set, made up of tokens that are most salient to the specific interests of this particular study of Nanti

¹⁴I am gradually archiving these data and recordings with the Archive of the Indigenous Languages of Latin America; see www.ailla.utexas.org for more information.

ways of speaking. In this section, I discuss the core strategies I used in this study: a grounded theory approach to data collection, (see §4.5.1); an iterative process of identifying the set of prototype-centered token/type relations that I call Nanti ways of speaking (see §4.5.2); and the careful construction of a network of salient units of analysis (see §4.5.3).

4.5.1 Taking a grounded theory approach to gathering data

Gathering naturally occurring discourse data via the complementary media of written fieldnotes, audio recordings, video recordings, and still photographs guaranteed me a richly heterogeneous corpus of data. Data of such thematic and structural complexity could fruitfully sustain inquiry into a wide range of research questions (many of which I have considered, and am still considering), as well as providing various kinds of answers to the central research question in this study (only some of which I am able to include here).

In order to deal with this heterogeneity, I found it necessary to become familiar with the patterns in the data set in a gradual and incremental manner, allowing the details and subtleties of the research question to interact with the details and subtleties of the data set. In particular, I relied on two basic insights that underlie the grounded theory approach to qualitative social science research (Bernard, 2002, 2006; Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Strauss and Corbin, 1990). The first basic insight is that by closely examining the properties of a data set, one can identify certain concepts and categories that inhere to that data set — rather than approaching the data set with one’s analytical concepts and categories already established, which arguably blinds the researcher to potentially more appropriate concepts and categories.

The second basic insight that underlies grounded theory is the notion of methodological recursivity. That is, the activities of data collection and data analysis

are part of an iterative process in which these two kinds of activities inform one another. Procedurally, first the researcher identifies the empirical phenomenon to be investigated. Then the researcher gathers an initial set of data pertaining to this phenomenon, identifies the relevant properties of that data set, and establishes a provisional category scheme for that data. At that point, the researcher proceeds to gather additional data and compares it to the initial set, in order to discover (a) if the properties identified in the first set are also found in the larger set and (b) if the provisional category scheme holds for the larger set. After this comparison, the researcher revises her generalizations so they fit the whole, larger set of data. Then this procedure is repeated, until the point at which the comparison of new data does not force substantial revisions of the existing generalizations, at which point the researcher may begin to talk about these generalizations as an ‘explanatory theory’ for the phenomenon of interest.

Another aspect of the grounded theory approach that was crucial for this study of naturally occurring discourse data is that it conceptually accommodated change over time in the data set, since it is fundamentally a research *process*. Rather than excluding the factor of time — as synchronic analytical frameworks do — the iterative nature of the grounded theory approach actually brought the axis of time to the center of the research process, allowing history, memory, novelty, innovation, and sequencing to inform rather than confound my descriptions and analyses of language use phenomena in Montetoni.

Note that grounded theory has, since its inception, been reworked, redefined, and territorialized by its founders, Glaser and Strauss, and as a result my sketch of its principles here is, of necessity, selective. Furthermore, I have made use of some aspects of the approach of grounded theory, but not others. For example, the iterative process of gathering and categorizing my data on Nanti ways of speaking has also taken into account various categorization schemes, analytical frameworks,

and theoretical approaches already available to me from other researchers working on similar phenomena, such that my generalizations do not result *only* from the internal properties of the data set (even if such a thing were cognitively possible) (see Glaser and Strauss (1967)).

4.5.2 Identifying tokens and types of ways of speaking in my data set

As I discussed in detail in Chapter 3, the primary framework I used for analyzing the sound patterns of Nanti ways of speaking was making generalizations about ‘types’ based on sets of ‘tokens’. In brief, in the context of this study, a ‘token’ is a strip of recorded data that corresponds to all or part of a single utterance that was produced in a real-time, face-to-face interaction in Montetoni. A token is a record of, as well as a representation of, a specific rememberable shared interpersonal experience, and it is an intersubjectively available artifact with definite, describable properties and characteristics that can be stored, shared, and revisited perpetually (in principle, at least).

A ‘type’, in contrast, and for the purposes of this study, is a conceptual (cognitive) category constituted by degrees of sharedness of characteristics, properties, or attributes of its members. Types are derived from, but crucially not identical to, tokens, and by definition (that is, as categories) types are derived from more than a single token. A type has no *inherent* intersubjective reality; any type is only ‘real’ in an intersubjective sense based on the degree to which interaction participants align and re-align their individual (cognitive) types through the production and reproduction of tokens.¹⁵ Following Schutz (1970), I call the cognitive pro-

¹⁵For example, at one point (in high school, I think) I thought the verb ‘enervate’ meant ‘to energize or invigorate’, and I had several conversations in which I used this word with no apparent misunderstanding between me and others. The problem only became apparent to me in hindsight, when I realized that I had the polarity of the verb wrong, and that I had *communicated* to others the exact opposite of what I had *meant* (cognitively).

cess of mapping (back and forth) among tokens of experience and cognitive types ‘typification’. Nonetheless, in a practical and functional sense, ‘types’ take on an intersubjective reality through their occurrence and recurrence in lived intersubjective (interactional and social) experiences.

The tokens presented as examples in this study are offered as representatives of specific types based on a specific set of characteristics that I claim they have. The characteristics that I claim define Nanti ways of speaking emerged from my data set through a recursive process of reviewing tokens of data (as discussed above in §4.5.1). Although I began with a set of possible characteristics and analytical categories in mind, in fact a relatively small set of those turned out to be salient in and relevant to my data set. I describe and define the relevant characteristics below in §4.5.3.

Concretely, in engaging with a large and diverse corpus of naturally occurring discourse recordings, the first step I needed to take was to identify distinctive, recurrent sound patterns in the data I had recorded. Based on my lived experience of the Nanti language in use, I had a general idea of the types of sound patterns I could expect to find, as well as of the types of activity frames and interactional frames in which I might find them. I was able to identify strips of recordings for close analysis by simply listening to hours and hours of data over and over again. It was crucial to learn to separate the task of listening to the sound patterns from the task of listening to the content of the utterances, in order not to conflate these two communicative channels. Once I had identified the distinct characteristics of these two channels, I could then put them back together again to look for meaningful correlations that supported my analyses of their patterns of co-occurrence and co-variation.

I made systematic comparisons among specific data (tokens), and then among sets of data (tokens) that I had grouped based on shared characteristics. I made

systematic comparisons of tokens and sets of tokens in an iterative process until at last I had identified a stable set of types, based on consistent (and predictable) clustering of certain characteristics. I call that set of types ‘Nanti ways of speaking’.

In order to find meaningful correlations among distinct characteristics of my data set, I looked for both patterns of co-occurrence and patterns of alternation. As discussed in detail in Chapter 3, in this study both the ‘presence’ and the ‘absence’ of particular elements or characteristics are assumed to be significant in the interpretation of utterances in interaction. Moreover, in seeking to identify a set of complementary ways of speaking, I am operating with an understanding of ‘systematicity’ that takes the relationship between the presence and absence of specific elements as significant. Procedurally, of course, identifying patterns of co-occurrence is the first step, as one sorts through and identifies sets of elements present in the data set. Identifying patterns of alternation is necessarily a later step, because only by knowing which elements are possible — through their occurrence in some data tokens — can one recognize their absence in other data tokens, and posit a system of alternations among these elements.

The process of identifying patterns of co-occurrence and patterns of alternation was also tightly linked to the notion of gradience in Nanti ways of speaking that I propose in this analysis, because some tokens in my data set were clearly interpreted (uptaken) by discourse participants as tokens of a particular way of speaking that did not manifest a full set of the co-occurrent characteristics of that way of speaking; see Chapter 3 for a detailed discussion of gradience.

Selecting the specific tokens analyzed in this study was a lengthy process. Although I kept fieldnotes about happenings and events in Montetoni that gave me leads as to where I might find prototypical examples of the ways of speaking examined in this study, in fact, upon close inspection, many strips of data proved to be either non-prototypical or unsatisfactory for any of a variety of reasons. Of

course, every strip of data that was recognizable as a particular way of speaking informed my descriptions and generalizations about the phenomenon, but I discovered through the analytical process just how much variation and gradience is possible on a word by word and utterance by utterance level within the interpretive frame of any particular way of speaking. To put this another way, participants responded to specific utterances as tokens of a particular way of speaking even when that token differed quite a bit from the prototypical sound pattern described here. Rather than cast doubt upon the identifiability and interpretability of Nanti ways of speaking, however, these interactional phenomena reinforce the claim that Nanti ways of speaking are interpretable as a result of the *conventionalization* of sound patterns.

It was as a result of identifying and comparing tokens that were interpreted in common ways in subsequent turns that I was able to identify and isolate specific sound characteristics of those tokens that constituted a specific type of way of speaking. Note that selecting specific best, or *prototypical*, examples of different ways of speaking for inclusion in this dissertation was much more difficult than finding non-prototypical, and yet communicatively equivalent, examples of each type in my data set (see Chapter 3 for a discussion of types and prototypes).

4.5.3 Units of analysis

In hindsight, it is clear that one of the most important processes I needed to go through, in describing Nanti ways of speaking as socially situated sound patterns, was the process of deciding on both the appropriate ‘units of analysis’ to use, and the relations among these units. Put in another way, this was the process of deciding on the core set of analytical principles by which I organized, disaggregated, and categorized specific segments of the vast, heterogeneous, and complex set of recordings that I created, and by which I made distinctions among the different types of signification embedded in any given strip of interaction.

This strategy is, in a sense, another face of the grounded theory approach described above, in as much as the process of identifying appropriate units of analysis, their relations to each other, and their relative importance was ongoing, recursive, and guided by the phenomena present in the data, as I explored and tested the appropriateness of concepts I found in an interdisciplinary body of literature.

The central unit of analysis in this study is the **utterance**. This unit is the focal point of four systems of relations that I explore in this study (illustrated in Figure 4.8). Ordered in terms of scale, the first of these four systems is the system of sound/experience relations, in which the **utterance** engages with domains of experiential knowledge through processes of association. The second is the system of grammatical relations, in which the utterance interfaces with the analytical unit **sentence** and other grammatical forms.¹⁶ The third is the system of interactional relations, in which the utterance interfaces with the analytical unit **turn**. The fourth is the system of social relations, in which the utterance interfaces with the analytical unit of the **move**.¹⁷ In this section, first I discuss briefly the salient types of relations between and within sets of units, after which I discuss each of the four analytical systems I use in terms of their relevance to the understanding of Nanti ways of speaking as socially significant sound patterns.

4.5.4 Relations among sets of units of analysis

The ‘units of analysis’ that I have used in this study are not unitary, discrete, unrelated elements, like a bunch of measuring cups strewn in a drawer. Rather, they fit together as sets, based on relationships of kind, scale, and scope. Some units and sets fit inside one another, while others overlap or intersect because of partial likenesses, and yet other sets are distinct from the rest in some fundamental

¹⁶To be clear, I am proposing that the ‘type’ utterance interfaces with the ‘type’ sentence. An actual utterance token, however, may in fact consist of a sentence or of a grammatical sub-unit of a sentence, such as a clause, a phrase, a single word, etc.

¹⁷These key terms are discussed in detail in §4.5.6, §4.5.7, §4.5.8 and §4.5.9.




Figure 4.8: Illustration of the four systems of relations that intersect in an utterance.

analytical way. In order to capture the nature of the relationships among the units of analysis I use, as well as among the sets of units, I have used three basic organizing principles: nesting units, intersecting units, and orthogonal units.

4.5.4.1 The principle of nesting units

The characteristic that defines nesting units is that some units of analysis are entirely contained within other, higher order units. Nesting units are perhaps the most com-




Figure 4.9: Illustration of two types of nesting units and two types of intersecting units relevant to this study.

mon type in grammatical relations, and are typified by the notion of ‘constituency’ in syntax: a word is an element of a phrase, a phrase is an element of another phrase or a clause, and these units nest upward until you get to the maximal constituent, the sentence. Another kind of example of nesting units is the system of organs in a living body; every one of the organs can be examined and described individually but all are entirely contained within the body. Each unit of analysis within a nesting set can be conceived of as an internally coherent unit which forms an element within another internally coherent unit. The smallest undecomposable (or undecomposed)

unit in a nesting set of units may be called an ‘analytical primitive’.

The notion of a ‘hierarchy’ is another way of characterizing some sets of nesting units. In a hierarchy, each element in a series is graded or ranked relative to every other element in that series. Thus, for example, in a social hierarchy such as a military organization, every type of member (except the top member) is seen as subordinate to a single other type of member. In a linguistic feature hierarchy such as a sonority hierarchy, each element is ranked as more or less sonorous relative to all other elements that share the feature of sonority. The key distinction of hierarchies is that some single property of the nested set of units has relative value.

When categorizing and analyzing the nesting units of a specific set of interactional data, nesting units may be identified in spatial, temporal, and/or conceptual aspects of the data.

4.5.4.2 The principle of intersecting units

The characteristic that defines intersecting units is that some units of analysis share some properties with others, but these units are sufficiently different that they can be conceptualized as intersecting or overlapping, neither wholly containing the other. Two intersecting units of analysis, then, are each internally coherent elements that share some, but not all, properties with each other. On a large scale, we may see ‘language’ and ‘culture’ in a human group as intersecting units of analysis — they share some, but not all, of their defining properties. Similarly, two spatially- or demographically-defined groups of people may have in common the knowledge of a single language like English or Nanti, but these two groups may not be members of a single speech community, because they do not share a single set of language practices.

When categorizing and analyzing the intersecting units of a specific set of interactional data, intersecting units may be identified in spatial, temporal, and/or

conceptual aspects of the data.

4.5.4.3 The principle of orthogonal units

The characteristic that defines orthogonal units of analysis is that some units of analysis are defined by fundamentally different principles or criteria than are other units of analysis, and these principles or criteria are simply independent of one another, not evaluable in terms of one another. It is often the case that different analytical approaches explore different properties of a single data set in ways that are independent of one another. Two orthogonal units of analysis, then, are each internally coherent units, based on a specific set of principles or criteria, but the principles that govern each of these units of analysis are fundamentally distinct. For example, an epidemiologist may describe a given group of people in terms of their biological characteristics, while an anthropologist or sociologist may describe that same group in terms of their social organizational characteristics; and, crucially, neither of the sets of analytical criteria used by the different analysts are subordinate to or dependent upon the other.

When categorizing and analyzing the orthogonal units of a specific set of interactional data, orthogonal units may be identified in spatial, temporal, and/or conceptual aspects of the data.

The four systems of relations that I use in this study are of this type: although they intersect at one point, the utterance, the relations that define each of these systems are unique to that system. While there are similarities and overlaps among the salient properties and relations, none of these systems can be reduced to another. At the same time, all four systems are members of a single larger system: my description and analysis of Nanti ways of speaking.

I take it as axiomatic that, in principle, all analytical units (a) have nesting units within them; (b) intersect with some other analytical units; and (c) are or-

thogonal to yet some other analytical units. Departing from that basic perspective, next I describe the analytical sets I use in this study, their subsets, and the relations among them.

4.5.5 Superordinate units

Although I consider the four analytical systems that I use in this study to be fundamentally systems of relation and contrast, their sole purpose is to make sense of real-world, real-time interpersonal phenomena. The following are a few superordinate units to which my analyses are anchored.

A location, in this study, is a mappable physical place whose uniqueness is defined by the activities that a group of people consider appropriate to it. A location may be as large as the whole forest or as small as the area circumscribing a cooking fire. ‘The village of Montetoni’ is one of the locations in this study. I consider ‘location’ a high order unit of analysis within the system of social relations because it is a necessary precondition for any type of human activity.

An event is an observable, photographable, unfolding coordinated physical activity of a group of people by whom the event is realized. Note that even an ‘event’ that one person carries out all alone is still defined by a coordinated absence of other people. An event is always associated with a location.

A participant structure is a specific group of individuals who co-participate in an event. A participant structure is always associated with an event and a location.

A strip of discourse is a continuous segment of arbitrary size of recorded verbal activity involving one or more participants.

An utterance is a strip of talk produced by a single speaker. For certain (but not all) analytical purposes, an utterance can be extracted from its situation of origin and examined as a synchronic, independent unit. An utterance may include

anything from a single vocal sound to multiple grammatical clauses.

As I have stated, the utterance is the focal unit of analysis for this study. In three of the four systems of relations I rely on, the utterance ‘maps onto’ another concept that is defined by certain, but not all of, the characteristics of the original utterance.

4.5.6 The system of social relations

4.5.6.1 Stable places and entities

The village, in this study, refers to the entire set of spatially-proximate huts that are called Montetoni by the people who live there (as well as by people who don’t/didn’t live there). The village of Montetoni is the mappable, visitable, photographable place located on the Camisea River in southeastern Peru. The village was clearly demarcated in that it was surrounded by many kilometers of uninhabited space. There is one and only one village, called Montetoni, in my analysis here; thus the village is a maximal unit of analysis. Montetoni is one of the salient types of **location** in this study.

Note that Nantis typically identified individuals based on the village or settlement they lived in, so this unit of analysis is useful both emically and etically. Note also that the village of Montetoni has existed in four distinct geographical spots since the early 1990s; Nantis have constructed and re-constructed their huts together four times within a space of about 5 kilometers, and have called it Montetoni each time.

The community refers to the social commitment of the residents of the village of Montetoni to one another as an enduring social unit. It is based on the spatial unit of the village, and co-extensive with it in one sense, but it was distinct from the village in that it was a unit actively, not passively, constituted through the collaborative and mutually-oriented activities of the residents of the

village of Montetoni. Note that Nantis in Montetoni explicitly recognized this social commitment — principally as a result of their relatively recent and yet intensive contact experiences with non-Nantis; see Chapter 2 for further discussion — and used the term *komoniraro*, borrowed from the Spanish term *comunidad*, to refer to this social unit.

A residence group is a physically clustered subset of huts in Montetoni that were tightly socially linked by frequent social interactions. Although this spatial unit was highly salient in the organization of everyday doings in Montetoni, this unit was not lexically identified in Nanti; thus, it is an etic unit. There were seven residence groups in Montetoni; note, however, that in each iteration of Montetoni each residence group has been organized slightly differently, based on shifting relationships — the formation of new couples, in particular.

A household is the group of people who worked, ate, and rested in a particular *kosena*, or cooking hut. Most, but not all, *kosenas* had one or more *magan-tariras*, or sleeping huts, associated with them, in which a couple and their children slept. Again, although the social unit of the household was highly salient in the organization of everyday doings in Montetoni, there was no lexical equivalent in Nanti.

A couple is a reproductive pair of individuals. In addition to having and raising children together, the couple was defined by sharing a set of related responsibilities having to do with procuring and preparing food and other necessary material artifacts. Nantis used the term *nokoriti* ‘my.spouse’ to indicate one’s partner in a couple relationship. Note that many men in Montetoni were members of two couples; see Chapter 2 for further discussion.

An individual is a biological human being. I assume axiomatically that every human being has a mind, memory, volition, goals, and emotions; participates in social and interactional relations; and, as a speaker of a language, is master

of a unique, complex set of sign relations. Nantis used the term *matsigenka* ‘human.being’ or ‘moral.being’ to refer to individuals; the relevant contrast between human/non-human and moral/amoral was provided by discourse context; see Chapter 2 for further discussion.

4.5.6.2 Types of social situations

An activity frame, in this study, is culturally-defined, recurring, goal-directed human activity. I presuppose that least one activity frame is always active wherever one living individual is found (even if the activity frame is ‘sleeping’ or ‘dying’); and that more than one activity frame may be active at once (for example, ‘cooking’ while ‘conversing’ and ‘breastfeeding’). Talking about activity frames is a way to talk about whatever it is that people are doing, describable in etic and/or emic terms, at a specific (chronological) time in a specific (physical) place.

An interactional frame is a kind of social situation constituted and sustained by the joint attention of its participants to their ongoing interaction; a given type of interactional frame, such as a hunting story, is constituted and sustained by the nature of the turn-by-turn interactional moves of its participants. I presuppose that least one interactional frame is active whenever co-present people are interacting. Interactional frames are describable in emic and/or etic terms. An interactional frame is always either co-extensive with or nesting within an activity frame; an interactional frame entails an activity frame, but not the reverse.

An interpretive frame is a set of conventions shared among participants for assigning meaning to particular kinds of verbal interaction. I presuppose that least one interpretive frame is active whenever co-present people are interacting; and that any active interpretive frame is produced, sustained, modified, and/or broken on a turn-by-turn basis, as a result of interaction among participants. I also presuppose that multiple interpretive frames are often active as participants collaborate to build

intersubjective understanding of one another; and that it possible for interactants to be operating at times from distinct interpretive frames, which leads to (and explains) miscommunications and misunderstandings.

A participant framework consists of the set of co-present individuals in a particular interaction, plus their point-to-point relations of history, blood relations, and prominence. I presuppose that any participant in — as well as any observer of — a particular interaction will only ever have partial access to the point-to-point relations that are immediately relevant for all participants; to some degree, however, the relevance of some of these point-to-point relations will be apparent to participants in, as well as observers of, any given interaction.

A move is any goal-oriented action on the part of an individual. A move is undertaken in order to affect the physical or social world in some way, in accord with the desires, intentions, or perceptions of the individual making the move. Any move is, by definition, one in an infinite series of moves, all of which are anchored in an intersubjective world of interacting actors. In more specific terms, in this study, moves are made in both activity frames and interactional frames, and the degree of communicative force of any particular move is entirely locally determined. Some moves may have, in principle, little or no communicative force as such, or may have exclusively communicative force. The conceptualization of goal-oriented action as a ‘move’ in a series of moves is principally rooted in the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein (Wittgenstein, 1953, 1958) and his intellectual heirs; and of Erving Goffman (Goffman, 1959, 1961, 1963, 1971, 1981a, 1982, 1974) and his intellectual heirs.

In this study, I am specifically interested in moves that are intended to have interpersonal communicative force. I will call these moves **interactional moves** following Goffman; he defines an interactional move as a “full stretch of talk or of its substitutes which has a distinctive unitary bearing on some set or other of the

circumstances in which participants find themselves” (Goffman, 1981a, p. 24). On analogy with notion of a ‘move’ in a game, an interactional move is an intentional contribution of some sort to an unfolding communicative situation that is recognized as an intentional contribution by co-participants.

4.5.7 The system of interactional relations

The terms I use to talk about the system of interactional relations in this study are deeply rooted in the theories and methods of Conversation Analysis, which I discuss in detail in Chapter 3.

The discursive ecology, in this study, is the set of communicative practices used by members of the speech community based in Montetoni during the period of this study. The members of the set of communicative practices share some but not all properties, some but not all history, and some but not all functions. The discursive ecology is a durable system of durable types of verbal interaction that can be seen as ‘durable’ because of shared history, shared resources, and shared expectations among users, together with the fact that both its systematicity and its component elements consistently recurred over the entire period of the study.

From a broader theoretical perspective, a *discursive ecology* is an emergent level of organization in communicative behavior that results from the dependent relationships across time and space among a set of communicative practices. From the analyst’s perspective, a discursive ecology is a dynamic system of distinct communicative practices whose organization is manifest in the observable patterns of continuity and contrast across individual utterances and interactions. More concretely, from a user’s perspective, this is the set of categories we use every day to figure out what *kind* of message someone is sending us.

The Nanti language is the set of formal structures that pertain to the durable sign system used in verbal interaction by Nantis. It is the communicative

sound system identified by ethnic Nantis as *nonijira* ‘I.speak.NOMINALIZER’.

The speech community is the set of people who were co-present in, and spoke Nanti in, Montetoni at any given moment in time. In this sense, the speech community is a dynamic, not static, entity that is constituted through the interactivity of a specific group of people; at the same time, the speech community is interdependent with the village and community as described above, since co-presence is based on durable spatial and temporal structures.

Naturally occurring discourse is any verbal interaction in Montetoni between two or more individuals that was taken by one or more participants as an interpretable interactional move. Such discourse is conceived of as ‘naturally occurring’ in as much as it was (a) meaning-bearing verbal sound that was (a) intentional or goal-directed in terms of its social function; and (b) spontaneous or extemporaneous in terms of its communicative function.

Communicative practices are the shared, conventionalized uses of the Nanti language described above.

A verbal interaction is an instance of mutually-oriented, jointly attended verbal activity among two or more individual speakers. It may be lengthy and composed of multiple sequences and turns involving multiple participants; or it may consist of a single utterance by a single individual, as long as it receives a response or uptake of some kind (verbal or not) by its addressee.

An adjacency pair or chain is a type of sequence in which the related turns are thematically, structurally, formally, and/or conventionally dependent upon one another. The prototypical example is a question/answer pair, in which ellipsis in the answer is interpretable based on its dependence upon the question; see Goffman (1981b).

A next position is a type of potential non-first element in a sequence, which is projected from, but not dependent upon, the first element, based on thematic,

structural, formal, and/or conventional properties of the first element. Next position elements are similar to but less conventionalized than non-first elements of adjacency pairs or chains; a prototypical example is the utterance ‘mmhmm’ which “projects (but does not require) the continuation of another speaker’s talk” (Goodwin and Heritage, 1990, p. 288).

A response or uptake is the non-first element in a sequence; that is, it is a turn that is (a) structurally recognizable and (b) locally interpretable as contingent upon the previous turn.

A sequence is a chronological series of turns within an interaction that are related to one another topically, thematically, and/or formally.

A turn is the basic unit in sequential interaction during which a particular speaker is the focus of joint attention; typically the turn constitutes one strip of talk in a chronologically-ordered sequence of strips of talk that alternate among participants; therefore, one turn may be made up of one or several utterances.

Note that as a type of analytical unit used in this study, a turn is constituted by its place in an interactional sequence, and as such has no existence outside of that sequence. This is a fundamental and important difference between the units ‘turn’ and ‘utterance’: the latter unit is that part of a turn that can be extracted from the sequence for certain analytical purposes. Within this framework, then, silence *can* constitute a turn but *can not* constitute an utterance.

4.5.8 The system of grammatical relations

In this study, **the Nanti language** (as also stated in §4.5.7) is the set of formal structures that pertain to the durable sign system used in verbal interaction by Nantis. It is the communicative sound system identified by ethnic Nantis as *nonijira* ‘I.speak.NOMINALIZER’.

The following grammatical units are relevant to the analysis of the sound

patterns of Nanti ways of speaking in spoken utterances.

A clause is a syntactically independent grammatical unit that minimally consists of a subject and a predicate including one verb. (A sentence is a grammatical unit containing one or more clauses.)

A phrase is a single syntactic unit composed of one or more words that form a subcomponent of a clause.

A word is a single syntactic unit composed of one or more morphemes that communicates a complete, comprehensible meaning of some sort.

A foot is a metrical unit of two syllables, formed starting at the left edge of a word.

A syllable is a unit of sound formed by a vowel or diphthong, with or without a preceding or following consonant.

A mora is a minimal unit of metrical time, equivalent in Nanti to a short vowel.

A phoneme is the smallest linguistic unit capable of conveying a distinction in meaning.

A feature is the minimal unit of phonological structure; a minimally contrastive phonetic or sound property of linguistic forms. Note that, in this study, a ‘feature’ is distinct from a ‘characteristic’, as discussed in the next section.

4.5.9 The system of sound/experience relations

The system of sound/experience relations that I include here is the most innovative one that I used in this study. This is the system that addresses the systematicity of the sound patterns deployed in communicative practice, beyond the patterns deployed within the system of grammatical relations. The central unit of analysis of this study, the **utterance**, is, in a narrow sense, defined in terms of this system of relations. The terms and relations of this system are described next.

A characteristic, for the purposes of this study, is a type of sound property of an utterance. A characteristic is an analytically isolable property of the sound form of an utterance whose presence is locally salient and signifying. A characteristic is like a feature, defined above, in that it is a phonetic or sound property of linguistic forms, but unlike a feature in that the gradient realization of a characteristic is itself significant, while the significance of a feature is based simply on its presence or absence. In addition, characteristics combine at the level of the utterance, not at the level of the segment, and are not contrastive within the system of sign relations of a language, but rather within the systems of interactional and social relations.

The characteristic **duration**, in this study, is the amount of measurable time that corresponds to a specific unit of speech. All units of speech, no matter what size, have duration, and I have taken duration as a ‘mandatory’ domain for this description of ways of speaking. Duration varies greatly, depending on the token measured; we can measure the duration of vowels, syllables, pauses, silences, words, utterances, overlaps, harangues, etc. In this study, I measure duration in seconds, tenths of seconds, or hundredths of seconds, depending on the data token.

We can speak of the duration of an utterance in terms of ‘speaker’s rate of speaking’ and quantify it in terms of absolute duration, in seconds; or in terms of relative duration — whether a strip of talk is faster or slower than a previous strip.

The characteristic **rhythm**, in this study, is the relative distribution of time within a specific superordinate unit of time. Perceptually, rhythm is the contrasts among lengthenings and shortenings of segments, syllables, and pauses relative to the unfolding sound stream of the utterance. While duration maps on to single temporal axis, rhythm is the result of the mappings between two temporal axes.

A timing frame, in this study, is one layer of an utterance, defined by (a) the duration (chronological timing) plus (b) the rhythm (relative timing) of an intonation unit (see below).

A voice quality, in this study, is any type of phonation used in the production of speech sounds. Different voice qualities are produced by changes to the airstream as it passes through the larynx. Voice quality is a characteristic of all human speech, but only certain voice qualities are salient in any given language (in terms of phonological relations) or speech community (in terms of utterance-level sound patterns). Voice qualities relevant to the description of Nanti ways of speaking include modal voice, creaky voice, and breathy voice.

Pitch in this study, is the perceptual correlate of the frequency of a sound wave produced in human speech. (Cruttenden, 1997, p. 4) points out that although pitch is “a perceptual term” — unlike fundamental frequency, which “involves acoustic measurement measured in Hz” — it is also true that “fundamental frequency values in speech are all relatively low (i.e. usually less than 500 Hz) and for most practical purposes pitch can be equated with fundamental frequency” (*ibid.*). According to Cruttenden, “[f]undamental frequency among male speakers varies between 60Hz and 240Hz and among female speakers between 180 Hz and 400 Hz. The average fundamental frequency for men is approximately 120 Hz, for women 220 Hz, and for children 265 Hz.” (Cruttenden, 1997, p. 3)

A pitch range, in this study, is an individual speaker’s continuous, contiguous set of vocal pitches with a definite upper and lower bound. In this study, I speak of both a speaker’s total pitch range and the pitch range of a particular way of speaking or of a particular token of data.

At the broadest level, every individual has a maximum and minimum vocal pitch that he or she is physically capable of producing. More narrowly, every individual has a maximum and minimum vocal pitch that he or she comfortably uses when speaking; it is this latter, more narrow, range I mean to indicate with the term ‘speaker’s total pitch range.’ Even more narrowly, every individual can be said to have habitual pitch, described next.

Habitual pitch, in this study, is “a single pitch or narrow range of pitches that the individual uses most of the time” (Coleman and Markham, 1991, p. 173). This relatively narrow pitch range is an artifact of the unique physiology of each individual speaker; at the same time, it is defined by frequency of use, not by the capacity of of the speaker’s physiology. This means, therefore, that the use of a broader pitch range than is habitual for a speaker is always a potentially meaningful modification. For example, Nanti individuals use their habitual pitch most continuously and consistently in matter-of-fact talk. In other ways of speaking, however, different spans of the speaker’s total pitch range are regularly deployed.

An intonation contour, in this study, is perceived pitch change over time; that is, an intonation contour is the perceived risings and fallings of voice pitch across a strip of talk. It is specifically the pattern of pitch over and above the realization of the language’s phonology and metrics, including its lexical tones/pitches if there are any. Intonation contours are, by definition, non-segmental phenomena with a single temporal axis. I take it as axiomatic that all utterances have a perceivable intonation contour. The intonation contour, in this study, is co-extensive with the intonation unit.

An intonation unit, in this study, is a unit of speech constituted by the co-extension of a single intonation contour and a timing frame (described above). An intonation unit may be co-extensive with a single utterance, or a with a syntactic sub-unit of that utterance, such as a clause, phrase, or word.

A breath group, in this study, is a subsegment of an utterance, segmented by the physical respiration of the speaker. Breath groups are implicated in the sequencing of talk and the demarcation of utterances, but are physical (acoustic) entities, not socio-interactional entities.

4.5.10 Units of representation

In order to transform my data into a set of accessible forms for this study, I have used the following units of representation.

A transcript is a physical artifact that represents, in writing, certain elements of a strip of talk.

A line is a type of representational subsegment of a strip of talk, in which the strip of talk is segmented according to grammatical structure and breath group (defined above). In a transcript, a line may correspond representationally to a move, a turn, an utterance, or a part of a turn or utterance.

A Praat picture is an image that combines a short transcript with a visual representation of the duration, rhythm, and intonation contour of the intonation unit(s) that map(s) onto the transcript.

A recording — either audio or video — is an archivable physical object that can be segmented into clips.

A clip is a listenable physical entity that conveys a strip of interaction. A clip is always either nested within or co-extensive with ‘a recording’.

4.6 Presenting tokens and their analysis for this document

I have presented examples of naturally occurring discourse data in four ways in this document: as embedded audio files; via ‘thick description’; via transcripts; and via visual representations of the sound signal, including pictures and line drawings. Each of these types of representation has particular unique affordances, and the four work together well to create a multi-faceted representation of strips of data.

The embedded audio files present the actual sound form of the utterances that I analyze here. The thick descriptions represent these utterances as ‘moves’ in

a system of social relations. The transcripts represent the utterances as ‘turns’ in a system of interactional relations, as well as ‘sentences’ and other types of grammatical forms in a system of sign relations. The visual representations draw out specific characteristics of specific utterances and represent ways in which different facets of a specific utterance interface with one another. Each of these types of representation is discussed below.

4.6.1 Embedded audio files

The audio files included in this document have primacy over all the other types of representation for two reasons. First, they are the most faithful representation of the original phenomenon, and therefore give the reader/listener the most direct access to the sound phenomena that I have described here. Second, all the other types of representation are based upon, or derived from, the strip of recorded interaction, so the audio files provide an anchor for the other representations.

All of the strips of data presented as embedded audio files were gathered via the audio recording strategies that I described above in §4.4.1. Some of them were captured on MiniDisc and some on HiMD discs; although all are digital recordings, none are uncompressed files. Furthermore, although the Minidisc and Hi-MD recordings themselves are digital, transferring them to a computer as digital files from the Sony MD and Hi-MD recorders that I owned required the use of specific Sony software called SonicStage that, in turn, is specific to Microsoft Windows. I, however, am a Macintosh computer user. This meant that there was no direct way to transfer my minidisc recordings to my computer as digital files, so instead I transferred the strips of data to my Mac via an analog connection. Procedurally, I connected the minidisc recorder from its headphone jack to the microphone jack of my Mac computer using a stereo patch cable, and then recorded the input sound signal using either WaveSurfer, Audacity, or Praat, all of which are free digital audio

applications for Mac OSX. Experts say that a procedure such as this one deteriorates the quality of the audio signal. No difference in signal quality was audible to my ear, but it is possible that Praat could have executed better analyses with the original digital recordings.

Because of the complexity of the sound signal in some of the examples that I chose to analyze, in some cases I amplified the signal using either WaveSurfer or Audacity. Amplification is the only way I manipulated the recordings embedded in this document.

I was able to embed the audio files into the text of this document by using L^AT_EX. L^AT_EX is a powerful typesetting program that produces elegant, uniformly-formatted PDF documents that may include such features as embedded and attached files; for more information, begin with http://www.ctan.org/what_is_tex.html and associated content. A L^AT_EX template that meets all of the requirements set by the Graduate School is available at www.utexas.edu/ogs/etd/LaTeX. The audio files are also available online at www.cabeceras.org/beier2010/.

4.6.2 Visual representations of the sound signal

In order to isolate and focus attention on specific characteristics of the data examples in this study, in many cases I have provided visual representations of the sound signal of the token in question, which I call ‘Praat pictures’. These visual representations all include an image of the waveform and a word-level or syllable-level segmentation that I produced using the free software program Praat. In addition, I have added timing information and a drawing of the intonation contour of the utterance to some of the Praat pictures.

In order to describe both the relative timing and the ‘absolute’, or chronological, timing of the data tokens, I used Praat to segment the sound signal into words, syllables, and/or segments that I could then measure in seconds. When possible, I

used the spectrograms generated by Praat to identify and mark changes in speakers' voice quality. Unfortunately, this is one of the domains in which the complexity of the soundscape co-present with naturally occurring discourse was a great obstacle to my analysis, and in most cases, the spectrograms represented a complex signal, only part of which is the voice of the speaker that I wanted to analyze. As a result, most of my descriptions of speaker's voice quality is based on my perception of the sound signal combined with my familiarity with the speaker's voice in other tokens.

In some cases, the Praat image I have provided includes the spectrogram, and/or the pitch and/or intensity analysis generated by Praat. In most cases, however, the quality of the sound recording is too complex for Praat to generate a useful analysis of pitch and/or intensity, due to the co-occurring or 'background' noise that is always present in my naturally occurring discourse data recordings. From wind to rain to chickens to rushing rivers to children's play to parallel conversations, there are essentially always more sounds in my recordings than the specific utterance that I am subjecting to analysis. In some cases, those sounds do not confound Praat's analysis, but unfortunately, in most cases they do, such that the pitch and/or intensity analyses reflect a combination of all of the sounds on the recording, not just the sound of the utterance under examination.

Therefore, in order to represent intonation contours for many of data examples in this study, I have created drawings of the contour based on my own perception of the pitch plus intensity of the utterance. I did this by comparing very small segments of sound of the utterance to one another, in order to determine relative pitch and relative intensity, and then creating a representation of the intonation contour using ZeusDraw, a proprietary graphic editor and vector drawing application for Mac OSX.

In order to include color PDFs of the analyses generated via Praat in this document, it was necessary to make screen shots of a selection of the analysis window

generated by Praat, using the Mac OSX application Grab. Grab produces TIFF files, which I then converted to PDF using the Mac OSX application Preview. I scaled and sized these PDFs using ZeusDraw before inserting them into the L^AT_EX file as figures.

4.6.3 Thick description

I argue in this study that the significance of utterances as interactional moves emerges from real-time interpersonal interactions. In order to support this claim, I have provided ethnographic descriptions of the situations of origin of my data examples. The purpose of these descriptions is to demonstrate how the particular utterances that I analyze fit into a matrix of surrounding or co-occurring physical, interactional, cultural, and social phenomena, thereby demonstrating how they may be understood as ‘turns’ in a system of interactional relations and as ‘moves’ in a system of social relations.

The notion of ‘thick description’ (Geertz, 1973) is a useful way to characterize the basic task of ethnography — and the ethnography of speaking in particular — as I have undertaken it in this study. Creating a thick description focuses and specifies the ethnographer’s work by prioritizing close attention to particular, concrete instances of human behavior and language use, and working outward from those particular, concrete instances toward a broad but coherent presentation of a range of factors (substantial as well as conceptual) that contribute to the significance that emerges from specific interpersonal interactions.

Aiming to produce thick descriptions of concrete instances of language use alleviates to some degree the potentially overwhelming task of adequately describing ‘sociocultural context’, because it provides a solid framework for assessing the relative relevance and salience of specific aspects of a given sociocultural context. Focusing on a specific token of talk as the point of origin for a thick description

provides structure and systematicity to both the ethnographic and analytical goals of this study.

4.6.4 Transcripts

Transcripts of utterances, like thick description, are intended to demonstrate how the particular utterances that I analyze fit into a matrix of surrounding phenomena, but the focus is much more narrow. Transcripts primarily demonstrate how utterances may be understood as ‘turns’ in a system of interactional relations, and as ‘sentences’ and other grammatical elements in a system of sign relations.

Depending on the length of the example, I have provided either a two-line transcript, which presents the original utterance in Nanti and an English gloss; or a four-line transcript, which presents the original utterance in Nanti, morpheme breakdowns, morpheme-level glosses, and an English gloss. Transcription conventions are provided at the end of Chapter 1.

In my view, transcripts form a cornerstone in building intersubjectivity with others about my analyses of Nanti interactional behavior. In this study, the explicit purpose of the transcripts I have provided is to draw attention to specific characteristics and patterns that are present within chosen segments or strips of recorded naturally occurring discourse. That is to say, my transcripts are necessarily ‘partial’, in the way discussed below.

4.6.5 Issues that frame these representational strategies

In analyzing the discursive practices “used by members of a profession to shape events in the domains subject to their professional scrutiny” (Goodwin, 1994, p. 606), Charles Goodwin reflects on his own professional practice and articulates the role that analytical representations can play in fostering intersubjectivity among researchers:

Graphic representations, including transcripts of talk, diagrams, and frame grabs of scenes recorded on videotape, are annotated and highlighted in order to make salient specific events within them. Such highlighting guides the reader to see within a complex perceptual field just those events that I find relevant to the points I am developing. (Goodwin, 1994, p. 607)

Goodwin's statement here captures what can be considered both the greatest strength and the greatest weakness of 'graphic representations': their selectivity. On the one hand, representational selectivity guides the reader's perception of relative salience. On the other hand, however, selectivity backgrounds and/or completely obscures many other potentially salient facets of the event under analysis. In this section, I wish to comment on my position regarding the selectivity of graphic representations.

Many other social scientists besides Goodwin have explicitly addressed the inherently positioned nature of graphic representations, and of transcripts in particular, and the range of implications of this positionality. The evaluative stances these scholars take regarding this issue vary widely, ranging from calling into question the validity of the basic notion of scientific study of human behavior, to exhorting practitioners to transcribe with greater theoretical and political responsibility and methodological rigor. In my view, the middle path is to first explicitly acknowledge and characterize the inherently positioned nature of one's transcripts, and thereafter make use of their selectivity and positionality as an analytical tool, rather than view this selectivity and positionality as obstacles to analytical precision.

Ochs (1979) was among the first linguistic anthropologists to articulate the perspective of 'transcription as theory' observing that "[w]hat is on a transcript will influence and constrain what generalizations emerge" (Ochs, 1979, p. 45). After making this observation, she goes on to propose novel ways in which the activity

of transcription can be pursued and improved as a result of this perspective. Ochs argues persuasively for creating highly detailed, selective transcripts whose design is motivated by the researcher's theoretical and analytical interests but is not blind to the influences and constraints imposed by that very selectivity.

Just as the transcript is inherently theoretical, Bucholtz (2000) draws our attention to its inherently political nature, pointing out the interpersonal, social, and even legal consequences in the transcription decisions that researchers make, and cautioning the researcher to be highly cognizant of the political ramifications of transcription decisions. When taken together with Ochs' insight regarding the utility of selectivity in creating transcripts, the researcher can then make transcription decisions that are sensitive and responsive to political issues — including, for example, the decision not to transcribe sensitive material at all (a decision I have made, as discussed in §4.4.2).

In discussing the transcript as both an inherently theoretical and an inherently political artifact of research, it is worth mentioning that I (and many other researchers) likewise consider the video and audio data we gather to be inherently theoretical and political for similar reasons. That is, who, where, and when I gather data is the result of circumstances, choices, and decisions made by situated individuals, including but not limited to me as researcher. At the most obvious level, for example, the data I gather is oriented toward answering particular questions about Nanti interactional behavior and not oriented toward answering other (equally valid) questions. In addition, which Nanti individuals agree (or refuse) to be recorded at any particular moment is the result of complex circumstances and decisions to which I may not even have access.

The goal I pursued in this study was to gather, select, transcribe, and analyze data on Nanti interactions while remaining cognizant of the situatedness and positionality of that body of data, in order to make sure that my representations

are as faithful as possible to the both theoretical and political issues it touches on. The step of evaluating my transcripts and other analyses as though a Nanti person — in particular, one who is represented there in the writing — is reading over my shoulder has provided an excellent guide for my representational decisions.¹⁸

Given the inherent selectivity of representational strategies — which entails that a single representation of an utterance or a strip of interaction will only ever address certain, but not all, of the researcher’s analytical goals — it makes sense to me that several different types of representation of a single utterance or interaction can be used effectively in order to address different phenomena found in the data. Multiple representations of a single strip of data have interactive affordances when used together or ‘layered’ sequentially while building an argument, as Charles Goodwin’s work effectively demonstrates (Goodwin, 1993, 1994).

In sum, it has been my goal for this study to take advantage of the affordances and strengths of a variety of descriptive and analytical tools that are available to me at this point in time, while taking account of their weaknesses and shortcomings, in order to present a particular set of perspectives on a particular set of data that was gathered during a particular historical period, under particular social and political conditions. It is my hope that the various elements of this study will be perceived, interpreted, and evaluated as they were intended: as mutually-informing parts of an integrated, but highly situated, single project.

¹⁸In a similar spirit, Feld set an admirable example for other ethnographers in his decision to discuss, reevaluate, and critique his book *Sound and Sentiment* (Feld, 1990) with Kalulis after its publication, an experience that he discusses at length in a post-script to the second edition of that same book, published in 1990.

Chapter 5

Matter-of-fact talk

5.1 Introduction

During the period of this study, *matter-of-fact talk* was the most widely appropriate¹ and most frequently used way of speaking in Montetoni. Matter-of-fact talk was used in every type of activity frame and in most types of interactional frame that I observed; it was used as a turn or turn sequence in all types of ongoing interactions between all types of participants; and it was used for initiating interactions, sustaining them, and closing them. As a result, both the sound patterns and the patterns of use of matter-of-fact talk were, to my ears, a significant part of the palpable substance of everyday social life in Montetoni.

Like all the labels I have chosen for Nanti ways of speaking, the label *matter-of-fact talk* is meant to be descriptive of the phenomenon I observed. That is to say, matter-of-fact talk was the way that Nantis typically spoke when they were talking about something as though it were intersubjectively available in the world, when statements were framed as facts, and when they were framing the content of an

¹By appropriate, I mean “not violating participants’ active expectations based on the already-active definition of the situation at hand”; see Chapter 3 for further discussion.



Figure 5.1: Collaborative activities were typically coordinated through the use of matter-of-fact talk, as on the occasion shown here of preparing the fish poison *kogi* (barbasco, *Lonchocarpus urucu*) for collaborative fishing.

utterance as ‘true’ and ‘verifiable’. I propose that Nantis used matter-of-fact talk when matters of subjectivity, evaluation, and orientation were trumped by the goal of establishing, maintaining, or maximizing co-participant intersubjectivity. Thus, among the set of Nanti ways of speaking, matter-of-fact talk is the one that is the most purely ‘propositional’ in nature, from the perspective of logic and formal semantics. In more practical terms, matter-of-fact talk was typically used as an interactional move to establish or increase mutual orientation and/or joint attention to a specified topic of talk in interaction among co-participants, and/or to increase the quality and quantity of their shared knowledge. I will expand on and substantiate all these assertions in the development of this chapter.

The presence of matter-of-fact talk was pervasive in Nanti interactions. This particular way of speaking was not dependent on any particular activity frame or interactional frame, but rather seemed to be appropriate to all of them. More specifically, matter-of-fact talk did not require that any other type of activity frame or interactional frame already be active for a turn of matter-of-fact talk to be an appropriate interactional move.² Moreover, the interpretive frame established by matter-of-fact talk was not sustained situationally or circumstantially, but rather was sustained on a turn-by-turn basis, as interactants used this way of speaking — or not — in their unfolding moves. Thus, while it was the most widespread way of speaking in terms of frequency of use, it was also among the most limited in scope, establishing only minimal expectations for either the content or the form of subsequent turns at talk of either the speaker or hearer(s).

Among the set of Nanti ways of speaking that I have documented, matter-of-fact talk has the least formally³ elaborated set of sound properties. This characterization sets matter-of-fact talk apart from the others in several ways. First, matter-of-fact talk is the way of speaking upon which our basic description of Nanti phonemic, phonetic, and prosodic phenomena is based, giving it a powerful analytical primacy. Second, matter-of-fact talk is the way of speaking that holds the most sound characteristics in common with all the other ways of speaking, giving it a useful contrastivity in relation to the rest of the set of ways of speaking. And finally, its status as ‘least formally elaborated’ in relation to all other ways of speaking raises important questions regarding the relation of its conventionalized interpretive frame to other types of interpretive frames that are activated by other ways of speaking.

²This contrasts, for example, with the dependence of *karintaa* poetry upon the prior establishment of the activity frame of feasting, and the interactional frame of group chanting, for it to be an interactionally appropriate move; or with the dependence of women’s visiting talk on the prior establishment of a particular participant framework within the activity frame of visiting for it to be an interactionally appropriate move.

³By ‘formal’ I mean ‘having to do with form’ in contradistinction to ‘content’, ‘substance’, or ‘meaning’. This distinction is explored in greater detail in Chapter 3.

A summary of the key characteristics of matter-of-fact talk is presented in Table 5.1.

Note that the generalizations made in this study about matter-of-fact talk, or about any other Nanti way of speaking, in terms of the relation between their sound characteristics and their conventionalized interpretations, are by no means intended to discount the co-present elements of individual creativity, spontaneity, memory, etc., or the inherent issues of ambiguity and context-dependence in interpersonal verbal communication.⁴ Rather, this discussion is meant to identify recurring patterns in Nanti language-in-use, patterns which individuals who are engaged in interpersonal verbal communication have available to them for narrowing down the range of possibilities for interpretation and sense-making during real-time, face-to-face interactions. At the same time, however, in my view, the issue of identifying local means for ‘the organization of diversity’ is perhaps most salient in domains where interactants are overtly seeking to build intersubjective understandings with one another, as I claim was the case in Nanti matter-of-fact talk.

In the next section, I discuss important aspects of the use and interpretation of matter-of-fact talk, especially in relation to other Nanti ways of speaking, as well as in relation to similar phenomena discussed in other social, cultural and/or interactional settings. Then, in §5.3, I discuss the social and interactional facets of matter-of-fact talk as I observed them in Montetoni. Next, in §5.4, I describe and discuss the specific characteristics of the sound patterns of matter-of-fact talk. Finally, in §5.5, I provide a set of detailed examples of matter-of-fact talk in use, in order to give life to the generalizations made in this chapter.

⁴This important issue is treated in greater detail in Chapter 3.

Table 5.1: Characteristics of Nanti matter-of-fact talk

Appropriate activity frames	All that I observed	§5.3.2
Preferred activity frames	Multi-participant collaborative activities	§5.3.2
Appropriate interactional frames	All that I observed	§5.3.3
Preferred interactional frames	Closing and opening interactions; establishment, maintenance, or increase of mutual orientation and/or joint attention; information exchange	§5.3.3
Appropriate participant frameworks	All that I observed; also most common way of speaking used with non-Nanti interactants	§5.3.1
Voice volume	Calibrated to addressee(s) plus environmental factors	§5.4.5
Pitch range	mid to low range of speaker's total range; speaker's habitual pitch range	§5.4.8
Intonation contour	Overall downdrift across utterance, permits cyclical repetition of contour	§5.4.9
+ contour cyclicity	Intonation contour cycles over syntactic constituents, most often the unit of verb-plus-arguments	§5.4.2
Rate of speaking	Speaker's discretion	§5.4.6
Rhythm and relative timing	Speaker's discretion but calibrated to metrical stress of language; exhibits substantial clipping	§5.4.7
Voice qualities	Modal voice	§5.4.4

5.2 Matter-of-fact talk in relation to other Nanti ways of speaking

Among the Nanti ways of speaking that I have documented, matter-of-fact talk contrasts with all other ways of speaking in as much as it frames utterances as being ‘about’ some state of affairs in the shared intersubjective world, and specifically *not about* the speaker’s orientation toward either the utterance itself, its referential content, or the surrounding situation.⁵ From this perspective, then, matter-of-fact talk conveys a kind of relative orientational neutrality that affords its use as a point of comparison with other ways of speaking. There are some very important limitations to that perspective, however, which are discussed in §5.2.3.

Because matter-of-fact talk utterances frame their content as intersubjectively available and ‘true’, this way of speaking was very frequently used for initiating a basic interactional frame between co-present individuals and for initiating interaction sequences. Consequently, matter-of-fact talk often preceded the use of other ways of speaking in sustained interactions. Speakers often used matter-of-fact talk, for example, to establish joint attention to a topic, before using hunting talk or women’s visiting talk to develop an interactional exchange regarding that topic. Such strategies are discussed in greater detail in subsequent sections.⁶

Importantly, matter-of-fact talk also contrasts with all other Nanti ways of speaking in as much as it is the way of speaking upon which our basic description of basic Nanti phonemic, phonetic, and prosodic phenomena is based. Saying that matter-of-fact talk corresponds to the privileged ‘citation form’ in descriptive linguistics, however, is not to assign it a privileged status in terms of interpretive saliency. As I discuss next in §5.2.1 and §5.2.2, a close study of ways of speaking as

⁵To be exceedingly clear, I am not claiming that the speaker has no orientation, but rather that, with matter-of-fact talk, the speaker is not asserting or emphasizing an orientation; see §5.2.3 for further discussion.

⁶An overview of other Nanti ways of speaking is provided in Chapter 2.

part of a coherent system of language use has led me to examine and disassemble certain basic and widespread assumptions that lump together aspects of sound form with interactional function.

5.2.1 Matter-of-fact talk and the notion of everyday conversation

The terms ‘conversation’ (Duranti, 1997; Levinson, 1983, for example), ‘ordinary conversation’ (Goodwin and Heritage, 1990, for example) ‘everyday conversation’, (Nofsinger, 1999, for example), and ‘everyday speech’ (Sherzer, 1983, for example) are often used by laypersons and specialists alike to refer to, as Levinson puts it, “that predominant familiar kind of talk in which two or more participants freely alternate in speaking, which generally occurs outside specific institutional settings” (Levinson, 1983, p. 284). As I see it, these and related terms are meant to capture a generalization about certain forms of interaction that seem to be not only experientially ubiquitous to users of language but also apparently cross-culturally universal.

At first glance, then, it might seem that what I am calling matter-of-fact talk is really nothing more than ‘everyday conversation’ done the Nanti way. There are, however, fundamental conceptual problems in equating Nanti matter-of-fact talk with an unexamined notion of ‘everyday conversation’.

The notion of ‘conversation’ in the aforementioned literature is mostly fruitfully used in the structural analysis of face-to-face interaction, in which the stream of talk in interaction is examined in order to identify its constituent units and their organization. The close study of ‘conversation’ in the traditions of ethnomethodology, interactional sociology, and conversation analysis has revealed the extraordinary complexity of face-to-face interactions, and has resulted in an entire specialized vocabulary of analytical terms for describing talk — including concepts that are central to the present study, such as utterance, turn, uptake, adjacency pair, etc. (discussed

in detail in Chapter 4; also see Goodwin and Heritage (1990) for a thought-provoking discussion of conversation analysis).

Crucially, however, if it is true that matter-of-fact talk exhibits many of the very elements of ‘local structural organization’ that characterize ‘conversation’ as just described, it is equally true that other, distinct Nanti ways of speaking exhibit these same elements and yet have (I argue) very different properties at the level of sound patterning.⁷

The problem, then, is that to equate Nanti matter-of-fact talk with ‘everyday conversation’ conflates a specific way of speaking, describable in terms of sound characteristics, with what is actually a kind of interactional frame — that is to say, a type of interpersonal communicative activity within which diverse ways of speaking may be employed. From a broader perspective, Nantis do, of course, ‘converse every day’, but in these quotidian interactions they deploy matter-of-fact talk, scolding talk, hunting talk, women’s visiting talk, and other ways of speaking on a turn-by-turn basis. The notion of ‘everyday conversation’ does not align with the notion of ‘ways of speaking’ because the former notion collapses into a single category a set of distinct communicative strategies that are used every day in Montetoni.

At the same time, there is a part of the notion of ‘everyday conversation’ that captures one of the important and unique aspects of matter-of-fact talk — namely, that it was the way of speaking that was the most frequently used, the most intersubjectively accessible, the least distributionally restricted, and the most evaluatively neutral. No less, it was the Nanti way of speaking most like a cross-linguistically widespread, if not universal, interactional frame often identified as ‘everyday conversation.’ The notion of ‘everyday conversation’ is useful here, then,

⁷Levinson addresses this problem by distinguishing ‘a conversation’ from ‘conversational activity’, that latter of which he characterizes “in terms of local organization, and especially the operation of the turn-taking system” (Levinson, 1983, p. 318) and which he rightly observes can take place in “many kinds of talk... which are clearly not conversations.” My purpose here is to press this distinction even further.

but it only tells part of the story, so to speak.

5.2.2 Matter-of-fact talk and the notion of linguistic markedness

If, as I claimed above, matter-of-fact talk was in fact the most frequently used, most intersubjectively accessible, least distributionally restricted, and most evaluatively neutral Nanti way of speaking, then can we consider it to be the ‘unmarked’ way of speaking in Montetoni? There are two answers to this question: yes and no. Before elaborating on these two answers, however, it is necessary to specify what I mean by ‘unmarked’ in this discussion, and clarify why this is even an interesting question.

The notion of markedness originated with Roman Jakobson and the Prague School of linguistics, as part of the early conceptualization of the types of relations that hold between phonemes, in which the more basic, ‘unmarked’ member of a pair lacked a feature — such as voicing — that its ‘marked’ counterpart had. Subsequently, the notion of markedness was adopted into linguistics more generally, such that, at present and in general, a ‘marked element’ is understood as one that is literally, overtly ‘marked’ as opposed to ‘not marked’ — as, for example, in the case of the plural form of nouns ‘marked’ with an *-s* in English, as in the form *cats*, which contrasts with the ‘unmarked’ singular form *cat*. As the notion of markedness was adopted into diverse domains of linguistics, however, a number of fundamentally distinct conceptualizations of markedness have emerged. In my view, the most interesting difference among these conceptualizations is whether the absence of an element (or feature or characteristic) is considered to signify *because* of its absence, or if only ‘presence’ signifies.

For the purposes of this discussion, markedness is conceptually useful in characterizing certain distributional phenomena in two domains: (1) language-internally and (2) cross-linguistically. From a language-internal perspective, the notion of markedness allows us to characterize the relative distribution of the characteristics

that constitute Nanti ways of speaking, as well as the relative distribution of the ways of speaking themselves.

We gain a general sense of this notion of markedness from Comrie (1976), who states that: “The intuition behind the notion of markedness in linguistics is that, where we have an opposition between two or more members [of a set]..., it is often the case that one member is felt to be more usual, more normal, less specific than the other” (Comrie, 1986, p. 111) and this “more usual” member is the unmarked member. As strong as such a ‘feeling’ may be, however, it does not afford the student of language an adequate means for characterizing the relative distribution of the members of some subset of a larger body of language data. If what we really want to know is whether one feature or element is more ‘usual’ or *common* in a given domain, then the solution to that distribution problem is to collect a large number of tokens of the domain of interest, and then count the features or elements that actually occur. But counting tokens to characterize frequency of occurrence doesn’t get at the more interesting and subtle issue of the *relationship* between or among the set of elements that can potentially occur in a given single domain. In Comrie’s terms, what counts as ‘more normal’ or ‘less specific’ in a given domain?

Siewierska draws our attention to an important aspect of the *relationship* between marked and unmarked elements within a larger system: “The existence of a typologically marked category, pattern, value, or form is taken to entail the existence of a typologically unmarked category, pattern, value or form, but not vice versa.” (Siewierska, 2004, p. 19). Practically speaking, this relationship of entailment was very helpful in illuminating distributional patterns of sound phenomena across interactional frames in Montetoni. That is to say, applying the notion of markedness to the presence or absence of certain sound characteristics across diverse Nanti ways of speaking is what enabled us to produce generalizations regarding what counts as Nanti phonology, phonetics, and prosody in the first place. Subsequently, it has en-

abled me to talk about the relative distribution of sound characteristics in distinct ways of speaking, as well as the distribution of these characteristics and ways of speaking more generally relative to other social and interactional phenomena.

Within the specific frame of a linguistic analysis of the sound stream, matter-of-fact talk can be considered the ‘unmarked’ way of speaking in Montetoni, in as much as all the component sound characteristics of matter-of-fact talk seem to appear within the interpretive frames established by other Nanti ways of speaking, while every other Nanti way of speaking incorporates some sound characteristics that are not present in matter-of-fact talk and/or not present in any other way of speaking.

We may say, then, that matter-of-fact talk is the least formally elaborated, or formally simplest, Nanti way of speaking, as well as the most widely distributed way of speaking in social situational terms.⁸ But how does this observation about matter-of-fact talk relate to ways of speaking in other speech communities?

In my view, because ways of speaking convey speaker orientation, they can only be compared cross-linguistically in functional terms. Functionally, it seems cross-linguistically universal that every language has a means for ‘making true statements’. Therefore, it is probably universal that every speech community has a *functional* equivalent to matter-of-fact talk, by which I mean a conventionalized sound pattern that expresses a relatively neutral orientation on the part of the speaker toward the content of an utterance.

It also seems to be the case that all languages have a declarative/indicative voice,⁹ which, in the general (unproblematized) case, is taken to have declarative or

⁸Note that this does not equate to a claim about the relative distribution of use of different ways of speaking at the level of the individual speaker.

⁹Every written grammar that I have ever read makes this assumption. And the idea that this ‘voice’ may be universal makes sense both functionally and logically. That said, though, it also makes sense to me that many distinctions among meaningful — that is, meaning-bearing — ways of speaking have simply been overlooked or ‘unheard’ up to this point.

indicative communicative function. In the general case, then, I infer that linguistic form and communicative function co-occur cross-linguistically, to *some* degree, in this domain. ‘Matter-of-fact talk’ is what I call the Nanti’s instantiation of that way of speaking which is probably universal to all humans who use language: it is the declarative voice, the voice of the verifiable fact, and the voice of the linguist’s acceptable sentence. Likewise, it is the way of speaking that is most invisible to both the native speaker and the analyst, the most naturalized, and the most revealing of the speaker’s basic operating assumptions about the lived world.

More broadly, from a cross-linguistic perspective, I take it as axiomatic that every speech community shares a (closed) set of locally-constituted ways of speaking. For the purposes of this study, I presuppose that in every speech community, speakers will have means for framing utterances as ‘about the shared intersubjective world and *not about* the speaker’s individual relation to either the statement itself or the indicated state of affairs.’ I also presuppose that in every speech community, speakers and hearers will have other, differentiable means by which speaker orientation toward the utterance and/or the indicated state of affairs is indicated in talk. In contrast, I presuppose that the *conventions* by which speakers frame utterances as de-individuated, and by which stance is indicated, will be locally defined. That is, I presuppose that the function is universal and static, but the forms are unique and dynamic.

The exact sound characteristics of the local equivalents of matter-of-fact talk in other speech communities must be identified and described in local terms; whether they have anything in common with Nanti matter-of-fact talk is entirely an empirical question, as is the question of their local distribution in social situational terms. Once an adequate description of the local equivalent of matter-of-fact talk is in hand — and which is something most grammars provide a significant portion of — the student of language in use can proceed to identify and describe other ways

of speaking.

I have claimed, then, that in terms of the distribution and elaboration of formal, sound characteristics, matter-of-fact talk is the ‘unmarked’ way of speaking in my data set. There is, however, another very important way in which matter-of-fact talk is *not* ‘unmarked’. This is in considering utterances within the domain of interpersonal orientation and interactional processes of interpretation. I assert that, in that domain, there is no such thing as an ‘unmarked’ way of speaking, because the fundamental function of ways of speaking is to convey the speaker’s orientation to the situation or content of an utterance and, as I will argue in §5.2.3, matter-of-fact talk conveys a ‘neutral orientation’, *not* ‘no orientation’. Even if matter-of-fact talk may be seen as the least informative way of speaking concerning a speaker’s general attitude, evaluation, emotion, and/or orientation; and even if we may assume that the speaker holds an evaluation or individualized orientation toward his or her utterance; nonetheless, I assert that the interpretive frame associated with matter-of-fact talk proffers that the speaker is intentionally selecting an intersubjectively accessible orientation toward the utterance. Note that a speaker’s use of matter-of-fact talk in a given utterance means — perhaps most saliently from the hearer’s perspective — that that speaker has *not* selected another way of speaking. To be explicit, this equates to the assertion on my part that, in this case, absence — ‘unmarkedness’ — is just as cognitively significant, and communicatively signifying, as markedness. I argue that every utterance has ‘speaker orientation’ represented in the signal, even if that orientation is ‘evaluatively neutral’. Just as to have speech you have to have sounds, to have meaning you have to have speaker orientation — even if it is shared, and therefore unquestioned, and therefore invisible. In sum, I assert that although matter-of-fact talk can be considered the *formally* ‘unmarked’ Nanti way of speaking, there is no *socially* unmarked way of speaking from the perspective of communicative practice.

5.2.3 The expression of speaker orientation in matter-of-fact talk

Looking at the communicative practices in the speech community of Montetoni during the period of this study as a coherent and integrated system, I posit that matter-of-fact talk was the way of speaking that was the most neutral option of the total set of options, in terms of speaker orientation, both relative to the referential (propositional) content of the utterance and relative to the surrounding interactional situation. As mentioned in §5.1, I claim that, from the speaker's perspective, matter-of-fact talk framed an utterance as a fact, as intersubjectively, verifiably 'true'. From the perspective of the hearer-interpreter, then, a matter-of-fact utterance was taken as not being solely dependent upon the perspective of the speaker, but rather as being (in principle if not in fact) accessible to multiple perspectives (including, potentially, the hearer's).

Importantly, however, my claim that matter-of-fact talk conveyed a non-perspectivized orientation on the part of the speaker is *not* a claim that *no* orientation and *no* perspective were conveyed by matter-of-fact talk. Rather, the orientation conveyed by this way of speaking was one of intended neutrality and of proffered, but contestable, facticity. Importantly, statements such as 'I saw...' and 'I heard...' were often made in matter-of-fact talk, statements that hewed closely to Nantis' shared expectations regarding sourcing one's information. The issue is one of potential share-ability of perspective: if another person had been in the same situation, place, and time, would or could that person have made the same statement? Matter-of-fact talk conveyed the perspective on the part of the speaker that, 'yes, any other person in my position could make this same statement.'

There is an important assumption underlying this analysis that I discussed in Chapter 3, but that I would like to render explicit again here. I assume that *because* (and if and when) an individual experiences that he or she has attitudes, stances, feelings, emotions, opinions, etc. (cognitive states and processes that I collectively

call ‘orientation’; see discussion in Chapter 3), he or she will infer (presumably implicitly) that other individuals also have attitudes, stances, feelings, emotions, opinions, etc. As a result of this inference, he or she will anticipate the possibility that such things may be conveyed in others’ utterances. Therefore, taking into account both speaker and hearer(s), every utterance may have an orientation either designed into it, read off of it, or both; moreover, those two orientations may or may not be functionally equivalent. This leads me to the conclusion that there can be no such thing as ‘no orientation’ in real-time interactions, because one interactant can never conclusively know if or what orientation is being read off of their speech by others. Therefore, I claim that a way of speaking such as matter-of-fact talk functions to overtly profer relative neutrality on the part of the speaker — either within or without his or her conscious self-awareness.

5.2.4 The uptake of matter-of-fact talk

As discussed at length in Chapter 3, I posit that utterances only have meaning in and through interaction, as part of a sequencing of moves and interpretations of those moves. No matter what referential, indexical, and/or orientational information one participant proffers in an utterance, what that utterance signifies to other participants unfolds through subsequent moves, as chains of utterances, reactions, responses, and uptakes co-create understandings of the interaction for participants. Therefore, an utterance proffered as matter-of-fact talk may or may not be interpreted as matter-of-fact talk by addressee(s) and hearer(s). In a practical sense, the only evidence that participants have that an utterance proffered as matter-of-fact talk has been interpreted as matter-of-fact talk is via subsequent uptake of that utterance.

In my data set, there are two very common types of uptake to a turn proffered as and/or received as a turn of matter-of-fact talk. The first common type

of uptake, not surprisingly, was a response, also using matter-of-fact talk, that accepted the proffered topic of talk; accepted the (referential/propositional) content as intersubjectively ‘true’; and either confirmed, or built upon, the content of the first pair part. In these cases, the apparent levels of joint attention and mutual orientation were high after a single adjacency pair of matter-of-fact talk.

As I mentioned above, matter-of-fact talk establishes joint attention and mutual orientation on a turn by turn (or adjacency pair by adjacency pair) basis, rather than projecting forward and establishing specific expectations for subsequent turns. Therefore, a successful turn sequence of matter-of-fact talk frequently served as an initial or opening interactional frame within which particular evaluations or orientations could be built up, over the course of an extended interaction, about the topic to which participants are already jointly attending. Thus, matter-of-fact talk was often used as a prelude to the use of other ways of speaking, establishing a type of ‘ground’ against which subsequent ‘figures’ were set. Because it proffered a neutrality of orientation, matter-of-fact talk introduced a topic into interaction with an ‘open’ evaluative channel, which could subsequently be used with another way of speaking, after the interactants have established mutual orientation and/or joint attention to a particular conversational ground.

The second common type of uptake to a turn proffered as and/or received as a turn of matter-of-fact talk was a response that refuted or contested the content or orientation of the first pair part. That response could be as simple as uttering the word *tera* or *jara* — ‘no’ — in either matter-of-fact talk or some other way of speaking. More probably, the response involved one or multiple utterances intended to contest either the propositional content of the first pair part, or the accuracy of the perspective conveyed in that first pair part, framed with either matter-of-fact talk or some other way of speaking. In these cases, the first speaker’s intention to establish joint attention and/or mutual orientation often required interactional

work on the part of all participants, over a series of turns, until all participants understood where the others stood.

While matter-of-fact talk was regularly used to initiate a subsequently sustained interactional frame, it was also often regularly deployed within an established interactional or interpretive frame on a turn-by-turn basis, with the goal of adding or clarifying information relevant to the ongoing interaction. In these cases, the ongoing interactional or interpretive frame was not broken or cancelled but rather was supplemented or suspended by the turns of matter-of-fact talk.

As discussed in Chapter 3, Nanti ways of speaking are gradient phenomena, reflecting the complex nature of speaker orientation toward experience and interaction. As a result, any utterance could be more or less ‘like’ matter-of-fact talk (just as every utterance could be more or less ‘like’ any way of speaking), and consequently, the uptake of any utterance reflected the uptaker’s interpretation of the sound patterns taken in. Every framing proffered by a way of speaking then, including matter-of-fact talk, was only real and valid to the degree that co-participants in interaction collaborated in its establishment and maintenance.

5.3 The social life of matter-of-fact talk

5.3.1 Participant frameworks

I observed matter-of-fact talk used between Nanti participants of all types — by individuals of all ages to individuals of all ages, and by members of all families and residence groups to members of all families and residence groups. There did not seem to be *any* social structural limitations to the selection of addressee(s), hearer(s), or overhearer(s) when using matter-of-fact talk. For example, its use was taken as appropriate regardless of the relative prominence of the speaker to the addressee;

and I never observed its use taken as inappropriate, no matter what the situation.¹⁰

The most unusual characteristic of Nanti matter-of-fact talk, with regard to participant frameworks, is that it was by far the most common way of speaking that Montetoni Nantis used with with (a) Nantis who resided in other places and (b) with non-Nantis.¹¹ Given the high value placed on overtly establishing intersubjective frameworks during the period of this study of Nanti language use practices, it is not surprising that Nantis most often used the way of speaking that proffered a neutral and/or mutual orientation toward the content of talk in their dealings with people they did not know well.

5.3.2 Appropriate activity frames for matter-of-fact talk

I observed that matter-of-fact talk was used in, and appropriate to, all types of activity frames. Moreover, it was often the only way of speaking used in a specific (token¹²) activity frame, or at least the only way of speaking used over long stretches of time within a specific activity frame, because it was the way of speaking most often used for exchanging referential information, coordinating physical activity, giving instructions, making requests, asking questions, and so on. Many collaborative activities — such as house-building, group fishing outings, group hunting outings, natural resource gathering, and village grounds maintenance — were primarily coordinated with matter-of-fact talk.

In those activity frames in Montetoni in which matter-of-fact talk was not the primary interactional frame — most especially in the activity frame of feasting, and the embedded interactional frames of *shitatsi* banter, hunting stories, chanting,

¹⁰I am not claiming that *speaking* was never taken as inappropriate, only that this particular way of speaking was never obviously taken as inappropriate in itself.

¹¹The other ways of speaking that I have observed — but not studied in detail — in use with Nantis from other places and/or with non-Nantis I would informally and provisionally label men's visiting talk, important visitors talk, and talk under duress. In addition, Migero, Montetoni's long-time leader, occasionally used *peresetente* talk with outsiders.

¹²The relevance of token/type distinctions to this study is discussed in Chapters 3 and 4.

and *karintaa* poetry — isolated utterances and/or turn sequences of matter-of-fact talk occasionally occurred, as discussed in the next section.

5.3.3 Appropriate interactional frames for matter-of-fact talk

In my data set, matter-of-fact talk was not only an appropriate element but also a common element in most interactional frames. As I mentioned, matter-of-fact talk was sometimes the only way of speaking used in a given (token) interactional frame. In addition, since matter-of-fact talk tended to be the way of speaking used to initiate interaction among co-present individuals, it often served to activate an interactional frame that was subsequently (that is, in subsequent turns of the initiated interaction) modified or elaborated, once mutual orientation and joint attention had been established among participants.

To extend the discussion begun in §5.2, matter-of-fact talk was typically used by Nantis for declarative and (focused) interrogative utterances regarding states of affairs in the shared intersubjective world, including people's doings and sayings. In Montetoni, matter-of-fact talk was used in any activity frame or interactional frame when a person wanted to share or receive information from another person, regarding events, activities, or states of affairs, that was expected to be "true" by Nanti standards; that is, any Nanti asking any Nanti this question would get the same answer under the same experiential circumstances. Matter-of-fact talk was often used for both parts in an adjacency pair, such as an opening, a closing, or a question/answer pair. It was commonly used for denoting, for conveying information for its own sake, for conveying new information in an ongoing interaction, and for recycling given information in an ongoing interaction. In addition, it was used for both establishing joint attention and creating joint attention 'to' something, regardless of the information structure of the utterance.

Furthermore, matter-of-fact talk typically constituted an invitation to inter-

act in a collaborative, cooperative, manner and to share information and observations about experiences in conventionalized terms. Matter-of-fact talk was the way of speaking most often used to instruct another in the steps of a task, to give another person spatial directions, and to make basic, easy requests of others.

In general, matter-of-fact talk was the way of speaking that Nanti individuals used to initiate an interaction with someone else. Matter-of-fact talk generally either proposed a topic or continued the existing topic of talk as the focus of interactional attention; it drew joint attention to the event, activity, or state of affairs referred to; it foregrounded the topic of talk as a potential orienting frame for next speaker's turn, without constraining the next turn to a significant degree. Nanti used matter-of-fact talk to set the initial conditions inside which participants will define the situation.

In those interactional frames in Montetoni in which matter-of-fact talk is not the primary way of speaking — especially in the interactional frames of *shitatsi* banter, hunting stories, chanting, and *karintaa* poetry that occur during feasting — isolated utterances and/or turn sequences of matter-of-fact talk occasionally occur. In these situations, matter-of-fact talk is typically deployed to give, get, or exchange pieces of information relevant to the successful execution of the already ongoing activity or interaction. For example, supplementary detail may be given in matter-of-fact talk for a hunting story primarily unfolding in hunting talk or for lengthy tease primarily unfolding in *shitatsi* banter. Or the whereabouts of another individual may be ascertained in matter-of-fact talk by an individual participating in a chanting line during a feast.

5.3.4 Conventional interpretations of matter-of-fact talk

Matter-of-fact talk is a way of speaking that foregrounds the information conveyed by the speaker — in other words, the referential content of the utterance — and

backgrounds the speaker's orientation toward that information. As discussed in §5.2.3, though it was backgrounded, an orientation was conveyed by matter-of-fact talk in as much as all talk is inherently positioned and perspectivized to some degree, but the orientation of matter-of-fact talk was maximally neutral relative to other locally possible orientations. With matter-of-fact talk, a Nanti speaker framed the content of an utterance as de-individuated, accurate, verifiable, and cooperative in nature. This way of speaking posited to the hearer(s) that the content of the utterance was both uncontested and uncontestable, because it was a statement of 'fact in the shared experiential world.'

A plausible gloss for the interpretive frame established by an utterance of matter-of-fact talk is: 'This statement about the experiential world is intended to be intersubjectively neutral, a statement I evaluate as factual and true to the best of my knowledge, and offer to you to evaluate in the same way.' Of course, activating this interpretive frame in one turn of talk comes with no guarantees that that frame will be perpetuated in the next turn or turns of talk.

As discussed in §5.2.4, I am not claiming that utterances of matter-of-fact talk were never contested. For example, sometimes one participant's presentation of a 'fact' was received as partial or incomplete, or as inaccurate relative to the knowledge held by another participant, and so that participant responded with a contestation, using either matter-of-fact talk or another way of speaking, depending on his or her own orientation at that point. The point, however, is that when a speaker used matter-of-fact talk, that talk was proffered as focally *about* the factuality of the facts in and of the 'shared experiential world' and not *about* the speaker's orientation toward his or her own utterance. Crucially, then, matter-of-fact talk indexes an important value shared by Nantis: the careful demarcation of individual responsibility and agency relative to the shared world.

I take it as axiomatic that every utterance is potentially contestable, regard-

less of the ‘truth of the statement made’ or the ‘truth value of the proposition of the sentence,’ because the utterance is first and foremost contingent upon the knowledge and presuppositions held by the interactants themselves. As a result, interactants need a way to indicate the intent to frame a particular utterance as ‘not evaluative in nature’, a means to offer a ‘statement about a state of affairs’ as simply that, a true statement.

Note that when a statement or proposition made by someone using matter-of-fact talk was challenged or contradicted by the next speaker, typically the contradiction was about the veracity of the statement itself, based on experiential or intersubjective criteria; the contradiction was not a challenge to the speaker as such. A backgrounded orientation toward the topic may be maintained by subsequent speakers, or the speaker may choose to foreground a contrasting orientation; thus, although matter-of-fact talk frames talk as ‘not perspectivized’, that talk nonetheless can be subsequently ‘perspectivized’ by another participant.

5.4 The sound patterns of matter-of-fact talk

5.4.1 Matter-of-fact talk as a basis for formal comparison with other Nanti ways of speaking

With respect to sound form, it is helpful to use matter-of-fact talk as one point of comparison for all other Nanti ways of speaking, because it is the least formally elaborated way of speaking in its prototypical form. Comparisons between a token of matter-of-fact talk and a token of any other way of speaking allow for the identification of formal characteristics in the latter token that have been ‘added’¹³ to the types of characteristics that characterize the former way of speaking. In terms of specific characteristics of the spoken sound stream that are relevant to my analysis

¹³See §5.2.2 for a discussion of markedness as it relates to matter-of-fact talk.

of Nanti ways of speaking, I have (cautiously) taken matter-of-fact talk to reflect the individual speaker's 'unmarked' way of speaking with respect to rate of speaking, volume, pitch range, and voice quality.

5.4.2 Domains of realization of matter-of-fact talk

Matter-of-fact talk was most typically realized across a single utterance which corresponded to a single turn at talk. Because matter-of-fact talk was primarily used for establishing or maintaining joint attention to a particular topic, sometimes a single utterance or single turn at talk was relatively lengthy, including multiple clauses and overt noun phrases, as the speaker strove to achieve mutual orientation and joint attention with addressees and/or hearers. As discussed below, the intonation contour of matter-of-fact talk is sensitive to this aspect of utterance length, and could be produced in a cyclical or iterative manner at the level of syntactic constituents within an utterance.

5.4.3 Clipping in matter-of-fact talk

As discussed in Chapter 2, Nanti speakers often 'clipped' some material from their utterances. That is, in the production of an utterance, a speaker often did not explicitly utter syllables that, grammatically, we would expect to have been present. The analysis of this usage phenomenon as 'the clipping of material' relies on certain stable relationships between sentences and utterances, or structure and use.

Based on a large corpus of Nanti speech, we have been able to deduce the grammatical parameters of well-formed sentences in Nanti. (See Chapter 2 and Michael (2008) for more information on the grammar of Nanti.) This was possible because on many occasions — particularly in careful speech, in repetitions and recycles of utterances, and in certain ways of speaking like scolding talk — utterances corresponded to complete, grammatically well-formed sentences. On the other hand,

on many occasions, utterances did not correspond to grammatically well-formed sentences. The expected but missing material was not randomly situated; it was always the final syllable or syllables (or, in some special cases, the initial syllable) of a phrase or clause. Crucially, in almost all cases, the clipped material was recoverable from (a) basic grammatical parameters, (b) the existing interactional matrix, and/or (c) shared world knowledge.

Clipping in Nanti speech was systematic and predictable. It was sensitive to foot structure and metrical stress, such that in the overwhelming majority of cases, only unfooted syllables were clipped from the ends of inflected verb complexes. It was also possible, however, to clip unstressed syllables or entire feet from the ends of verb complexes, adjectives, adverbs, and discourse particles in fast speech. It was also possible to clip the initial syllable, which corresponds to the subject clitic, from an inflected verb complex. Note that this occurred when the subject referent had already been established in the discursive frame.

As an observer of Nanti language in use, I infer that speakers of Nanti have access to the ‘grammatically well-formed’ sentence that corresponds to the overt clipped version produced in an utterance. Certainly, Nantis regularly successfully interpreted and responded to clipped utterances, so I take this as an indicator that clipped utterances are almost always ‘sufficiently grammatically well-formed’ for communicative purposes.

Clipping is especially common in matter-of-fact talk. Note that clipping can create the impression that the speaker is speaking rapidly, as a result of the relationship — for the hearer/interpreter of the utterance — between heard syllables and amount of information associated with its interpretation.

Analytically, however, clipping in Nanti speech has presented a representational challenge. This language use practice has necessitated that I make certain representational choices in the transcripts presented in this study. The basic chal-

lenge is: if material is not overtly present in the sound signal, should it be included in the transcript? Because in most cases this clipped material was obviously (a) salient to and (b) recoverable by competent speakers of Nanti, I have chosen to include it to the degree that I can reliably recover it. I have indicated ‘reconstructed’ clipped material by placing a caret (^) before it.

5.4.4 Voice quality in matter-of-fact talk

Prototypical matter-of-fact talk requires only the basic phonological processes of the Nanti language, without any added characteristics like nasalization or creakiness that are found in other Nanti ways of speaking; and it is produced with a given speaker’s most frequently used pitch range, rate of speaking, and volume (these characteristics are discussed in turn below). To be clear about this point, my assessment of frequency of use here is impressionistic, not statistical, and is based on my exposure to a given speaker’s productions across all types of speech and all ways of speaking. The prototypical voice quality of matter-of-fact talk corresponds to the notion of *modal voice*, which Ladefoged and Maddieson (1996, p. 48) characterize as “regular vibrations of the vocal folds at any frequency within the speaker’s normal range.”

5.4.5 Voice volume in matter-of-fact talk

In matter-of-fact talk utterances, the speaker’s voice volume was calibrated to the speaker’s assessment of the interactional situation at hand, not to this way of speaking itself. As I mentioned above, I cautiously consider matter-of-fact talk to reflect the ‘unmarked’ case for an individual’s speech production, and in the case of voice volume, this is characterized as the voice volume requiring the minimal physical effort necessary to get the utterance heard by the intended addressee(s). The volume used for a matter-of-fact talk utterance did not usually seem to take into account

an audience of ratified overhearers, although in some cases it did.

Note that in general, Nantis set their volume at the minimum level necessary for the addressee(s) to hear and comprehend the utterance — Nantis are capable of much higher voice volume than they typically used in matter-of-fact talk. When a person raised the voice to be heard from a distance, or when the voice was raised in order to demand the attention of someone, it became apparent that Nantis normally exert significant control over the volume of the voice.

5.4.6 Rate of speaking in matter-of-fact talk

The rate of speaking of matter-of-fact talk was generally the rate a given speaker uses most frequently in ideal speaking conditions — that is, addressing an adult native-speaker interlocutor in the absence of background noise, excitement, or rush, and in a fairly sedentary and relaxed environment. The rate of speaking was, however, often modified to accommodate factors such as those just mentioned.

From a comparative perspective, the speaker's rate of speaking in a strip of matter-of-fact talk tended to be faster than scolding talk but slower than hunting talk.

5.4.7 Rhythm and relative timing in matter-of-fact talk

The rhythm and relative timing of matter-of-fact talk are the time distribution phenomena upon which analyses of phonemically contrastive vowel length and (default) meter in the Nanti language are based. In addition to phonemically contrastive length, however, real-time utterances exhibit phonetic duration — both absolute (measurable in seconds) and relative (that is, utterance internal) in nature. My claim is that the real-time relative phonetic duration of utterances of matter-of-fact talk are typically consistent with the phonemic time distribution phenomena described for the Nanti language. Therefore, in matter-of-fact talk utterances, the

phonetic duration of stressed syllables is typically longer than unstressed syllables, and the phonetic duration of the primary stressed syllable is typically longer than that of the secondarily stressed syllable. At the same time, phonetic lengthening of a topically prominent syllable — such as the subject clitic of a verb complex — is also attested in matter-of-fact talk utterances.

In matter-of-fact talk utterances, it is not uncommon for the final syllables of a many-syllable word, phrase, or clause to exhibit a shorter phonetic duration than the early syllables of that same constituent. In these cases, the (perceptually) longest syllable of the constituent in question is usually the syllable that bears metrical primary stress. Similarly, clipping (also discussed in §5.4.3) was common in matter-of-fact talk, with the result that obtaining full and complete forms of words, and especially fully-inflected verb forms, required supplementary elicitation of speech at a slower, elicitation-oriented rate of speaking that often had distorting effects on rhythm and relative timing.

5.4.8 Speaker's pitch range in matter-of-fact talk

In matter-of-fact talk utterances, the speaker mostly used the mid to low range of his or her total possible pitch range. The average pitch range used in matter-of-fact talk by a given individual seems to correspond to the notion of 'habitual pitch' for a given speaker (see, for example, Coleman and Markham (1991)). Regardless of the pitch point at which a matter-of-fact talk utterance begins, the total change in pitch over the course of the utterance was usually (a) relatively small and (b) gradual, a point I discuss in the next section.

5.4.9 Intonation contour in matter-of-fact talk

The characteristic intonation contour of matter-of-fact talk begins with a slight rise on the first stressed syllable of the intonation unit, followed by a relatively shallow

descending contour over the remaining syllables of the intonation unit, with the steepest part of the descent occurring on the final syllable or two. At all but high volume speech, the pitch range is narrow and low relative to the speaker's possible range. The prototypical intonation contour of matter-of-fact talk is nicely illustrated in Figure 5.5, in §5.5.3.

As mentioned above, the intonation contour of matter-of-fact talk is characterized by a gradual net descent in pitch from a mid point in the speaker's total range to a low point. Over the course of the utterance, the difference in pitch between adjacent syllables is usually small, which provides an important point of contrast with other ways of speaking that are characterized by large changes in pitch over a single syllable or adjacent syllables (as in both scolding talk and hunting talk; see Chapters 6 and 7.)

At the same time, the intonation contour of matter-of-fact talk often exhibits a cyclicity across a lengthy utterance. In these cases, a single cycle of the intonation contour of matter-of-fact talk may be co-extensive with a syntactic unit of almost any size: a word, a noun phrase, a verb phrase, or an entire clause. An utterance often includes two or three of these cycles in a row, but still demonstrates a net descent in pitch from the initial to the final pitch point of the utterance.

5.5 Detailed examples of matter-of-fact talk

This section examines in detail several examples of matter-of-fact talk in order to demonstrate both its sound characteristics and the kinds of uses to which it is put within the Nanti discursive ecology.

5.5.1 Joshi and Anterés' example

This example clearly demonstrates the way in which matter-of-fact talk is used to establish joint attention between participants to a specific topic of talk. This



Figure 5.2: Joshi, one of the authors of Example (5.1), is pictured here in 2004, making *kóriki*, women’s metal nose disks. Joshi made *koriki* by pounding and shaping Peruvian coins. Before metal coins were available, Nantis made nose disks from fish cheekbone. Notice that both girls watching Joshi are wearing *koriki*.

example consists of a brief (adjacency pair) exchange between Joshi (JOS), a member of my residence group in Montetoni, and Anterés (ANT), a resident of Marankejari.¹⁴

→ *You have five options for listening to examples; which of these options will function will depend on the PDF reader you are using: (1) click the hyperlink below for the embedded file, which may launch the file in your media player; (2) open the embedded file from the list of attachments to the PDF (in Adobe Reader, go to View → Navigation Panels → Attachments); (3) click the URL hyperlink below, which may launch the file in your browser; (4) copy and paste the hyperlink for the URL into your browser, which will play the file through*

¹⁴Sound file unique identifier: 031230L.1.-0855_JOS.ANT

your web browser; or (5) play the MP3 files at:

<http://www.cabeceras.org/beier2010/beier2010dissertation.htm>

→ Play example from embedded file: beier2010ch5ex1.mp3

→ Play example from:

<http://www.cabeceras.org/beier2010/beier2010ch5ex1.mp3>

(5.1) a. JOS: Pitotsi pikenanta[^]ke.

pitotsi *pi= ken* *-aNT* *-ak* *-i*
boat.NPOSS 2S= travel.in.a.direction -APPL:INST -PERF -REAL.I
You came (here) by boat.

b. ANT: Pitotsi nokenanta[^]ke.

pitotsi *no= ken* *-aNT* *-ak* *-i*
boat.NPOSS 1S= travel.in.a.direction -APPL:INST -PERF -REAL.I
I came (here) by boat.

5.5.1.1 Surrounding social situation

On December 30, 2003, Anterés came to Montetoni from Marankejari to visit. Not long after arriving in Montetoni, Anterés entered Joshi’s and Bikotoro’s *kosena* to visit, and shortly thereafter Lev and I joined the group there; it was Lev who recorded this interaction.

For about 8 minutes, Lev and Anterés chatted (using matter-of-fact talk) in Joshi’s presence, primarily catching up with each other on news and happenings. At one point, they discussed the fact that Anterés had traveled to Montetoni for this visit in a boat rather than on foot. Note that at that time, it was much more common to make this trip by foot, so it counted as ‘interesting’ and ‘newsworthy’, in terms of local expectations, that Anterés came by boat.

At the end of that period of dyadic interaction, after a gap of about 60 seconds, Joshi addressed Anterés, saying: *Pitotsi pikenantake*. ‘You came by boat’,

as shown in (5.1.a). The sentence-initial focused object in Joshi's utterance, *pitotsi* 'boat.NPOSS', indicates the relative salience of this particular bit of information. In addition, the fact that Joshi made this statement to Anterés demonstrates that Joshi had been attending to the conversation between Anterés and Lev; thus, Joshi's utterance was not a request for information, since Joshi already had the information. Rather, we can see Joshi's utterance as an invitation by Joshi to Anterés to interact — and invitation that Anterés accepted, as shown in (5.1.b) — as well as a move to establish joint orientation between the two of them to the topic as stated — which, based on Anterés' response, was a highly successful move on Joshi's part.

Similarly, Anterés knew that Joshi already knew that he came by boat, so his answer was not informational either. Rather, it was an acceptance of Joshi's invitation to interact and an affirmation of jointly oriented attention to the topic Joshi had stated. Anterés' reply completed an adjacency pair initiated by Joshi, as he complied with the 'potential next position' that Joshi's question proposed. After this adjacency pair, there was another pause of about 5 seconds, after which Anterés addressed Joshi and initiated an amicable multi-turn strip of interaction between the two of them that lasted about 30 seconds.

In terms of the communicative conventions in Montetoni during the period of this study, the high degree of similarity of Anterés' response to Joshi's statement conveys a high level of alignment by Anterés to Joshi. As I discuss at length in Chapter 2, parallelism is a common alignment strategy in the speech community in Montetoni. I suggest that parallelism conveys the following message: "The likeness of my utterance to your utterance represents the likeness of my perspective to yours; it demonstrates my willingness to cooperate with you and my willingness to act in concord with or in support of your actions."




Figure 5.3: Praat image of waveform of Joshi's and Anterés' matter-of-fact talk in Example (5.1), including utterance-internal relative timing and impressionistic intonation contour (added with ZeusDraw; background noise made an accurate finer-grained analysis by Praat impossible). The purpose of this figure is to visually represent the general shape of the sound forms of the two utterances relative to time, as well as the similarities between the two utterances.

5.5.1.2 Sound patterns of Joshi's and Anterés' utterances

What is most striking in this example is that Anterés responded to Joshi with a nearly identical utterance, not only referentially but formally as well. Referentially, Anterés' utterance is identical to Joshi's, except for the shift in pronoun to first person. Grammatically, it is identical (if we accept my analysis of the clipping of each token; see §5.4.3). In addition, both utterances are 1.16 seconds long; they have nearly identical utterance-internal relative timing; the volume and intensity of the two men's speech is equivalent; and the intonation contours are nearly identical (see Figure 5.3).

The intonation contour of the two utterances is prototypical of matter-of-fact talk. The utterances begin at a pitch in the upper middle of the speaker’s total pitch range and end at the low end of the speaker’s range. From the initial pitch point, pitch begins to drop on the first metrically stressed syllable and then descends gradually across the remaining syllables of the first syntactic constituent (a topicalized object noun phrase, *pitotsi*); the pitch then cycles back up on the first syllable of the second syntactic constituent (a fully inflected verb phrase, *pikenantake* or *nokenantake*) and gradually descends again through the end of the constituent and utterance. Both speakers devoice the final syllable of the first constituent (the *-tsi* of *pitotsi*), and clip the final syllable of the second constituent (the *-ke* of *pi/nokenantake*.)

5.5.2 Jororinta’s example

This example illustrates the iterative down-stepping pattern of the intonation contour of matter-of-fact talk from the mid to low range of a female speaker’s total pitch range (see Figure 5.4); it also provides contrast with Jororinta’s example of scolding talk in Chapter 6.¹⁵

→ Play example from embedded file: beier2010ch5ex2.mp3

→ Play example from:

<http://www.cabeceras.org/beier2010/beier2010ch5ex2.mp3>

(5.2) a. Noguntetaka na^ˆro ijatira Bikoto^ˆro ishigaji.

no= guNte -t -ak -a naro i= ja -t
 1S= see -EPT -PERF -REAL.A 1S.PRO 3mS= go -EPT
-i -ra Bikotoro i= shig -aj -i
 -REAL.I -REL Bikotoro 3mS- run -ADL -REAL.I
I saw Bikotoro’s leaving, he ran off.

b. (no_{gum})(te'ta)<ka> ('na.ro) (i'ja)ti<ra> ('bi.ko)to<ro> (i_fi)(g^ˆai)

¹⁵Sound file unique identifier: 000703.010.JRN_mod

5.5.2.1 Surrounding social situation

On July 3, 2000, I participated in an interaction that included Lev, Migero,¹⁶ and Jororinta.¹⁷ We were all in Anterés' *kosena* conversing about the circumstances of Jororinta's return to Montetoni that day after an extended stay in Marankejari. Jororinta's turn immediately prior to this one was a single utterance of scolding talk (directed at her small daughter) which I examine closely in Chapter 6.

During this lengthy interaction, one of the topics that emerged was the doings of Bikotoro, one of Migero's brothers, who was also staying in Marankejari at that time. Jororinta contributed this piece of first-hand information regarding the manner of Bikotoro's departure from the village earlier that day, saying *Noguntetaka naro ijatira Bikotoro, ishigaji*. 'I saw Bikotoro's leaving, he ran off.'

Jororinta's laughter at the end of this utterance merits a bit of discussion. For the past several minutes of this lengthy interaction, Migero had been addressing her in what I call *peresetente talk* — a way of speaking used almost exclusively by Migero, used once in a while by other senior men. *Peresetente* talk was unusual relative to other Nanti ways of speaking in that (a) it consisted of very long, dense turns by the speaker; (b) the speaker spoke relatively rapidly, which has the effect of leaving few openings for others to begin a turn addressing the speaker; and (c) the speaker foregrounded his opinions and evaluations about happenings and people's doings within a frame of how those happening and doings have affected other individuals and/or the community more generally. Migero was addressing Jororinta with *peresetente* talk as he commented on the circumstances and consequences of her, Josukaro's, and Bikotoro's extended stay in Marankejari. Jororinta is relatively shy and soft-spoken and did not often engage in lengthy discussions of a political nature with anyone, much less Migero. I interpret her laughter at the end of this

¹⁶Migero, male; at the time approximately 48 years of age and *peresetente* of Montetoni.

¹⁷Jororinta, female, at the time approximately 46 years of age and the only spouse of Josukaro, a well-respected man in Montetoni.




Figure 5.4: Waveform and spectrogram of Jororinta’s matter-of-fact talk in Example (5.2), including pitch contour in blue and intensity contour in yellow. The purpose of this figure is to visually represent the general shape of the sound form of Jororinta’s utterance relative to time.

turn — as well as in numerous other turns in this interaction — as an indicator of her discomfort in being the focus of so much direct attention, particularly from Migero.

5.5.2.2 Sound patterns in Jororinta’s example

Jororinta produced this utterance in 3.9 seconds. It consists of five words, 17 distinguishable audible syllables and three laugh pulses. Of the 5 words in the utterance, two of them have their final syllable clipped — a common occurrence in matter-of-fact talk, as discussed in §5.4.3. Both of the clipped elements are right-dislocated

topicalized subjects, the first-person focus pronoun *naro* and the personal name *Bikotoro*; therefore the clipped elements in both cases are the final unfooted¹⁸ syllable of a complete clause as well as of an NP. The relative timing of the syllables in this utterance conforms to the timing principles of the metrical stress system in Nanti.

This utterance exhibits three cycles of the characteristic matter-of-fact talk intonation contour. Each cycle corresponds to one verb complex in the utterance, plus the right-dislocated topicalized subjects associated with the first two verb complexes.

Jororinta's measurable pitch variation in this utterance is a total of 149Hz, from 207 Hz to 356 Hz; based on my knowledge of her speaking voice, this range represents the middle to low reaches of her personal total pitch range. Apart from the acoustic effects of her laughter there are no other modifications to Jororinta's voice quality in this utterance.

5.5.3 Migero's example

The entire interaction presented in this example, among Migero (MIG), Lev Michael (LDM) and me (CMB), was conducted using matter-of-fact talk.¹⁹ I focus on one particular utterance of Migero's for close analysis, found in line (5.3.1). This example provides contrast with Migero's example of hunting talk in Chapter 7.

→ Play example from embedded file: [beier2010ch5ex3.mp3](#)

→ Play line (1) from embedded file: [beier2010ch5ex3lineL.mp3](#)

→ Play example from:

<http://www.cabeceras.org/beier2010/beier2010ch5ex3.mp3>

¹⁸See Chapter 2 for further discussion of clipping and its interaction with prosody.

¹⁹Sound file unique identifier: 031230L_04

- m. LDM: ↑ Aryo. ↑ ↑a, a,
 ari.
Indeed (you say). Indeed (you say).
- n. PAUSE (~0.5 seconds)
- o. CMB: ↓ Ainyoka ipiriniti. ↓
I infer he is sitting (at rest) there?
- p. MIG: ↑ Ainyo kara noka^ ↑ Ainyo. Ainyo ipiriniti.
Over there, I^ He's there. There he sits (present).
- q. PAUSE (~3 seconds)

5.5.3.1 Surrounding social situation

This example comes from the activity frame and interactional frame of an inter-household, intra-residence group visit. On December 30, 2003, Migero came to visit me and Lev in our hut and we discussed various people's doings. Just after the recording began (which was not the very beginning of the interaction), Lev and Migero closed an interactional sequence, in (5.3.a and b), with a type of adjacency pair that is common in Nanti interactions, in which one party avers having understood the other, and the other avers knowing that he has been understood. (As discussed in Chapter 2, the verb stem *kem* "means" both 'hear' and 'understand'). After this pair of turns there was a pause of three seconds, during which the floor was open (5.3.d).

Lev made the next conversational move, informing Migero (in matter-of-fact talk) that we had recently had two other visitors to our hut, Tejerina and Tómasi (in 5.3.e and g). Both these men lived in a different residence group from ours, and so their visit to our hut was a noteworthy event. Moreover, although Migero's *kosena* was quite near our hut, he was not around at the time Tejerina and Tómasi visited, so he was unlikely to know that the two had come to visit us. Migero responded

to Lev, as is common in such information-swapping situations, by repeating part of each of Lev's turns (5.3.f and h), and both men use the 'discourse affirmative' word *aryo* to indicate their ongoing mutual orientation. A similar pair of utterances followed, when I spoke up to characterize their 'coming here' as a 'visit' (5.3.j) — that is, they hadn't merely passed by our hut, or stopped at our hut on the way to a destination, but rather they had come to our hut in order to visit us — and Migeró responded to me with another partial parallelism (5.3.k).

Migeró's next move, in line (5.3.l), was to report to us where he himself had visited earlier that day, inferably during the time that Tejerina and Tómasi visited us. The multi-turn interaction among the three of us that followed the strip presented here was about the various other people that Migeró had visited earlier and what news he had from them.

5.5.3.2 Sound patterns in Migeró's example

The entire strip presented in Example (5.3) is 25 seconds long, and all the turns represented here are categorizable as matter-of-fact talk. The voice volume of each speaker is calibrated to the other participants such that all can easily hear one another; the rate of speaking of each participant is unhurried; the relative timing within each utterance is metrically predictable; and the distinct turns of talk have a large percentage of overlap and back-channeling, as is typical in Nanti conversation (see Chapter 2 for further discussion.) Each of the speakers is using their modal voice with no modifications of voice quality.

We will isolate one particular line of this larger interaction as a prototypical example of matter-of-fact talk; that is, it clearly demonstrates all of the defining characteristics of matter-of-fact talk simultaneously. In line (5.3.l), Migeró made his first substantive contribution to this topic sequence, which is, referentially, an outright statement of a fact about the shared intersubjective world: he went across




Figure 5.5: The intonation contour of Migeró’s matter-of-fact talk. This figure combines a screenshot of the waveform and spectrogram generated via Praat with an impressionistic drawing of the intonation contour added via ZeusDraw; the sound signal of the original recording is too complex for a more fine-grained analysis of intonation via Praat. The purpose of this figure is to visually represent the general shape of the sound form of Migeró’s utterance relative to time.

the village from his home to the home of Ijonira, in another residence group, in order to visit Ijonira, and he successfully visited the very person he sought. In this utterance, using the mid-to-low range of his total pitch range, speaking in modal voice at an unremarkable rate and volume, he produced the prototypical intonation contour of matter-of-fact talk, in three prototypical cycles, across three different syntactic constituents — a verb phrase (verb plus adverb, *nojati janta*); a fully inflected verb (*nokamosoti*); and a noun phrase (*Ijonira*) — as illustrated in Figure



Figure 5.6: Bikotoro, one of the authors of Example (5.4), shown here preparing *seri* (tobacco snuff) in 2004.

5.5. Each of the three cycles begins, and ends, at a slightly lower pitch than the previous cycle began, resulting in a net downdrift of pitch.

5.5.4 Bikotoro's example

I have chosen this example from Bikotoro (BIK) because in addition to illustrating the sound characteristics of matter-of-fact talk, it demonstrates Bikotoro's use of matter-of-fact talk to introduce a new topic of talk during an ongoing interaction with Lev Michael (LDM), and to establish joint attention to a specific piece of information — namely, Migero's report that he had shot at a tapir (discussed in Chapter 6) — prior to a subsequent extended interaction, partly in hunting talk, about the details corresponding to this shared piece of information.²⁰

²⁰Sound file unique identifier: 031231L.010

→ Play example from embedded file: beier2010ch5ex4.mp3

→ Play line (d) from embedded file: beier2010ch5ex4lineD.mp3

→ Play example from:

<http://www.cabeceras.org/beier2010/beier2010ch5ex4.mp3>

→ Play line (d) from:

<http://www.cabeceras.org/beier2010/beier2010ch5ex4lineD.mp3>

(5.4) a. LDM: Ari pogijatakeri.

ari pi= ogija -t -ak -i =ri
AFFIRMATIVE 2S= follow -EPT -PERF -REAL.I =3MO
Indeed (I understand that) that you followed him.

b. BIK: Ari nogijatanake, ↓ je.

ari no= ogija -t -an -ak -i je
AFFIRMATIVE 1S= follow -EPT -ABL -PERF -REAL.I yes
Indeed (it is so that) I followed him away, yes.

c. LDM: ↑ Jeje.

jeje
yes
Yes.

⇒ d. BIK: Ikamanta^ˆke ikanti, ‘kemari nokentantabeta^ˆka aka.’ Maika↓

ikaman^ˆti.↓

i= kamaNt -ak -i i= -kaNt -i kemari no=
3mS= inform -PERF -REAL.I 3mS= say -REAL.I tapir 1S=
keNt -aNt -a -be -t -ak -a aka
shoot.with.arrow -INST -EPA -FRUS -EPT -PERF -REAL.A here
maika i= kamaNt -i
moment.in.time 3mS= inform -REAL.I

He informed (me; and maybe you too), he said, ‘A tapir, I shot (it) without killing (it) here (indicating corresponding part of his own body).’ Recently he informed (you of this?)

e. LDM: ↑Je.

↑Jeje, jeje.

Je. Jeje, jeje.

yes yes yes

Yes. Yes (he did inform me).

f. BIK: Aryo ika, ‘tera irogatinka[^] ke omonkejaa[^]ku.’

aryo *i=* *=ka* *tera* *i=* *r-* *o-*
AFFIRMATIVE 3mS= =QUOT IRREAL.NEG 3mS= IRREAL- CAUS-
katink *-ak* *-i* *o=* *monke jaa* *=ku*
straight.course -PERF -REAL.I 3nmS= be.full -CL:fluid =LOC
Indeed (I aver) he said, ‘he did not send it straight to the main river course.’

g. LDM: Jeje.

jeje

yes

Yes (so I heard).

g. BIK: Jeje.

jeje

yes

Yes (so I heard).

g. LDM: Aryo.

aryo

indeed

Indeed (so I heard).

5.5.4.1 Surrounding social situation

Like example (5.3), this example also comes from the activity frame and interactional frame of an inter-household, intra-residence group visit. On December 31, 2003,

Bikotoro came to visit me and Lev in our hut, as he did almost every day. At that time, Bikotoro and his two spouses lived in the same residence group as we did, which is also the same residence group that Migero and his two spouses lived in.

As was always the case during such visits, Bikotoro discussed various people's doings with us. One topic that Bikotoro introduced was a recent hunting experience of his brother Migero's. Bikotoro's first interactional move in introducing this topic was to establish that we had enough background information to discuss the details of Migero's hunting story, in line (5.4.d). In this turn at talk, Bikotoro sought to establish joint attention with Lev to one salient point of Migero's hunting story, namely that Migero had shot (without killing) a tapir. It is important to notice that Bikotoro introduced the topic of Migero's activities by quoting Migero himself, thus making clear to Lev that the information he was presenting regarding this topic came directly from the person involved in the event.

Notice, also, in the first part of line (5.4.d), that there is no lexical or syntactic information that distinguishes whether Bikotoro is uttering a declarative statement, or asking Lev a yes/no question regarding Lev's own knowledge state. The verb *ikamanta^ke*, 'He informed', has no object clitic nor is there an overt oblique argument indicating *who* was informed. Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 2, there is no obligatory intonation contour in Nanti that marks a yes/no question; rather, distinguishing a yes/no question from a declarative statement is the result of local management of turns at talk, as is demonstrated in this very case. It is the repetition in line (5.4.d), *Maika ikamanti*. 'Recently he informed.' that made it clear to Lev (and to me) that Bikotoro was overtly seeking confirmation (that is, a 'yes' or 'no' uptake) from Lev that indeed Migero had informed Lev of the happenings that Bikotoro was introducing as a topic of conversation.

We see, in line (5.4.f), that after Bikotoro had overtly established with Lev that they both had basic knowledge of Migero's experience, and had established with

Lev a shared interactional frame and joint attention to this topic of talk, Bikotoro *then* made a move to introduce a detailed discussion of Migero's experience — still quoting Migero, and now tinging his quotation of Migero with some of the characteristics of hunting talk that Migero had used in telling his own hunting story to Bikotoro. Several turns of talk on this topic followed the strip discussed here.

5.5.4.2 Sound patterns in Bikotoro's example

This strip of interaction is 13 seconds long. The first 8 seconds include lines (5.4.a to e) and two adjacency chains (a to c, and d to e), all produced by Bikotoro and Lev in matter-of-fact talk. Both spoke at an unhurried rate and effortless volume, calibrated to their proximity to one another, and both used their respective modal voice quality in the middle to low range of their total personal pitch ranges (based on my knowledge of their speaking voices). The intonation contour of each utterance in these lines shows a net lowering of pitch.

The intonation contours (as well as the referential content) of lines (a) and (b) are very similar, as Bikotoro produced, in line (b), a closely parallel and aligned response to Lev's discourse affirmation utterance in line (a), before changing the topic of talk in line (d).

In line (d), Bikotoro produced two utterances, separated by 0.4 seconds, each of which demonstrates a prototypical matter-of-fact talk intonation contour that gradually descends from a mid-range pitch point to a low pitch point without demonstrating a steep descent on any single syllable. The first utterance, *Ikamantake ikanti kemari nokentantabetaka aka*, demonstrates three cycles of the characteristic matter-of-fact talk intonation contour, each corresponding to a syntactic constituent: two inflected verbs *ikamantake* and *ikanti*, and a verb phrase plus adverb *kemari nokentantabetaka aka*. The shape of the intonation contour of this strip is shown in Figure 5.7. The second utterance, *Maika ikamanti*, also demonstrates a




Figure 5.7: Praat image of waveform of Bikotoro’s matter-of-fact talk in line (d) of Example (5.4), with impressionistic intonation contour (added with ZeusDraw); the sound signal of the original recording is too complex for a more fine-grained analysis of intonation via Praat. The purpose of this figure is to visually represent the general shape of the sound form of Bikotoro’s utterance relative to time.

matter-of-fact talk but is slightly louder and produced within a slightly higher pitch range.

The way of speaking in line (f) is different than in the other lines just described. The first two words of this utterance of Bikotoro’s, *Aryo ika*, ‘Indeed he said,’ demonstrate an intonation contour characteristic of hunting talk — described in detail in Chapter 6 — a graded high-to-mid fall on first lengthened syllable, followed by a step-wise mid-to-high rise on the final syllables of the intonation unit; and Bikotoro produced the fifth and final word of the utterance, *omonkejaa^ku* with a breathy voice quality, also characteristic of hunting talk.

5.6 Concluding remarks

This chapter has presented Nanti matter-of-fact talk as a social and interactional phenomenon, as well as a sound phenomenon. I have characterized both the types of situations in which I documented this way of speaking in use, and the set of sound characteristics that distinguish this way of speaking from all others.

In this chapter, I have argued for the importance of distinguishing ‘ways of speaking’ as interactional and sound phenomena from the more general notion of ‘everyday conversation’ and for the importance of applying the concept of ‘markedness’ only to the sound properties of ways of speaking, and not to their social, or interpretive, properties. I have attempted to demonstrate the interpretability of this particular way of speaking in terms of speaker orientation, and to argue for the salience of its orientational *neutrality* relative to all other Nanti ways of speaking.

Because matter-of-fact talk is the least formally elaborated way of speaking discussed in this study, as well as the most widely distributed one, this chapter is meant to serve as a basis for comparison with the other two ways of speaking that I describe in detail, in subsequent chapters — first scolding talk, in Chapter 6; and then hunting talk, in Chapter 7.

Chapter 6

Scolding talk

6.1 Introduction

This chapter presents a detailed discussion of the Nanti way of speaking that I have labeled *scolding talk*. During the period of this study, scolding talk was a ubiquitous way of speaking in Montetoni. It was used to convey disapproval on the part of a ‘scolder’ regarding some action of a ‘scoldee’, and was either directed to the scoldee or to someone else in the presence of the scoldee. Not surprisingly, scolding talk was most often used by mothers to scold their own children. That said, scolding talk could be used appropriately by anyone, with the restriction that the scoldee be equal to or lower than the scolder in social prominence.¹ Thus, siblings also used scolding talk very often, both toward and about their siblings. Scolding talk was used appropriately in all activity frames and interactional frames that I observed in Montetoni; it was also very noticeably gradient in both its acoustic² realization and its communicative force. The rest of this chapter will develop and substantiate each of these generalizations. The distinctive characteristics of scolding talk are

¹See Chapter 2 for a discussion of social prominence in Montetoni; see Chapter 3 for a discussion of appropriateness.

²In this study, I use the word ‘acoustic’ in a general sense, meaning ‘having to do with sound’.



Figure 6.1: Occasionally, a child’s behavior would exasperate a parent, and the parent would use *tanko* (stinging nettles) — rarely, the application of it; usually, the suggestion of the application of it — to influence a child’s behavior or punish a child’s misbehavior. In this photo, Márota is returning home with her already-repentant son after retrieving a stem of *tanko* (in her right hand).

summarized in Table 6.1.

Among Nanti ways of speaking, scolding talk distinguished itself in two key ways. First, it was, as a sound pattern, a highly distinctive way of speaking — and therefore it was relatively easy for even a non-Nanti person to recognize. Scolding talk was one of the Nanti ways of speaking that could be named in the Nanti language; Nantis used the transitive verb root *kanomaj* to mean ‘to scold or reprove someone’ and, crucially, in my experience in Montetoni this verb was used to categorize talk that *sounded like* scolding talk as described here — as, for example, in those cases when an individual could hear the sound pattern, but not the actual content, of an utterance spoken at some distance.

Second, scolding talk was a very common way of speaking — one that was likely to turn up within any type of activity frame and one that was used many times every day by most Nanti individuals in Montetoni. Because it was so distinctive and so commonly used, scolding talk exemplifies in a particularly clear manner the relationships I wish to highlight between ways of speaking and patterns of social interaction.

In addition, scolding talk was socioculturally a very important phenomenon in Montetoni because it played a very important role in the socialization of children. It was by far the most common mechanism that I observed parents use to influence, modify, or intervene in a child's behavior. While I witnessed countless moments of scolding talk, I never saw a parent yell at or hit a child for his or her behavior, and I rarely witnessed any child punished; the one punishment — more often a threat than a reality, see Figure 6.1 — that I witnessed was brushing a child with *tanko*, stinging nettles, as a response to misbehaving.³ To be sure, a parent's use of *tanko* always *followed* the use of scolding talk with a misbehaving child.

In §6.1.1, I begin with a brief sketch that illustrates the recognizability, utility, and social effects of scolding talk in everyday life in Montetoni, in order to place the subsequent analytical work in an ethnographically-informed frame. Then in §6.1.2, I provide a brief summary of the key examples that I use in this chapter, each of which is discussed in detail in §6.4. In §6.2, I describe and exemplify the social and interactional patterns that co-occur with scolding talk; then in §6.3, I describe the sound characteristics of scolding talk.

³*Tanko* was regularly used by adults to treat skin ailments, and by youngsters to tease and surprise one another in play. A few different varieties of wild plants were called *tanko*; these plants had sharp spines or thorns, on their leaves and/or stems, which produced a hot, aching, stinging sensation upon pricking the skin.

Table 6.1: Characteristics of Nanti scolding talk

Appropriate activity frames	All that I observed	§6.2.3
Appropriate interactional frames	All that I observed	§6.2.4
Appropriate participant frameworks	Scoldee is equal to or lower than scolder in social prominence.	§6.2.1
	Usually a single scolder and a single scoldee;	§6.2.2
	more than one scoldee is possible.	§6.2.2
	Scoldee may be either recipient or ratified overhearer of scolding talk.	§6.2.2
Voice volume	Usually louder than previous turn or turn in progress.	§6.3.2
Rate of speaking	Usually slower than previous turn or turn in progress; speaking rate may be increased in cases of urgency	§6.3.3
Rhythm and relative timing	Lengthening of metrically stressed syllables; some compensatory shortening of other syllables.	§6.3.4
Intonation contour	High level of contrast between initial and final pitch point; scold begins at high end of personal pitch range and end at low end; steep pitch descents across single lengthened vowels.	§6.3.5
Voice qualities	Add nasalization; increase laryngeal tension	§6.3.6

6.1.1 Becoming aware of scolding talk in Nanti interactions

When I was learning how to behave appropriately in Nanti society, scolding talk was one of the first Nanti ways of speaking that I learned to recognize. I attribute this to the fact that scolding talk was used so many times a day, by so many individuals, in such a wide variety of situations: it really caught, and demanded, my attention by its mere ubiquity. “Why,” I thought, “do Nantis speak this way sometimes? What do the occasions of its use have in common with one another? And what would I be expected to do if it were ever directed at me?”

Early on, I formed two practical hypotheses: first, if this way of speaking was used so frequently — but, crucially, not continuously — then Nantis were producing it, and attending to it, in some communicatively ‘useful’ way, and therefore so should I; and second, if some turns of talk were so recognizably ‘the same’ in their sound pattern, then that sound pattern itself might be significant, or ‘signify’, in and of itself. I mean to emphasize here that when I first recognized what I now call scolding talk, I wasn’t thinking about it as an ‘analyst-observer’ of Nanti, but rather as a new ‘participant’ in Nanti social life, someone searching for patterns and clues in my social environment regarding how to act, and interact, appropriately.

The first pattern that I noticed when I heard this particular way of speaking had to do with participants. Women regularly spoke this way to their children, and moreover, they spoke to their children this way much more often than they spoke to anyone else in this way. The second pattern I noticed had to do with ‘uptake’, that is, how children addressed in this way responded to it. Once I knew who to watch, then as soon as I heard a woman begin to use this way of speaking, I began paying close attention to the children’s reactions to it. In this manner, I began to understand the social and interactional ‘weight’ of this sound pattern: I discovered that whoever was on the receiving end of this distinctive sound pattern typically responded as though they’d been reprovved or scolded, and usually behaved

differently immediately afterward. In fact, most of the time, *instead* of offering a verbal response, children would respond by modifying or stopping whatever it was they were in the middle of doing. And yet, as I continued to pay attention to moments of scolding talk, I was fascinated by the realization that often *what* was said — that is, the topic of the talk — simply mentioned or described something that a child was doing; the words of the utterance were not a reproof in and of themselves. I deduced that the scold was conveyed by the way of speaking, and moreover, that it was to *that* part of the utterance that the child usually responded.

Of course, over the years that I have been observing scolding talk, I have discovered variations and subtleties in how it actually works among Nantis, beyond what is briefly sketched out in the previous paragraphs, and I will discuss the complexities of scolding talk at length below. The point of this initial sketch is to convey a sense of how experientially attention-getting scolding talk was in everyday life in Montetoni — and how efficacious it could be in motivating its recipients to modify their behavior.

6.1.2 Key examples of scolding talk

The following are brief summaries of each of the examples of scolding talk that I will reference throughout this chapter, and then examine in detail in §6.4. Sound files are provided for each example.

Note that each of these examples has particular strengths and weaknesses as representatives of scolding talk, and that I have chosen each one *because* it has particular strengths for rendering specific aspects of scolding talk salient. Because scolding talk, like any Nanti way of speaking, is a layered, gradient phenomenon, each token incorporates different characteristics to different degrees. Nonetheless, these four examples taken together present a rich and nuanced picture of the distinctive characteristics of scolding talk.



Figure 6.2: If a child demanded the attention of her mother while her mother was busy, and the mother considered the child's demands inappropriate to the situation, the mother might scold the child without interrupting her own activity, as shown in this photo.

1. Bejaterisa's example provides two utterances with identical referential content but different ways of speaking, thereby drawing out the sound characteristics of scolding talk. In this example, Bejaterisa addressed her small daughter, who had begun to fuss. First, using matter-of-fact talk, she said: *Ika, jara pipinkantira*. 'He said, don't be afraid.' But a second later the child fussed again, at which point Bejaterisa repeated her previous utterance, this time as scolding talk. This example is discussed in detail in §6.4.1.

2. Jororinta's example illustrates the changes in voice quality associated with scolding talk, as well as illustrating the prompt actional rather than verbal uptake on the part of the scolded. In this example, Jororinta briefly addressed her small daughter, during an extended conversation among several adults, whose voices are audible in the background. Her child had been fingering a garment, and Jororinta said: *Pinoshimaitiro, gu*. 'You're pulling the threads, look.' She only said this once, and the child stopped touching the garment by the time she finished producing her utterance. Jororinta modified her voice quality by using nasalization as well as strong creakiness on the [ɔ] of the second syllable and the final syllable she uttered. This example is discussed in detail in §6.4.2.

3. Bibijón's example illustrates the gradience of scolding talk across a turn of talk, as well as illustrating the place of scolding talk in the socialization of Nanti children to adult expectations. In this example, Bibijón's father Erejón told his spouse Chabera about something Bibijón had done earlier. Erejón said: *Neje, maika inka(jara) oga, irento oga, omagamento obarigakero oka jenoku onta. Onkante 'nobetsika,' aryo onkante 'nobetsika'*. 'Yeah, a little bit ago that one knocked down her sister's bedding from up above. She'll say 'I fixed it', indeed she'll say 'I fixed it.'" Erejón began speaking matter-of-fact talk but gradually transformed his way of speaking into scolding talk, most noticeably the words *obarigakero* and *nobetsika*. Meanwhile, while Erejón was speaking, Chabera scolded Bibijón directly, saying: *Gajiro oka*. 'Give that back.' During this onslaught of scolding, Bibijón defended herself verbally against her mother's framing of events, claiming innocence and reframing the event. This example is discussed in detail in §6.4.3.

4. Maroja's example provides several utterances in sequence with the same referential content but gradient realization of scolding talk. In this example,

Maroja was attempting to get her teenaged daughter to wash a plate. She began by saying: *Kibatero pirato*. ‘Wash the plate.’ Her daughter did not respond to her, however, and so Maroja produced her request in gradually more obvious scolding talk until her daughter finally acknowledged her by saying: *Je*. ‘Huh?’ After that point, Maroja repeated her request in once again, this time using matter-of-fact talk. This example is discussed in detail in §6.4.4.

6.1.3 Scolding talk as a gradient phenomenon

Throughout this discussion of scolding talk, it is of crucial importance to bear in mind its gradient nature, both as an sound phenomenon and as a social one. In the domain of the sound form, *gradience* means that each identifiable characteristic is one that can be realized to a greater or lesser degree, or with greater or lesser intensity; that its realization is not binary (that is, only evaluable as ‘present’ or ‘not present’); and that these characteristics are fundamentally relative, which is to say, characterizable only in terms of a range of possibility and contrasting realizations within that range. For example, vowel lengthening in scolding talk only makes sense in terms of ‘longer’ or ‘shorter’ duration relative to other vowels; and utterance rate and rhythm in scolding talk only make sense in terms of ‘faster’ or ‘slower’ speech production across time. While it is possible to measure the length of a particular vowel or the duration of a particular utterance in terms of seconds, this measurement is only useful in identifying scolding talk if we compare it to the length of another vowel or to the duration of another utterance. In analyzing Nanti scolding talk, measurements such as these are compared among tokens by the same speaker, usually tokens taken from a different strip of the same interaction.

Gradience is, of course, potentially a factor in all speech production; for example, what counts as /a/, ‘short a’, or /aa/, ‘long a’, in Nanti is not dependent upon absolute time duration of the sound [a], but rather is the result of identifying

the sound as ‘short’ or ‘long’ based on locally salient contrasts between them in relative duration and articulation. The crucial difference between gradience in this case and in the case of scolding talk is that, in the first case, on the phonemic level the [a] sound is perceived and categorized as either /a/ or /aa/; the contrast is ‘binary’. In the case of scolding talk, however, gradience in realization is salient and relevant to the processes of categorization and interpretation in interaction.

This is why I claim that scolding talk is a gradient phenomenon socially as well as formally: ⁴ gradience in the sound form of utterances corresponds to different types of utterance interpretation and uptake; and in particular, the more a specific token of talk resembles a prototypical token of scolding talk, the higher a level of commitment the speaker is inferred to have to the utterance in question.

In practice, any given token of talk may be more or less “like” scolding talk or any other way of speaking; the sound characteristics that constitute any particular way of speaking may be more or less obvious, realized to a greater or lesser degree in one token than in another. In the particular case of scolding talk, I have made this generalization regarding likeness based on two types of comparison: either a given token may be recognized as ‘similar’ to most tokens that count as scolding talk in a large data set of non-adjacent tokens (and, by extension, in the addressee’s cumulative experience); or a given token may be more obviously like scolding talk than surrounding or adjacent tokens in an ongoing interaction or a single continuous datum.

Far from being merely a source of indeterminacy in communicative situations, the possibility of gradience in the realization of the sound form of scolding talk affords a corresponding possibility for gradience in the degree of foregrounding of the speaker’s orientation toward the utterance. In other words, degrees of realization of scolding talk correspond to degrees of severity of the reproof or scold

⁴By ‘formal’ I mean ‘having to do with form’ in contradistinction to ‘content’, ‘substance’, or ‘meaning’. This distinction is explored in greater detail in Chapter 3.

conveyed by the speaker. Evidence for the correspondence between degrees of realization of scolding talk and degree of severity of the scold is found most clearly in recorded interactions in which the speaker gradually increases the prominence of the characteristics of scolding talk over several turns, until the point at which the focal addressee responds in a way that satisfies the speaker and brings the strip of scolding talk to an end. We will look closely at this phenomenon in Maroja's example below in §6.4.4.

6.2 The social life of scolding talk

6.2.1 Participant frameworks: who uses scolding talk and with whom

In Montetoni, I have observed that it is possible for any individual, of any age and of either sex, to use scolding talk; over the years, I have witnessed practically every Nanti I know using scolding talk at one moment or another. That said, there are clear social restrictions on who counts as an appropriate focal addressee of scolding talk.⁵ The general pattern that I have observed is that Nantis deploy scolding talk 'down the chain of social prominence' that is constituted by the ongoing situation.⁶ To be more specific, Nantis most often address scolding talk to someone who is younger, less influential, and/or less experienced than themselves in the situation at hand.⁷ In addition, scolding talk is more readily used by individuals when they are in some sense responsible for the well-being of the focal addressee at the time

⁵I will discuss what I mean by *focal addressee* below in §6.2.2.

⁶Please see Chapter 2 for a lengthy discussion of social prominence in Montetoni.

⁷Note that while in many situations, local relative social prominence is easy to assess (for example, a father and his small son), in some cases relative prominence is ambiguous (two teenagers) and therefore tends to be constituted through behaviors *in the moment*, including the move to evaluate someone else's behavior through the use of scolding talk. This kind of ambiguity in relative prominence is often played out on the spot, through contestations, protestations, and outright backfires of these interactional moves.

— parents or siblings caring for youngsters being the typical case.

As I have observed scolding talk in Montetoni, I have identified six groups, based on group members' age plus life-stage, which can be ordered to reflect the (impressionistic rather than statistical) relative frequency with which members of each group are likely to deploy scolding talk. These six groups, listed in descending order of frequency, are: adult women, prepubescent girls, prepubescent boys, teenage girls, adult men, teenage boys. This ordering, not unsurprisingly, reflects which groups of people spend the most time care-taking (and, by implication, socializing) small children. In general, it is not 'unusual' for any person to use scolding talk with an appropriate focal addressee.

Interestingly, in my data set, these same six groupings are not viable when considering the relative frequency of being the focal addressee of scolding talk. Rather, a different set of groups, still based on age and life-stage, can be identified. The following groups are ordered to indicate (impressionistic rather than statistical) relative frequency as focal addressee: children, of either sex, between the ages of roughly 4 and 10; children younger than 4; children between roughly ten and puberty; teenagers; adults. There is an important additional distinction for teenagers; for a teenager with a spouse and/or a child, life-stage is more important than age, and thus such individuals are less often addressed with scolding talk. Adults are rarely the focal addressees of scolding talk, and adult men almost never so.

6.2.2 Addressees of scolding talk: recipients, ratified overhearers, focal addressees

In my data set, it was most common for a turn of scolding talk to be directly addressed to someone whose behavior the speaker wished to influence. In this type of case, there were only two necessary participants in the interaction: the speaker and



Figure 6.3: A scolded or embarrassed child (or an embarrassed adult) would often bury the face in the crook of the arm, as shown in this photo. Here, a young girl was recovering her composure, as two of her sisters looked on, after the embarrassment of being scolded while having a loose tooth pulled in front of a group of spectators.

the focal addressee. Grammatically, the utterance may be an imperative: *Kibatero*. ‘Wash it.’ (as in Maroja’s example); a declarative: *Pinoshimaitiro, gu*. ‘You’re thread-pulling it, look.’ (as in Jororinta’s, Bejaterisa’s, and Bibijón’s examples); or an interrogative: *Tata pogi*. ‘What are you doing?’. Less commonly, a single scolding talk utterance was directed at more than one scoldee, if two or more individuals were engaged in an activity that the scolder was evaluating.

It was also very common for a turn of scolding talk to be directed to a third

participant, in the presence of the person whose behavior the speaker wished to influence. In this type of case, then, it is necessary to distinguish the *apparent* addressee from the *focal* addressee; the apparent addressee was the person to whom the utterance was directed in a strict — or grammatical — sense, while the focal addressee was the person whose behavior was under scrutiny. In Goffman's terms, the focal addressee was a ratified overhearer of the utterance. These utterances were most often declaratives: *Irento oga omagamento obarigakero oka jenoku onta*. 'Her sister's bedding, she knocked it down from above.' (as in Bibijón's example); or deontics: *Jame oshigakakeri shimpenaku*. 'Had she only not caused it to run away into the grass.'

The fact that scolding talk was often directed at an apparent addressee rather than the focal addressee reflects an important aspect of Nanti social relationships (also discussed in detail in Chapter 2): by describing someone's behavior to someone else — and evaluating it negatively through the deployment of scolding talk — the speaker was effectively foregrounding a specific potentially-shared perspective on and evaluation of the focal addressee's behavior. By drawing attention to the behavior, such an utterance suddenly rendered the behavior 'public' and held it up for the scrutiny of anyone listening. Moreover, it drew attention to how that behavior might be remembered and spoken about subsequently. Simultaneously, particularly in the case of parents and children, such an utterance explicitly framed certain behaviors as inappropriate, continuing and reinforcing the child's socialization into Nanti behavioral norms and standards of appropriateness. A common occurrence, for example, was for one parent to address scolding talk to the other parent regarding a child's behavior; such an interactional move usually elicited a very strong and swift response from the child under scrutiny.

6.2.3 Appropriate activity frames for scolding talk

My data show that scolding talk could be used appropriately within any type of Nanti activity frame; that is, the appropriateness of the use of scolding talk was not determined by settings or situations of use. Rather (as discussed in Chapter 3), the appropriateness of scolding talk was contingent upon and calibrated to the relative social roles and status of participants.

If indeed scolding talk could potentially be used within any activity frame, it was at the same time a more common and prominent way of speaking in some types of activity frames than it was in others. Scolding talk was most common in Montetoni's *kosenas*, when adults and children were in close proximity and engaged in household-level socializing, household maintenance, and/or manufacturing activities. It was at such times that adults had extended periods of access to the activities and behavior of children, as well as ample opportunity to observe, evaluate and comment on what children were doing. In such situations, scolding talk might be particularly prominent, because Nantis tended not to 'chat' (in the sense of conversing casually for its own sake) while working, and so when turns of talk were infrequent overall, a large portion of turns might in fact be scolding talk.⁸

6.2.4 Appropriate interactional frames for scolding talk

My data show that scolding talk most often activated a brief, 'non sequitur' interactional frame that, when activated, temporarily suspended any other interactional frame that the speaker may have been participating in (as in Bejaterisa's example). For example, Nantis often interrupted themselves, or an interaction in which they were participating, in order to execute a brief secondary interaction or side sequence of scolding talk; in these situations, the scolding talk effected a pause in the primary interaction, after which the primary interaction resumed.

⁸See Chapter 2 for a more general discussion of patterns of interaction in Montetoni.

Similarly, scolding talk sometimes activated an embedded interactional frame within an ongoing interaction, particularly in cases when scolding talk was directed at an apparent addressee in the presence of the focal addressee, as described in §6.2.2 (as in Bibijón's example). In these situations, the topic of the scolding talk might be related to or continuous with the topic of the primary interaction — such as the recent activities of the scolded — or the topic might be a 'non sequitur' comment on the immediate activities of the scolded during the primary interaction.

Finally, scolding talk utterances were often produced while an ongoing multi-party interaction was unfolding. In these cases, scolding talk constituted a brief, parallel secondary interactional frame that typically had no impact on the primary interaction (as in Jororinta's example). Speakers managed these types of interactions most often via control of the voice volume and force of their turns, as discussed in §6.3.2.

As mentioned above, actional responses were more common, and in most cases, more appropriate than verbal responses to scolding talk. If, in some cases, the scolded chose to respond verbally in defense of her actions, this response might be produced in matter-of-fact talk or in scolding talk, depending on local social and circumstantial factors, including relative social prominence, the age of the scolded, and the degree to which the scolded considered the original scold to have been misplaced.

6.2.5 Conventional interpretations of scolding talk

Based on my observations of scolding talk in use, and considering individual tokens of scolding talk as one link in a chain of actions and utterances, I have made the following generalizations regarding the conventional interpretations of scolding talk in Montetoni.

- The referential content of a strip of scolding talk may be, and often was, simply

a description of an action or event in the shared world; the referential content itself may not convey any stance, evaluation, orientation, or emotion on the part of the speaker.

- The cluster of sound characteristics that constitute scolding talk framed the referential content of the utterance with a negative evaluation of the scolded's behavior or its consequences.
- Based on the kinds of uptake that scolding talk elicited, it is clear that an utterance produced as scolding talk communicated a sense of disapproval on the part of the speaker toward the actions of the focal addressee *together with* an expectation that the focal addressee would modify or rectify the behavior in question as a consequence.
- Scolding talk drew attention to the scolded's actions — and to the social relevance and moral status of those actions. Moreover, it drew the attention not only of the scolded but also of anyone else in earshot, in effect placing the scolded's actions in a public domain⁹ inside a negative framing.
- The use of scolding talk did not constitute a 'threat' by the speaker to the focal addressee; that is, scolding talk did not imply nor lead to subsequent punishment. On the other hand, scolding talk did constitute an unwelcome reproach in the public domain; it served to frame the action in question as inappropriate in some way and not to be repeated.
- While scolding talk did not foretell punishment, as gradient phenomenon it might intensify through a sequence of turns. Therefore, scolding talk unheeded might result in stronger and more reproachful scolding talk; it might also lead to a physical intervention by another person if the focal addressee did not

⁹See Chapter 2 for a discussion of 'publicness' in Montetoni.

respond to the scolder's satisfaction soon enough, and/or if the consequences of the behavior were assessed as harmful.

- As discussed in Chapter 2, in Nanti society, speaking was considered an important and consequential form of social action and words were seen as deeds to a much greater extent than in many other societies. Therefore, how a person was construed or represented in talk was a matter to which individuals paid close attention, and it was a matter of concern if the representation were negative. Nanti individuals are, of course, *socialized* into a sensitivity to the social and personal consequences of talk — in part, through the lived experiences of scolding talk — and therefore the rapidity and the intensity of an individual's response to a turn of scolding talk increased with age. In general, the older the focal addressee of scolding talk was, the more quickly he or she would respond.

6.3 The sound patterns of scolding talk

6.3.1 Domains of realization of scolding talk

In my data set, the domain in which scolding talk is most commonly realized is a single turn of talk which corresponds to a single continuous utterance, which in turn corresponds to a complete but short grammatical clause (as in Bejaterisa's and Jororinta's examples). That is, the turn, the utterance, and the clause are often co-extensive. Less commonly, the single continuous utterance over which scolding talk is realized may consist of a sequence of clauses (as in Bibijón's example), or may be a syntactic constituent, or may even be a single word.¹⁰ As an interactional strategy, scolding talk may be realized by a single speaker over the course of a sequence

¹⁰In the case of a single word, the most frequent word used is *jara*, the irrealis negator, which conveys the sense, 'You will not continue to do that which you are doing.' or more colloquially, 'Stop that right now.' See Bejaterisa's example for further discussion.

of utterances (Maroja's example), but in terms of the domain within which the sound properties of this way of speaking are clustered, we must look at the *single utterance* and its parts. On the one hand, the possibility of small-scale variations in the scope of the domain of realization reflects the gradient nature of the realization of the sound pattern, since one part of an utterance may be "less scoldy" than other of its parts; and on the other hand, it reflects the speaker's control over the unfolding, time-dependent production of scolding talk, allowing for the possibility of modifications or 'mid-course corrections' as the speaker is speaking.

While in many cases the 'single utterance' is clearly separable as one turn of talk in a series of turns of talk among multiple participants, in the case of scolding talk it is also quite commonly the case that a series of single utterances by one speaker are in fact interspersed with 'turns' of silence by the addressee(s) — whether these silences are attributable to a genuine unawareness on the part of the addressee of the speaker's turn, or to a display of inattention to them. In any case, in terms of defining the domain in which scolding talk is realized, what is most salient is identifying the turn of talk which is preceded and followed by recognizable *opening* (or turn relevance place (Sacks et al., 1974)) for a turn on the part of a non-speaker. Note that these openings not only render appropriate a verbal response on the part of the focal addressee, but they also render appropriate an *actional* response; that is, the focal addressee may, in the next turn, respond to the turn of scolding talk by modifying the behavior that is under scrutiny as the topic the scolding talk-infused utterance.¹¹

In sum, then, the typical domain of scolding talk can be characterized as a single utterance, one turn of talk by a single speaker, with the possibility of gradient realization across this domain; this will be our default unit of analysis in the discussion that follows, unless explicitly stated.

¹¹Goffman (1981a) provides an illuminating discussion of gestural and behavioral responses within adjacency pairs and adjacency chains.

6.3.2 Voice volume in scolding talk

The volume of the voice in scolding talk is usually louder than in the speaker's previous turn or the turn in progress. Functionally, the increase in volume serves to demand the attention of the scolded, as well as other hearers; as a result, in an extended sequence of turns of scolding talk, the scolder may gradually increase voice volume, until the scolded has responded to the scolder's satisfaction.

The main exception to this generalization — that voice volume is increased in scolding talk — are those cases in which an utterance of scolding talk constitutes a secondary, parallel interaction to an ongoing primary interaction. As discussed in Chapter 2, Nantis generally set the volume and force their turns of talk based on their physical distance from the intended hearer(s), such that someone farther away was addressed with greater volume and force than someone nearby. At the same time, Nantis tended to speak in the quietest and least forceful manner that enabled the intended hearer(s) to hear them. Overall, Nantis calibrated the volume of their voices quite carefully to the social situation and potential participants at hand, demonstrating a relatively high level of control over the selection of hearers and ratified overhearers of their turns at talk.

This strategy was particularly apparent in the management of turns of scolding talk that were simultaneous, or parallel, to other turns of talk. When a secondary interaction of scolding talk occurred simultaneously with an ongoing primary interaction, the speaker typically made an effort to speak unobtrusively and at a quieter volume than that of the primary interaction, thereby signaling a lack of intent to take the floor with the content of the utterance. I observed in such cases that the scolding talk was usually disattended by non-addressees and, indeed, did not constitute an interruption; at the same time, the experience of being scolded during an ongoing interaction seemed to result in especially prompt responses on the part of scolded.

6.3.3 Modifications of rate of speaking in scolding talk

Scolding talk is typically produced at a slower rate than talk produced not using this way of speaking. That is, the duration of the utterance in a token of scolding talk is measurably longer than the length of the same lexico-syntactic material uttered without this way of speaking. This generalization is based on three types of data: first, it is based on the comparison of adjacent tokens of talk, from single speakers, with identical lexico-syntactic content, which do and do not count as scolding talk respectively (as in Bejaterisa's and Maroja's examples); second, it is based on comparisons of tokens of talk from single speakers, from adjacent utterances, with non-identical lexico-syntactic content, which do and do not count as scolding talk respectively (as in Bibijón's example); and third, it is based on the comparison of tokens of talk, from single speakers, from non-adjacent utterances, with non-identical lexico-syntactic content, which do and do not count as scolding talk respectively (as in Jororinta's example).

In most tokens,¹² the lengthening that corresponds to scolding talk is realized on a subset of the vowels in the utterance, based on both their degree of sonority¹³ and on whether or not the segment is already a metrical stress-bearing element in the utterance.¹⁴ That is, lengthening is most likely on more sonorous vowels that already bear metrically-assigned stress and least likely on non-stress-bearing vowels of lower sonority. In terms of broader metrical patterns in Nanti, primary-stress-bearing syllables are the most common sites of lengthening, and secondary-stress-bearing

¹²The generalizations made here are based on assessments of perceptual salience made by the author, and comparative, but not statistical, methods.

¹³Nanti is sensitive to the intrinsic sonority, or resonance, of its vowels. The sonority hierarchy in Nanti corresponds to the natural height classes of its vowels with low vowels having high intrinsic sonority and high vowels having low intrinsic sonority. See Crowhurst and Michael (2005) for further discussion of the relevance of the Nanti sonority hierarchy to stress assignment.

¹⁴In brief, in the default case for purposes of stress assignment, prosodic words are parsed iteratively left to right by disyllabic iambic feet, final syllables are extrametrical, and primary stress is rightmost; see Chapter 2 for further discussion.

syllables are the next most common sites. In terms of degree of sonority, the vowels most often lengthened are /a/, /aa/, /o/ and /oo/; less often, the vowels /e/, /ee/, /u/, /ui/ may be lengthened; occasionally even /i/ and /ii/ are lengthened, if this vowel quality is an available stress-bearing element.

If a particular vowel in a token is lengthened, then it is possible that adjacent consonants may be lengthened as well.¹⁵ The degree of lengthening of consonants is contingent upon two factors: the degree of lengthening of the focal vowel, and the degree of sonority of the consonant in question. The lengthening of consonants is more likely as the duration of the adjacent vowel is increases. In some cases, only the adjacent onset consonant is lengthened; in other cases, only the coda consonant is lengthened (remember that the only permissible coda consonants in Nanti are nasals); in other cases both onset and coda are lengthened; and in yet other cases both the onset consonant of the vowel-lengthened syllable and the onset of the following syllable may be lengthened (with or without a coda consonant). The more sonorant consonants — nasals, fricatives, and the glide — are more often lengthened than are the stops, affricates, or the flap. Not surprisingly, considering basic articulatory affordances, lengthening is most common in the production of the nasals, [m], [n], and [ŋ]— which occur in both onset and coda position. The fricatives [s] and [ʃ] are also common sites of lengthening. But note that it is possible to lengthen any consonant in the inventory, if rate of speaking of the whole utterance is sufficiently slow. The examples that we will examine below demonstrate lengthening in every type of segment.

Note that the perception of increased duration of an utterance can actually result from two different articulatory modifications, both of which are attested in the Nanti data. First, and most commonly, syllables (and their component vowels and consonants) may be *lengthened* — that is, phonation is produced continuously

¹⁵The generalizations made here are based on assessments of perceptual salience made by the author, and comparative, but not statistical, methods.

at a slower rate.¹⁶ Second, however, the duration of an utterance may be increased when the rate of speaking is slowed through brief *interruptions* of the phonation process, or more specifically, through constrictions of the larynx that result in a pulsing of the airflow during speech production. In the case of scolding talk, the effects of increased laryngeal tension result in a distinctive voice quality that ranges from ‘stiff’ voice to ‘creaky’ voice to the presence of audible glottal closure in some cases. I will discuss the phenomenon of modified laryngeal tension in detail below; the point here is that this articulatory modification, when present, contributes to the increase in duration of the utterance of scolding talk.

6.3.4 Characteristic rhythm of scolding talk

In scolding talk, the relative timing of syllables within the utterance is modified such that some or all lexically or phrasally stressed syllables are lengthened, while some or all lexically or phrasally unstressed syllables are either: 1) lengthened less than the stressed syllables; 2) unmodified; or 3) compensatorily shortened; in all of these cases, however, the relative timing is altered, or redistributed, at the level of the disyllabic metrical foot. The characteristic modifications in duration and lengthening in scolding talk have already been discussed above; the characteristic rhythm of scolding talk is the result of the modified relationship between the lengthened parts of the utterance and their surrounding parts. Therefore, although this modification in foot-level timing may include the shortening of some syllables, the overall duration of the utterance may still be lengthened through the processes described above.

¹⁶In the case of a voiceless obstruent, the ‘lengthening’ is more accurately the suspension of phonation, but the effect is the same.

6.3.5 Characteristic intonation contour of scolding talk

The characteristic intonation contour of scolding talk involves a cumulative lowering of pitch from the beginning to the end of the utterance, combined with repeated melodic drops in pitch that co-occur with the lengthening of vowels. The difference between the initial pitch point and the final pitch point of the overall contour of the utterance is usually large, as is the difference between the initial and final pitch point on lengthened vowels. In some cases, a brief ascending pitch precedes the longer descending contour across a lengthened vowel, as the speaker prepares the voice for the melodic downdrift. Due to the large degree of lowering of pitch that speakers produce over the course of the utterance, the final pitch level at the end of the utterance is typically at the low end of the speaker's personal pitch range, as in Bejaterisa's example (shown in Figure 6.6); however, if the speaker's initial pitch point is relatively high for her personal range, the final pitch point may not be at the low end of her range, as in Jororinta's example.

6.3.6 Modifications in voice quality in scolding talk

Tokens of scolding talk demonstrate two types of modification in voice quality: increased laryngeal tension and nasalization. Note that neither of these voice qualities is phonologically contrastive in Nanti; nonetheless, these articulatory capacities are part of the Nanti sound system at the level of language in use, and they 'signify' the presence of scolding talk at the level of the utterance.

Increased laryngeal tension in scolding talk seems to be the result of the combination of increased tension in the laryngeal musculature and advancing of the tongue root (See Ladefoged and Maddieson (1996) for a discussion of these articulatory phenomena). This assessment is based on: 1) comparing the sound of scolding talk to similar vocal qualities in other language data; 2) producing the sounds of scolding talk and analyzing the shape of my own vocal tract; and 3) analyzing spec-

trograms of data tokens using Praat.¹⁷ The effects of increased laryngeal tension in scolding talk range from ‘stiff’ voice to ‘creaky’ voice to the presence of audible glottal closure in some cases. The effects of advancing the tongue root include the raising of some vowels, most notably /a/, /aa/, /o/, and /oo/. Note that I have opted to use the term ‘increased laryngeal tension’ instead of ‘laryngealization’ in order to avoid the implication that this phenomenon is restricted to ‘creaky voice’ only.

Nasalization of vowels in scolding talk generally co-occurs with increased laryngeal tension, both phenomena affecting the same syllables within a token of scolding talk. Nasalization is less common than increased laryngeal tension, however. The most common sites for nasalization are the vowel nuclei /a/, /aa/, /o/, and /oo/ in syllables that also contain a nasal consonant, whether in onset or coda position. Note that these same vowels are also the most common site of lengthening, with the result that these vowels in any particular token of talk may be the parts of that token most representative (or most ‘like’) scolding talk. Both increased laryngeal tension and nasalization are demonstrated in Jororinta’s example below.

6.4 Detailed examples of scolding talk

6.4.1 Bejaterisa’s example

Bejaterisa’s example provides two utterances with identical referential content but different ways of speaking: first matter-of-fact talk and then scolding talk. The sentence that she produces in the two utterances is shown in Example (6.1).¹⁸

¹⁷I relied on spectrograms to the greatest extent possible; unfortunately, naturally occurring discourse data is not very ‘clean’ due to ambient noise, and as a result, the corresponding spectrograms are not very ‘clean’ either, rendering fine-grained analysis impossible in many cases.

¹⁸Sound file unique identifier: 050308AC_9_012_BEJ

→ You have five options for listening to examples; which of these options will function will depend on the PDF reader you are using: (1) click the hyperlink below for the embedded file, which may launch the file in your media player; (2) open the embedded file from the list of attachments to the PDF (in Adobe Reader, go to View → Navigation Panels → Attachments); (3) click the URL hyperlink below, which may launch the file in your browser; (4) copy and paste the hyperlink for the URL into your browser, which will play the file through your web browser; or (5) play the MP3 files at:

<http://www.cabeceras.org/beier2010/beier2010dissertation.htm>

→ Play full example from embedded file: beier2010ch6ex1.mp3

→ Play first utterance from embedded file: beier2010ch6ex1mft.mp3

→ Play second utterance from embedded file: beier2010ch6ex1st.mp3

→ Play full example from:

<http://www.cabeceras.org/beier2010/beier2010ch6ex1.mp3>

→ Play first utterance from:

<http://www.cabeceras.org/beier2010/beier2010ch6ex1mft.mp3>

→ Play second utterance from:

<http://www.cabeceras.org/beier2010/beier2010ch6ex1st.mp3>

6.4.1.1 Bejaterisa's scold

(6.1) a. Ika jara pipinkantira.

<i>i-</i>	<i>ka</i>	<i>jara</i>	<i>pi-</i>	<i>pink</i>	<i>-ant</i>	<i>-i</i>	<i>-ra</i>
3mS-	say	NEG.REAL	2S-	be.afraid	-INST	-REAL.I	REL

He said, don't be afraid.



Figure 6.4: This photo was taken on the day this recording was made; Bejaterisa is facing the camera, to the right of the author, and her daughter Nora is on the far right in orange.

b. Metrical stress assignment

(i.ka) ('ja.ra) (pi,piŋ)('kaŋ.ti) <ra>

6.4.1.2 Surrounding social situation

At about noon on March 8, 2005, Lev and I walked over to Bejaterisa's and Ijonisi's *kosena* in the residence group adjacent to ours on the downriver side.¹⁹ We had been

¹⁹At the time, Bejaterisa, about 28, female, was the first and only wife of Migero's oldest son Ijonisi, about 20; their only daughter, Mikajera, was about 18 months old; Bejaterisa's daughter, Nora, was about 10 years old, and her son, Bisako, was about 7, both from her previous relationship

personally invited to come and drink there; at about 10 that morning, Bejaterisa had come to our hut, served us a 3-quart pot full of *oburoki*, and then simply said, *Aityo*. ‘There’s more.’ We promised her we would visit shortly, after eating. When we arrived, a small group was already gathered and Bejaterisa was serving *oburoki* to everyone. Her two daughters, Nora (about 10 years old) and Mikajera (about 18 months old), were also in the *kosena*, and Nora was attending to Mikajera while Bejaterisa attended to the visitors. After Lev and I had been present for about 30 minutes, Mikajera began to fuss and seek out her mother’s attention. Bejaterisa, however, was engaged in serving *oburoki* and responded minimally to Mikajera’s fussing. Observing the disalignment between Bejaterisa and Mikajera, Nora, Lev, and I all attempted to engage Mikajera’s attention so that Bejaterisa could continue her activities. When Mikajera began to attempt to cling to her mother, Bejaterisa became impatient with Mikajera, which upset Mikajera further. In reaction to this, Nora and I, and then Lev too, cajoled Mikajera not to be afraid of the gathered company — a common interactional strategy in Montetoni for attempting to calm a fussy and clinging child, which may work either by drawing an older child’s attention to the social inappropriateness of his or her own behavior, or by simply attracting and engaging a younger child’s attention.

In Mikajera’s case, our attempts to engage her attention were unsuccessful, and she continued to fuss. Bejaterisa then took up our line of interaction and repeated to Mikajera what Lev had just said: *Ika, jara pipinkantira*. ‘He said, don’t be afraid.’ After a second of silence, however, Mikajera uttered another cry, after which Bejaterisa exactly repeated the content her own last utterance, but this time in scolding talk. Note that although Nora and I both had appealed to Mikajera not to be afraid, Bejaterisa recycled Lev’s speech. This reflects a frequently-used strategy in Nanti scolding talk to render the scold more persuasive by framing it

with Tejerina, about 28.

in the viewpoint of an especially authoritative person — in many cases, the child's father; in this case the most involved male. Ironically, in this particular case, Lev's attempts to assuage Mikajera appeared to have the opposite effect, since she fussed more loudly thereafter. It is plausible to infer that Mikajera, at only 18 months of age, found the experience of being directly addressed by an adult man who was not from her residence group more distressing than distracting or convincing.

In this example, we see the joint efforts of three adults and an older sibling to influence the interactional behavior of a small child. Both the child's fussing itself and her (individual-oriented) interference with her mother's (group-oriented) activities are types of behavior that Nanti children are gradually socialized out of; but at 18 months, Mikajera was still in the early stages of socialization. In this particular strip of interaction, three different strategies for influencing Mikajera's behavior are evidenced: first, the older participants each attempted simply to redirect the child's attention and thereby engage her in more socially appropriate behavior. Next, the older participants attempted to eliminate a possible motive for her fussing, framing her behavior as a manifestation of fear and suggesting to her that if she ceased to be afraid, then she would cease to need to fuss. Next, when a series of turns deploying these strategies failed to stop Mikajera's fussing, the small child's mother deployed scolding talk, which did succeed in quieting Mikajera to some degree. At least two readings of Mikajera's response are possible; either the scold itself had the desired effect of guiding Mikajera out of an undesired behavior, or Mikajera was assuaged by the fact of having obtained her mother's direct attention, albeit negative. In either case, this interaction constitutes one more unambiguous and visceral experience for everyone involved that the sounds of scolding talk co-occur with overt, active attempts to induce a behavioral change in the focal addressee.




Figure 6.5: Bejaterisa's matter-of-fact talk.




Figure 6.6: Bejaterisa's scolding talk.

6.4.1.3 Sound patterns in Bejaterisa's speech

This example consists of two sequential utterances of identical referential content, which allows for an especially straightforward comparison of the sound properties of the two utterances. The two utterances are illustrated in Figures 6.5 and 6.6. In the first utterance, Bejaterisa produces nine syllables ((i.ka) ('ja.ra) (pi,piŋ)('kaŋ.ti) <ra>) in 1.7 seconds, while in the second utterance, she produces the same nine syllables in 3.52 seconds, slowing her rate of speaking down by half, while increasing the volume of her voice. She alters the timing of her scolding talk relative to her matter-of-fact talk by substantially lengthening the primarily stressed vowel [i] plus the following consonant [k] of the first word of the utterance, [ika]; and then substantially lengthening all of the segments in the secondarily stressed syllable, [piŋ], and the primarily stressed syllable, [kaŋ] of the final word of the utterance. Table 6.2 shows the length of each syllable in the two utterances based on the segmentations provided in Figures 6.5 and 6.6; note that sounds co-occurrent with Bejaterisa's voice are also visible on the spectrograms.

Special scolding talk forms of negators. One more issue of timing merits mention. In a move that is common in scolding talk and yet metrically anomalous, Bejaterisa lengthens the 'wrong' syllable, that is, the second syllable, of the word *jara* in her scolding talk. This is an example of a more general phenomenon. The two negators *jara* and *tera* in fact each have a special form that is used (possibly exclusively) in scolding talk. Both of these special forms undergo substantial lengthening of the second syllable only (instead of the first syllable), which violates the metrically assigned trochaic stress pattern for two syllable words.

At the same time, since scolding talk is 'about' providing a negative evaluation of some action or state of affairs, *jara* and *tera* are probably the most commonly used words in scolding talk. Many scolding talk utterances consist of just a single word: *jara*, which, as the realis negator in Nanti, is best translated as 'will not' and

Table 6.2: Syllable lengths in Bejaterisa's tokens

Syllable	First utterance	Second Utterance	Difference
i	< .01	0.23	+0.22
ka	.06	0.29	+0.23
ja	.09	0.18	+0.09
ra	0.17	0.46	+0.29
pi	0.23	0.25	+0.04
piN	0.40	0.86	+0.44
kaN	0.29	0.61	+0.32
ti	0.25	0.32	+0.07
ra	0.21	0.32	+0.11
Total time	1.70 sec	3.52 sec	+1.82 sec

Table 6.3: Pitch points and changes in Bejaterisa's utterances

Foot	Matter-of-fact talk			Scolding talk		
	High	Low	Difference	High	Low	Difference
i.ka ja.ra	315	222	93	469	145	324
pi.piŋ	378	247	131	313	189	124
kaŋ.ti	238	222	16	240	145	95

all by itself as scolding talk can convey the message, 'You, scoldee, will not continue to do that which you are doing.' Moreover, because these two very common words have a special and yet high frequency form in the domain of scolding talk, their use can effectively mark or bracket an entire utterance or turn of talk with a negative evaluation, even when the characteristics of scolding talk are less prominent in other parts of the utterance or turn.

Now let us compare the intonation contours of Bejaterisa's two utterances of the sentence (('i.ka) ('ja.ra) (pi.piŋ)('kaŋ.ti)<ra>). The first, matter-of-fact talk, utterance demonstrates two pitch peaks: one on the first syllable of the entire utter-

ance, and the other on the first syllable of the verb complex. The second, scolding talk, utterance demonstrates three pitch peaks: one on the first syllable of the entire utterance (i), one on the first syllable of the verb complex (pi), and another on the primarily stressed syllable of the verb complex (kajt).

In the first utterance, the pitch of Bejaterisa's voice drops step-wise over the series of [a] nuclei, and there is relatively little change in pitch over the duration of each individual syllable nucleus. The highest reliably measurable pitch point²⁰ in the first utterance is 378 Hz, on the first syllable of the third foot, and the lowest reliably measurable pitch point is 222 Hz, on the second syllable of the second and fourth feet, a cumulative difference of 156 Hz.

In the second utterance, the pitch of Bejaterisa's voice also cumulatively drops from the beginning to the end of the utterance; however, the drop is not progressive. Rather, on the first syllable of the first, third, and fourth feet, her pitch rises across the vowel; and then, on the lengthened second syllable of second, third, and fourth feet, her pitch drops across the vowel plus coda consonant. The highest reliably measurable pitch point in the second utterance is 469 Hz, on the first syllable of the first foot, and the lowest reliably measurable pitch point is 145 Hz, on the second syllable of the second and fourth feet, a cumulative difference of 324 Hz. The pitch points and changes are presented in Table 6.3.

6.4.2 Jororinta's example

Jororinta's example illustrates the changes in voice quality associated with scolding talk — nasalization and laryngeal tension — as well as illustrating the prompt actional rather than verbal uptake on the part of the scoldee.²¹

²⁰Because these data were recorded in 'natural' surroundings, the quality of the sound signal varies considerably. The principle obstacle to reliably measuring pitch points is the presence of multiple sound sources, all of which are represented in the spectrogram. In all cases, I have done the best I could do under the circumstances presented by the recording.

²¹Sound file unique identifier: 000703A_009_JRN_amp.

6.4.2.1 Jororinta's scold

→ Play example from embedded file: beier2010ch6ex2.mp3

→ Play example from:

<http://www.cabeceras.org/beier2010/beier2010ch6ex2.mp3>

(6.2) a. Pinoshimaitiro gu.

pi- noshi -mai -t- -i -ro gu
2- pull -CL:THREAD -EPT -REAL.I -3mO look
You're thread-pulling it, look.

b. (pi,n₂) (fi'mai)ti<ro> 'gu_i

6.4.2.2 Jororinta's matter-of-fact talk

→ Play example from embedded file: beier2010ch6ex3.mp3

→ Play example from:

<http://www.cabeceras.org/beier2010/beier2010ch6ex3.mp3>

(6.3) a. Noguntetaka na^{ro} ijatira Bikoto^{ro} ishigaji.

no- gunte -t -ak -a naro i- ja -t -i
1S- see -EPT -PERF -REAL.A 1S.PRO 3mS- go -EPT -REAL.I
-ra Bikotoro i- shig -aj -i
-REL Bikotoro 3mS- run -ADL -REAL.I
I saw Bikotoro's leaving, he ran off.

b. (no,gun)(te.ta)<ka> ('na.ro) ('i.ja)ti<ra> ('bii.ko)to<ro> (i,fi)(g_{ai})

6.4.2.3 Surrounding social situation

On July 3, 2000, I participated in an interaction that included Lev, Migero,²² and Jororinta.²³ We were all in Anteres' *kosena* conversing and Jororinta's daughter Otirija, about 2 at the time, was with her. At one point, Migero was addressing Jororinta at length and the rest of us adults were listening to him. Otirija, standing near her mother, began to tug at the edge of a piece of clothing. When Jororinta noticed what Otirija was doing, she exclaimed, *Pinoshimaitero, gu*. 'You're thread-pulling it, look!' Upon hearing this exclamation, Otirija stopped touching the cloth. In this recorded example, we can hear Migero's voice in the background; he continues speaking, unfazed by Jororinta's exclamation. Despite being the addressee of Migero's talk, she was able to execute an utterance of scolding talk without interrupting the flow of the ongoing interactional frame.

The referential content of Jororinta's utterance is descriptive, not evaluative. The main verb complex of the clause, *pinoshimaitiro* is marked with realis mood, which tells us that Jororinta is asserting that the thread-pulling is occurring, as opposed to suggesting that it might occur. Jororinta's final exclamation, *gu*, 'look!' tells us that she intends to direct Otirija's attention toward her own actions; the interjection *gu* is used frequently by Nantis to direct another person's attention toward something in their immediate environment, and is not necessarily a warning or admonition, although it does usually convey a sense of immediacy; in usage, it constitutes a mild imperative that is in principle appropriate in any social relationship.

Jororinta does not speak loudly when she scolds Otirija. I attribute this to two factors: first, Otirija, the sole and focal addressee of this utterance, is very near to her; therefore, Jororinta doesn't need to project her voice over a distance

²²Migero, male, approximately 48 years of age; at the time, *peresetente* of Montetoni

²³Jororinta, female, approximately 46 years of age; only wife of Josukaro, a well-respected man in Montetoni.

to be heard by Otirija; second, by speaking at a low volume, she is less likely to interrupt or distract the already ongoing conversation. Although Jororinta speaks simultaneously with Migeró, her talk does not compete with his, but rather is spoken ‘under’ Migeró’s ongoing turn and constitutes an unrelated parallel interaction directed only at Otirija.

The utterance in example (6.4.2.2) is Jororinta’s next utterance after the scolding talk of example (6.4.2.1), following it by 4 seconds. She makes this statement after the last two seconds of Migeró’s turn-in-progress, and after two seconds of silence has elapsed. This example is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5.

6.4.2.4 Sound patterns in Jororinta’s example

Because this utterance is a secondary interaction, carried out simultaneously with another ongoing interaction, Jororinta’s voice volume is roughly at the level of her usual speaking voice. The child that she is addressing is at her side, and so she is able to speak and be heard by the child without interrupting Migeró’s ongoing talk (heard in the background). Jororinta’s overall rate of speaking for this utterance is slower than she usually speaks. For example, she took 2.6 seconds to produce the 7 syllables of this utterance, while she took 3.9 seconds to produce the 17 audible syllables in example 6.4.2.2; moreover, Jororinta has clipped at least two syllables in the latter utterance, while every syllable is fully produced and enunciated in this example. The second, third, fourth, and final syllables of this example are particularly long, and she lengthens both vowels and consonants; notice how she lengthens the [j] of the third syllable and the [m] of the fourth syllable, as well as the [ɔ] of the second syllable, the diphthong [ai] of the third syllable and the diphthong [ui] of the final syllable. At the same time, Jororinta alters the relative timing of the utterance by compensatorily shortening the third, fifth, and sixth syllables of the utterance.

Jororinta's intonation contour in this utterance is relatively flat for a strip of scolding talk. Her pitch ranges from 413 Hz to 300 Hz, a total range of 113 Hz, and hovers around 370 Hz for the first four syllables of the utterance. Characteristically, however, she does drop her pitch across most of the most sonorant segments that she lengthens, including the [ɔ] of the second syllable, the [m] of the fourth syllable, and the diphthong [ui] of the final syllable. The most salient decending contour takes place over the course of the 0.6 seconds of the final word of the utterance — which is a single lengthened heavy syllable that constitutes a complete interjection; she first raises her pitch from 373 Hz to 405 Hz and then finishes the utterance below 300 Hz.

In this utterance, Jororinta adds both nasalization and laryngeal tension to her speech production. Increased laryngeal tension is audible on each of the lengthened syllables of the utterance, which are the second, fourth and final syllables. The constriction of her laryngeal musculature results in significant creakiness on the second and final syllables, and the advancement of the tongue root alters the quality of the /o/ of the second syllable. In addition, she lightly nasalizes the two vowels that follow nasal consonants — the /o/ of the second syllable and the /ai/ of the fourth syllable — as well as the short /i/ of the third syllable (which precedes a nasal consonant).

Gauging by the rapid actional response of the scolded child — Otirija stopped the criticized action before Jororinta's scold was even fully uttered — the manner of Jororinta's scold conveys a sense of urgency. Based on comparison among numerous tokens of scolding talk in my data set, it seems that the greater the modifications of voice quality, the more promptly the scoldee responds.

6.4.3 Bibijón's example

Bibijón's example illustrates the gradience of scolding talk across an extended turn of talk, as well as illustrating the place of scolding talk in the socialization of Nanti children to adult expectations. In this three-party interaction, two parents simultaneously use scolding talk to scold their child. In addition, this example includes a transition from matter-of-fact talk to scolding talk over the course of a single turn of talk by one of the participants, Erejón.²⁴

6.4.3.1 Bibijón gets scolded

→ Play example from embedded file: beier2010ch6ex4.mp3

→ Play example from:

<http://www.cabeceras.org/beier2010/beier2010ch6ex4.mp3>

(6.4)

NOTE: *Bibijón (BIB) and her sister are conversing when Erejón (ERE) begins to speak. Chabera (CHA) interjects in line (d).*

a. ERE: Neje maika nonej^ˆi inka^ˆjara, oga, (1.0)

Yeah just recently I saw, that one,

b. ERE: irento oga omagamento,

her sister's 'magamento',

c. ERE: obari↓gakero oka jenoku onta.

she knocked it down from above.

d. CHA: ↑Gajiro ↓oka.

Give that back.

e. BIB: ↑Tera.

²⁴Sound file unique identifier: 050311C.004.ERE

No (it isn't the case that I took it.)

f. ERE: ↓Onkante, nobetsikaji, aryo onkante, nobetsikaji.

She'll say, 'I fixed it', indeed she'll say, 'I fixed it.'

g. BIB: ↑Inka inka inka n- intsipa.

He will say he'll say he'll say n- 'intsipa' (fruit).

6.4.3.2 Surrounding social situation

On March 11, 2005, I went out visiting (*kamoso*) in the late afternoon, as I often did, and ended up spending a while, as I often did, in the *kosena* of Erejón and Chabera.²⁵ At that time, Chabera's sister Sara, her husband Aripóns, and their four children were staying in the *kosena*, having recently arrived in Montetoni from Pirijasánteni. During that particular visit, a large group of us were sitting together near the fire in the *kosena*, including Chabera, Erejón, and several of their children. One of their daughters, Bibijón, at about nine years old, was at the stage in her life when Nanti children's behavior is under the most intensive and least tolerant scrutiny. I have observed many Nanti children go through a social phase, at roughly this age, in which their parents' attitudes and comments convey the sense that "everything is their fault"; their behavior is often overtly criticized; and random, minor mishaps are frequently blamed on them. It seems a difficult social position to be in, and during this phase, children rapidly improve their skills at defending their own actions and/or redirecting blame towards someone else.

As this example begins, Bibijón and one of her sisters are interacting when Erejón, Bibijón's father, begins to speak. He comments on Bibijón's actions earlier in the sleeping hut, addressing Chabera but informing everyone present he had

²⁵Erejón, male, approximately 43 years of age, and Chabera, female, approximately 38 years of age, have been partners since they were teenagers, and have 8 living children whose ages ranged from 3 to about 24 in 2005. Erejón has only ever had one wife, Chabera.

seen Bibijón knock down her sister's *magamento*, or mosquito net.²⁶ This first utterance frames his subsequent talk as a first-hand report of something that he himself saw earlier. Over the course of his first utterance, he gradually increases the characteristics of scolding talk, which frame the event as undesirable. Note that the referential content of Erejón's turn is not in itself explicitly evaluative, but rather simply describes something Erejón saw Bibijón do. The evaluation, the scold are conveyed by his way of speaking; the identical referential content said using a different way of speaking could as easily convey humor, praise, surprise, etc. without irony.

While Erejón is speaking, Chabera also begins to speak. Saying, *Gajiro oka* 'Give that back', she scolds Bibijón to give back to her little brother the bit of food she has taken from him.

At the end of the example, the beleaguered Bibijón responds to Chabera in a defensive way,²⁷ contesting Chabera's implication that she took something from him by saying, *Tera*. which, in this context, can be glossed as, 'No, it isn't the case that I took it, and therefore I don't need to give anything 'back'.'²⁸ She blusters

²⁶The word *magamento*, is the name, borrowed from Matsigenka, for the cotton or synthetic mosquito nets that have been brought to Montetoni by various outsiders, including Cabeceras Aid Project. The *magamento* is a rectangular box of cloth, open only on the bottom, which is suspended by its four top corners and drapes to the floor or ground. From the Nanti perspective, the *magamento* has numerous desirable qualities. It provides privacy and warmth while sleeping, as well as protecting its inhabitants from insects, vampire bats, rodents, and other biting creatures. As such, the *magamento* is a much valued imported item and is well-cared-for by its owner. When vacant, the sides of the *magamento* are usually tucked up over the top to keep them out of the way and open the floor space for other uses. If Bibijón knocked down her sister's *magamento*, she presumably caused the tucked-up sides to fall by bumping against the *magamento* in some way.

²⁷The sound characteristics of Bibijón's way of speaking in this utterance are common to self-defending speech; this way of speaking remains to be explored in future research.

²⁸*Tera* is the realis negator in Nanti, and negates a proposition corresponding to co-occurrent or past experiential time. Bibijón's use of *tera* negates the immediately prior utterance and its proposition, that is, Chabera's assertion that Bibijón give back something, which entails that she took something away in the first place. Her use of *tera* constitutes a denial of Chabera's framing, which nullifies the validity of Chabera's directive and exonerates her from following it. If instead Bibijón had wanted to state a refusal to follow Chabera's directive, she would have said, *jara*, 'No, I will not do so (in the immediate future).'

that her little brother would say, in her defense, (*inka*) that he is eating *intsipa* fruit.

Meanwhile, Erejón anticipates Bibijón's reaction to his own comment, asserting that she will excuse her action by claiming to have fixed it: *Onkante, nobetsika*, 'She'll say, I fixed it'. Note that he does not anticipate that she will deny the truth of his original comment. Moreover, by projecting that Bibijón will take a defensive stance in her response, he reinforces the assumption that his first utterance will be interpreted by her and others as a criticism (rather than a description or admiration, for example.) In this line as well, Erejón uses scolding talk, which continues to frame Bibijón's actions in a negative light; note that had he not used scolding talk in this utterance, Bibijón and other could possibly have interpreted her reparative action as making up for her original transgression. Instead, by using scolding talk while presenting Bibijón's possible reply, he expresses disapproval of that very reply; thus, Erejón scolds Bibijón for something she has not even yet done.

6.4.3.3 Sound patterns in Erejón's speech

In the first line of Example (6.4), Erejón speaks in matter-of-fact talk (see Chapter 4). In 1.2 seconds, he produces 10 syllables of nearly uniform length (each about 0.10 seconds), while clipping 3 more syllables. He uses a nearly flat intonation contour with slight downdrift at the end of the fourth, eighth, and tenth syllables. In this strip, his pitch hovers near 143 Hz, extending over a pitch range of 45 Hz, from a maximum of 157 Hz to a minimum of 122 Hz. We will use this strip as our baseline for contrasts with his subsequent speech.

In line (b), he slows his rate of speech and lengthens the primarily stressed syllables of the two content words, producing all 10 syllables in 1.4 seconds. He uses a downdrifting intonation contour, beginning at 181 Hz and ending at 110 Hz, extending in this strip over a range of 87 Hz. His lowest pitch point, 94 Hz, is at the end of the word *irento*, and during the production of both the second (*ren*) and

seventh syllable (*ma*) of the line, he slightly raises his pitch before dropping it.

In line (c), he intensifies his scolding talk. He slows his speech even more, producing the next 13 syllables in 2.6 seconds, and he does not clip a single syllable. He drops his pitch successively lower over the eight syllables of *obariyakero oka* — nearly reaching the bottom of his personal pitch range — and then raises his pitch abruptly in the first syllable of *jenoku*, only to drop again to a very low point by the end of this line.²⁹ In line (f), he continues to use scolding talk, but his speech is somewhat faster and his intonation contours less steep, perhaps as a response to the intensity of the simultaneous interchange between Chabera and Bibijón, whose topic concerns an unfolding event. Nonetheless, the syllable /o/ in the two tokens of *nobetsikaji* have the characteristic small rise followed by a steep descent in pitch.

In addition, Erejón modifies his voice quality to ‘creaky voice’ by increasing laryngeal tension at the end of line (c) and in line (f). Specifically, he advances his tongue root enough to change the vowel quality of the /o/ (this modification is most noticeable on the two tokens of the syllable /no/); and he tenses his laryngeal musculature enough to produce creakiness in line (f).

While Erejón is speaking, in line (d) Chabera simultaneously addresses Bibijón with a directive, *Gajiro oka*, using intense scolding talk. Speaking very loudly and slowly, she takes 1.8 seconds to produce the five syllables of her utterance, and drops her pitch from a starting point of about 357 Hz on the first /a/ of *gajiro* to an ending point of about 182 Hz on the final /a/ of *oka*. She also alters the quality of the two /o/ vowel nuclei by advancing the tongue root.

6.4.4 Maroja’s example

Maroja’s example illustrates the importance of evaluating the addressee’s uptake in assessing and calibrating the communicative force of scolding talk. In this example,

²⁹I have not provided pitch measurements because the other simultaneous talk makes measurements of Erejón’s speech impossible.

Maroja uses eight turns at talk to engage her daughter Márota in a desired course of action, and she uses increasing degrees of scolding talk across the first seven of these turns in order to gain her daughter's attention. It is only after she has secured her daughter's undivided attention that she returns her voice to matter-of-fact talk to make her request one final time, at which point Márota does as asked.³⁰

In this example, Maroja (MAO) addresses her daughter Márota (MTA). The two were co-present inside their large *kosena*, but they were about 10 feet apart and, crucially, too far apart for Maroja to easily engage Márota's attention or eye gaze. Prior to this interchange, Maroja had been silent for about 30 seconds and Márota had been silent for almost 3 minutes. Neither was participating in any other interactional frame at the time that Maroja began this sequence. The total time of this interaction is 26 seconds.

6.4.4.1 Maroja's scold

→ Play example from embedded file: beier2010ch6ex5.mp3

→ Play example from:

<http://www.cabeceras.org/beier2010/beier2010ch6ex5.mp3>

(6.5) a. MAO: Shh. Pirato, kibatiro oga.

pirato kʰiwa:tiro oga

Shh (shooing chicken away). (This) plate, wash it, hey.

b. 1.4 seconds

c. MAO: Ñeje.

nʰehẽ

Look here.

d 0.4 seconds

³⁰Sound file unique identifier: 050322C_015_MAO

- e. MAO: Kiba↓tiro.
 k̂jiwa:tiro
Wash it.
- f. MTA: ↑Ñe^je
Look (under the breath, addressee unclear).
- g. MAO: Taje.↓
 tajē
Come here.
- h. MTA: ↑Ñe^je.
(under the breath, addressee unclear)
- i. MAO: Noka, kibatiro, ta↓je.
 nɔ:kə: kibatiro tahe
I say, wash it, come here.
- j. MTA: ↑Taje.
Come here (speaking to a small child).
- k. 1.4 seconds
- l. MAO: Ta^je inkajara, ↓kibagetake.
 ta iŋka::ra k̂jiwaḡzetak̂se
Come here right now, wash these up.
- m. MTA: ↑A::ka.
Here (addressee unclear, probably to child, completing previous utterance).
- n. 1.9 seconds
- o. MAO: Inkajara.
 iŋkə::ra
Right now.

- p. MTA: Je? Jara nokajati.
Huh? I am not going bathing.
- q. MAO: Aka kibageshobatiro.
 aka k̂fibaḡzeḡsowatiro
Right here wash them all up.
- r. MTA: Je?
Huh?
- s. MAO: Kibagetiro, pirato. (2.0)
 k̂jiwaḡzetiro pirato
Wash them up, (these) plates.

6.4.4.2 Surrounding social situation

On March 23, 2005, I went to visit Maroja in her *kosena*. Her daughters Anita and Márota were present, as were a few other people from our residence group, and when I arrived, all were conversing sporadically about recent visitors. During that conversation, and throughout my visit, Maroja was busy with domestic tasks. After I had been present for about four minutes, she sought assistance from her daughter Márota (who was about 13 at the time), asking her to wash a plate (line a). Maroja used a directive, ‘wash the plate’, while looking toward Márota, but she did not explicitly specify her addressee, making it excusable for her daughter, who was not already looking at her mother, to ignore her. Note, however, that even this first utterance is slightly tinged with scolding talk, which signals that Maroja’s focal addressee is much lower than she is in local social prominence. In fact, Márota eluded responding to her mother for several turns, as she was busy (or busying herself) with another small child who was present (lines f, h, j, and m). As a result, Maroja addressed Márota seven times (lines a, c, e, g, i, l, and o), before she directly acknowledged her mother (line p); Maroja then gave her directive twice more (lines



Figure 6.7: This photo of Márota, left, and Maroja, right, was taken a few weeks before the recording analyzed here.

q and s) before Márota complied.

It is reasonable to infer from line (p) that Márota assumed her mother wanted her to go wash plates down at the river, a much larger commitment than washing plates in the *kosena* (which seems to have been Maroja's intention), an inference that could explain Márota's persistence in not attending to her mother's words. Márota's reply, *Jara nokajati* 'I am not going bathing', reflects the fact that Nanti women usually engage in both bathing themselves and washing household items when they make trips to the river. I am certain that Márota *heard* her mother's words in

every turn, given the spatial arrangement of the *kosena* and the volume of Maroja's voice; I am also certain that for several turns she felt comfortable disattending them, and her *lack* of uptake served as her turns, between Maroja's successive turns of requesting/demanding Márota's attention and cooperation. Whatever Maroja's original intention, she eventually made a more specific request in line (q) that Márota was willing to attend to, which she acknowledges by looking at her mother and responding to her, in line (r). Finally, in line (s), Maroja issued a directive that Márota acted upon.

As Maroja repeated her directive over the course of her first four turns, she gradually increased the sound properties of scolding talk in her utterance, until Márota finally responded to her directly verbally. Once Márota cooperated by giving her mother her direct attention, Maroja dropped nearly all of the characteristics of scolding talk and stated her directive one last time, successfully, using matter-of-fact talk.

6.4.4.3 Sound patterns in Maroja's scolding talk

The characteristics of scolding talk that are most salient in Maroja's speech in this strip are a progressive slowing of her rate of speech; lengthening of primarily stressed syllables; dramatic descents in intonation contour across lengthened vowels; some nasalization; and increased laryngeal tension, which changes the quality of many of the /a/ vowel nuclei in her speech.

In line (a), Maroja utters her directive to Márota for the first time. Maroja utters these nine syllables in 1.41 seconds, giving each syllable an average length of 0.16 seconds. Then a 1.43 second pause occurs between Maroja's first and second utterances, during which time Márota does not respond as Maroja expects. Over her next four utterances (lines c, e, g, and i) Maroja's speech progressively slows, as her average syllable length increases to 0.28 seconds. Then, in line (o), after another

1.9 second pause during which Márota does not respond as Maroja expects, Maroja reaches her slowest rate of speech, producing four syllables in 1.16 seconds, giving an average syllable length of .29 seconds. Once Márota finally responds directly to her mother in line (p), Maroja increases her rate of speech; her syllable length averaging 0.20 and 0.22 seconds respectively in lines (q) and (s).

In addition to these utterance level changes in her rate of speech, Maroja alters the relative timing of her speech in the way we expect for scolding talk, such that metrically primarily stressed syllables are lengthened the most substantially, while unstressed and extrametrical syllables are lengthened less, not lengthened at all, or even shortened. This change in relative timing is especially clear in the lengthened /a/ of the verb *kibatiro* in lines (e) and (i); and in the lengthened [aa] of the adverb *inkajara* in lines (l) and (o).

Maroja adds quite a bit of laryngeal tension over the course of her turns. Note, however, that Maroja's matter-of-fact talk tends towards creakiness, especially when she is speaking quietly. As a result, it is the advancing of the tongue root that is most distinctive in her scolding talk. This change is most clear when she uses the self quotation *noka* in line (i), *noka*, and in the two tokens of *inkajara* 'right now' in lines (l) and (o).

In addition, Maroja uses two short utterances, in lines (c) and (g), specifically to call Márota's attention, without repeating the unanswered directive. In each of these utterances, she uses a dramatic intonation contour on the first stressed syllable and adds nasalization to three of the four vowels, as is indicated in the text of the example above.

6.4.5 Concluding remarks

Each of these examples has provided especially clear illustrations of specific aspects of the multi-faceted phenomenon of scolding talk. It is possible for this kind of

differentiation and contrast among tokens of scolding talk precisely because scolding talk is a gradient phenomenon, in which different characteristics may be differentially realized over the course of an utterance or a turn.

Because scolding talk occurs in many of the same activity frames and interactivity frames in which matter-of-fact talk is also used, in my view scolding talk contrasts strikingly with matter-of-fact talk in the degree of speaker orientation it often conveys. I claimed in both Chapters 2 and 5 that Nanti individuals to be very aware of and attentive to the relationships among themselves, their interlocutors, and the intersubjective nature of their interactions. The unmistakable differences between the sound patterns of scolding talk and matter-of-fact talk constitute some of the best evidence, in my view, for the salience of this aspect of day-to-day interactions.

Chapter 7

Hunting talk

7.1 Introduction

During the period of this study, the telling of hunting stories was one of the most frequent — and most entertaining — components of Nanti social interactions in Montetoni.¹ Whether as part of everyday conversations or as part of multi-party banter during community-wide feasts, recounting the exploits of the hunters and the hunted was a constant topic of interest among Nantis. As small-scale horticulturalists, Nantis relied on hunted animals, birds, and fish as the best (and most valued) sources of protein in their diets. As such, the activities of hunting — and a man's potential status as a successful hunter — were of central economic as well as social importance in Montetoni. Yet almost all hunting activities took place outside of the village, and most hunting was done by solitary men or by small (mixed sex and age) groups of silent individuals, with the result that many of a hunter's most exciting moments during the hunt went unobserved. Without the tellings of hunting stories back in the village, then, hunting would have remained a highly individualized

¹A verbal interaction is always a type of social interaction, but a social interaction is not always a verbal interaction; see discussion of nested units of analysis in Chapter 4.



Figure 7.1: During the period of this study, men often hunted and fished alone. In this photo, taken in March 2005, †Oras is leaving the village alone to go hunting, with his bow and arrows in his left hand and his machete in his right hand.

experience. Hunting stories and hunting talk were widely-used means for introducing these individualized experiences into the arena of shared knowledge (see Figure 7.1).²

Not surprisingly, the content of hunting stories focused on the details, both large and small, of the story teller's experiences while hunting game for food. But well-told hunting stories consisted of much more than a mere report of events. They were told using a characteristic way of speaking that I call hunting talk. As with other Nanti ways of speaking, hunting talk is identifiable by the occurrence of certain sound properties or characteristics within the domain of an individual utterance. I will discuss these characteristics in detail in this chapter.

²I echo Voloshinov's observation (1986[1973]:85) that our experiences as individuals are already organized in 'social' terms; I mean here that 'individualized' experiences are introduced into inter-individual, or intersubjective, social experience; see Chapter 3 for further discussion.

Throughout this discussion, I will maintain a distinction between hunting stories and hunting talk as two discrete levels of organization in Nanti communicative activity. A hunting story is a type of interactional frame, while hunting talk is one of the component elements of the interactional frame, constituted at the level of the utterance. Thus, a ‘hunting story’ is any narrative *about* hunting³ — long or short, involving many interactional turns or few, told by one or many individuals. A ‘hunting story’ may narrate the actions or activities of one or many individuals; it may include just one or multiple perspectives; and in principal it may be told using any way of speaking. In contrast, the sound form of *hunting talk* is a distinct way of speaking that was typically deployed by Nantis in the telling of a hunting story, but was also deployed at the level of single utterance or a short utterance chain within other kinds of talk and interactional frames.⁴

In this chapter, I describe the sound properties of Nanti hunting talk that set this way of speaking apart from other Nanti ways of speaking. This description is supported by a set of examples from hunting stories that were told as part of naturally occurring interactions recorded in Montetoni between 2003 and 2005.

I argue that hunting talk was a recognized and recognizable way of speaking within the discursive ecology⁵ of Montetoni to the degree that the following characteristics occurred within a given utterance:

1. The use of the upper end of the speaker’s total pitch range;
2. The alteration of the setting of the vocal cords relative to airflow, resulting in breathy phonation or devoicing;

³By this I mean that, for the participants, as evidenced by the nature of their sequential contributions, the narrative was more ‘about’ the experience of the hunt than it was ‘about’ anything else.

⁴For example, an individual recounting a personal narrative might embed a strip of hunting talk in that narrative without shifting the entire interactional frame to a hunting story; see Maira’s example in §7.4.4.

⁵See Chapter 3 for a discussion of the notion of a discursive ecology.




Figure 7.2: The pitch contour (in light blue, produced by Praat); relative timing (segmented by me, timed in seconds); and pitch peaks and valleys (tagged by me in Hertz) are illustrated for the word *samaniti*, extracted from line (e) of Example (7.3) of Migeró’s hunting talk. The sound pattern illustrated here is prototypical of hunting talk. Note the steep descent in pitch across the first lengthened /a/, the relative shortness of the subsequent vowels, and the nearness of the final pitch point on the final /i/ to the initial pitch point on the first /a/.

3. The modification of relative timing within an intonation unit within the utterance, characterizable as the relative lengthening of one or more segments of one lexically (specified) or metrically (assigned) stressed syllable (onset consonant, vowel nucleus, coda consonant, and adjacent onset consonant are all candidates), followed by a relative shortening of the vowel nucleus of subsequent unstressed syllables within the intonation unit;
4. The use of a hunting talk-specific intonation contour over that same intonation

unit, characterizable as a gradated⁶ high-to-mid or high-to-low fall on the lengthened syllable, then a step-wise mid-to-high or low-to-high rise on the final syllable or syllables of the intonation unit; this contour is illustrated in Figure 7.2.

5. The co-extensive co-occurrence of this relative timing pattern plus this specific intonation contour over one intonation unit constitutes one cycle of hunting talk; one utterance or one turn of hunting talk usually consists of several sequential cycles.
6. These characteristics are summarized in Table 7.1.

As discussed in detail in Chapter 3, each of these individual characteristics may be observed, to varying degrees, in other utterances that don't count as hunting talk. This is a reflection of the combinatorial power of component linguistic resources. The crucial point here is that it is the co-occurrence of these characteristics — or a sufficient subset of them — in the appropriate domain, the utterance, that renders hunting talk recognizable and interpretable as such. As with all Nanti ways of speaking, because of the combinatorial potential of individual characteristics, a given utterance can be more 'like' or less 'like' hunting talk along a continuum or axis of realization at whose terminus we approach (conceptually) a prototype, or (concretely) an 'exemplary' token, of hunting talk.⁷

7.1.1 Characteristic content of hunting stories and hunting talk

As the name suggests, hunting talk is tightly linked to specific types of referential content. This way of speaking occurred in utterances whose topic was some aspect of the culturally significant activity of 'hunting', defined here in the relatively broad

⁶By 'gradated' I mean a gradual transition from high to low, passing through intermediate pitches, in the production of a single segment.

⁷See Chapter 3 for a detailed discussion of prototypes.

Table 7.1: Characteristics of Nanti hunting talk

Appropriate activity frames	Embedded in an already-active interactional frame.	§7.2.3
Preferred activity frames	Intra- and inter-household visiting events; sitting drinking in early hours of a feast.	§7.2.3
Appropriate interactional frames	Embedded in an already active conversational frame.	§7.2.3
Preferred interactional frames	Embedded in hunting stories; embedded in dyadic and multi-party conversations; embedded in <i>shitatsi</i> banter.	§7.2.3
Appropriate participant frameworks	Speaker was a participant in, or first-hand observer of, narrated event; Parallel and overlapping turns by multiple speakers are common; Back-channelling from hearers is common and preferred.	§7.2.1
Voice volume	Speaker preference.	
Pitch range	Wide range, typically from high end to middle of speaker's total range; less typically from high end to low end of speaker's total range.	§7.3.2
Rate of speaking	Often faster than previous turn or turn in progress.	§7.3.4
Rhythm and relative timing	Lengthening of lexically or metrically stressed syllable of intonation unit; subsequent vowel nuclei of intonation unit are relatively shorter.	§7.3.4
Voice qualities	Alteration of the setting of the vocal cords relative to airflow, resulting in breathy phonation or devoicing.	§7.3.5
Intonation contour	Gradated high-to-low or high-to-mid fall on the lengthened syllable, then a step-wise low-to-high or mid-to-high rise on the final syllable or syllables of the intonation unit.	§7.3.3
Cyclicity	One intonation unit of altered relative timing plus altered intonation contour constitutes on cycle of hunting talk.	§7.3.1



Figure 7.3: Jerónima and Jororentino are pictured here in April 2005 at the river's edge, decomposing a *shintori* 'collared peccary', one of the most commonly hunted animals during the period of this study. Notice the knife in Jerónima's right hand; the introduction of metal tools has made this task much easier. Traveling in large herds as they do and yet very fleet of foot, *shintori* were the topic of many hunting stories and many turns of hunting talk in Montetoni (as in Aroyo's example in §7.4.3).

sense of 'actively pursuing a living thing in order to capture or kill it'. Nanti men hunted many species of birds, fish and mammals, including tapirs, peccaries, deer, monkeys, and agoutis, with either bows and arrows or task-specific traps or nets. Women and children also participated in many aspects of hunting and trapping, and all Nantis engaged in diverse types of wild-gathering of edible plants and insects.

The hunting stories into which hunting talk was usually embedded touched on a wide variety of types of hunting experiences. At one extreme, a hunt could include many individuals coordinating their actions to bring down as many peccaries



Figure 7.4: Hunting talk and hunting stories were commonplace during the early hours of feasting, as part of the interactional frame I call *shitatsi banter*, as pictured here in March 2005. Notice that men were clustered in the center of the hut near the cooking fire, and women were seated around their perimeter. Notice also the array of pots, full of *oburoki*, at the top center of the photo.

as possible from a panicked herd (see Figure 7.3). In such cases, multiple narrators would comment on their own as well as on other individuals' roles in the shared event, thus producing a lengthy co-narration that juxtaposes multiple perspectives on the single overarching event. At the other extreme, a lone individual would unexpectedly come across a target and attempt to capture or kill it. In these cases, the hunting story would privilege a single perspective on the entire event.

In general, both the length of a hunting story and the quantity of hunting talk used in its narration were proportional to the desirability of the prey and the level of effort expended by the narrator. I make this generalization based on correlations among narrative length, quantity of hunting talk used over the course of the narrative, actual referential content in the narrative that overtly expresses the

desirability of the hunted and the efforts of the hunter, and frequency of repetition of specific words or phrases conveying details of the narrated experience.⁸ The degree of surprise, uncertainty, and excitement involved in the hunt; the probability of failure to capture the prey due to its unpredictable behavior; and the degree of a hunter's success in the narrated event, all generally showed a positive correlation with both the quantity of and the intensity with which hunting talk was deployed as part of their actual description. Thus, for example, a lengthy hunt of a herd of peccaries resulted in more elaborate and detailed stories, including more and lengthier strips of hunting talk, than did a narrative about a successful expedition to find and capture edible caterpillars. Nonetheless, any moment of intense activity that was intended to acquire a desired food source is potential material for hunting talk by the participants. Variations in the specific, concrete realizations of hunting talk within a hunting story are possible for two distinct reasons; first, hunting talk may be produced in some but not all lexemes, clauses, utterances, or turns of a hunting story's narration; and second (as discussed at length in §7.3), each of the sound characteristics of hunting talk can be realized independently of the others, resulting in tokens of hunting talk that are more, or less, like a prototypical instance of hunting talk.

As part of the interactional development of a hunting story, its co-narrators at times contrasted their own unique points of view on an event with the points of view given by others who were present. These contrasts could be either implicit or explicit; that is, not only would each narrator convey what he specifically saw and did, but he might also use a turn of talk to foreground and contrast his unique spatial, temporal, and evaluative perspective on the event, relative to the perspective given by another narrator (as in Jabijero's example).⁹

⁸See §7.3.6 for further discussion of the use of parallelisms in the development and elaboration of hunting stories and hunting talk.

⁹Framing this in different terms, we can benefit from the distinction between 'visual' perspec-

7.2 The social life of hunting talk

7.2.1 Participant frameworks

7.2.1.1 Typical participants in hunting talk

Hunting talk was a way of speaking used most often by adult men. That said, it was not uncommon for everyone who participated in a hunting event to participate in telling stories about the event to others, and to deploy strips of hunting talk to convey their participation and individualized perspectives on the events. Hunting talk was most often and most fluently used by senior men (as in the example from Migero); followed, in terms of frequency and fluency, by high status young adult men (as in the example from Jirero); other young adult men; adult women (as in the example from Maira); *korakona* (teenagers) (as in the example from Aroyo); and lastly, children. In view of that generalization, it is interesting to note that the transition for many Nanti males from social recognition as a *korakona* to social recognition as an adult was linked to both their increasing hunting prowess and their ability to talk about it effectively using this way of speaking.¹⁰ We will return to this theme in our discussion of Aroyo's example in §7.4.3.

7.2.1.2 Participant turns and turn-taking

Hunting stories in general, as well as particular strips of hunting talk, were — like most other forms of Nanti public talk¹¹ — often produced by multiple parties who are speaking either simultaneously or with significant overlap among utterances.

tive, represented in speech through reference to spatial attributes of subject, objects, and their environment — for example, *The monkey was directly above me in the tree.* — and 'evaluative' perspective, which assigns *value* to attributes of subjects, objects, and aspects of their environment — for example, *I had a much better shot at that monkey than Shanebo had.*

¹⁰See Chapter 2 for a discussion of life stages in Nanti society.

¹¹By 'public talk' I mean talk designed to be heard and potentially acknowledged by anyone present at the scene; see Chapter 2 for a lengthy discussion of 'public talk' in the context of Nanti society in Montetoni.

In multi-party interactions in Nanti society in general, simultaneous and overlapping talk was not only appropriate, in fact it constituted an indicator of successful communication (see Chapter 2 for more information). Likewise, simultaneous and overlapping speech in hunting stories typically built up (rather than broke down) the turn-taking structure of the interaction, as illustrated in Jirero's example, (7.1.b to c, and 7.1.e to f).

Typically, every hunting story has a principal narrator, who maintains the narrative thread that runs through the entire hunting story, to which other participants respond and add. In many cases, such as in the examples from Jirero (Example 7.1) and Migero (Example 7.3), only one narrative thread was being spun at a time. In other cases, however, especially in the interactional frame of *shitatsi* banter, the simultaneous and overlapping speech of hunting story-telling decomposed into more than one running narrative thread, as several narrators shared the floor, each spinning out his own narrative thread, with responses and additions from other participants. These narrative threads were always relevant to one another to some degree — recounting the same event, the same day, or a similar encounter with a similar prey, for example — but were not necessarily closely coordinated, nor even in agreement with one another, as we see in Example (7.2) from Jabijero and Migero.

7.2.2 Patterns of uptake: responses and continuers

Part of what constituted and sustained the interactional frame of the hunting story was the collaboration among participants in developing, shaping, and extending the narrative thread(s). Typically, as the principal narrator spins out details of his experience, his co-participants contribute certain types of responses and continuers to demonstrate their sustained attention to the topic and the speaker, their acknowledgment of the details of the story, and their recognition of the perspective conveyed

by hunting talk.

Co-participants contributed to the narration of a hunting story, and collaterally, the continuation of strips of hunting talk, by using parallel structures in their responses and continuers. For example, they might repeat words or phases spoken by other participants (as in 7.2.n and o); or they might deploy generic continuers, such as *aryo* 'indeed' or *kantira* 'it was said', repeating the intonation contour just used by the principal narrator. The set of appropriate responses and uptakes from co-participants included not only back-channeling and partial parallelisms, but content-continuous questions and commentary (see 7.1.c), and topical counterpoint (see 7.1.e and g) as well.

7.2.3 Appropriate and preferred interactional frames for hunting talk

In the course of my observations of hunting talk during the period of this study, I observed that hunting talk was used in all kinds of activity frames, provided that an interactional frame was already active. That is to say, I never observed an interaction initiated with a strip of hunting talk; such utterances were always embedded in an already active conversation, and usually in an already unfolding narrative or hunting story. Moreover, although it appeared that hunting talk could be used appropriately while interactional co-participants were engaged in other activities such as cooking or manufacturing, most frequently a strip of hunting talk was a focal activity during its deployment, and other physical activities were suspended during its production. Thus, the appropriateness of hunting talk seemed to depend on the existence of an ongoing interactional frame more than on any other situational factor.

I also observed that hunting talk was more common in certain types of activity frames than others. Hunting talk was most commonly used, not surprisingly, during an unfolding hunting story. Hunting stories, in turn, most often occurred dur-

ing conversations within the activities of intra- and inter-household visiting events in the evenings; and during the early hours of feasts, as part of multi-party *shitatsi* banter (these activity frames are described in Chapter 2). In these activity frames, social interaction was typically the focal activity of all participants and other activities are suspended — with the exception of the intermittent consumption of *oburoki* within the activity frame of feasting and *shitatsi* banter.

7.2.4 Spatiotemporal patterns of hunting talk use

Spatially, hunting stories and hunting talk most commonly took place in the *kosena* ‘cooking hut’. Typically, during visiting and hunting story-telling, people would assume loose, comfortable body postures, sitting on *shitatsi* mats, facing in roughly the same direction as their interlocutors (see Figure 7.5). When hunting talk and hunting stories occurred during *shitatsi* banter, participants sometimes stretched out or lay down in a row on the *shitatsi* mats, their heads oriented in the same direction.

Temporally, hunting stories and hunting talk most commonly took place the evenings, when people were relaxing after the day’s activities; or when men were visiting with one another and recounting the day’s events; or in the early hours of feasting — usually late afternoon and early evening — when people gathered together to drink and interact with one another. Note that neither hunting stories nor hunting talk were limited to these times and places; they were simply most common in these circumstances.

A hunting story told in the evening during visiting hours was usually shorter and less elaborate than the hunting stories told as part of the *shitatsi* banter that takes place during feast gatherings. Within the frame of *shitatsi* banter, numerous hunting stories may be spun, one after or during another, cycled away from and then back to, over the course of an hour or more. These rambling hunting stories introduce a much lower percentage of ‘new’ information to the public domain, and



Figure 7.5: During the period of this study, Nanti individuals often interacted sitting facing in the same direction, and typically engaged in very brief, intermittent periods of eye contact (sharing intersubjective glances, not gazes). This pattern was common whether individuals were interacting in dyads, in triads, or in groups, as shown in this photo of a group of twenty people clustered together during a feast gathering in 2005.

instead often involve recountings, recyclings, and reminiscings of previously shared experiences.

7.2.5 Conventional interpretations of hunting talk

When using hunting talk, I argue that speakers are activating a highly individuated and perspectivized frame of reference relative to the content of their utterances, an interpretive frame that specifically foregrounds their own unique agency in, evaluation of, and affective response to the moment-to-moment turns of events that constituted the hunt. In other words, hunting talk is not simply a report about what happened, but a verbal recreation of the speaker's own unique active role in

or point of view on those happenings.¹² In Nanti society, where speaking is a very consequential form of social action, asserting a highly individualized perspective on the facts of the shared world is *not* something that people do carelessly. The sound characteristics of hunting talk, then, frame a strip of talk as evaluative in a particular conventionalized¹³ way. By using hunting talk, the speaker establishes the special nature of the utterance, categorizes it as a member of a particular type of talk, and activates a specific, historically-precedented, locally-shared interpretive frame. I suggest that by using hunting talk the speaker signals to hearers: ‘You know that I know that I’m foregrounding my own actions here, and I invite you to calibrate your response accordingly.’

7.2.6 Grammatical patterns in hunting talk

Typically, individuals use hunting talk to introduce their unique personal experience of a specific hunting event into the realm of shared knowledge about that event. As exemplified in the following example of hunting talk by Jirero,¹⁴ hunting talk utterances tend to provide a narrative focus, from a first-person point of view, on specific small-scale details of the physical scene and its spatial and temporal arrangement. The repetition and recycling of key elements is common — both by the primary narrator (for example, the element *chojenityo* in (1.a, f, i, and j)) and by addressees.¹⁵ Clauses marked with a first person singular subject (*no-*) (as in 1.b, d, and i); perfective aspect (*-ak*) and realis mode (*-i*) (as in 1.b, d, and j), which refer to specific points of temporal (e.g. *ironpa*, ‘suddenly’) and spatial (e.g. *chojenityo*,

¹²Note here the relevance of the distinction between hunting talk and hunting stories: hunting stories that are told without deploying the sound patterns of hunting talk do *not* necessarily foreground the perspective described here.

¹³By *conventionalized* I mean an arbitrary but durable association between two phenomena based on the sharedness of this association among members of a speech community; see Chapter 3 for further discussion.

¹⁴Sound file unique identifier: 031230L_06_0257_JIR

¹⁵See Chapter 2 for a general discussion of the use of parallelisms in Nanti discourse.

‘really close’) reference on activities (e.g. ‘coming close’, ‘setting the dog straight’, ‘going with the the dog’), and perceptive states (e.g. ‘suddenly, look!’ and reporting internal speech, as in 1.d and i) are very frequent in hunting talk. (Every utterance that Jirero produced in this example manifests the sound characteristics of hunting talk, summarized in Table 7.1 and discussed in detail in §7.3.)

→ *You have five options for listening to examples; which of these options will function will depend on the PDF reader you are using: (1) click the hyperlink below for the embedded file, which may launch the file in your media player; (2) open the embedded file from the list of attachments to the PDF (in Adobe Reader, go to View → Navigation Panels → Attachments); (3) click the URL hyperlink below, which may launch the file in your browser; (4) copy and paste the hyperlink for the URL into your browser, which will play the file through your web browser; or (5) play the MP3 files at:*

<http://www.cabeceras.org/beier2010/beier2010dissertation.htm>

→ Play example from embedded file: beier2010ch7ex1.mp3

→ Play example from:

<http://www.cabeceras.org/beier2010/beier2010ch7ex1.mp3>

(7.1) a. Jirero: Chojenityo matsigenka, inka chojenityo, onpo^ˆke,

chojeni =tyo matsigenka i= N- ka chojeni =tyo
close =AFF person 3mS= IRREAL- say close =AFF
o= N- -pok -e
3nS= IRREAL- -come -IRREAL.I

The people [were] really close, he'll say 'really close, it'll come',

b. nogatinkatakiro ↓ otsiti.

no= o[+voice]- katiNka -t -ak -i =ro otsiti
1S= CAUS:NAGNT- set.straight -EPT -PERF -REAL.I =3nO dog
I set the dog straight.

c. Migero: ↑ Po^ˆgake non^ˆka, tya pogake.

p= og -ak -i no= N- ka tya p= -og -ak
 2S= do -PERF -REAL.I 1s= IRREAL- say INT 2S= do -PERF
 -i
 -REAL.I
you did^ˆ I will [say], what did you do?

d. Jirero: Nogatinkati okiro, nonte^ˆntero, aryo irori non^ˆ,

no= o[+voice]- katiNka -t -i okiro no= N-
 1S= CAUS- set.straight -EPT -REAL.I straight 1S= IRREAL-
teNt -e =ro aryo iro- =ri no=
 accompany -IRREAL.I =3nmO indeed 3nm.PRO =CNTRST 1S=
 N-
 IRREAL-
I set her (the dog) straight, (I said to myself), I'll [go with her], indeed
it's with her I will (go),

e. Migero: ogari ↓ (*unintelligible*) pashi^ˆni,

o- oga =ri pashini,
 3nm- that.one =CNTRST another
that one, another,

f. Jirero: ↑ chojenityo o^ˆ

chojeni =tyo o=
 close -AFF 3nS=
Really close it^ˆ

g. Migero: Ogari.

o- oga =ri
 3nm- that.one =CNTRST
That one.

h. [0.5 second silence.]

i. Jirero: Chojenityo o^ˆ irompa nero maniro, ‘nonte^ˆntero, ari chojeni,’

chojeni =*tyo* *o*= *iroNpa* *nero* *maniro* *no*= N-
close =AFF 3nmS= suddenly look deer 1S= IRREAL-
tent -*e* =*ro* *ari* *chojeni*
accompany IRREAL.I =3NMO indeed close

Really close, suddenly, look, a deer [I said to myself], 'I'll go [with the dog] — indeed it [the deer] is nearby.'

j. *chojeni, iroka inka, 'arika ontentapajero, omponaaga' ↓ ityara iˆ*

chojeni *iro* =*ka* *i*= N- *ka* *arika* *o*=
close 3nm.PRO- =INFR 3mS= IRREAL- say maybe 3nS=
N- *tent* -*apaj* -*e* =*ro* *o*= N-
IRREAL- accompany -ADL IRREAL.I =3NO 3nS= IRREAL-
ponaaga *i-* *tya* =*ra* *i*=
lie.down 3m- when -SUB 3mS=
nearby, he might have said, 'maybe the dog will go with the deer and it will lie down,' when heˆ

k. *Migero:*

↑ *Ari ikanti.*

ari *i*= *kant* -*i*
indeed 3mS= say REAL.I
Indeed (you say) he said.

Clearly, any ‘personal narrative’ by definition foregrounds a ‘personal’ perspective on an event. What is salient here are the *kinds* of details and perspectivization that occur with great frequency in hunting talk. Details of the sensory perceptions of the narrator — sights seen (as in 1.i), sounds heard, and smells smelled; distances between salient subjects and objects (as in 1.a, f, i, and j); and types, trajectories, and speed of movement of subjects and objects (as in 1.a, b, d, i, and j) all tend to be foregrounded in hunting talk, and more so than in other kinds of personal narratives. Moreover, the focus on these details and perspectivizations results in a higher level of speaker commitment to a particular perspective and interpretation than to a collaborative co-construction of a multi-sited perspective on the narrated event.

7.3 The sound patterns of hunting talk

I argue that Nanti hunting talk is recognized and recognizable as a unique way of speaking to the degree that a uniquely identifiable cluster of sound characteristics occur within an utterance. In this section, I will discuss in turn each of the sound characteristics that constitute hunting talk.

As discussed in Chapter 3, it is important to bear in mind throughout this discussion that each of the sound characteristics described below is *optional*, *suprasegmental*, *gradient*, and *relative* in its realization in a given token of speech. First, they are *optional* because they are not required for either a grammatically well-formed or an interactionally minimally-appropriate utterance. In fact, I argue that it is *because* their deployment is optional that they serve to index a particular interactional frame. Second, they are *suprasegmental* because these phenomena occur at distinct levels of organization of language use such that they can always be differentiated from and separated from the required segmental and constituent-level phenomena that constitute the Nanti language as a phonologically and grammatically structured system.¹⁶ Third, they are *gradient* because each of these characteristics may be realized in degrees — each can be described in terms of being ‘more’ or ‘less’ present in the data. Finally, these characteristics are *relative* in their realization because they only constitute meaningful elements in a given utterance as a result of their *relation* to other elements in that utterance and surrounding utterances. Thus, for example, the realization of the vowel /a/ in a strip of hunting talk is salient relative to the speaker’s and hearer’s knowledge of the realizations of /a/ in other situations. Likewise, parallelisms only exist through a relation of similarity between or among sequenced elements.

¹⁶Descriptions and discussions of relevant aspects of Nanti phonology, prosody, and grammar are provided in Chapter 2.

7.3.1 Domains of realization of hunting talk

As discussed in §7.2.3, strips of hunting talk are typically embedded in an already active interactional frame, and most often they are embedded in an already unfolding hunting story. Within any interactional frame, tokens of hunting talk occur at the level of the utterance, which (as discussed in Chapter 4) may or may not be co-extensive with a single turn of talk. In addition, within the utterance, hunting talk is composed of one or more intonation units, each of which is constituted by the co-occurrence of (1) the alteration of unit-internal relative timing and (2) a single cycle of a hunting talk-specific intonation contour. It is typical for a strip of hunting talk to include a series of these intonation units, which gives the sound of hunting talk a cyclical pattern across one or several utterances or turns.

7.3.2 Speaker's pitch range in hunting talk

In producing hunting talk, the speaker uses a much wider range of his total vocal pitch range, and in particular, more often uses the upper end of his pitch range, than he does other ways of speaking, and especially relative to matter-of-fact talk. In my data set, speakers most frequently use the mid-to-high range of their individual pitch range in hunting talk; the mid-to-low range is used less frequently and tends to co-occur with repeated lexical material in multi-turn chains of hunting talk over the course of a developing hunting story.

7.3.3 Characteristic intonation contour of hunting talk

The characteristic intonation contour of hunting talk starts at a high pitch point relative to the speaker's habitual pitch range; followed by a gradated¹⁷ high-to-mid or high-to-low fall on a lengthened syllable; followed by a more step-wise low-to-

¹⁷By 'gradated' I mean a gradual transition from high to low, passing through intermediate pitches, in the production of a single segment.

high or mid-to-high rise on the final syllable or syllables of the intonation unit; back to approximately the starting pitch point (or higher) of the unit. Depending on the number of syllables within the intonation unit, the voice may make the mid-to-high or low-to-high transition progressively over the course of several syllables, or more abruptly over the last one or two syllables. In a many-syllable intonation unit, the medial syllables may have secondary, less steep ascending and descending pitch contours on each foot; if these are present, they are bracketed by the long high-to-mid or high-to-low fall on the lengthened syllable and the short step-wise mid-to-high or low-to-high rise back to the initial pitch point on the shorter final syllables.

This distinctive intonation contour can occur on intonation units of different sizes. The smallest size unit across which it occurs in my data set is a two syllable sequence; in these cases, the falling contour occurs on the lengthened first syllable and the rise occurs on the shorter second syllable. More commonly, the distinctive contour occurs on a three- or four- syllable word, or a sequence of two to four words, and several of these distinctive contours may occur in a row over the course of a single utterance.

7.3.4 Rate of speaking, rhythm, and relative timing in hunting talk

The speaker's overall rate of speaking is often faster in hunting talk than in previous turns or the turn in progress. The overall rate of speaking in a strip of hunting talk, however, is of less importance than the relative timing within the intonation unit. Hunting talk is characterized by a contrast between longer duration at the beginning of the intonation unit and shorter duration at the end of the unit. This effect may be realized in various ways.

The most common means for redistributing time in hunting talk is the lengthening of the first lexically (specified) or metrically (assigned) stressed syllable in the

first foot of the intonation unit. Interestingly, the onset consonant, vowel nucleus, coda consonant, and adjacent onset consonant are all candidates for lengthening. As mentioned above, this lengthening co-occurs with a distinctive intonation contour, and from a functional perspective, the lengthening process seems to be guided by the exigencies of intonation contour rather than the reverse; that is, segments are lengthened as necessary in order to provide an environment for changes in pitch over time.

Another common means for redistributing time in hunting talk is the shortening of the final one or two syllables of the intonation in order to achieve a high level of contrast with the previous lengthened syllable. In this case, the vowel or vowels are short in length, but the onset consonant of the syllable(s) may in fact be lengthened to create the impression of a short nucleus.

Figure 7.2, a screen shot of an image generated by Praat of a token of hunting talk produced by Migero in line (e) of Example (7.3), provides a clear illustration of the co-occurrence of the relative timing and intonation contour typical of hunting talk.

7.3.5 Modifications in voice quality in hunting talk

Hunting talk involves an alteration of the setting of the vocal cords relative to airflow that results in breathy phonation or devoicing. This alteration is usually most apparent on the lengthened syllable of the intonation unit, but it often occurs on the final syllable or syllables of the intonation unit as well; and occasionally on other segments and words in the utterance but outside of the intonation unit described above. In many tokens, I have observed a tension between increased voice volume and voice quality alteration, such that louder segments sound unaltered (or, rarely, creaky) while quieter segments sound breathy or devoiced. In my data set, voice quality alteration is a relatively more isolated phenomenon in hunting talk than

in other ways of speaking; by this I mean that it is much more frequently altered over a small series of syllables or segments than over an entire word or utterance. At the same time, voice quality is altered more often *overall* in hunting talk than it is in any other way of speaking except scolding talk.¹⁸ As discussed in Chapter 2, breathy and creaky phonation are not contrastive at the phonemic level, rendering these voice qualities available for use at the utterance level.

7.3.6 Multi-turn patterning: parallelisms in hunting talk and hunting stories

Part of the distinctive sound pattern of hunting talk is the result of the cyclic repetition of the intonation unit described above. In addition, there is a correlation between repetitions of the intonation unit and repetitions of referential content from earlier in the turn or earlier in the interaction. In hunting talk, we find parallelisms — or principled repetitions — of lexemes and morphemes, phrases, and clauses, by some or all participants even more frequently than we find them in other Nanti ways of speaking. These parallelisms may be deployed within a single strip of hunting talk; may be deployed across a series of utterances by a single speaker; and/or may be deployed by different speakers participating in a single interaction.

As discussed above in §7.2.2, the well-told hunting story involves highly collaborative narration. A substantial portion of this collaboration involves simultaneous talk and back-channeling, both of which usually consist of the repetition and recycling of material by other participants. Over the course of a sustained interaction, then, all participants are repeating key strips of talk content- and form-faithfully. Over the course of their talk, speakers repeat key words and phrases, as well as modified versions of them, as a key strategy in building their verbal text; as a result, both the referential stream and the sound stream are a continuous unfolding

¹⁸These estimations of relative frequency are impressionistic, not statistical.



Figure 7.6: This photo of Jabijero (center) and Migero (right), listening to a recorded interaction with Lev (left), was taken in Montetoni in December 2003.

of old and new, novel and familiar, giving the text both complexity and coherence for speaker and hearer alike.

Speakers use two kinds of parallelisms: grammatical parallelisms and prosodic parallelisms. Grammatical parallelisms entail the repetition of morphological, lexical, phrasal and/or clausal units, while prosodic parallelisms entail the repetition of pitch contours and/or relative timing over an intonation unit.

7.4 Detailed examples of hunting talk

In order to more fully demonstrate the various characteristics of hunting talk described above, this section examines in detail a set of extended examples recorded in Montetoni between 2003 and 2005.

7.4.1 Jabijero's example

This example illustrates the place of hunting talk in the negotiation of perspectives on an intersubjectively-available hunting experience. In this example, recorded on 10 October 2004,¹⁹ a small group (including Jabijero, Migero, Bikotoro, Josukaro, Jabijero's spouses Rerisuja and Márota, Migero's spouse Arísuja, and I) was drinking *oburoki* in Jabijero's *kosena*. The main topic of conversation during the last half-hour of the gathering (right up until the *oburoki* ran out) concerned the recent hunting activities of several members of the gathered group. The group's host, Jabijero, was especially prominent in initiating and sustaining hunting stories during this gathering, and produced numerous turns of hunting talk as he narrated the details of a very recent hunting trip in which a number of those present had co-participated. Migero had been directly involved in a particular episode of Jabijero's narrative — in which both he and Jabijero had pursued a particular bird that they injured but which eventually escaped from them — and thus, at this point in the narrative, the two men were simultaneously contributing their individual perspectives on their interactions with the bird in question.

→ Play example from embedded file: beier2010ch7ex2.mp3

→ Play example from:

<http://www.cabeceras.org/beier2010/beier2010ch7ex2.mp3>

→ Play hunting talk in line (1) from embedded file: beier2010ch7ex2lineL.mp3

→ Play hunting talk in line (1) from:

<http://www.cabeceras.org/beier2010/beier2010ch7ex2lineL.mp3>

(7.2) a. JAB: ^Takont^,

¹⁹Sound file unique identifier: 041010B_MON_hu_88m16s

No= otinka -t -i oka pi= otinka -t -i oka
 1S= strike -EPT -REAL.I this 2S= strike -EPT -REAL.I this
 =ka aka =ka ogijashira.
 =INFR here =INFR up.above

I struck this (gestures to corresponding area on his own body), so perhaps you struck this, here perhaps, up above.

g. JAB: ↑ No=

no=
 1S=
I,

h. JAB: ogijashira, ↓ tera nontinteburo ogijashira.

ogijashira tera no= n- tintebu =ro ogijashira
 up.above NEG 1S= IRREAL- *hit.with.arrow* =3nmO up.above
up above, I did not hit it up above.

i. MIG: ↑ Irori abentara iro,

iro =ri abent -a -ra iro
 3nm.PRO =CNTRST stay.in.place -REAL.A -SUB 3nm.PRO
That's why it stayed, that,

j. JAB: Non[^]ej*i* tujaka n[^], sot[^], ↓ sotog[^], nonej[^]*i*, oga otujaka,

no= nej -i tuj -ak -a sotoga
 1S= see -REAL.I fall.over -PERF -REAL.A come.out.a.hole
no= nej -i o= oga o= tuj -ak -a
 -REAL.A 1S= see -REAL.I 3nm- that.one 3nmS= fall.over -PERF

-REAL.A

I saw (it) fall over, er, (my arrow) came out a hole, I saw, that one, it fell over,

k. MIG: ↑ ogenka pinej[^]*i* tera onije.

ogenka pi= nej -i tera o= nij -e
 right.there 2S= see -REAL.I NEG 3nmS= vocalize -IREAL.I
right there, you know, it didn't make a sound.

⇒ l.²¹ JAB: tera on^ˆije, ↓ noja^ˆti (unintelligible) noneji is^ˆ, maika ↓ noneji oogaji; noka na^ˆro, ↓ ‘kara kurayu nonejira ari, ari ↓ omparige.’

tera o= nij -e no= ja -t -i
 NEG 3nmS= vocalize -IRREAL.I 1S= go -EPT -REAL.I
 (unintelligible) no= nej -i (unintelligible) maika no=
 (unintelligible) 1S= see -REAL.I (unintelligible) point.in.time 1S=
 nej -i oog -aj -i no= ka naro kara kurayu
 see -REAL.I eat -REG -REAL.I 1S= QUOT 1PRO there up.high
 no- nej -i =ra ari ari o= -N parig -e
 1S= see -REAL.I =SUB indeed indeed 3nmS= fall -IRREAL.I
*It didn't vocalize, I went, I saw it (unintelligible), then I saw it eat again;
 I said, 'there up high, I see it, maybe it will fall.'*

m. MIG: Niganki kentiro ↑ niganki kentiro ↑ negiku kentiro oka. ↑ Aka sankari oshintsi oshigaka, sabiku ↓ oka isotog^ˆ.

niganki kent -i =ro niganki
 middle pierce.with.arrow -REAL.I =3nmO middle
 kent -i =ro negi -ku kent
 pierce.with.arrow -REAL.I =3nmO chest -LOC pierce.with.arrow
 -i =ro o- oka aka sankari o=
 -REAL.I =3nmO 3nm- this.one here clear.color 3nmS=
 shintsi -t -i o= shig -ak -a
 be.strong -EPT -REAL.I 3nmS= run.away -PERF -REAL.A
 sabi -ku o- oka i= sotog -i
 underneath -LOC 3nm- this.one 3mS= come.out.a.hole -REAL.I
*Shot in the middle, shot in the middle, shot in its chest here (gestures
 toward the equivalent spot his own body). Here (gestures) in the light it
 got strong and ran away, underneath he (the arrow) came out a hole.*

n. JAB: ↑ Ari jaroka gijaji↓

aryo jaroka o= gij- aj -i
 indeed never 3nmS= ? -REG -REAL.I
 Indeed it will never ? again.

²¹The rapid rate of speaking and dense overlapping of Jabijero's and Migerero's talk at this point made the alignment of lines (l) and (m) in the transcript very difficult; as a result, the arrows are a bit off.

Jirero, about 20, is Migero’s sister’s eldest son; Shanebo, also about 20, is Migero’s spouses’ sister’s son; and Migero, about 50, was also the *peresetente*, or acknowledged political leader, of the village at the time.²⁴ The three men lived in the same residence group (where Lev and I also were residing) and they regularly hunted together. In this conversation, the three of them were swapping details of their individual hunting experiences earlier that day. Lev and I were present, but only as ratified overhearers, not as acknowledged recipients of the three men’s talk.

→ Play example from embedded file: beier2010ch7ex3.mp3

→ Play example from:

<http://www.cabeceras.org/beier2010/beier2010ch7ex3.mp3>

→ Play the token *samaniti* in line (e) from embedded file:

beier2010ch7ex3lineE.mp3

→ Play the token *samaniti* in line (e) from:

<http://www.cabeceras.org/beier2010/beier2010ch7ex3lineE.mp3>

→ Play example of Migero’s matter-of-fact talk (Chapter 5, Example 3, line (1)) from embedded file:

beier2010ch5ex3lineL.mp3

→ Play example of Migero’s matter-of-fact talk (Chapter 5, Example 3, line (1)) from embedded file:

<http://www.cabeceras.org/beier2010/beier2010ch5exlineL.mp3>

(7.3) a. MIG: Inkajara atsi biro ponkujataji,

inkajara atsi biro pi= onkuja -t -aj -i
 right.away so 2PRO 2S= come.around -EPT -REG -REAL.I
So right away (just when) you came around,

²⁴Migero’s sister Amárira is Jirero’s mother. His father Matero died *ca.* 1993. Migero’s spouses Arísuja and Maira are sisters to †Károme, who was mother to Shanebo.

b. yoga oshoritaku, nogushoritari.

i= oga o= shorita -ku no= ogu- shorit
3mS= that 3nmP= hip.area -LOC 1S= *glance.off.of* hip.area
-a =ri
-REAL.A =3mO
there, in the hip area, I got him briefly in the hip.

c. *All three men laugh.*

d. SHA: Tetyara pobo^ˆ↓

tetya -ra pi= obo
yet -SUB 2S= ?
When you hadn't yet^ˆ?

⇒ e. MIG: ↑ Aka, oshoritaku. Samaniti ikemira.

aka o= shorita -ku samaniti i= kem -i -ra
here 3nmP= hip.area -LOC far.off 3mS= hear -REAL.I -SUB
Here, in the hip area. From far off they heard me.

f. Nonontsibitakaro, ainyoni.

no= nontsibi -t -ak -a =ro ainyoni
1S= be.near -EPT -PERF -REAL.A =3nmO nearby
I was close to it, really nearby.

g. Oshyoritaku aka, okantara oka.

o= shorita -ku aka o= kant -a -ra o=
3nmP= hip.area -LOC here 3nmS= do REAL.A -SUB 3nmS=
oka
this
In the hip area here, it got this (part) (gestures to equivalent area on his own body.)

h. (2 seconds silence.)

i. MIG: Ogatyo oga oponaagaka oga nero, Shanebo itsamai^ˆtira.

o= oga =tyo o= oga o= ponaag -ak
 3nmS= that =indeed 3nmS= that 3nmS= lie.down -PERF
-a o= oga nero Shanebo i= tsamai -t
 -REAL.A 3nmS= that look Shanebo 3nmS= work.garden -EPT
-i -ra
 -REAL.I -SUB

So that very one is lying over there, look (gestures in the direction of Shanebo's garden), in Shanebo's garden.

j. \sim Iro kiji ↓ mahabogera.

iro kij -i majabogera
 3nmPRO enter REAL.I brush
It entered into the brush.

k. SHA: ↑ Jeeje.

jeeje
 affirmative
Yes.

In this example, Migero (MIG) is recounting his adventures with a tapir that he grazed with an arrow, while Shanebo (SHA) and Jirero (JIR) are listening attentively to him and back-channeling appropriately. In lines (3.a and b) Migero describes his moment of shooting at the tapir relative to his observations of Shanebo's movements at the same moment. In line (3.c), all three laugh together, which as a turn itself can be interpreted as demonstrating mutual alignment (note that neither of the other men contest Migero's account of events; if they were to do so, this would have been an appropriate moment.) Then in line (3.d) Shanebo begins a statement about Migero's timing that invites Migero to continue recounting his experience. Accepting this invitation, Migero elaborates on his moment with the tapir in lines (3.e, f, and g). After this turn a two-second pause occurs (line 3.h), then Migero again takes the interactional floor and describes the tapir's subsequent action of taking off into the brush at Shanebo's garden (line 3.i). He states (his own inference, I

infer) in line (3.j) that the tapir is lying down in the brush, presumably as a result of its injury from Migeró's arrow. Shanebo expresses his agreement with Migeró's statement in line (3.k), which is both interactionally appropriate and factually significant in as much as Shanebo was also present at the time of the recounted event itself.

Note that at various points in this interaction, either Shanebo or Jirero could have taken the floor, either shifting the focus or topic of conversation, or providing an alternate perspective on the very event recounted by Migeró. They do not do so. It is possible that neither of them has an alternate perspective on this event; it is equally possible that Migeró's deployment of hunting talk conveys to them a high level of commitment on Migeró's part to the account he has provided them of his participation in the hunt and neither chooses to contest Migeró's recounting. Throughout this strip, both Shanebo and Jirero contributed to this interaction in a highly appropriate manner, by laughing in solidarity with Migeró, and by Shanebo contributing turns that either drew out or affirmed Migeró's narrative.

The sound pattern of a token of Migeró's hunting talk is illustrated in Figure 7.7. Figure 7.8 shows a token of Migeró's matter-of-fact talk (from Chapter 5, line (l) of Example 3) for comparative purposes. Both images are screen shots of analyses that I produced with Praat; the pitch contour in Figure 7.7 was produced directly by Praat, while I added the impressionistic intonation contour in Figure 7.8 the Praat image using ZeusDraw. If we compare the pitch peaks and valleys in the two images, we see that Migeró's pitch ranges from 119 Hz to 239 Hz in the matter-of-fact talk example, while it ranges from 230 Hz to 374 Hz in the hunting talk example.

Comparing the contours of shown in the two Figures, we see that in the matter-of-fact talk example (Figure 7.8), the slopes of the three cycles of the intonation contour of Migeró's speech are relatively shallow and most of the token hovers around 146 Hz. In the hunting talk example (Figure 7.7), however, the mode for the




Figure 7.7: Pitch contour (in light blue, produced by Praat) and maximum and minimum pitch points for a strip of Migero's hunting talk.




Figure 7.8: Impressionistic intonation contour (drawn by me) and maximum and minimum pitch points for a strip of Migero's matter-of-fact talk.



Figure 7.9: Aroyo with a big catch of fish, photographed in April 2005, after a collaborative fishing party using *kogi* (barbasco; see Chapter 2).

pitch in the strip of hunting talk is around 244 Hz, and the slopes of the descents and ascents in the two cycles of the intonation contour are much more steep. The first cycle of the contour, over the first two syllables (no.gu), descends from a high of 344 Hz to a low of 230 Hz and then rises up to 374 Hz. Over the next syllable of the token (sho), Migeró's pitch descends again, to a low of 244 Hz, and then finally climbs back up to 354 Hz on the final syllable of the token (ri). Finally, notice the utterance-internal timing of Migeró's hunting talk in Figure 7.7, visibly evident in how much shorter the final three vowels of the token are than the first three vowels.

Migeró's laryngeal tension is noticeably altered throughout the entire example. Perhaps because of his laughter or because of the relatively high volume of his voice, his voice quality is creaky rather than breathy or devoiced in lines (3.a, b, e, and f). His voice volume drops over the course of lines (3.g, i, and j) and his voice

quality becomes breathy on the final syllables of each the final words of these lines — on *oka* in (3.g), on *itsamaitira* in (3.i), and most clearly, on *majabogera* in (3.j).

7.4.3 Aroyo’s example

This third example, a strip of talk from Aroyo, is of special interest because it illustrates the difference between hunting talk as a way of speaking and the interactional frame of a hunting story. In this example, although Aroyo successfully produced several turns of hunting talk while recounting a narrative of his own recent experiences, he did not succeed in drawing any of his interactants into the interactional frame of a hunting story, and as a result, he abandoned his narration.

→ Play example from embedded file: beier2010ch7ex4.mp3

→ Play example from:

<http://www.cabeceras.org/beier2010/beier2010ch7ex4.mp3>

→ Play line (g) of example from embedded file: beier2010ch7ex4lineG.mp3

→ Play line (g) of example from:

<http://www.cabeceras.org/beier2010/beier2010ch7ex4lineG.mp3>

(7.4) a. ARO: Oga, naganaji oga.

o- oga no= ag -an -aj -i o-
 3nm- that.one.ANIM 1S= take -ABL -REG REAL.I 3nm-
oga
 that.one.ANIM

That one, I brought along that one (indicating one of the family’s dogs).

b. Aityo nijatani.

aityo nijatani
 EXIST.INAN stream

There’s a stream (that the dog and I encountered).

c. Tetyaka ojokake nijateni, noketyo samani ‘jojojo’.

tetya =ka o= jok -ak -i nijateni
 not.yet =INFR 3mS= get.in.water -PERF -IRREAL.I stream
 no= ke =tyo samani jojojo
 1S= REP =AFF far.away jojojo
 (Probably) when she (the dog) had not yet gotten in the stream, from far
 off I definitely heard, ‘jojojo’ (onomatopoeia for barking.)

d. Otsiti omarane.

otsiti o- marane
 dog 3m- large.ANIM
 (I heard) a big dog.

e. [3 seconds of silence]

f. Shonkaroka, ipigaati, irogipig[^]aje.

shoNk -a =ro =ka i= pig -aa -t
 turn -EPA =3mO =INFR 3mS= return -TRANLOC.IMPF -EPT
 -i i= r- ogi- pig -aj -e
 -REAL.I 3mS= IRREAL- CAUS- return -RET -IRREAL.I
 I infer that she (the big dog) had turned around, and he (one of the
 men) was coming, (thus) he caused (the dog) to return.

⇒ g. Nokemi (inbreath), “atsi, jatabaati,” ika, “sama[^]ni, noti[^] shintori, ooj,”

no= kem -i (inbreath) atsi ja -t -ab -aa
 1S= hear -REAL.I so go -EPT -TRNS -TRNLOC.IMPF
 -t -i i= ka samani no= oti- shiNtori
 -EPT -REAL.I 3mS= say far.away 1S= ? peccary.species
 ooj
 (admiration)
 I heard (inbreath), “so let’s go,” he said, “it’s far off, I [scared off] that
 peccary ooh,”

h. noke ika, “sama[^]ni, api[^], nijateni apija[^]tira,”

no= ke i= ka samani nijateni apija
 1S= REP 3mS= =QUOT samani stream flow.into.another
 -t -i =ra
 -EPT -REAL.I =SUB
I heard he said, “far off, at the mouth of the stream,”

i. obashi nomonteja[^]

obashi no= montej -a
 therefore 1S= cross.flow -REAL.A
so I crossed over[^]

j. [SER:] Nero, oka.

nero o= oka
 look 3nmS= this.one.INAN
Hey, look at this. (speaking under her breath about her task).

k. [1 second silence]

l. [ARO:] Irorira kemira ikanta kemari, ipi[^], .jjj

Iro= =rira kem -i =ra i= kant -a kemari
 3nmPRO =REL hear -REAL.I =SUB 3mS= do -REAL.A tapir
 i= (unintelligible) (inbreath)
 3mS=
That’s what I heard, it sounded like a tapir, he[^] (inbreath).

m. *(At this point, the women begin speaking among themselves about the task at hand, and Aroyo stops talking.)*

I recorded Aroyo (ARO) on March 26, 2005 while I was visiting the *kosena* shared by Barentín and Arán and their families.²⁵ At the time, Serina (SER)²⁶ and several other women were cooking yuca for *oburoki* for a feast. In response to a question from Serina, Aroyo, a young man then about 16 years old, began

²⁵Sound file unique identifier: 050326CG1.0304.008

²⁶Serina, about 43 at the time, was the only wife of Arán, who is the brother of Aroyo’s father, Barentín.

telling Serina (his father's brother's wife) about an outing that many men from their residence group had made to *Seraato*.²⁷

In this example, Aroyo recounted that he had left the village, accompanied by one of the family's dogs (line 4.a), to follow the group of men toward the *Seraato*. As he and his dog approached a small stream (4.b) — and, he said, presumably before his dog entered the stream (4.c) — he heard another larger dog barking in the distance (4.d). He then said that he inferred that the larger dog had turned around and come back toward him (4.f), in order to drive the peccary back toward the men. He then heard a man's voice calling out to the others to double back (4.g), because he had startled a peccary and it had fled far away toward the mouth of the stream (4.h) — near where Aroyo himself was. Aroyo seized this opportunity to participate in the hunt, recounting, 'so I crossed over (the stream)...' (4.i). By this point in his narrative, however, the women had begun to converse among themselves (4.j and m) and Aroyo finally stopped talking. Note that Aroyo initiated his narrative of this event three times, in spite of the fact that no one was responding to him at all, much less with the kind of back-channeling appropriate to hunting talk. It was only when the women actively began a parallel interaction that he gave up on telling his narrative.

Aroyo's turns in lines (4.f through i) are unambiguously hunting talk. Over the course of these turns, the pitch of Aroyo's voice ranges widely, up to the uppermost reaches of his total range, reaching about 400 Hz on the two tokens of *ika* in lines (4.g and h). Across lines (4.g, h, and i) he produces a full nine cycles of the characteristic intonation contour of hunting talk, producing intonation units as short as two syllables on the tokens of *sama* in lines (4.g and h). The characteristic utterance-internal timing of hunting talk is most obvious in the quoted material in lines (4.g and h), where he lengthens a syllable simultaneous with producing a

²⁷*Seraato* is the Nanti name for the Manu Chico River, which lies to the east of the Camisea River.

descent in pitch across a stressed vowel. Note that by using hunting talk for this quoted material he may be quoting the original speaker form-faithfully, emphasizing his own perspective on what he heard the original speaker say, or both; in any case, Aroyo frames this strip of talk as highly perspectivized through his use of highly prototypical hunting talk.

Aroyo begins to alter his laryngeal tension in line (4.c), producing breathy vowels on the onomatopoetic form *jojoho* at the end of line (4.c); and on the last three syllables of *omarane* at the end of line (4.d). He produces slightly breathy vowels in the sequence *ipigaati irogipig^h* in line (4.f), followed by a strongly breathy inbreath right after the word *nokemi* in line (4.g). Then in lines (4.g and h), Aroyo switches narrative voice and quotes another hunter; in doing so (presumably as part of quoting the other man form-faithfully), he increases his voice volume and produces no breathy or voiceless segments. When he returns to his own narrative voice in line (4.l), however, he produces slightly breathy vowels in the sequence *kemira ikanta kemari*.

7.4.4 Maira's example

This example demonstrates the use of hunting talk by a woman, Maira, in her description of the outcome of successful fishing outing made by Jerónima, a man from a neighboring residence group.

→ Play example from embedded file: [beier2010ch7ex5.mp3](#)

→ Play example from:

<http://www.cabeceras.org/beier2010/beier2010ch7ex5.mp3>

→ Play line (1) of example from embedded file: [beier2010ch7ex5lineL.mp3](#)

→ Play line (1) example from:

<http://www.cabeceras.org/beier2010/beier2010ch7ex5lineL.mp3>

- (7.5) a. MAI (to Marijana:) Tyani yoga? (to child:) Taje. (to Marijana:)

Tyani?

tyani *i-* *oga* *taje* *tyani*
INTER.ANIM 3m- this.one.ANIM come.here INTER.ANIM

(to Marijana:) Who's this (you're referring to)? (to child:) Come here.
(to Marijana:) Who?

- b. MRN: Yoga guta[^]

i- *oga* *(unintelligible)*

3m- that.one

This guy, (unintelligible).

- c. MAI: Tyani, tsini, tsini? jaj?

tyani *tsini* *tsini* *jaj*
INTER.ANIM WHO.DEF WHO.DEF huh?

Who, which person, which person, huh? (Because of the surrounding noise, Maira either cannot hear or understand Marijana's words.)

- d. MRN: Jerónima.

Jerónima.

personal.name

Jerónima.

- e. MAI: Tsini?

tsini

WHO.DEF

Who exactly? (Because of the surrounding noise, Maira either cannot hear or understand Marijana's words.)

- f. SOP: Jerónima.

(Sopija, who is sitting nearer to Maira than Marijana is, relays the message.)

- g. MAI (to child:) Taje. (to Marijana:) Nonejajiri maika. (1.2s)

Noguntuti maika.

taje *no= nej -aj -i =ri maika no=*
 come.here 1S= see -REG -REAL.I =3mO point.in.time no=
guNt -ut -i maika
 glimpse -RET -REAL.I point.in.time
(to child:) Come here. (to Marijana:) I saw him again at the time. I
got a glimpse at the time.

- h. Arisa^{no} oka, tya oka^{nti}, okantira, ‘jajiganaji.’ (2.8s) Noguntuti maika.

arisano o= ka tya o= kant -i o=
 indeed 3nmS= QUOT INTER 3nmS= say -REAL.I 3nmS=
kant -i =ra ja -jig -an -aj -i no= guNt
 say -REAL.I =SUB go -PL -ABL -REG -REAL.I 1S= glimpse
-ut -i maika
 -RET -REAL.I point.in.time
Indeed, she said, what did she say? Her words were, ‘they have gone
off.’ I got a glimpse at the time.

- i. Nokoba^{gira} oga maika nogu^{ntuti}; abenta^{ka}; yotamejati.

no= kobag -i =ra o- oga maika
 1S= hand.gather -REAL.I =SUB 3nm- this.one.INAN point.in.time
no= guNt -ut -i abent -ak -a
 1S= glimpse -RET -REAL.I for.river.to.stay.high -PERF -REAL.A
i= otameja -t -i
 3mS= seal.a.dam -EPT -REAL.I
While I was hand-gathering those (jétari fish) then I got a glimpse; the
river had stayed high (because) he sealed a dam.

- j. MRN: Pikobagira?

pi= kobag -i =ra
 2S= hand.gather -REAL.I =SUB
While you were hand-gathering (jétari)?

- k. MAI: Nokobagira. Ma. Onti inkajara tetyara onx^{ute}, tet^{yara}, arisano ogoanka, yotamejati.

no= kobag -i =ra ma onti inkajara tetya
 1S= hand.gather -REAL.I -SUB none PRED.FOC before not.yet

=ra o= n- kut -e tetya =ra
 -SUB 3mS= IRREAL- become.day -IRREAL.I not.yet =SUB
 arisano ogoganka i= otameja -t -i
 indeed over.there 3mS= seal.a.dam -EPT -REAL.I

While I was hand-gathering (jétari). (I got) none. It's that before when it was not yet day, not yet, indeed over there he sealed a dam.

⇒ l. MAI: (inbreath) Arisano aka jétari.

arisano aka jétari
 indeed here jétari.fish

Indeed, (up to) here (she gestures the size of a pile on the ground) jétari.

m. Pineji yoga yagase^{ti} ikoba^{gira}.

pi= nej -i i- oga i= aga -se -t
 2S= see -REAL.I 3m- this.one.ANIM 3mS= get -CL:MASS -EPT
 -i i= kobag -i =ra
 -REAL.I 3mS= hand.gather -REAL.I =SUB

You see, that one, he got a mass of fish while he hand-gathered.

n. Ari nonejapaji yoga yoga notineri. (1.3s) ↓Yaga^{ti}

ari no= nej -apaj -i i- oga i-
 indeed 1S= see -ADL -REAL.I 3m- this.one.ANIM 3m-
 oga no- tineri i= aga -t -i
 this.one.ANIM 1P- son.in.law 3mS= get -EPT -REAL.I

Indeed, I saw upon arriving, this one, this one, my son-in-law, he got (lots of jétari).

o. CMB: ↑ Arisano, ari.

arisano
 indeed
Indeed, really.

p. MAI: Arisano, yagase^{ti}. Iko^{bagi} maika aikiro noneji yaga^{ti} jétari aikiro.

arisano *i=* *aga* *-se* *-t* *-i* *i=kobag* *-i*
indeed 3mS= get -CL:MASS -EPT -REAL.I 3mS= hand.gather
maika *aikiro* *no=* *nej* *-i* *i=* *aga* *-t* *-i*
-REAL.I point.in.time also 1S= see -REAL.I 3mS= get -EPT
jétari *aikiro*
-REAL.I *jétari.fish* also
Indeed, he got a bunch (of jétari) at the time also. I saw he (my son-in-law) got jétari too.

This example²⁸ is from a recording that I made at about 4pm on April 21, 2005, at a feast gathering in Pasotoro's, Mecha's, and Jeba's *kosena*.²⁹ Mecha was serving a relatively small batch of *oburoki* (2 small pots and 2 large pots) to a relatively small group. Jeba was out of the village, at Seraato with her brothers.

This strip began just after Marijana (MRN), one visitor, asked Maira (MAI), another visitor, if she had seen Jerónima earlier.³⁰ Maira apparently did not understand about whom Marijana was asking, so she asked for clarification until she understood (lines 5.a, c, and e). Once Maira understood who Marijana was asking about, she provided relevant information about what she observed of Jerónima's activities earlier that day.

Maira lived in a residence group a short distance upriver of the residence group that Jerónima lived in. Apparently, Maira had gone out to hand-gather *jétari* fish (line 5.i) and while she was at the river, she glimpsed Jerónima (lines 5.g and h) hand-gathering fish near a dam that (I infer) he had constructed (lines i and k). While Maira had no success gathering *jétari*, (line 5.k), Jerónima and her son-in-law (line 5.n) gathered an impressive quantity of fish (lines 5.l, m, and n).

²⁸Sound file unique identifier: 050421.CG2.01.03.MAI

²⁹Pasotoro, male, about 33 at the time, had two spouses, Mecha, about 33 at the time, and Jeba, about 34 at the time. Mecha and Jeba are not sisters and do not seem to have a close relationship.

³⁰Marijana was one of Ijonira's two spouses; the other was Sopiya (SOP). Marijana and Sopiya are not sisters but got along well. Maira was one of Migero's two spouses; the other was Aríjuja. Maira and Aríjuja are sisters and had a close relationship. Jerónima was Maira's first spouse, but after they split, Maira became Migero's second spouse. Migero had had a second spouse, Anita, but they split, after which Anita became Jerónima's only spouse.

Dams such the one mentioned by Maira in (lines 5.i and k) were constructed of large rocks and large leaves in an already-shallow section of the river, and they had the effect of creating very shallow water right below them, which made hand-gathering *jétari* from the river bottom a much easier task; see Chapter 3 for further information and a photograph. It is possible to infer from Maira's account that she herself had also been hand-gathering fish at the time (line 5.i), but had been doing so upriver of the dam, and therefore the water was higher where she was; it is to this what she attributed her lack of success (line 5.k), which she contrasted with the success of Jerónima and her son-in-law, who were hand-gathering below the dam.

This strip of talk is 52 seconds long. In the first eleven lines (5.a to k) of this example, Maira, Marijana, and Sopiya all spoke to one another in matter-of-fact talk, as they first (lines 5.a to f) accomplished the communicative task of mutually oriented to the same topic of conversation, Jerónima; and then (lines 5.g to k) as Maira reported to Marijana, Sopiya, and any others who were listening (including me) what she had seen earlier that day. After she had described the scene, she switched to hunting talk, (beginning at the end of line 5.k) to describe her perspective on the quantity of *jétari* that she saw Jerónima and her son-in-law to have gathered. Note that the first full line (5.l) in which she used hunting talk conveyed little referential information; the utterance includes an interjection, a single noun and no verb, and she used a gesture to indicate the physical quantity of *jétari*. After this line, Maira continued using hunting talk (lines 5.m, n, and p) as she recycled and slightly elaborated on her observations of the two men.

Figure 7.10 illustrates an image of line (l) of Example 5, Maira's most prototypical utterance of hunting talk. In this screen shot of an image produced by Praat, the utterance-internal relative timing is clearly illustrated: notice the relative lengths of the first four segments (a.ri.s) compared to the final three segments (a.no) of *arisano*; the first two segments (a.k) compared to the final segment (a) of *aka*; and




Figure 7.10: Pitch contour (in light blue) and relative timing of Maira’s hunting talk utterance, line (1) of Example (7.5).

the first three segments (je.t) compared to the last three segments (a.ri) of *jetari*. Although the pitch contour identified by Praat is erratic as a result of the presence of background noise, the descents simultaneous with lengthened segments and the ascents simultaneous with shortened segments are clearly visible in this image.

7.4.5 Concluding remarks

Through hunting talk and hunting stories, Nanti individuals shared information about their activities and their environment, adding to the pool of knowledge that community members shared with one another, both about each other and about their surroundings. At the same time, these stories constituted a socially-appropriate frame in which individuals would foreground their own experiences, hunting prowess, near misses, and concrete successes against the background of shared village life. Hunting talk provided an acceptable social framework for heavily perspectivizing

narrations, and for providing an individuated explanation for (sometimes intersubjectively available) events, constituting a crucial point of intersection for shared and individualized knowledge and experience. Hunting stories provided a recognized interactional frame in which individuals could involve others, through collaborative tellings, in what may have originated as a solitary and individualized activity, while accommodating overtly individualized perspectives through the use of a way of speaking dedicated to that very communicative purpose.

Chapter 8

Conclusion

On the first page of this study, I stated that a *way of speaking* is a recurrent, conventionalized, socially meaningful sound pattern manifest at the level of the utterance, and throughout the dissertation I strove to substantiate this statement in all its parts, specifically as it pertains to the language use practices of the Nanti speech community of Montetoni between 1999 and 2009. My principal strategy was to examine each part of this statement on its own terms while *also* maintaining a focus on the organization, or systematicity, of the relations among those parts. I implemented this strategy by approaching the phenomenon of ways of speaking with a progressively narrower focus, moving from broader and more conceptual perspectives, in Chapters 2, 3, and 4, to a more data-driven perspective, centering on a set of recorded examples from three particular Nanti ways of speaking, in Chapters 5, 6, and 7. It is my hope that the dissertation has paralleled my more general analytical process by both disaggregating and reaggregating various parts of the whole phenomenon in question.

In this study, I claimed that ways of speaking are an indispensable part of the social life and communicative system of the speech community of Montetoni. In order to support this claim, I provided multi-faceted descriptions of the social

and linguistic environment in which language use practices in general, and ways of speaking in particular, took place during the period of this study. In both Chapters 1 and 2, I discussed how ways of speaking were implicated in my own language socialization into that speech community, within the frame of my longterm relationship with the community as ally and advocate, as well as researcher. More importantly, in Chapter 2 I described various aspects of Nanti lifeways, history, society, and culture, as well as fundamental characteristics of the Nanti language, from which Nanti language use practices emerged on a day-to-day basis.

In order to establish a solid foundation for the description of the sound patterns and the social significance of a specific set of historically-situated Nanti ways of speaking, I chose to explore in detail the conceptual and analytical frameworks on which those descriptions depend, rather than relying on my own (or the reader's) unexamined assumptions about those frameworks. Chapters 3 and 4 were dedicated to this exploration, in order that the reader have a clear understanding of the specific assumptions underlying the descriptions and analyses in the subsequent three chapters. In particular, I laid out in detail the concepts of frames and framing (grounded in the work of Bateson and Goffman) and the framework of type/token relations that are fundamental to my subsequent descriptions of the use of ways of speaking in the speech community of Montetoni.

After establishing both the ethnographic and analytical frameworks for the study itself, I then turned to a close description and analysis of three particular Nanti ways of speaking — *matter-of-fact talk*, *scolding talk*, and *hunting talk* — dedicating a chapter to each one. In each of these chapters, I used ethnographic description, sequentially-anchored transcripts, sound analyses, and visual representations to illustrate both the form and the social meaning of a series of naturally occurring interactions, which I recorded in Montetoni during the period of this study.

In order to disaggregate the various parts of the phenomenon of Nanti ways

of speaking, I focused on the *utterance* — defined as a strip of talk consisting of a single continuous sound form produced by a single speaker — as the fundamental unit of analysis for this study. In Chapters 3 and 4, I examined the relation of the utterance as an analytical unit to four other analytical units onto which the (type) utterance maps — the sound form, the sentence, the turn, and the move. This analytical approach enabled me to address these four aspects individually, without conflating them, as I analyzed specific examples in Chapters 5, 6, and 7.

In this study, I also claimed that all Nanti utterances manifested sound patterns that were not distinctive in terms of the phonology of the language, but were interpretable as *ways of speaking* — defined here as an utterance-level sound pattern that is made up of a set, or cluster, of distinct sound characteristics. The sound characteristics that I examined for each Nanti way of speaking include speaker’s pitch range, rate of speaking, voice volume, and voice qualities; together with the rhythm, relative timing, and intonation contours manifest in a particular utterance token. Ways of speaking, I argued, expressed *social* meaning in interpersonal interaction, and constituted a conventionalized means for participants to express, assess, and interpret ‘speaker orientation’ in real-time, sequenced turns of talk.

In order to support these claims, I provided a brief description of the phonology of the Nanti language in Chapter 2, complemented by a variety of data examples, in chapters 5, 6, and 7, that illustrated (a) the unique clusters of sound properties that characterize matter-of-fact talk, scolding talk, and hunting talk, respectively, and (b) the distinct types of interpretation that accompanied the utterance-level sound patterns characteristic of these distinct ways of speaking. I concluded that ways of speaking express speaker orientation principally based on the different types of uptake that participants produced in response to these distinct Nanti ways of speaking.

In Chapters 1 and 3, I claimed that the sound patterns of Nanti ways of

speaking are crucial to successful utterance interpretation. In order to demonstrate the interpretability of the sound patterns of ways of speaking, I presented my understanding of how utterances are made meaningful by individual participants in interaction, through processes of interpretation that emerge from real-time turn sequences. I discussed how turn sequences and ways of speaking together serve to establish, maintain, and maximize joint attention to particular aspects of an unfolding interaction. I articulated my perspective on the ways in which aspects of meaning-making and interpretation are fundamentally social in nature, by focusing on the *relational* aspects of interaction — including both interpersonal relations, and the relations of interaction participants to the specific situation in which an interaction is unfolding.

I explored the relations among participants, interactions, situations of interaction, and the utterances that link them all, attending to both (1) the individual-level cognitive (subjective) facets of interpersonal communication and (2) the necessarily intersubjective environment in which communication takes place. In examining aspects of the interpretive processes that individual participants brought to real-time interactions, I demonstrated some of the links between individual-level interpretations on the one hand, and the collaborative, sequentially-organized process of building joint attention, intersubjectivity, and shared understandings on the other hand. I also argued that *because* the function of language is the coordination of individual action, participants in interaction attend to and assess one another's relative orientations as the interaction unfolds, which means that, invisible though it may seem at times, 'speaker orientation' is an indelible part of the social meaning of an utterance that is expressed via ways of speaking.

I explored the ways in which the different ways of speaking I observed in use in Montetoni were meaningful in relation to one another, particularly by adopting an 'ecological' perspective toward the communicative system in Montetoni. Using both

‘thick’ ethnographic description and historically-situated, sequential transcripts, I showed how discrete moments of communicative interaction are associated with one another, as well as how they contrast with one another, in the unfolding processes of meaning-making, interpretation, and intersubjective coordination among individual interactants across time; I referred to this phenomenon as Montetoni’s ‘discursive ecology’.

Within Montetoni’s discursive ecology, I focused most closely on the relationships among matter-of-fact talk, scolding talk, and hunting talk. In Chapter 5, I described matter-of-fact talk as the least formally elaborated Nanti way of speaking and I identified matter-of-fact talk as the formally unmarked way of speaking in Montetoni during the period of study. At the same time, I argued that because speaker orientation is a necessary component of any utterance, all ways of speaking are equally salient, and therefore equally ‘marked’ in this sense. In Chapters 6 and 7, I described the clusters of sound characteristics — including breathy voice, creaky voice, nasalization, altered voice volume, altered rate and rhythm of speaking, and alterations of pitch range and intonation contours — that typically occur in scolding talk and/or hunting but do not typically occur in matter-of-fact talk; and I described how the use of these clusters of characteristics foregrounded particular types of speaker orientation in each way of speaking.

I concluded that while matter-of-fact talk proffered a highly intersubjectively available orientation toward the topic of talk, scolding talk expressed the speaker’s disapproval regarding some aspect of the focal addressee’s behavior, and hunting talk expressed the speaker’s individualized commitment to the perspective associated with the content of the utterance. I also concluded that the realization of Nanti ways of speaking is a gradient phenomenon, such that every utterance is more or less like every possible way of speaking, and therefore, speaker orientation is expressed and evaluated relatively, rather than absolutely, on a case by case basis. These

conclusions taken together account for both the conventionality of ways of speaking as a communicative practice, and the unique communicative force of each token utterance relative to its particular speaker and situation of origin.

8.1 Theoretical contributions

This study demonstrates *how* the extra-phonological sound patterns of language in use — that is, sound properties that are phonemically non-contrastive in Nanti, such as creaky voice, intonation contour, and pitch change — are systematic, meaning-bearing, and crucial to appropriate utterance interpretation in a particular time period in a particular speech community. This result is based on the recurring correspondences that I identified, between certain types of utterance-level sound properties and certain types of uptake and interpretation, which were manifest in turn sequences in specific recorded interactions.

In addition, I have shown that Nanti ways of speaking constitute a durable level of organization of language in use. By this I mean that there was a relatively stable and durable set of ways of speaking that Nanti speakers drew on in their communicative practices in order to express certain types of meaning in their utterances. This set of ways of speaking was a set of orderly yet flexible resources (in the way that, for example, the phonology and the lexicon are orderly yet flexible) for expressing conventionalized associations between sound forms and specific types of speaker orientation. Like phonology, ways of speaking rely on relations of contrast among different combinable characteristics; but unlike phonology, ways of speaking are a gradient phenomenon — that is, the degree of realization of characteristics is significant (or signifies) in itself. As a result, every token utterance expresses the category ‘speaker orientation’, but *how* this category is expressed and *how* it is interpreted can only be discovered by examining the utterance in relation to its own situation of origin.

The aspect of this study that perhaps will most benefit subsequent scholarship is the close relationship it reveals between (a) certain describable ‘extra-phonological’ patterns manifest in utterances, and (b) the recognizability and interpretability of those patterns *independent of* the referential content of those utterances.

8.2 Methodological considerations

Throughout this document, I strove to render transparent the processes through which I arrived at the analyses and generalizations I presented in it. I chose to prioritize clarity over density in my prose, knowing that readers of this study come from different intellectual and disciplinary frames of reference. In Chapter 3, I articulated a set of sixty assumptions (axioms, premises, and presuppositions) that underlie this study, because I feel that such fundamentals, when not made explicit, can lead to unnecessary confusion and/or disagreement among individual researchers who are striving to answer the same kinds of questions. Stating this set of assumptions, in addition, resulted in a greater degree self-consistency within this study. Looking forward toward future work, this formulation of the set of concepts underlying a study of this type provides a solid point of departure for further improvement, refinement, and critique of this very set of assumptions; by stating them explicitly, I have made it possible to pinpoint misperceptions, inconsistencies, errors, and the like, the correction of which will strengthen both the foundations and the outcomes of similar studies in the future.

The primary motivation for adopting such an authorial stance was to meet one of my stated goals for this study: “to lay out a set of analytical strategies by which ways of speaking can be described in other speech communities” (p. 5). As I have also stated, in the course of completing this study, I drew upon both theoretical insights and methodological strategies that are rooted in a number of

different traditions, and I hope that my efforts to achieve a degree of intellectual alignment and synthesis among these resources will serve other researchers in their own future projects. In a similar spirit, I myself now realize a number of ways in which the work presented here can be improved upon,¹ and I hope that I am not the only person to attempt those improvements in the future.

An important facet of my argument in this study foregrounded *how* one looks at naturally occurring language use data. In particular, my analysis of Nanti ways of speaking emerged from the process of mapping between (1) sound patterns in linguistic forms and (2) patterns of uptake and interpretation in sequenced face-to-face interactions. Rather than only looking at language use data one utterance at a time, or only making broad generalizations regarding linguistic form, linguistic meaning, and social meaning, I took a detailed look at sequences of utterances in and across real-time interactions, in order to build up evidence regarding how intersubjectivity and shared understandings emerge from interactions, rather than assuming that meaning either inheres in solely the utterance, or is the sole ‘property’ of any particular participant in interaction. In this study, I put to use the insights and methods of Conversation Analysis, and pushed them farther than usual, in order to describe and explain historically grounded and socioculturally situated multi-party interactions over a ten-year period in a specific speech community.

8.3 Ethical considerations

As I discussed at length throughout this dissertation, my research on Nanti ways of speaking was carried out within the context of my long-term commitment to the health and well-being of the Nanti people; and my desire to understand the complexities of meaning-making in language use was fundamentally grounded in

¹This is especially the case in the realm of the analysis of sound properties themselves; I am very grateful to Megan Crowhurst for her detailed suggestions for how to improve my work in the future.

the practical need to communicate effectively and appropriately within the context of that long-term relationship.

Carrying out research within such a context is certainly a methodological strategy, in terms of allowing the researcher to achieve a greater depth of understanding over time, but it is also an ethical decision that I hope to promote by example. At least in Amazonia, many outsider-researchers have earned the reputation of taking without giving, and research projects designed with only the researcher's short-term interests in mind are at best benign, at worst exploitive and destructive to everyone else involved. It is my hope that at least some aspects of this study will serve as a guide for others, as they develop sensitive and mutually-beneficial research projects based on sincere and realistic commitments to the well-being of the participating speech community.

From another perspective, in writing this dissertation, I have always imagined some future moment when a Nanti individual has the opportunity to read it. The purpose of this exercise has been to imagine how a Nanti person might react to the observations, representations, claims, and generalizations I have provided here, and this exercise has been very successful in keeping sensitive information and insensitive portrayals out of these pages. I have attempted to show respect and love for the Nanti people who are represented in these pages, and if I have failed in any way, I apologize. In my view, it is too easy, in academic writing, to dehumanize, homogenize, and otherwise unfairly diminish the people who have given life to social science research, and I have struggled to work against that tendency.

It is for this reason that I carefully situated this study in a specific timeframe (1999 to 2009) and wrote this dissertation using verbs in the past tense when making generalizations about Nanti lifeways and behavior. That is, I chose to narrate this study as part of a 'historical past' rather than an 'ethnographic present'. I feel strongly that I owe my Nanti friends and collaborators the highest degree of

intersubjectivity in my writing that I can muster, and that I can only speak with authority about what I myself have seen or heard.² Most importantly — and despite my strong interest in the role of expectations regarding the future in interpersonal communication — I strove to avoid making either assertions or assumptions about how Nanti individuals will behave in the future, and instead characterize the patterns that I, and many other Nanti individuals, have made use of in our shared interactions prior to the present moment.

8.4 Looking forward toward future research

Perhaps the most fruitful line of inquiry to emerge from this study concerns the typological implications for future work in the documentation and description of language use practices in other speech communities. By examining my data in terms of token/type relations, I have clarified the types of sound patterns, as well as the types of social meanings, that are manifest in my data set, laying the groundwork for others to seek out those type-level categories in other data sets. In addition, the characteristic sound patterns that I have identified for a set of Nanti ways of speaking provide a point of departure for the analysis of the sound properties of other sets of language use data.

I propose that by investigating the correlations between (1) phonemically non-contrastive, utterance-level sound properties manifest in tokens of recorded naturally-occurring discourse and (2) recurrent patterns of uptake and interpretation in sequenced interactions over time within a bounded speech community, students of language in use will discover important aspects of *social* meaning, and primary among these, locally-salient conventions for the expression and interpretation of locally-defined types of speaker orientation.

²It merits mention that my awareness of the importance of careful evidential and epistemic practice in language use has been forever altered by my participation in the Nanti discursive ecology.

As I have stated elsewhere in this study, I assume that any comparison among (or within) languages is only possible because of a pre-existing assumption of functional equivalence. Therefore, even if a linguistic theoretical or typological discussion is entirely free of reference to ‘communicative function’, the underlying assumption that forms have functional equivalence is indispensable. This assumption allows for the observation of various *types* of outcomes in communicative interactions which can subsequently be evaluated in terms of non-arbitrary correlations and co-occurrences of other phenomena, such as sound patterns, shared interpretations, and social meanings.

To offer a specific example, I reached the conclusion that all speech communities will have the functional equivalent of what I called *matter-of-fact talk* in this study. This amounts to a proposal that other investigators, studying other speech communities, will be able identify and describe a distinctive conventionalized sound pattern that consistently and systematically conveys a relatively neutral, or non-evaluative, speaker orientation (that is, relative to other locally conventionalized speaker orientations), and that this sound pattern will contrast (socially) meaningfully with other conventionalized sound patterns that convey other speaker orientations. Note have not made any specific proposals regarding the actual form or characteristics that these sound patterns will manifest. However, I do hypothesize that the sound pattern that expresses the equivalent of *matter-of-fact talk* will be formally unmarked — or, least formally elaborated — relative to other locally instantiated possibilities.

On a final typological note, it merits mention that this study had the advantage of working with data from a small, relatively autonomous, face-to-face speech community. Each of these factors helped to reduce the degree of variation and rate of change of language use practices by individual community members. I intuit that the type of study presented in this dissertation will be more easily replicable in other

small face-to-face communities of practice than it will be in large-scale communities with highly fluid membership.

8.5 Last remarks

I conclude this study firmly convinced on two points. First, I am convinced that ways of speaking were an important level of organization for language use in the speech community of Montetoni during the period of this study, and moreover — though their specific forms will change, as does all of language — I am sure that the phenomenon of ways of speaking is a stable, durable part of the Nanti communicative system.

Second, I am also convinced that ways of speaking are a cross-linguistically viable level of organization for language use more generally. The relations between sound form and social function that I observed in Montetoni reveal an interesting form/function correlation that awaits discovery and description in other speech communities. Informally, I have already begun to discover the social lives of various sound patterns in the other speech communities of which I am a member. I will go just one step further on this point. I assert that, in as much as ways of speaking are ‘signifying sound patterns’, the work of identifying and describing ways of speaking can best be done within the framework linguistic description, not outside of it (as the situation stands at the time of writing).

I aver that if we don’t understand the phenomenon of Nanti ways of speaking, then we can’t really understand either Nanti communication or Nanti social relationships. Ways of speaking — sound patterns with a social life — are, without a doubt, an important part of the ‘total linguistic fact’, and to ignore their systematicity is to ignore a crucial aspect of the meaning-making capacities of language.

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Vita

Christine Marie Beier was born in Hammond, Indiana on September 1, 1966, the daughter of Margaret Minogue Beier (now Heyl) and †William Earl Beier. She graduated from Glenbard South High School in Glen Ellyn, Illinois, in May 1984 and received the Bachelor of Arts in English Literature from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign in December 1987. In May 1989, she completed one year of study toward the Master of Arts in English Literature at the University of Washington in Seattle. Between 1989 and 1995, she focused on a commitment to social justice issues, working and volunteering in the non-profit sector in Seattle, Washington and Portland, Oregon. In 1996, she moved to Austin, Texas and, with her partner Lev Michael, founded Cabeceras Aid Project, a (501)(c)(3) organization whose purpose is to assist small indigenous communities in the Amazon Basin in maintaining and improving their well-being in the face of rapid social change. Since 1997, Beier has spent part of every year doing humanitarian work and research in Peruvian Amazonia. In September 1999, she entered the Graduate School at the University of Texas at Austin, in the Linguistic Anthropology Program. In August 2008, Beier moved to the Bay Area in California.

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